

VEDĀNTA EXPLAINED

Śaṅkara's commentary

on

The Brahma-sūtras

[Vol.—One]

by

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With a foreword by

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To

My Spiritual Teacher

F. H. Date

PREFACE

Śri Śaṅkarācārya has hitherto been shown as a great idealist and mystic; but this expository treatment of his greatest work, viz his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra*, which I am presenting in two volumes, aims at pointing out in addition the ethical-spiritual standpoint of his philosophy. It is not the mere intellectual understanding of the reality, but the moral and the spiritual awakening of man which is, according to Śaṅkara, responsible for the realization of the *Atman* in this very life. If this be the truth, a new light will be flashed upon the philosophy of the great Ācārya. He will be seen to have built upon the foundations of renunciation and asceticism a new but an over-arching structure of moral and spiritual equality of all men before God and their identity in Him.

To achieve this purpose, a more literal translation of his *Śhloka*, as a Socratist or a grammarian would like to have it, will not do. On the contrary, a free rendering in simple and philosophical language is desirable. I have remained absolutely faithful to Śaṅkara, though I have added a few lines here and there to bring out explicitly what is usually implicit in the commentary, my aim being to preserve the unity of ideas rather than that of mere words. I have tried to see that the ideas are connected logically, and that the arguments of *Pāra-śakya* and the *Yodhātā* develop in a natural manner. In other words, my aim has been to see that the entire book reads as a connected whole, as though it had been originally written in English. I believe that a readable account of the metaphysical position of Śaṅkara, as gathered from his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra*,

will go a long way to understand his theistic and mystical position, which is mainly to be found in his minor religious works. People, in general, have still to understand that the monistic idealism of Śaṅkara is simply a prelude to his general teachings in philosophy which are mainly theistic and mystical in character. I shall therefore be more than rewarded if, while giving a readable (but full) account of his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra*, I show in his own words that the mystical knowledge of reality is the sole end both of philosophy and religion. I shall, however, have to wait, till the second volume is complete, to be able to write a critical survey of the philosophy of Śaṅkara, as developed in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtra*.

I shall then be able to point out how the doctrine of Māyā is not incompatible with its so-called rival doctrine of Cidvilāsa. Why Śaṅkara favours the one and not the other is because he finds that the doctrine of Māyā, unlike the other, serves the double purpose of bringing home to consciousness the reality of Brahman and the unreality of anything else, apart from Brahman. Had Śaṅkara been able to understand the element of truth contained in the Cidvilāsa theory, it would have been impossible for him to explain the meaning of 'Sarvam *Idam* *idam* Brahman'. But the important point to note is that, so Śaṅkara, the '*sarvam*', like '*idam*', is nothing else but Brahman, though he holds that the experience "all this is Brahman" comes much later than the experience, "I am the Brahman". From the view-point of mere logic, as we shall see, the '*idam*' and the '*sarvam*', that is, the 'I' and the 'world' have their existence apart from the other *seu* *vis* Brahman in the two propositions mentioned above. But from the view-point of spiritual experience or realization, there remains only the Brahman, as both the subject and the predicate of the propositions, and the consciousness of the 'I' or the 'world' as a separate entity drops down altogether. In

order to preserve the truth, and in order not to allow the slyness and pretension to say that they are having the Brahmanic scriptures, when, as a matter of fact, they are engrossed with the serious and sensual pleasures. Śaṅkara keeps himself away from the Calvinistic theory. The world may be a 'Villain' of Brahman, but let it not be a 'villain' for one who has not realized the Brahman. Better it would be if one were to think that the 'villain' as divorced from Brahman is only transitory and insufficient to satisfy completely and finally, and that therefore it is as good as an illusion. I shall then be able to point out how the protest of Māyā is due to the urge on the part of Brahman to become many which, instead of being conscious of the Brahman which is manifest in them, become conscious of themselves as finite and limited; how Brahman instead of being a blank in the repository of all the qualities, so much so, that Śaṅkara believes—to borrow a phrase from Rāmānuja, a song of Mādhurā—*that Nitya is just the same as Durbhāga*; how Śaṅkara leads us on through the different stages of non-contradiction to the ultimate mystical criterion of *Īśvara*, and how, finally, Śaṅkara shows us that the individual soul is a power and not a lower life being absorbed in the Brahman.

The translation and the literal meaning of the words in the Śūtra may create a taste for Sanskrit even in those to whom the language may be totally unfamiliar. The translation of the Śūtra is not simply aphoristic in nature; the additional words in the brackets are intended not only to explain the Śūtra, but also the topic and the context in which they arise. And, as indicated above, the rendering of the commentary is so presented that it gives a complete and apt picture of the arguments for or against. Many of the Upanisadic and other references therefore which might to have been explained or pointed out in the footnotes have been so incorporated in the body of the commentary that, sometimes, the argument begins with the form of a story or a

dialogue is an *Upanishad*, and an attempt has been made to bring out the whole Vedantic position with as much narrative interest as force of reasoning. If a particular argument consists of too many queries and replies, or doubts and counter-doubts, I have, instead of tiring out the reader by compelling him to go through these unending wanderings, simplified the issues and presented them as several points in the argument. I have taken utmost care, however, not to omit or neglect even the smallest point in the argument of the *Purvaśikha* or the *Vedānta*. As for the footnotes, they are given only when they are absolutely necessary.

Some more features of this undertaking deserve emphasis here. I have given at the end of each volume a broad outline or summary of the whole volume, so that one may have at a glance the relevant position of a particular philosophical theme in the whole scheme, as well as be acquainted in a general way with the richness and extent of the field of inquiry covered by Śaṅkara. I have also thought it well to give separately almost all the important *Upaniṣadic* and other references in the commentary, so that each of my readers as may thereby be tempted to read Śaṅkara in the original may be encouraged to come in contact with that beautiful, simple and powerful work. The *Sikṣa-vāra* index of references too will be immensely useful for a comparative study of the different schools in Vedānta. I also intend to give at the end of the second volume some important philosophical passages in the original from the Commentary of Śaṅkara which will explain my critical survey of his philosophy.

Professor R. D. Banerji, M.A., D.Litt., Ex-officio-Chancellor of the University of Allahabad, has been so intensely and generously kind to me in all my affairs ever since he first taught me philosophy in 1920, that whatever my head touches has lost its gratitude, it is a wrench to take it away from them. He has not only

made me what I am philosophically, but has also enabled me to a small degree at least, to value the way of the Spirit, and to understand sympathetically how Sanatana-dharma must have been able to remove the grief of Nirvāṇa by imparting unto him the love of the Ātman. I am therefore all gratitude to this great saint for having blessed my undertaking. Another great influence upon my life is of the 'philosopher-statesman' of India, for it is the writings of Professor S. Radhakrishnan which have inspired me to make philosophy understandable and to bring it within the reach of all. Truth is truth even if some are slow to understand it. But it is with respect to these 'some' that Dr. Radhakrishnan has taught me that the truth must be given in the form in which it is acceptable. I can never be too grateful to him also for having blessed me.

My wholehearted colleague, Dr. K. R. Srinivas Iyengar, Professor of English, Andhra University, Waltair, has exceedingly obliged me by reading the proofs and by making a number of valuable suggestions. It was he who persuaded me to publish my earlier book, 'The Yoga of the Saints' (Popular Book Depot, Bombay, 1944), and again it was he who voluntarily came forward to help me in this new venture. I am grateful to him for teaching me that friendship based on a sense of dedication to higher values does not easily fade away. Another friend of mine, and a Sanskrit scholar, Dr. M. A. Karandikar, M. A., Ph. D., of the Elphinstone College, Bombay, has helped me in the selection of the Upanishads and other sources in the original and in correcting their proofs. I am greatly indebted to him for this. Professor K. L. Vama, M. A., Principal of my College, is to be specially thanked in this connection for the very kind interest he has taken in the publication of this volume and the tangible encouragement he gave me by affording me facilities for the books which I required. One of my post-graduate students, Mr. Shyam Sunder Joshi, getting interested in

my work, has helped me a lot in the correction of the galley-proofs, and my thanks are due to him on full measure. Nor must I omit to mention that my sons have been very helpful to me. Vibondith is preparing the Sanskrit index and is comparing the references with the manuscript, and Rajboudh, in addition to this, is doing the typeset's job so willingly and so well.

It would have been impossible for me to bring out this volume had I not been fortunate in meeting the young, upright, and obliging gentleman, Mr. D. M. Tish. With courage and generosity he has rendered me a great service, which I shall ever remember with gratitude. I cannot commend too highly the quick despatch, the sincerity of purpose, and the aesthetic sense he has displayed in the production of this volume.

My debt to Filzari, as also to such eminent scholars as George Thibaut, Max Müller, Vinodan, Sârin Abhyankar and the Âcârya-bhakti Bapat, and others, is too obvious to require any special mention. It is in the company of the work of these protectors in the field, that I have been able to evaluate to some degree the previous work of Ânandabharu in the philosophy of Śaṅkara.

Finally, I am greatly indebted to the University of Rajasthan for making a generous grant towards the cost of publication of this volume.

Maharaja's College,
Jaipur,

V. H. Datta

7th February 1934

FOREWORD

I have great pleasure in writing this small foreword to a very important work of my former student and now Professor at Mithuranga's College, Jaipur, Dr. V. H. Datta, M. A., Ph. D. The translation of *Śhiksha Sūtra* has been attempted by very few persons in the history of Sanskrit Scholarship, and I am glad that Prof. Datta can be placed in that list. His translation has this particular characteristic about it, namely, that it is not merely literal but explanatory. Dr. Datta makes his translation always readable by introducing some stories from the *Upanishads* and similar works. I think the book would be useful to University students and scholars alike. At the end of each volume Prof. Datta intends to give a summary of the contents of the volume which will enable the reader to have a short glimpse of the *Sūtra*. The primary intent of the *Śhiksha Sūtra*, as Dr. Datta tells us, is ethics-spiritual, the metaphysical portion being in the background. It may be as he points out, an extension of the experience of *atmā* which *Sankarācārya* has put this idea very beautifully as has been their well known *repetitio ad effectum* (repetition for effect). Dr. Datta has kept before himself the model of Dr. Radhakrishnan's works on Indian philosophy, who, as everyone knows, has immensely succeeded in creating interest in the minds of his readers by his lucid and comprehensive exposition. The transcription and the translation of the *Sūtra*, along with the clear exposition of the objections and answers in the shape of *ghṛta* and *prasa* will be found very useful by students of the *Sūtra* in India or outside. If Prof. Datta sometimes undertakes to expound the texts of the *Upanishads* verbatim, his expositions will also be found extremely readable as

they will introduce readers to the contents of the Upanishads at first hand in the most clear manner. Prof. Das is not merely well-versed in European Philosophy, but also in Indian Philosophy having learnt it, and particularly the Vedanta, from a Master of repute. Finally, I shall feel very glad, as Prof. Das will certainly feel, that his translation will enable some at least to rise up the ladder of Vedantic Philosophy to its real spirit, namely, a first-hand contact with Reality, which is the beginning, the end and the life of the world-Tagsatva.

5th February 1954.

R. D. LINSIDE

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as natural and illusory' is the practice of the world to juggle the truth and falsehood and to superimpose one on the other, forgetting all the while that they can never be identical on account of their attributes being absolutely opposed to each other, that we readily have such responses as 'I am this', 'This is that'.

But what do we mean by 'adhyesa' or 'superimposition' at all? It is the apprehension of something perceived previously but remembered while perceiving something else. In the opinion of some, adhyesa means the superimposition of the attributes of one thing on another thing. Others define it as the illusion due to not being able to note the difference between the two things. To some

there are two parts of the world, the one below things and the one above them, existing one beyond the other, it can logically be said to form the third part of it, viz. the intermediate position of the consciousness.

1. An illusion arises out of the ignorance of the real. The knowledge of the real character has got the power to cancel the illusion. Similarly, we can give an example that besides a single illusory natural and therefore it is that knowledge of the real gives the cancellation of knowledge.

1. Adhyesa is not the same as superimposition. Another has pointed out a comparison in the simile when it is perceived to be not that, that is, immateriality. In adhyesa of the other hand, the substantial part of the object, e.g., silver, is not really perceived by the eye. In superimposition, the very perceptions are made voluntary to cancel the same object. In adhyesa, they take an illusory aspect.

4. This illusion arises both due to the ignorance of *anubhava* and *pratyakha*. The first is the view of the Nyayacharya and of the Jyotisha school of Advaitism, while the second is of the Vishishtadvaita school. According to the first school, something is the first view the object appears as, regarded as something other than what it is. The shell appears to resemble as something else, viz. as silver. In most instances, the cause that the mistake of the Nyayacharya against this view is that the shell does not become the silver as soon as the apprehension of it is in the shell. Otherwise, the shell may be able to hold the value of silver in the matter. According to the second view it is the mistake in assuming that silver that appeared and subsisted as natural object after being superimposed on the shell. The Nyayacharya would say against this that if all senses in regard to changes there would be no mistake in distinguishing between truth and error. Cognition of silver is obtained by comparing things in the past.

5. This is the view of the Prabhakara school of Advaitism. According to it, simply seeing silver is enough. There remains no taking a comparison with a real substance. The 'like' aspect of the shell is lost if the eye is compared with the 'value' aspect of the silver which is fully transparent and is not to be mixed with the eye. One is never both either on the surface of the eye or eye or the glass of the shell but never both either on the surface of the eye or eye or the glass of the shell to perceive, to recognize, given of the shell leads the way to the glass of the silver. Despite a mixture of the glass of the shell has been not lost, the mind is the recognition of it as previously seen, but stops with the recognition of silver as present.

others, still, it means the ascription of false attributes to a thing.¹ All these cases however agree in representing illusion as the false apprehension of the attributes of one thing on another, e. g. the appearance of silver on the mother-of-pearl², or the appearance of one moon as double.

How can, one may ask, the objects and their attributes be superimposed on the Atman who, as has been said above, is never an object, and who is therefore said to be 'paripati', i. e., who manifests or shines as self, not and through? The Atman who is totally disconnected with the idea of 'yugmad', can hardly be said to be amenable to superimposition which one may experience with reference to objects in contact with sense-organs.

We reply that notwithstanding its being paripati, and its being unrelated to the objective world which is denoted by the word 'yugmad', the pure Atman too is capable of being known as an object, whenever one becomes aware of one's self as 'I am',³ as also of the intuitive certainty⁴ of the existence of one's self. And it is not

¹ Sometimes the very combination of substance and accident is called an illusion. The opinion of the Vedāntins upon this point is, that if there should really exist complete coincidence between what is perceived and what is apprehended, a person may very well experience from that by itself alone, that he apprehends 'that' would then be confused with the perceiver's self.

² This is the case of the Mother-pearl in the description. Some teachers in representing the shimmering silver as arising on the shell which shines as 'product of root'. The Vedāntins dispute in this that there can be an emergence of a secondary thing.

³ The object of the Vedāntins is known as *anubhava* or *anubhava* is the cognition of what is the self as neither real nor unreal. For it is not as such as will not be revealed by any later experience, and it is not as unreal as not to appear on the shell. When there appears on the shell, but while the experience is unreal, that is which is apparent, on the shell, is real. Hence it is said, with the knowledge of the experience, on the shell the appearance of silver disappears.

⁴ When the perception of the 'I' means the consciousness of the 'I', it is known by the qualities of being, unity, immortality, etc. That is the possibility of the existence of being the true (atman) the subject (ātman) with reference to properties, who is free from material limitations. For, on the other hand, as we know of being, unity, etc. is conscious of being, unity and immortality. Hence it is concluded with the spiritual truths.

⁵ The self-sufficiency of the Atman is capable of being completely felt by all without any doubt, and this constitutes the dependent side of the Atman. In other words, the Atman is the one object.

a universal rule that objects in front of us or in contact with sense-organs should alone be superimposed on one another. The thing, though imperceptible is still called by ordinary people as having a coloured surface. Similarly it is no contradiction to superimpose the objects which are *an-Ātman* in character, on the preceptible or the self-luminous imperceptible *Ātman*. What men call this kind of adhyāsa is *avidyā*¹², and by contrast with this, they call it as *Vidyā* which enables them to discern the real nature of the *Ātman* (*vidyā*). Such being the nature of *vidyā* and *avidyā*, neither the defects of the *an-Ātman* nor the virtues of the *Ātman* will in any way affect¹³ the substratum on which they are superimposed. It is due to this mutual superimposition of the *Ātman* and the *an-Ātman* that there arise all the practical distinctions of ordinary and Vedic life, pertaining to knowledge and its objects, prohibitions and injunctions, as also pertaining to *mokṣa*.

How is it, it may be asked, that the means of right knowledge such as perception and others, and the various *Sūtras* have their origin in *avidyā*? The answer is not difficult to find. In the first place, the absolutely free and unattached *Ātman* cannot be said to be the knower unless the body, the mind and the senses are first superimposed upon it, and there arise the wrong notions such as, 'I am this', 'it is mine', etc. And, secondly, it is only after the knower is established that the body and the senses will be active¹⁴, and the means of knowledge will be employed. In short, it is the *avidyā* in which is rooted the distinction between the knower and the known, and it is due to it that we employ the means of knowledge and

¹² *Avidyā* is, strictly speaking, the name of adhyāsa. *Avidyā* is not only the opposite of *Vidyā* but is equivalent to being covered by *Vidyā*.

¹³ The *Ātman* is not affected by the qualities of *baudhā* and *ajñāna* such as bright and the others are baudhā and the means affected by the qualities of the *Ātman*, such as consciousness and bliss.

¹⁴ Had the activities of the senses been dependent only on the body without reference to the *Ātman* which is superimposed on the body, they would have been active even during sleep when there is no such superimposition.

follow the instructions of Brute. In this respect there is no difference between a man and a lower animal¹⁷. A cow runs away through fear from a man who has a raised stick in his hand, but it moves towards him if he has fresh green grass with him. A man too approaches another, if the latter is of gentle behaviour, but he runs away from a fierce-looking strong person, who approaches showing and flourishing a sword in hand. So, in spite of the difference of intelligence between man and animals, their cognitional and other activities of the practical worldly life are ultimately due to the mutual superimposition of the *Artes* and the *an-*Artes**.

Now what can we say about that kind of activity which is enjoined by the Vedas? No doubt a person who wishes to qualify himself for the performance of such actions, a student for instance, gets first the intellectual conviction that the soul ought to have a relation with the next world¹⁸. But this does not include the knowledge of the real nature of the *Atman* who is, so the Upanishads tell us, beyond the bodily wants of hunger and thirst, beyond the distractions of cares such as *Bekhaya* and *Kayama*, and beyond the rounds of birth and death. As a matter of fact, this kind of knowledge has no purpose to serve for a person who has to perform a sacrifice; on the other hand, it goes against and disqualifies that person. But before the advent of such *Angarapada* knowledge of the *Atman*, what can be said of the whole of the *Karma-Kanda*? The reply is, it has its basis in *avidya*. Unless the distractions of *care*, *liking*, *app.*, etc. are superimposed

17. The point is none of the difference between *hail* and its performance: a man may only a matter of this distinction, besides knowing that the *hail* will do good, have got different *dispositions*. And yet as far as the actual superimposition of the *hail* and the *act* is concerned, the man resembles the animal.

18. It is suggested by some of the critics that a person, who wishes to attain the *brahma* (highest) and who therefore wishes to perform the *pragya* (sacrifice) must not be entering into any kind of *avidya*. For it is supposed that that person should know the truth that there is a great world body which is some other than the body. It must be the soul which ought to be associated with the *hail* of the sacrifice. In other words, it is supposed that the person will have no *disposition* about the existing difference between the body and the soul. On the contrary, he will have all the possible knowledge about the soul, and will not therefore superimpose *hail* and the body.

upon the Ātman, there will be no possibility of the performance of a sacrifice by a Brahman.

How this natural and endless superimposition operates in the world and creates the false knowledge that the soul is the doer and experiencer of actions and their effects, we shall explain by a few examples. A man considers himself happy or otherwise, as his wife and children are. He considers himself to be stout, lean, fat, weak, deaf or blind, when as a matter of fact his body or sense-organs are so. The desires, the doubts and the various modifications of his mind, as also the sense of empirical consciousness in the form of 'I am', are ascribed by him as belonging to the eternal Ātman in him, the witness of all.¹¹ And reciprocally, the Pratyagjīvan also is superimposed by him on body, senses, mind etc.¹²

With a view therefore to remove this adhyāsa which is the root-cause of all evil, and thereby to enable one to attain the knowledge of the unity of the Ātman, the study of the Vedānta is undertaken. And that all the Vedānta passages have this purpose alone, we shall prove in what follows, viz. the *Sūtrasamuktānt*.¹³

The first Sūtra of the Vedānta-samuktānt is as follows:

॥ विद्युदाविर्भवम् । (१)

व्याप्तेः कवचिकल्पः । १

[Ātma—now, tat—therefore, Brahmaprajñā—doer to know the Brahman.]

NOW WHEREFORE THE NEED TO KNOW THE BRAHMAN. 1

[1] Qualities belonging to others and thereby constituting the causal net of a man or creature belonging to his own body or to his senses, or what is equivalent say all superimposed upon the ātman. In other words, the superimposition takes place either through the causal relations or through the psycho-psychological associations.

[2] It is an instance of this type of relation, viz. of the ātman on the senses, feelings etc., that I now attempt to be understood with reference. As opposed to that, the other kind of relation, viz. that of ātman, etc., on the ātman, requires the deal with the senses that lie in the line of cause and effect or of being.

[3] The thesis being that to know is to liberate, and the first, which stands in long debt to know liberates as liberate. A liberator or liberated, whether the

The word 'now' indicates that the inquiry about the Brahman follows as a consequence of some prior event. It does not indicate the mere beginning of a new subject such as the nature of Brahman, after another subject has been finished. Nor does it make us aware of any prior event which is not connected as cause or condition of the inquiry of Brahman. To say that the word 'now' is used to indicate the suspicious beginning of a work, is also inadequate; for such a beginning is indicated by the mere sound of the word 'atha'. So far as its meaning is concerned, it is used then to denote a necessary connection.

What then is that necessary, antecedent, condition which, when fulfilled, makes one fit to enter upon the inquiry of the nature of Brahman? It cannot be the study of the Vedas exclusively, for it is the common antecedent of both the inquiries regarding the Brahman and Religious duty. Neither can the knowledge of Religious duty be said to be the antecedent, because one can have the knowledge of the Brahman even without the knowledge of such duty, by merely studying the Vedānta literature. Here there is no indication of the order of ascension, as is indicated with reference to certain things to be done in a series. Knowledge of Religious duty and that of Brahman are not so related to each other that the study of the one will prepare a person to study the other. They differ in subject-matter and in results. Brahma-jñāna ends in salvation and eternal bliss, while Dharma-jñāna has transient prosperity as its end. Dharma-jñāna-requires performance of religious acts, while Brahma-jñāna does not. The fruit of one is dependent on human activity; in the other it is not so, Brahman being eternal and an ever-accomplished fact, the knowledge of it is not something which will accrue at some future time as the result of human effort. The fruit of Dharma, on the other hand, is to be accomplished at some future

Śāstra is the name of Vedānta as well as known as *Śāstra* in Vedānta. The name changing from the use of all Vedānta passages, it is also known as *Vedānta* in Vedānta.

time by the performance of some religious acts. Besides, the intent of the Śruti statements differs entirely in the two inquiries. A statement in the Itihāsas, such as "A person wishing to obtain *svarga* should perform the *Agnyotsoma* sacrifice", informs us about *Dharma*, by urging us to act. But a statement from the Upaniṣads, such as "The *Ātman* is verily the *Brahman*", does not render a man inclined to do some activity, but instructs him straightaway regarding the nature of the *Brahman*. In other words, whereas the knowledge about the *Brahman* is the immediate result of the Upaniṣadic statement, without requiring any intermediate human activity, the knowledge about *Dharma* is dependent not only on the statement from the Itihāsas but on human activity too. Unlike *Dharma-jñāna*, then, the knowledge of the *Brahman* is like perceptual knowledge which arises as soon as there is contact of a sense with its objects. It does not wait to come into being till there is some human activity, for it does not require it. If *Dharma-jñāna* then is not the necessary antecedent of *Brahma-jñāna*, we must state what that antecedent is.

The real antecedent conditions are:—The discrimination between what is sheding and what is not sheding, non-attachment to the material and extramundane objects of pleasure and pain, possession of tranquillity, restraint and other virtues¹ and the desire for final liberation. If these conditions are fulfilled, then alone, irrespective of the knowledge of *Dharma*, it is possible to enter upon an inquiry of the *Brahman* and to know it. The word 'now' therefore indicates that *Brahma-jñāna* is subsequent to the fulfilment of these four conditions.

The word 'therefore' supplies an additional reason as to why the four moral and spiritual means alone, and not *Dharma-jñāna*, are to be construed as the prerequisites of *Brahma-jñāna*. The statement from the Chāndogya Upe-

1. The other virtues besides these (tranquillity and desire for liberation) are *brahma* (truthfulness), *dharmata* (righteousness), *śānti* (tranquillity), *śamā* (restraint), *śamā* (restraint), *śamā* (restraint), and *śamā* (restraint).

and (2, 1, 6) regarding the 'perishable nature of the fruits of actions acquired in this or the next world', closes away the possible objection based on the belief that dispassion for fruits of the next world may not be had inasmuch as they are not perishable as the fruits of this world are. Thus while the fruits of Agnihotra and other sacrifices are declared by Veda itself to be impermanent, the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad*, on the other hand, points out to us that "He who knows the Brahman becomes the Brahman" (2, 1). From this it is clear that the above-mentioned qualifications, such as the discrimination that the Brahman alone is the Reality, are the only necessary antecedents of Brahman-jñāna.

The third and the last word in the *Sūtra*, viz., 'Brahma-yatni' indicates that Brahman is the direct and principal object of enquiry. Of course this may imply other objects of enquiry, which are less important and therefore of a secondary nature, e.g. means of knowledge, reasoning, *sādhana* and its results. When someone says, "There goes the king", what he means is that the king is going along with his retinue. *Sūtra* also tells us that Brahman is the direct object of the desire for knowledge, e.g. we get in the *Taittiriya Upaniṣad* (2, 1) "That from which these beings are born etc., desire to know that: That is Brahman". This desire for knowledge, again, has for its object not merely an intellectual understanding about the nature of the Brahman, but the realisation of it, for it is this direct realisation of Brahman which constitutes the *Summa* of human life, and which is necessary to root out all *avidyā*, the seed of all evil in this *Samsāra*.

Brahman is derived from the root 'bṛh' (to become great), and so means the Being having unlimited greatness. This quality of unlimited greatness, in its turn, implies that Brahman is eternal, pure, self-conscious and free.

1. There are the primary attributes of Brahman, and comprise what is known as the 'characteristics' of Brahman. As distinct from the *śādhana* which deals with

The existence of Brahman is also known by its being the self of every thing. Every one has the consciousness of the existence of the self in the form of 'I am'. And yet, opinions differ regarding the specific nature of the self. The Lokiyatāṇas and the ordinary men believe that the body alone, when endowed with intelligence, is known as the self. Others say that the organs and the intelligence, or the mind alone is the self. To some others like the Buddhās, the momentary knowledge or the void state is the self. It is, to some others, a being which is distinct from the body etc. and is responsible for actions. Some say the self is merely the subject of experience, while some others posit the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent Lord of all, and call him the real self as distinct from the selves, while there are some others who call him the self of selves. Thus it is that different people hold different opinions, and advance in support arguments and passages from Śruti which are only partly true. When such is the state, if a man accepts as true any one of the wrong views, he will not only not have the highest bliss, but will also be bound by the chain of births and deaths. So it is with a view to make possible the release of all that the author of the Sūtras has started the inquiry into the knowledge of Brahman, by resorting to arguments which are not inconsistent with Śruti.

२. अन्वयपरिकल्पम् । (२)

अन्वयस्य सङ्गः । २

[{anvaya—अन्वयः सङ्गः—; sanga—of this, sangat—from which}]

{[Brahman is that] from which [existence and dissolution] proceeding with the origin of this [world follows]} 2

the primary nature of Brahman there is another definition of it known as 'Tatvato-
bhāvaḥ'. It points out what distinctive qualities of Brahman such as 'omnipotence,
omniscience, omnipresence, etc.

The word 'janmādi' is a compound which can be solved in two ways, and so may mean either the substance and dissolution merely without including the meaning of the word 'jama', our origin, along with them or the substance and dissolution which come after the origin. If we take the second meaning, then also it is possible to relate the three states to this world, in the order of origin, subsistence and dissolution. For what comes into being does not exist and cease to be in course of time. Śruti too points out the same order (Tai. 2, 1). The world that is qualified by these three states is this very world made up of names and forms, subjects and objects, causes and effects, and space and time. It baffles our imagination when we think about its wonderful construction. It is this world which is dependent for its origin, subsistence, and dissolution on the Brahman.

We need not however increase the number of states from three to six, as the sage Yaska has done it. For the motive of the sage was to speak about the nature of all created things after once the five elements have come into existence. In the first place, the three additional states of modification, growth and decay are involved in the three states already mentioned, the first two being a kind of origination, and the last a kind of dissolution. Secondly, if these six states are mentioned, they may refer to the five great elements as their cause and not to the Brahman. In order to ward away this possible suspicion, the author of the Śhiva has mentioned only the three states and not six. Even the origin of the five great Śhivas must be referred back to the Brahman, which is both omniscient and omnipotent.

It is not possible therefore to attribute the origin etc. of the world to any other cause, such as the non-intelligent

1. The first meaning gives 'janmādi' (origin) as explained before only, and so the word does not denote the moment we are talking of the first subsistence (i.e. subsistence and dissolution). The other meaning treats the word 'janmādi' as subsistence + change + dissolution, and so all the three modifications enter in to constitute the meaning of the compound.

principles of the Śāṅkhya, or the atoms of the Vaiśeṣika or the non-being of the Śaṅkayāda, or the transmigrating Haraṃyugaṇa. Nor can it be said that the world came into being spontaneously as the Lokāyān hold, because as inferred by those who believe in the existence of God, a particular place, time and cause are required for the production of an effect.

This does not however mean that the present Śāṅkayāda are more similar argument without reference to Śruti. On the contrary, this and the other Śāṅkayāda merely afford an opportunity to collect the material from Śruti for thought and discussion, consequent on which, and not simply due to inference and other premises, there will spring up the knowledge of Brahman. But if inference too is brought forward to strengthen the conclusions of the Śruti, it is a welcome and serviceable instrument of knowledge. Śruti itself has admitted its utility. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka recommends the hearing and the thinking about the Atman, and the Chāndogya declares that just as a man led away by robbers would return back to his country of Gāndhāra after being guided by others and by his intelligence, even so one who has been guided by a spiritual teacher can employ his own reason also and achieve the knowledge of the Brahman.

Now, Brahman-yajñ is unlike Dharma-yajñ. For while in the latter the Śruti passages are alone capable of giving us knowledge, in the former, not only these but self-realisation also is available as an authoritative source. Brahman as the object of knowledge is a thing as existing thing, and therefore can be apprehended only through intuitive knowledge. In the case of knowledge of a thing which is to be accomplished, there being no possibility of intuitive knowledge, Śruti would be the only possible means of proof. Besides, the thing to be accomplished, whether ordinary or vedic, depends on human activity which may be done or not done. A man may go to a place on horse-back or on foot, or not go at all. Similarly a man may or may not accept the Śodāś

cup of someone as the *Anvita* sacrifice : or a man may or may not make children before or after sunrise. In all such cases, injunctions and prohibitions, systems and rules have a place, because they refer to the intellect of men. The knowledge of the *Vastu* (Brahman or Substance) has no reference to human intellect or activity, but is rooted in itself alone. To say with regard to a post that it is a man or something else is false knowledge; to say that it is a post is correct, because this knowledge is rooted in the thing itself. Even so the knowledge of Brahman depends entirely on Brahman alone, inasmuch as it is already an accomplished fact.

One may say that Brahman as an existing substance can also be known by other means of knowledge, and so the discussion of the *Vedānta* passages is not essential to know it. But this is not correct. For Brahman is not like the external things an object of the senses. We perceive the world but not the Brahman. Nor can we infer that the world is an effect of Brahman, for no irreversible necessary connection can be established between an effect which is perceived and a cause which is incapable of being perceived. Therefore the present *Sūtra* does not refer to inference as the means of knowing Brahman; it refers to the *Vedānta* passages which are capable of describing the Brahman. In the dialogue between Yama and his son (Tat. 3, 1, 6), the Brahman is described as *Brah* and as that from which beings are born, and that in which they live and merge after death. This and other passages referred to by the *Sūtra* point out therefore the single conclusion that Brahman is eternal, pure, intelligent, free and unchanging, and that it is the cause of the world.

To confirm this, we proceed:

१. ब्राह्मणोक्तिनिर्दिष्टम् । (३)

ब्राह्मणोक्तिनिर्दिष्टम् । १

[*Sūtra*—*Brah*, *janatā*—from being the source.]

FROM ITS MIND THE SOURCE OF ŚRUTI, OR ŚRUTI
BEING THE MEANS OF ITS KNOWLEDGE. 3

If the compound Śāstrayoni be treated as *śāstrāparāyaṇa* and be dissolved as 'Śāstrayāṇa parāyaṇa', then the meaning of the Śloka is that the Brahman is the source of the Śruti, but if the compound is treated as *Brahmayāṇa* and is dissolved as 'Śāstrayāṇa parāyaṇa Brahmayāṇa parāyaṇa', then the meaning will be that the Śruti is the means of the knowledge of Brahman.

The Śruti, i.e. the Ugras and other branches of study, is a mine of knowledge and light; nevertheless, it comes 'as a branch' (Bṛ. 3, 4, 10) from the omniscient and omnipotent Brahman, just as grammar comes from Pīthā. Where else can we look for the source of this momentous quality of the Śruti? Or the Śloka may be interpreted to mean that the knowledge of the Brahman as the cause of the world is possible only through Śruti, as has been shown by quoting a passage in the preceding Śloka. But as there was some room for doubt in the preceding Śloka, whether or not there was in it a reference to inference, the present Śloka is intended to remove that doubt and explicitly state that the Śruti is the means of knowing that Brahman is the cause of the Universe.¹

४ अयमवधारिण्यम् । (४)

Somewhat may arise an objection like the following: How can it be maintained that Śruti is the means of knowing Brahman? For in the Pīthā Mūlāntarī (Sūtra 1, 3, 1), Jaimini has stated that action is the sole end of Śruti, and so those Śruti passages which do not bear on action are useless. No doubt, there are many passages in the Veda which appear to have no connection with action,

1. The first interpretation would fit in best in suggesting that Brahman is inferred from Śruti, just as the first Śloka, quoted above, has suggested that Brahman is inferred from the world. But the meaning of the fact that Śruti is the source of the great thing is maintained by the Śruti itself because both these Ślokas.

that is, which neither enjoins nor prohibits any action. For example, 'Wind is a swift deity,' appears to have no relation to human activity when taken in isolation. But read in the proper context, it means that the action of sacrificing a white animal to the deity of Wind will bear the fruit as swiftly as the wind is swift. Similarly, 'the Fox wept on account of being castrated by gods,' is endowed with meaning because it implies the attainment of *śānta* and the offering of it as a sacrifice, *śāntaśānta* as *śānta* is produced out of the roots of *śānta*. Therefore, as Jaimini says (PG. MĪ. Śū. 1, 1, 7), each Vedic sentence, known as 'arthavāda' is to be supplemented by way of praise or censure other sentences which enjoin or prohibit actions. The mantras too, as Jaimini tells us (PG. MĪ. Śū. 1, 2, 45), are connected with other the actions or their means. For example, in the mantra, 'the strength they' (Rg. Śū. 1, 1, 1), the action of cutting a branch is implied. No Vedic passage can therefore be said to have any meaning unless it refers to some action or to some means or fruit of action. The Vedic passages which are declared to refer to the Brahman as an accomplished fact are therefore other sentences, because these are other means of proof such as perception, or if they are to be of any use, they must, in the first place, refer in a subsidiary manner to some action or agent, or secondly, to the means or fruit of action, as explained above by Jaimini, or thirdly, must point out the process of meditation for the sake of realising the Brahman. In any case, they do not refer to Brahman directly or independently of any action.

In order to relate this the Śāntikām says :—

तुमु मन्मथाम् ! ४

[Tat—that, tu-mu; *mān-mathā*—being the words of harmony.]

BUT THAT (BRAHMAN IS KNOWN FROM ŚĀNTI), IS THE RESULT OF HARMONY (OF THE VEDĀNTA-PASSAGES). 4

1. The transcendent and omnipotent Brahman then is the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world. This is the only harmonious and consistent conclusion of the Vedānta passages, such as: "Being alone was in the beginning, one, without a second" (Bṛh. 3, 2, 1); "All this was in the beginning, the one Ātman alone" (Aṣṭ. Br. 3, 4, 1, 1); "This is the Brahman, without cause and without effect, having nothing else inside or outside, the Ātman is the Brahman, the spectator of all" (Bṛ. 3, 5, 19); "That which is seen in front of one's self is the immortal Brahman alone" (Mā. 3, 2, 11). When the words in these passages refer directly and undoubtedly to Brahman, it will be improper to imagine that they refer to an altogether different thing viz. action. To do so is to commit the error in two ways; it is to reject the *Pratyak* which is repeatedly indicated and to accept the action which is not so stated.

2. Nor can it be said that these passages refer to the agent or the duty which is implied in every action. But passages like "then by what means, he (the Ātman) should see whom?" (Bṛ. 3, 4, 12) remove the possibility of reference to agent, actions, means or the fruit thereof.

3. Notwithstanding that it is already of the nature of an existing thing, Brahman cannot be known through perception or other means of knowledge; for the fact that Brahman is the Self of all, cannot be understood except by means of direct passages, such as "That thou art" (Bṛh. 6, 8, 7).

4. Nor can it be said that instruction regarding the nature of Brahman will serve no purpose, because Brahman is not something which is to be accepted or rejected. For it is exactly this knowledge of the Brahman as the self of all, which does not require the further doing or non-doing of anything, and which results in the *Somavasi* *Bhava* of man's life by making him free from all pain.

5. There may be certain passages in which the description of the *devata* is subordinate to the process of meditation. But *Brāhman* is not described in this manner as an object of meditation. For meditation implies the duality of the meditator and the object of meditation. Once the knowledge of unity arises, and the sense of duality is uprooted, there will be no such distinctions as agents and actions, nor anything which will be desired or avoided. Hence *Brāhman* can never be considered in a subordinate manner as an object necessary for the process of meditation.

6. There may be passages in *Karma-Kṛdya* in which it is easy to point out that certain sentences known as *arthavāda*, whose function is to praise or censure, are supplementary to other sentences which enjoin or prohibit action, and are therefore authoritative. But the *Vedānta*-passages which impart the knowledge of the *Ātman* have their own direct fruit, viz. the final release. Valid by themselves they do not owe their validity to other passages which deal with activity such as meditation or inferential reasoning. It is clear, therefore, that *Śruti* is authoritative as a means of the knowledge of *Brāhman*.

At this point, some others (*Vijñānīna*) raise the following objection:

1. *Brāhman* is still the object of the process of meditation, even though we may accept that it is known through *Śruti*. Knowledge about the sacrificial post or about the "Akṣaraṇa" fire cannot be had by ordinary means of post; it is given by *Śruti*. And yet the post and the fire are described in a subsidiary manner, because they are involved in other activities which are recommended or prohibited by the *Veda*. That the purpose of *Śruti* passages is to induce a man either to do or not to do a particular thing, is clear from the following extracts: "The purpose of it (*Veda*) is to give the knowledge of some kind of activity" (*Śābha* Bhā. 1, 1, 1); "A statement inducing action is known as an injunction."

(Śāb. Bhā. 1, 1, 3), 'A statement which gives knowledge about religious duty is known as initiation or instruction.' (Jai Śā. 1, 1, 5), 'Let words be connected with the verb denoting action' (Jai Śā. 1, 1, 15), 'Activity being the aim of Śrauta, passages which have no such aim are useless' (Jai Śā. 1, 2, 1). The Vedānta-passages too, inasmuch as they belong to Śrauta, are purposive in the same way. Just as 'agnihotra' etc. are recommended as a means to attain to heaven, even so the knowledge of Brahman is recommended as a means for the attainment of immortality.

3. The Vedāntins may say that the objects of knowledge and the fruits thereof differ as the two Śāstras. According to Karma-Kēdha, Dharma is to be accomplished in the future, according to the Vedānta, the Brahman is an already accomplished and eternal fact. The fruit is one, viz. heaven, is dependent on the performance of actions, the fruit is the other, viz. the release, is not the result of any actions. Therefore the analogy, that the knowledge of Brahman is recommended for the purpose of final release in the way in which a medicine is recommended for attaining heaven, is not correct. In refutation of this, we reply that the knowledge about Brahman given by the Vedānta-passages is only in connection with some actions. The desire to know the Brahman is produced in us on account of such directive statements: 'Verily, the Ātman must be seen' (Iy. 1, 4, 5); 'Search out and understand the unseen Ātman' (Chā. 8, 7, 1); 'One should worship the Brahman in the form of Ātman only' (Iy. 1, 4, 7); 'One should worship the Ātman only as his true nature' (Iy. 1, 4, 13); 'One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mā. 3, 2, 9). And to the question, what is this Ātman? What is the Brahman?, which arise in the mind by reading the above-mentioned directive statements, we get the reply in other Vedāntic statements that 'The Ātman is eternal' (Ka. 2, 18), 'Omniscient' (Mā. 3, 9), 'all-pervading' (Svā. 3, 11), 'eternally content with itself' as well as

'eternally pure, self-conscious and free', and that 'the Brahman is of the nature of consciousness and bliss' (Bg. 1. 2. 38). The nature of the Brahman is thus described because the motive of the Vedānta-passages is primarily to enable a man to meditate on it in order to achieve the final release.

3 If the Vedānta-passages were mere statements of existing facts and did not refer to actions to be done or not to be done, as if they resemble statements like, 'there are seven continents on the earth,' 'the king is marching,' they would be useless in practical life. It is alleged that the fear of the serpent will be removed by the mere assertion of the statement that 'this is a rope, not a snake'. But it is a matter of common experience that the mere verbal knowledge of the nature of Brahman does not in any way remove the wrong notions about one's own self. On the contrary, a man having such verbal knowledge continues to be affected by pleasure and pain of *saukhya*.

4 Besides, as stated in the Śruti (Bg. 2. 4. 3), the *śravaṇa* (hearing) is to be followed by reflection and contemplation. This clearly shows that as far as Brahman is known by Śruti, it becomes the object of the devotional process.

Our reply is simply that the objections are futile, because :

1 There is a great difference between the results of *Karma-vidyā* and *Brahma-vidyā*. (a) While the knowledge and practice of dharma and adharma result in unending pleasure and pain, the knowledge of Brahman results in final release which is free from pain and is beyond the ken of the senses. (a) Unlike *mokṣa*, pleasure and pain arise on account of the contact of the senses and its objects, and are experienced by all the beings from Brahmanदेव down to the blade of grass. *Mokṣa*, however, is impossible

for those who have not seen the Ātman. (a) There is the difference of degree in the merits or demerits and in the consequent pleasures and pains, as also in the capacity of persons performing religious acts. There is no such difference either with reference to mokṣa, or with reference to persons who are capable of having it. (b) Those who perform meritorious acts go to learning and contemplation go after death by the northern path of light to Brahmaloka, while those who do the duty routine of *agrikartā* etc. or menial service and exhibit menial qualities go by the southern path of smoke to Candraloka, and here these all must be reborn (Udā. 3, 10, 11). (c) Thus, in short, is described the transitory, fleeting nature of *Saśaita* of the embodied beings as opposed to the disembodied state of final release which is not actually the result of actions induced by *Saśaita* but due to ignorance and is full of pleasure and pain, merit and demerit, *saṃsāra*, on the other hand, emerges by the fruit of *dharma*. It means knowledge, the disembodied and original transcendence of purity and bliss, as is clear from the passages: 'The man does not grieve, because he knows that the Ātman is bodiless though residing in the bodies, and is changeless though residing in the changing things. The Ātman is the greatest and the unimpugned being of all' (Ka. 2, 12). 'He is pure, and without priya and maṃsa' (Mā. 2, 1, 12). 'This puruṣa is not attached to anything' (Bṛ. 4, 3, 18). In other words, these passages point out that the Ātman is without gross or subtle body, and is unattached to both of them. So it has been proved that *saṃsāra* is the eternal disembodied state and is different from the fruits of actions induced by *dharma*.

3. Some may hold that the eternal nature of change is compatible with change (*paravasthā-matṛ*). The five elements of earth, water etc. or the three guṇas of the *Māhātmya*, are eternal in the sense that they are recognized as eternal even though undergoing change for the sake of the evolver.

1. From the viewpoint of one who has achieved Brahmaneyama, all all about the five guṇas and *bhūta* is *śaśvata*.

turn of the universe. But *mokṣa* is eternal in the true sense of the word; it does not undergo any transformation, and is unmovable (*Kṛpāthamya*). All-pervading like *ākāśa*, existing by itself, content with itself, without body, parts or modifications, it is self-illuminating, timeless and unaffected by merit and demerit (*Ka. 1, 2, 10*). Therefore, *mokṣa* in the disembodied condition is the same as Brahman, and so the instruction of Brahman cannot be mere supplementary to action.

3 Consider the following: 'One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (*Mu. 3, 2, 9*). 'Ineffective because the actions of one who sees the Brahman as the support of the higher and the lower' (*Mu. 3, 2, 9*). 'He who has the Brahmanic joy fears on no account' (*Tis. 3, 9*). 'O Janaka, You have achieved fearlessness' (*Bṛ. 4, 2, 4*). 'Brahman knew itself as Brahman and so has become all this' (*Bṛ. 3, 4, 10*). 'How can infirmity and sorrow affect him who has seen oneness in all?' (*Bṛ. 7*). 'Seeing which, the sage, Vilmādeva, realized that he was Maya, he was the son' (*Bṛ. 3, 4, 10*). All these Śruti passages indicate that *mokṣa* follows immediately after the realization of Brahman, or that there remains nothing to be done after Brahman-jñāna to attain *mokṣa*. If it be the result of any activity, one would get *mokṣa*, like heaven after a lapse of some time. But just as a man can sing while standing, even so there need not be any lapse of time between Brahman-jñāna and *mokṣa*.

4 Consider again the other passages which indicate that the only result of *Atma-jñāna* is merely to remove the obstacles in the way of *māyā*. Bhīmadṛṣṭa and other sages say to their Guru, Pippalāda, 'You are father unto us, because you have carried us to the other end of *avidyā*' (*Pr. 6, 8*). Nārada says to Śaṅkhaśālin, 'Since I have heard from men like thee that one who knows the Atman overcomes grief, carry us then beyond my grief' (*Kṛ. 7, 2, 3*). 'Several Śaṅkhaśālin carried him beyond ignorance, because his sin were washed out' (*Chā.*

7, 26, 2). The author of *Nyāya-sūtra*, Uvāka, too, holds the view that the successive destruction of false knowledge, false activity, birth and misery results in *mokṣa* (*Nyāi* 52, 1, 1, 2). Unlike the *Nyāya* view the Vedāntin holds that the destruction of false knowledge results from the knowledge of the identity of *jīva* and Brahman.

5 This knowledge of the identity of the *jīva* and Brahman is not due to make-believe (*bhāvanā*)¹ on account of the fact that consciousness is common to both, though a similar make-believe is referred to in the *Brūh.* 'Indraṇṇaṁ vāc Vātvodevān' and *śānta* is the word in its modification; so it is that the person who follows the mental states as *Vātvodevān* gets the world that knows no disturbance' (*Bṛ* 3, 1, 9). The identity of the *jīva* and Brahman however is real and not imagined.

6 Nor is the knowledge of identity of the nature of superimposition (*adhyāsa*). Brahman is not superimposed on the *jīva*, in the manner in which it is never needed to be superimposed for the sake of meditation on mind or on the sun (*Chā* 3, 12, 1, 3, 19, 1).

7. Nor again is the knowledge of the identity of *jīva* and Brahman on the pattern of the functional identity conceived between *prāṇa* and *viśva*. The *viśva* or mind is said to be the absorber of everything e.g., of fire, sun, etc. at the time of dissolution, and *prāṇa* is said to be the absorber of speech, sight, hearing etc. during sleep (*Chā*. 4, 3, 7; 4, 3, 5). It is on account of this common activity or function of the two, that the *prāṇa* is to be contemplated

1 The *Śāṅkhya* however takes it many times, the Vedāntin takes it one time only.

2 *Bhāvanā* is different, though imaginary identification of two things on account of similarity. *Adhyāsa* is identity identification; and known by difference. *Bhāvanā* is without a prior or things are known in relation by establishing upon the higher; e.g. the Vedāntins are contemplational disposed to know reality about the place of the architecture of the mind, while the *Śāṅkhya* though not so disposed in the process of meditation. *Bhāvanā* can typically occur continuously in the nature of the 'what' of two things or the 'that' of others.

as the wind. The *jiva* however is not identical with the Brahman in the sense that both of them have the common activity of growing.

8. Now does this knowledge of identity mean the act of purification of the *jiva* in its activity of seeing the Brahman, as is implied in the seeing of ghee by the milkman's wife in the Upanishad Tīga? The seeing of the identity of the *jiva* and the Brahman is not referred to in any passage connected with sacrifice.

9 (i) To suppose that this knowledge of identity arises on account of make-believe etc. as mentioned above, is to set at naught the words in the following passages which clearly indicate that the identity is real and not imagined: 'Thou art that' (Ka. 6, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman' (Bg. 1, 6, 10); 'The Atman is Brahman,' (Bg. 2, 3, 10). The cessation of *avidyā* is the result of this knowledge and the fact of the realisation of the Brahman are clearly mentioned in the passages: 'The knot in the heart is broken, and all the doubts are cut'; 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mā. 2, 2, 8; 3, 2, 9). (ii) Hence it is clear that Brahman-jñāna is not the result of some human activity, but comes in itself alone. It exists as certainly as an object that is perceived or inferred exists by itself. In other words, it is impossible to conceive Brahman or the knowledge of Brahman as in any way connected with human activity and treated as an effect. (iii) Brahman is not an object of knowing, because it is stated 'to be different from the known effect and the unknown cause' (Ka. 1, 3); 'How can one know Him by whose power everything that is known' (Bg. 2, 4, 13). (iv) Now again is Brahman the object of any religious worship; for the tongue cannot say anything about it, though it is through its power that the tongue speaks 'Know that to be Brahman and not that which is worshipped' (Ka. 1, 4, and 5).

10. If it is indescribable, how can *śruti* be said to be the means of knowing the Brahman? The reply is that

what Śaṅkara is at showing is that Brahman is the internal imperishable Ātman. It can never become the subject, because all the empirical differences of the knower, the known and the knowledge are caused by avidyā. The paradoxical statement that 'it is not known by those who think that they know it, but that it is known by those who say that they do not know it' (Ka. 2, 3), means that it transcends the mind of the knower, the knower and the knowledge, and that it is only to be realized. The same idea is conveyed in the passage, 'You cannot see the end of sight, hear the bound of hearing, think the thicker of thought, and know the knower of knowledge etc.' (Bṛ. 3, 4, 3). In short, the Śaṅkara denies the imaginary transitory nature of the Ātman, and thereby brings out the eternally free nature of the same; mokṣa, in other words, is not transitory.

11. To consider mokṣa as a thing to be produced like a jar, or brought into being by a modification in the original condition like curds from milk, or reached as if it is a place of journey, is to consider it as short-lived, and as dependent on some action of body, mind or speech. Mokṣa is nothing but Brahman or the Ātman, which is already present in all. Brahman is perfect and so nothing can be added to it, being eternally pure, there cannot be any flow in it which requires to be removed. It is not amenable to any change, and hence mokṣa does not mean the modification of the real nature of the Ātman on account of the latter being purified by some action, as if it is a mirror which becomes clear when the dust over it is removed.

Again, it is the empirical soul and not the Ātman that gets itself associated with the body, and which, therefore, is said to be purified by actions such as bathing, sipping of water, and the wearing of the sacred thread. In the proposition, 'I am free from disease', the empirical soul signified by the word 'I' is nothing but the shadowy that arises on account of avidyā and gets itself associated

with the body. "Joined with the body, the senses and the mind, it becomes known as the enjoyer or Bhokta (Ka. 3, 1, 4), and as such, 'into the sweet fruit', while the other (the Atman) merely looks on without eating" (Mā. 3, 1, 1). Brahman is described to be 'the one God, the hidden Atman in all beings, all-pervading, watching all activity, the support of all, and yet absolutely free from all qualities' (Sre. 6, 11), or again, as 'self-luminous, disembodied, without any ears or muscles, pure and without evil' (Ch. 8). Moha, then, being the same as the Atman or Brahman, cannot in any way be connected with action. It has its relation with knowledge alone.

12. Is not knowledge itself an activity of the mind? No, the two are entirely different. Action is dependent on the mind but independent of the nature of things, and so admits of being done or not done. This includes even mental actions like reflection and meditation on a deity, as are required to be done by the 'hoti' while he is saying 'magh', and the chief priest is engaged in making the offering (Ait. Brh. 3, 8, 1). Knowledge, on the other hand, is not dependent on the mind of man or the Vedic injunctions. It depends on the thing itself and is made available by perception. The difference between action and knowledge will be clear from the following example. Mindfulness on man and woman as fire (Chā. 3, 7, 1 | 3, 8, 1) is an action because it is dependent on the will of man and conveys a Vedic instruction. The idea of fire, on the other hand, constitutes knowledge because it refers to the actual perceived fire, and is not dependent on the mind of man or on some Vedic statement. The knowledge of Brahman too is in the same manner objectively real, that is, refers to Brahman alone and not to any human activity or Vedic instruction. The various imperative statements such as 'The Atman should be seen, meditated upon etc.' become as imperative as the edge of a razor when it is applied to a stone, because the Brahman, which is referred to by these statements, is not something which can be acquired or rejected. The only purpose

served by these imperative statements is that they enable us to turn our back against our common objects of life and desire, as also against our activity which is devoted in achieving them, and to enable us to direct our eye on the Ātman itself. That after the realization of the Ātman, there remains nothing to be achieved or expected, is no defect, but on the contrary, constitutes the strength of the Vedāntic position. It is the fulfilment of all our duty and the end of our life. "If one were to realize the Ātman and realize him as this very Puruṣa (Brahman) what and for whom will he wish anything and suffer in the body?" (Bṛ. 4, 4, 12), or as the Bhagavadgītā declares, such a person achieves the aim of his life. Brahman is not therefore expended as the object of any activity.

15. The opinion of those who, following Jaimini, say that there is no portion of the Vedas which does not recommend at prohibitory action, or which is not either meant to action, is not therefore only erroneous but is also the expression of blindness. For the Upanishadic description of the Puruṣa is only a statement of fact, and not a statement regarding any action. It is impossible to hold that the Upanishadic Puruṣa or Brahman, who is beyond birth and death, and who is unrelated to action which is involved in production, modification, acquisition and purification, does not exist or is not realized. His existence is implied by the very word 'Ātman' in the passage which tries to describe him negatively as 'not this', not that' (Bṛ. 3, 9, 16). To deny the Ātman is to post him, for otherwise the very denial would become impossible.

It will be wrong to suggest that the Ātman need not be known from the Upanishads, and that any body will be aware of it as the object of consciousness. For what people are aware of is not the Ātman, but the empirical soul. The Ātman of the Upanishads is the witness of the soul, the in-chief of all, the unchanging one and same to all. Knowledge about him cannot be had from

Karma-Kiṇya or Logic. He alone is imperishable among all perishable things, and so cannot be avoided, and being eternal, pure, intelligent and free, he is not like a thing which is to be got by effort. "There is nothing beyond the Puruṣa, He is the highest Good" (Ka. 1, 3, 11). He is referred to 'as taught in the Upanishads' (Bṛ. 3, 9, 26). This clearly shows that the main concern of the Upanishads is to teach the doctrine of the *Ātman*.

14. Now even if we take Jaimini's dictum that action alone is the support of the Veda, we shall find that within the domain of the Karma-Kiṇya portion itself, statements regarding 'karma' and 'dharma', such as 'One should sacrifice with "karma" or "sacrifice" as offering', will become meaningless. The words 'karma' and 'dharma' do not themselves indicate any action. If, on the other hand, it is contended that they have got all the meaning inasmuch as they form part of some action to be done, then why should we suppose that the Mīmāṃsā portion of the Veda which gives instruction about the eternally existing, unchanging *Ātman*, has no connection with some future event which necessarily follows as a result? Though *Ātman* itself is not a part of action or is not subservient to action, yet necessary result of the knowledge of the *Ātman* is the removal of false knowledge and of the consequent vices. The connection of a thing with action does not change that thing into action. Knowledge of things only as already existing facts is possible in both the spheres of Karma and Jñāna, and it is the common nature of both that they are necessarily connected with results peculiar to them.

Besides, if the dictum of Jaimini is pressed too far, some negative propositions from the Karma-Kiṇya itself which mentioned abstinence from action will have to be considered as useless, for they are themselves neither actions nor subservient to actions, and so appear to be mere statements of existing facts. But such a conclusion is not desirable. If it is urged that a negative statement may imply a positive statement over and above the

negation of some positive idea, then there would be no difference between actions which are enjoined and actions which are prohibited. The word 'not' in the statement, 'A Brahman should not be killed', has got the primary meaning of desisting from killing, and we should not be construed as merely having the secondary or the implied meaning, viz. of doing something else than killing, that is, showing respect to him. The negative particle merely indicates the non-existence of that action with which it is connected and not any new action, unless there is some special case. It is certain that the negative utter contributes an action. For example, in the *Pratipadashika*, the Brahman is asked not to eat the rising sun. Here, 'not to eat the rising sun' is not simply the absence of eating the rising sun, but constitutes a positive will to abstain by itself. But excepting such cases, the negative particle indicates a mental condition of the mind which arises on account of the negation of an action. It need not be maintained that this negation of the negation and the consequent mental condition of mind will last for a short time, and will again give rise to a desire to do the actions, for the fire is extinguished only when the fuel is burnt. Knowledge about the negation of an action will last destroy the desire for action and then destroy itself. In short, it is the mental condition of indifference to actions that constitutes the meaning of a negative proposition, and not an action which is contrary to some prohibited action. So if there be any part of the *Vedas* which is meaningless, it is that which has no other aim but to narrate some stories.

15. We have proved so far that Vedic statements regarding existing facts are not purposeless, even though they do not point to any action. They are of the type, 'This is a rope, not a snake', and are therefore purposeful in the way in which this proposition is as removing the fear of the snake. No doubt, one who has merely an intellectual understanding of the Brahman may be found engaged as before with the affairs of the world; but not

certainly one who has realized the Brahman. It is natural that a man who has fully identified himself with his body should suffer from the effects of misery and fear, but he will never suffer in this way if he once realizes, as the Vedas tell, that he himself is the Brahman. A person who feels grieved on account of his riches may mourn over the loss if he is robbed of them; but is it ever possible for a person to mourn over the loss if he has renounced the world and has given up his attachment for wealth? Similarly, a person may derive pleasure from ear-rings because he has the sense of ownership, but is it possible for him to have the same pleasure in ownership, once he casts away the ear-rings and feels no attachment to them? As the Gita tells, 'neither pleasure nor pain touches a man who has lost the egoism of his body' (CG 3, 12, 1).

16. As far the disembodied condition or *moksha* we have already said that it is eternal. One may perhaps say that the disembodied condition is possible after death, but that the *Atman* may again assume the body on account of the merits and demerits incurred by it. But the *Atman* is neither related with body nor with merit and demerit. To hold that the *Atman* is related to the body because of merit and demerit, and that it incurs merit and demerit because it has got a body, is to argue in a circle. To hold open that the body, on the one hand, and merit and demerit, on the other, are mutually related to each other as seed and tree, is to believe in a chain of blind men who will be unable to lead one another. No doubt, kings and great men are called authors of actions, although their servants do them for the sake of wealth. But there is no such link to establish the relation of master and servant between the *Atman* and the body. Hence there is no other reason for the embodied condition except the wrong notion that the soul has got a body. Hence too arises the egoism in the form of 'I am the performer of activities etc.' on account of the false knowledge that the 'I' is identified with the body.

17. Following the Prabhākara school, it need not also be said in this connection that the congeneracy of the *Ātman* as the body arises on account of the transference of the idea and the name of one thing to another thing because of certain characteristics which are common to both. The meaning of the transferred name is only secondary and not primary. On seeing the features and similar qualities of a man, he may be called a 'man' among men. But where there is no cognition of the two things as separate from each other, the transference occurs on account of error. In darkness, a post is taken for a man, thus appears silver on the shell; for there is no clear and distinct apprehension of the post or the shell. So the meaning of the term 'man' or of 'silver' does is transferred to the post or the shell is not the secondary meaning, but the primary meaning due to error. Similarly, the application of the word 'I' and of the consciousness of that 'I' to the body-complex arises on account of the ignorance of the difference between the body and the 'I'. In the absence of the knowledge of the difference between the two, there will necessarily be the absence of the transference of the secondary meaning (if any) from one to the other. So it is on account of superimposition or error that the word and the meaning of 'I' are transferred to the body. This error is not peculiar only to shepherds and common people, even learned men who know the distinction between the *Ātman* and the body, commit it.

All this goes to prove two things, (i) that the embodiedness of the *Ātman* is due to false notions, and (ii) that the disembodied condition as *mukta* can be experienced even while living. From the viewpoint of one who has realized the Brahman, 'the body is like the cut-off, dead slough of a snake, he himself, on the other hand, remains immortal, without the body, and becomes verily the Brahman and the Light' (Bg. 4, 4, 7). So perfect is the disembodied condition of such a person that he behaves 'as if he has neither eyes, nor ears, nor mind nor life.' The Bhagavadgītā too, while describing the characteristics of

a Schotengröße, tells us that one who has realized the Ātman is in no way connected with any kind of action. Then, it has been proved beyond doubt that one who has realized the Brahman never assumes to be Brahmin, nor one who clings to Brahmin has realized the Brahman.

18. Finally, the objection that Brahman does not constitute an independent topic of enquiry but a subsidiary one to Dharma-śāstra is also not true. Reflection and contemplation as well as listening to narrations about the nature of Brahman are for the purpose of realizing the Brahman, and not for some other purpose. Had Brahman been subservient to the process of meditation, it would have been incorporated in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā alone. At best, Jaimini would have made a separate chapter to deal with Brahman, as if it were an appendix to Dharma-śāstra, as he has done with reference to sacrifice and Samanya Dharma of his (P. 301 B. 4, 1, 2). But nowhere in Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is there any reference to the knowledge dealing with the identity of the Brahman and the Jīva; and hence it is appropriate to have a separate branch of study for dealing with the subject of Brahman.

Therefore all the precepts regarding action and all the means of knowledge have their utility so long as the knowledge, 'I am the Brahman', has not dawned. Once there arises the knowledge of this non-dual Ātman, that can neither be accepted nor rejected at the will of a man, there remains neither the subject as the knower, nor the object as the known, nor again the means of knowledge. Hence it is said: 'The moment one knows that he is really the Brahman, his secondary or false consciousness that he is related to his son or to his body drops down, and there remains nothing to be done by him.' The Ātman appears as the subject in relation to an object so long as it is not known in its true nature, but the moment the Ātman is known the person becomes one with the infinite Brahman.

५. निरूपणम् (५-११)

We have proved so far that the only aim and the sense of the Vedānta-passages is to make us aware of the fact that Brahman is the Self of everything, that it has no relation with action, and that, being omniscient and omnipotent, it is the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world. The Śūtrikṣas and other philologists, however, rely on inference and not on Śruti. And so they think that the Vedānta-passages which deal with the problem of creation point out that the cause of the world is the connection of prakṛti with Parāp. The followers of Rāṣiṣ think that God and the atoms are the efficient and the material causes of the world. Others now take their stand on Vedānta-passages and use fallacious arguments and objections. Against all these opponents it will be shown that the only aim of the Vedānta-passages is to impart the knowledge of the Brahman. The views of the opponents will therefore be propounded and refuted.

To state first the view of the Śūtrikṣas. Prakṛti is the cause of the world, though it is non-intelligent and consists of the three guṇas. It can be said to be omnipotent, because it has the power to produce all its effects, and it is omniscient because 'knowledge comes out of action' (B. G. 13, 14). This is borne out by the fact that the jīvas themselves become omniscient because they are endowed with body and senses (the effects of prakṛti), and possess the active quality of prakṛti in its highest degree. Even at the time of the dissolution of the world, when the three guṇas are in the condition of *śūnyatā*, the prakṛti has got the capacity for knowing all, in spite of its being non-intelligent. On the other hand, Brahman is incapable of having full or partial knowledge, for it is said to be solitary, devoid of body and other organs of sense and action, and though it is pure consciousness, it is conscious of nothing in particular. And what does omniscience of Brahman mean, except the

capacity for all knowledge as in the case of *pradhāna*? For if we mean by it a perpetual actual cognition of objects, *Pradhāna* will be robbed of its freedom to know, and if we mean by it transient cognitions, then it will be robbed of its eternal consciousness which is said to be its essence. Besides, being without the means of action, like the body and the senses, it can neither have knowledge nor be able to create this world. It can never be the cause of the world because it is one and homogeneous. As opposed to this, the *pradhāna* is capable of modifications. It consists of more elements than one, and may therefore be the cause of the world.

To show the Śāṅkhya reply :

॥**वदन्त्येवमस्मद्**॥ ५

[*It is said*—on account of saying, we—not ; *abolished*—not found in reality.]

BECAUSE 'EVAM' (AS EVERLASTING, THE *PRADHĀNA*) WHICH IS NOT FOUND IN THE *VĪDĀ*, IS NOT (THE CAUSE). 5

The *pradhāna* cannot be the cause of the world, for being non-intelligent, it cannot perform the act of "saying" which is mentioned in the *Śruti* as performed by the cause. The word "saying" does not refer simply to the meaning of the root 'Iṣ' (to say) but includes in it meanings of other words also which indicate possession of intelligence or knowledge, as the same manner in which the word "Iṣṭi" is used by lawyers to indicate any sacrifice. The word "thus" in the following passage refers to this world of names and forms as caused by the intelligent Brahman above. "Thus was, in the beginning, the one, non-dual Being; it saw within it the desire, 'to become many and produce much', and so created the five" (*Chāṅ* 6, 2, and 3). "Thus was in the beginning one *Ātman* alone, and nothing else had the capacity to move. He saw within him the desire to produce the worlds, and produced them" (*Ait. Br.* 1, 1, 1). In one place, it is the *Parāṇa* consisting of

so have been given freely by the sun, even so the 'seeing' of the Brahman is a free act impelled by its eternal cognition. The all-knowing Brahman 'sees', as is clear a statement about the freedom of the Brahman, as the statement the sun 'illuminates' about the freedom of the sun, even when there is no object to be seen or no object to be illuminated. And if at all the 'seeing' should grammatically require some object to be seen, it will be no other than the very names and forms of this world which were before creation present in the bosom of the Brahman as ideas to be seen or thought of. If the Yogin can have a perceptual knowledge of the past and the future on account of His grace, is it too much to suppose that He himself, the eternally pure, has an everlasting cognition of the creation, subsistence and dissolution of this world? Like luminosity of the sun, eternal knowledge, being itself the essential nature of Brahman, does not require the means of knowledge. Being bound by avidyā, the individual soul may require body and other instruments for the sake of having knowledge. But as the following mantras tell us, God is free from every hindrance to knowledge. 'He has neither body nor senses; neither is there anyone who is equal or superior to him; manifold and extraordinary is his power; and his actions are the natural result of his knowledge. Handless and holding fast the things, without feet and moving swift, without eyes and yet having sight, without ears and yet hearing, He knows all that is knowable, but nobody knows him, they call him the first and the great Puruṣa', (Sv. 6, 8, . 3, 16).

No doubt, the individual Jīva, though bound in avidyā is essentially not different from jīvan, 'other than whom, there is no other seer or knower' (Bṛ. 3, 2, 20). And yet, just as false notions arise regarding the existence of different portions of space on account of the existence of the limitations of things like jars and vessels in one

1. The names and instruments by which things are known, are themselves regarded themselves, besides can they be used as by instruments? Even so, the thing are "help-while Brahman is 'seer'" In other words, having their organs as help, they are inseparable.

space, even so there arises the false notion that the soul and God are different on account of the ignorance of the fact that the soul is attached to the limitations of body, and the senses. The Ātman is thus wrongly believed as the non-Ātman, and therefore, seizes the body and the senses for carrying on the affairs (lit. for 'seeing') of this world.

One may ask if the non-intelligent prakṛiti cannot be said to have 'seen' in the manner in which a hawk of a river is figuratively said to be wishing to fall. The prakṛiti too brings about the evolution of the universe as regularly, as a man should execute his plan of going to a village after taking his bath and dinner. Such a figurative use is made even in Śruti. 'The fire saw, the water saw' (Chā 6, 2, 3 ; 4). Or else, if the 'seeing' refers to Brahman, there too it must be taken as a figurative sense, because, in the context where it is used, it refers more than once to non-intelligent objects, such as fire and water.

To this the Śāstrakāra replies :

विचक्षेत्तद्वचनम् ॥६॥

[One should—intend, or—of, or—not, Anvayabodh—
an account of the word 'Ātman']

THE ACCIDENT OF THE WORD 'ĀTMAN' BEING APPLIED TO THE CAUSE THE MEANING (OF THE WORD 'ĀTMAN') IS NOT FICTITIOUS. 6

The Śruti passage which mentions the Sat (Being) as alone existing before the creation of this world, and as alone responsible for the creation of fire, water and earth on account of its 'seeing', mentions further that it was the divinity of Sat which thought of entering with its own jīvaśman into the other divinities of fire, water and earth and so evolving the world of names and forms (Chā 6, 2). If the 'seeing' as thought should refer in a figurative manner to the prakṛiti, then the word 'divinity' too

would refer to it, but in that case, how can 'Jivisman', which means both consciously and cryptologically the intelligent ruler of the body and the bearer of pain, be the conscious nature of the non-intelligent prakriti? But if by 'net' we mean the Brahman which does the act of 'seeing', not in a figurative or secondary manner, but literally or primarily, the use of the word Atman with reference to jiva will be intelligible. In a chapter of the Chândogyaopaniṣad (6, 8, 11, Svetakēśa is told that he is the Atman, and that all this is the Atman, the very subtle essence, the 'net' or the Puruṣa." As for fire and water, even though they are spoken of as possessing the 'seeing' in a figurative manner, and as being smaller deities, they are in reality non-intelligent and created objects having names and forms.

It may still be urged that the word 'Atman' may refer to prakriti, in the same figurative manner in which a king may say about his servants, Bhadrakarma, that he is his very soul. For the prakriti is useful in making the jiva reap the fruit of his actions or have his salvation, just as the minister of a king is useful to him in peace and war. Or the word 'Atman' may refer to both intelligent and non-intelligent beings, just as the word 'piti' indicates both a mother and a flame, and hence the 'seeing' may still be taken in a figurative meaning.

To this the Śāṅkhya replies :

तन्मिदं कर्मयोगेऽपि । ४

[Tannidam—of him who is devoted to Brahman ;
tannidam—on account of salutar being preserved.]

BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTION IS THAT ONE WHO IS DEVOTED TO BHĀ, GETS FINAL RELEASE, (THE WORD ATMAN CANNOT BE USED WITH REFERENCE TO PRAKṚTI).—7

The passage from the Chândogyaopaniṣad which tells us that the subtle Being (Net) is the Atman and which further expands the truth 'That thou art', is immediately

followed by another statement which tells us that the knowledge of the identity of the *jīva* and the *Ātman* or the *Sat* is achieved by one who has got a spiritual teacher, and that he becomes one with the *Ātman* after the fall of the body. This means that *mokṣa* is possible for one by being devoted to the *Sat* or the *Ātman*. If, on the other hand, the *Sat* were to refer to the *pradhāna*, it would mean that a conscious human being, who is hankering after *mokṣa* is asked to believe that he is nothing but the non-intelligent *pradhāna*. This would only mean that he would not only not have *mokṣa*, but also be bound all the more by the ties of *samsāra*. His condition will be no better than that of a blind person who, wishing to reach his home, is ill-advised to take hold of the tail of an ox, and who therefore, instead of reaching his home, is merely hurt by the drafts and stones on the way as he is carried away by the ox in any direction. Therefore it behoves us to say that the *Sūtra* passages contain instructions regarding the means to realize the *Ātman*, just as it may behave one to say that *Agnihotra* and other sacrifices are recommended as means to attain to heaven (Chā. 6, 8, 7, 6, 14, 3, 6, 16, 3). The conviction 'I am the Brahman', will lead one to *mokṣa* as surely as the holding fast of a red-hot iron without being burnt was once considered to be the means of making a man free from the pail of death. That the word '*Sat*' means the '*Ātman*' is then literally true and not merely in a figurative sense. Otherwise, like devotion to the '*idāna*' or the '*pīṇa*', it will yield only temporary result (Ait. Ār. 3, 1, 2, 6).

Sometimes, words are used in a figurative sense no doubt, for instance, the word '*Ātman*' in '*Īśādrasena* is my *Ātman*'. But to assimilate the belief, and to say that the word '*Ātman*' in '*I am the Ātman*' is used in a figurative sense, is to create confusion. Which meaning is intended on a particular occasion, must be settled by reference to the context or to the qualifying word. So if we are not to be confused, we must take the word '*Ātman*' in its literal sense with reference to sentient beings like *Jīvātmas*, or

with reference to their actions, such as the 'saying' performed by the Śac. But we should take it in the figurative sense with reference to non-existent things, such as the senses and elements. Again, the interpretation of the word 'jyoti' is no key to the interpretation of the word "Ātman". The word 'jyoti' has got the derivative meaning of 'manifest', because the suffix indicates the primary meaning of the word, viz. light or flame is it. The word 'Ātman', on the other hand, cannot be transferred with its meaning which is available with reference to sentient beings, to the non-sentient prakāśa, because there is nothing common between the sentient Brahman and the non-sentient prakāśa.

हेतुनाशकत्वम् । ८

[Hetuna—fact of being discarded], asau—there being no movement, ca—and.]

THERE BEING NO STATEMENT THAT IT IS TO BE DISCARDED (THE PRAKĀśA IS NOT MENTIONED IN THE WORD "Śac"), AND. 8

The word 'Śac' has not been used to denote the prakāśa, even as a preliminary step, so that it should denote afterwards the Brahman or the Ātman. Had it been so, Śaṅkara's father who wished to instruct his son regarding the nature of the subtle being or the Ātman, would have first asked him to discard the notion of the prakāśa being the Śac. But this has not been done. When the very small star of Arundhati is to be shown, the device adopted is to show first a bigger star now it as if it is the star of Arundhati, and then to direct the attention to the real star, thereby discarding the earlier false knowledge of the bigger star as Arundhati. But such a device has not been used in the case of the knowledge of the Ātman. The false notion of the prakāśa as the Śac has not been introduced first and discarded later, so that it should be an aid to the understanding of Śaṅkara that Ātman alone is the Śac or the real being.

The sixth adhikya of the Chāndogyaopaniṣad deals with the direct statement of the Ātman as the real Being.

Even if the problem is believed to be rejected, the word 'sat' in the Sūtra indicates that there would arise the additional defect of contradiction in the earlier statement, viz. the cause being known, everything else becomes known. For the sixth adhikya begins with the statement of the question as to what it is which when known enables one to know what is originally never known, hear what is never heard, and realize what is never reached. And the reply is given by saying that to know the clay is the cause is to know everything that is made out of clay, for all the modifications of clay are mere distinctions in name which have their origin in speech and not in clay as such. The truth is that all these modifications are clay only (Chā 6, 1, 3-6). If the word *sat* were coordinate problem, then the knowledge of problem in the cause would have given us the knowledge of the individual soul. But this does not happen, because the souls which are without cause by the effects of the non-existent problem. Therefore the word 'sat' does not mean problem.

A further reason why 'Sat' does not mean Problem.

साधकम् ११

[*Sat*—Ātman ; *apāyati*—on account of absorption.]

ON ACCOUNT OF (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) ENTERING INTO THE ĀTMAN, (THE WORD 'SAT' DOES NOT MEAN THE PROBLEM). 9

It is with reference to the cause which is denoted by the word 'sat' that it is said that the individual soul becomes one with the 'sat' during sleep (Chā 6, 8, 1). In the waking state, the soul apprehends the objects intellectually and becomes endowed with the consciousness of the body. The same soul goes by the name of the 'mind' when the person dreams on account of the desires which only are left behind. But when he becomes

devoid of the two conditions, that is, when there are neither the external objects, nor the body, nor the senses, nor even the dream of which he should be conscious, he is said to sleep or enter, as if, as his true being was the Ātman. This interpretation of the word "Śuṣupti" (he sleeps) as 'Brahm apito bhāvanā' (becomes absorbed in the Ātman) is analogous to the interpretation of the word "Hṛdaya" (heart) as 'hṛdi apito Ātma' (the Ātman is in the heart. Chā. 4, 3, 2). Similarly, again, the words "āśayā" and "āśayā" are explained as 'water which carries the food eaten by him' (āśayā), 'see which carries away what has been drunk (āśayā) by him (Chā. 4, 3, 2). So it is impossible that the conscious Ātman will be resolved in the non-conscious prakṛti. Even if the word "Śu" were to denote, not necessarily Ātman, but prakṛti as 'belonging to the Ātman,' there would be the same defect of the conscious being mixed up with the non-conscious. The soul then, "unmixed as he is by the conscious Ātman, knows nothing inside or outside" during sleep (Bṛ. 4, 3, 21), and so, it is not prakṛti, but the conscious Ātman alone which is the cause of the world, which is indicated by the word "Śu" and in which all creatures beings go for rest.

Prakṛti is not the cause for a further reason :

वृत्तिप्रमाणम् : १०

[Cause—knowledge : *āśayā*—on account of similarity.]

On account of the similarity of objects (indicated in Sanskrit *Āśayā*), Brahman is the cause, and not prakṛti. 10

Had the Vedānta-passages contradicted each other as the arguments of the logicians do, then it would have been plausible to hold that the cause of the world is either the intelligent Brahman or the non-intelligent prakṛti or something else. But there is the unanimous declaration that the intelligent Brahman alone is the cause.

Compare for instance : "Just as sparks emanate from fire in all directions, even so, from the Ātman proceed the planets, and from planets the gods, and from gods the world" (Kā. 3, 3). "From the Ātman has come forth the Īlīm" (Tā. 2, 1). "All this has come out of the Ātman" (Chā. 7, 26, 1). "From Ātman alone proceeds the planets," (Pā. 1, 3). So, just as the eyes of different men agree in having the same knowledge regarding colour, even so the verses expressed in different Vedānta passages agree in holding the conscious Ātman or Brahman as the cause of the world. And the consensus of opinion is certainly a powerful argument.

A further reason in support of the conscious Brahman as the cause of the world :

सुखायाम् । ११

[*Sukhāt—being mentioned in the Veda, is—and*]

AND BECAUSE IT IS MENTIONED IN ŚĀNTI (THAT THE ALL-KNOWING BRAHMAN IS THE CAUSE). 11

The manuscript of the Śvetāśvatara tells us that "He alone, the all-knowing God, indicated by the word 'Bṛ' is the cause and the Lord of lords, while there is none else who can be said to have produced him or be his lord" (8, 9). This means that the conscious Brahman alone is the cause of the world.

५ अनन्दमादिशब्दम् । (११-१२)

In the above and in the preceding nine Śūtras, what we have been showing by the help of suitable arguments is that the various Vedānta passages are at proving that the all-knowing and the all-powerful God is the cause of the origin, sustenance and dissolution of the world. The purpose of the remaining Śūtra is to show that Brahman assumes two forms, one without limitations as the object of knowledge, and the other with limitations as the object

of devotion. Consider the following 'where there appears duality, one sees the other'; but when one becomes identified with the Ātman, who should see whom? (Bh. 4, 3, 13). 'When one sees nothing but the Ātman, hears or knows nothing but the Ātman, he is the greatest; but where one sees or hears or knows something else, it is a little thing; he who is the greatest attains immortality, everything little is perishable' (Chh. 7, 24, 1). 'Having created all, the wise Being names them and calls them by their names' (Tis. Ar. 3, 12, 7). 'He is without limbs or organs, without any blemish or defect, unperturbed, unaffected, the bridge of salvation, and is like fire which has consumed the fuel of avidyā' (Sre. 6, 16). 'Not this, nor that' (Bh. 2, 3, 6). 'It is neither gross nor subtle' (Bh. 3, 4, 6). 'Perfect is not devoid, imperfect the other'. All these and several other passages show that Brahman as the object of knowledge differs from Brahman as the object of devotion. The latter however is the result of avidyā. So long as avidyā lasts, there arise different forms of devotion which either aim at prosperity, success in works or gradual liberation. 'As a man worships, so he becomes' (Chh. 3, 14, 1). 'Whoever one remembers at the time of death, he attains that' (B. G. 8, 9). 'Though the Ātman is eternal, unchanging, uniform and hidden in all the movable and immovable things, he becomes manifest in proportion to the degree of the excellence of the mind, and being endowed with power, dignity and glory' (Ait. Ar. 3, 3, 21, B. G. 10, 41) becomes an object of worship. Similarly, in the Brahmasūtras too (B. 1, 28 and 1, 1, 22), the colourless golden person who appears on the disc of the sun as well as the Ākṣita are declared to be the highest Being.

Thus, though Ārādhana is the immediate cause of mādya, it must be settled whether it refers to Saguna or to Nirguna Brahman, and whether Brahman is the object of knowledge or of devotion. The sūtras will solve this problem, as also incidentally explain in

the remaining Sūtras the earlier point than Brahman, and not *pradhāna*, is the cause of the world.

आनन्दमयोऽन्मयात्मा । १२

[*Anandamaya*—a being full of bliss, *anānāda*—because of repetition.]

ANANDAMAYA (MEANS THE BLISSFUL) ANĀNĀDA (THE WORD ANĀNĀDA, AN INFINITE BRAHMAN) IS REPEATED 12

After having mentioned in subsection several *ānāmas* consisting of food, prāṇa, mind and intelligence, the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* tells us that the innermost *Ātman* consists of bliss (2, 1, 3). The question to be solved in the connection is whether *anandamaya* *Ātman* is the Brahman itself, the Being which is already pointed out as *satya*, knowledge and *ananta*, or like the self of food, prāṇa etc., it is different from the Brahman. The *pūrvaśaṅka* contends that it is *prajñāna* only and not Brahman, because, in the first place, the *anandamaya* comes last in the series of lower states such as those that are made up of food etc., secondly, even though immortal, it has joy etc. as its *śakti*, e.g. "joy is its *śakti*"; and thirdly, it has, unlike the Brahman, the body viz. the preceding *ānāma* made up of intelligence (The 1, 4).

In reply to this, it is to be said that *anandamaya* means the highest *Ātman* alone, for it is in this sense that the word 'ananda' has been repeatedly used; e.g. after introducing the topic of *anandamaya* as an embodied one, it is further said to constitute the cause of *saṃsāra* (*śrāva*). It is after getting this *śānti* that one finds the bliss; if this bliss be not in the *śakti* of the heart, who would be able to breathe? He alone makes one enjoy the bliss, and the test of this bliss of the Brahman is that one who gets it does not fear anything, but reaches the *Ātman* and realises that *Bliss* itself is the Brahman (The 2, 75; 3, 8). Again we have 'knowledge and bliss are Brahman' (The 3, 9, 28). So the word *Bliss* is

"Isanda" is repeatedly used for Brahman; hence we say that "Isandamaya" Atman is Brahman only.

As for the objections, we say that they have no force. In the first place, the Isandamaya Atman is the innermost reality of all, beyond which no other Atman is mentioned. The most ignorant of the people understood by the Atman the body which is made up of food. So in order to raise the understanding of the common run of people, the Atman is first shown to be that which is un-former; then another un-former of the same shape but more real because inner than the first; then another still of the same shape, but much more real because inner than the second, and so on, till the innermost Atman which consists of Isanda only is finally shown as the real one. Just as the very small star of Arundhati is shown last of all, after having first shown the bigger ones in the neighbourhood as aids to the eye-sight, even so the un-Atmans made up of food, gills, etc. are shown in succession in order that people of ordinary intelligence may gradually eliminate the false Atmans, and posit the innermost Atman consisting of Isanda as the only reality. Secondly, to speak of this Atman as "having the head of joy" or the "body of intelligence" is but an imagination. The language of "head" and "body" is used with reference to this Atman, because it is mentioned as the last link of the chain. Otherwise it has neither body nor head as the politician has. *Isandamaya* Atman is truer than the Brahman or the highest Atman.

निवृत्तव्यवस्थेति चेन्न बहुवचनम् । १४

[*Vivṛtāvasthah*—due to word denoting modification, *na*, *na*, *na*—*q*, *na*, *pratyakṣah*—due to abundance.]

IF IT BE SAID (THAT *Isandamaya*) DOES NOT DENOTE THE HIGHEST ATMAN, BECAUSE IT IS A WORD DENOTING MODIFICATION, (YET IT IS) NOT SO, (THE MEANING OF THE ADJ. "HEAD") BEING ABUNDANCE. 14

If the affix 'māya' is used to change the meaning of the original word, then the word *brahmadāya* may mean 'made up of' or 'consisting of' *brahmas*, just as the word "*annadāya*" means "made up of food". The objection however is not valid, because 'māya', as Pāṇini tells us, (Pā 8-3, 4, 21) may mean 'abundance' also. In "*annadāya yajña*" e.g., the word "*annadāya*" means 'abounding in food', and so *annadāya-yajña* means a sacrifice in which there is plenty of food. Similarly, "*brahmadāya*" means 'abounding in bliss', and so *brahmadāya-ātman* means Brahman itself as abounding in bliss. That the bliss of Brahman knows no measure is seen from the passage in the *Tattvadeśanaka* (2, 8), where the several blisses beginning with the bliss of man and ending with the bliss of Brahman are measured according to degree, each bliss being made up of hundred blisses of the preceding being.

सद्वैकुण्ठकृतैश्च । १४

[Tat., *śiva*—cause, *vyaśakṣit*—because it is mentioned]

BECAUSE (BRAHMAN) IS MENTIONED AS THE CAUSE OF (THE SUN, THE AFFIX "MĀYA" BEING APPLIED). 14

Just as a person who makes others rich must himself possess abundant wealth, even so the Ātman who 'causes bliss' (Tat. 7) himself must abound in bliss. As 'māya' means 'abundance' '*brahmadāya*' means therefore the highest Ātman only.

वायव्यमूर्तिर्यत्र च सौम्ये । १५

[*Śāntarāśtrāḥ*—as in *śānta*, etc., or, *śānta*—peace]

(*Śāntarāśtra* IS BRAHMAN BECAUSE) THE HIGHEST (BRAHMAN) WHICH HAS BEEN MENTIONED IN THE MĀNTA IS MENTIONED (IN THE BĀHMANA). 15

The mantra and the Brâhmana portions of the Taittiriya-sûtra (Ch. 1, and 2) do not contradict by dealing with two different topics, but are consistent with each other in referring to the same Brahman. The mantra which first introduces the topic of Brahman by saying 'one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman,' describes it further as truth, intelligence and identity, as giving birth to things and other elements, and to all movable and immovable things, and as making made the being, and finally as being the innermost Atman of the series of other atoms. The same Brahman is spoken of by the Brâhmana¹ as 'anandamaya' and as being the innermost of all. Besides the vedya known as Biligyal Vâkyal centre round this 'anandamaya', and beyond this there is no mention of any other Atman. Therefore anandamaya alone is the highest Atman.

वेदोऽन्यदनेन । ११

[Nô—net, ane—the other, anapamâj—because not found.]

(ANANDAMAYA IS) NOT THE OTHER (ALL THE VEDYAS) BECAUSE (THINGS) DO NOT FOLLOW. 11

With reference to anandamaya it is said, 'He wished to become many and to produce (the world); he made a person and created this all' (Tait. 2, 4). Now it is impossible for the individual soul or for any other being except the highest Atman to think, in the first place, about things to be created during this disembodied condition, and secondly, to create the things so much a way as will be non-different from himself.

वेदोऽन्यदनेन । १२

[Etha—difference; anyadâj—being pointed out, or—and.]

1 The Brahman which is described as 'anandamaya' in the Brâhmana portion of the Upanishad (Tait. 2, 4) appears in the Rigveda as also described in the same manner in the earlier portions (Tait. 1, 1) known as Mantras.

AND BECAUSE THE DIFFERENCE IS POINTED OUT (THE JAGADGURU IS NOT THE JĀṬHUR). 17

The Tattvaśopāṅga tells us (2, 7) that the individual soul gets the bliss of the Ātman after it first gets the taste of the Ātman, for the Ātman is described as bliss itself and as flavour (rasa). It is clear that the attainer and the attained cannot be one and the same. No doubt, Śiva and Brahmā recommend the search of the Ātman, as there is nothing higher than the knowledge of the Ātman. In reality, the Ātman is in its own nature, Ātman alone. 'There is no other root or hearer than the highest Lord' (Bg. 3, 3, 38), and hence no search of it is possible. Yet, in common experience owing to ignorance, the Ātman is identified with the non-Ātman like body, senses etc., and so it is possible to say that the Ātman is to be searched or heard or attained.

The jīvanmukta who is really not different from God (Ātman) is unreal. He is the product of avidyā, and being embodied is responsible for his actions and the results thereof. The eternal cannot be said of God. We cannot say that God is unreal because he is identified with the jīvanmukta, for he is the ground of avidyā. Just as a propound is the cause or support of an unreal prototype of him who climbs up a rope and holds a shield and a sword in his hands, or just as the unlabeled Śiṣya being leaned by the adjuster of a jar appears distinct from the Śiṣya in the jar, even so the Lord is different from the jīvanmukta, inasmuch as he is not only real but the support or the ground of the illusory nature of the jīva.

कामाक्षी नानुवाचोक्त । ६८

[Kāmāksī—that so-called, ca—and, na—not, anavasthāpita—established, āpti—attainment of experience.]

AND ON ACCOUNT OF MERE (MIND) ESTABLISHED BY JAGADGURU'S) NO MINDFUL OF IMPAIRING (THE PRASĀDĪNA). 18

The desire on the part of brahmanya to 'become many and to create' (Tā. 2, 6) precludes the possibility of the non-intelligent prakṛiti being the cause of the world, or being the same as brahmanya. The refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine was already done in the Sūtra 1. 1. 1, but is again insistently done here to show that the Vedānta-passages are uniform in the view that Brahman is the cause of the world. Desire and 'saṃśāda' cannot belong to prakṛiti even in a figurative manner.

ब्रह्मिण्यस्य च लोके वासि । १९.

[Aśvat—in that ; aśva—of that ; ca—and ; tadgataḥ—united-with that ; (ast)—travels.]

BEFORE, WITHIN THE (ĀRABHAKṢA, THE CAUSE OF THE (PHENOMENAL) WORLD) IS TRAVEL. 19

Besides, the brahmanya does not denote the prakṛiti or the jīva, because the jīva obtains salvation when it is joined or identified with the brahmanya. The jīva, we are told, 'becomes fearless when he is lodged in that trouble, inseparable, undefinable, unsupported and fearless Ātman, but the moment he feels himself even slightly away from the Ātman he encounters the fire of suffering' (Tā. 2, 7).

We must have our own say, however, as the connection (lie or against the view of the Vyākaraṇa regarding the meaning of the word saṃśādaḥ). How can the affix 'many' mean 'modification' or 'product' when it is added on to words such, priya, manas and Vyākaraṇa, and manas, all of a sudden, 'abundance,' when it is added on to the word brahmanya in the same context? The words beginning with ananyaya and ending with brahmanya form one series, and accordingly show it that only the last word of the series refers to Brahman? This is like supposing that a certain body consists partly

of an old lady and partly of a young lady. We grant that Brahman is the chief topic of discussion (Tat. Chapter 2) but, in that case, if 'brahmanaya' were to denote the Brahman, 'anandaya' etc. two, would denote it. It may be said that brahmanaya points to Brahman because while other atoms such as anandaya etc. have, each one of them, a further atom beyond it, there is no such atom beyond brahmanaya. But in The Tattvayogopaniṣad itself (2, 5) it is said with reference to brahmanaya that 'joy is its head, satisfaction is its right wing, delight is its left wing, knowledge (jñāna) is its seat, and Brahman is its tail and support.' The same Brahman which is mentioned as truth, knowledge and reality is mentioned here as the tail and support; and it is to have the knowledge of this Brahman, that the imaginary description of the five sheaths, from anandaya to khandanaya, is given. In saying therefore that brahmanaya does not mean Brahman, but that the tail of brahmanaya is the Brahman, we are not leaving (as the Vyākṛtīn suppose us to do) the original and main context of the description of Brahman, and introducing the new topic of describing the five as brahmanaya. ३६१६३

Now, the description of Brahman as mere matter or the tail of the brahmanaya may be said to reduce it to a subordinate position, and so if we are to stick to the context, once again, the brahmanaya may be regarded as the true Brahman. But this is to consider one and the same Brahman as at once the whole, viz. the brahmanaya, and as a mere part thereof viz. the tail. If we are to get away from this contradiction, we must locate the mention of Brahman either in the sentence referring to brahmanaya or in the sentence referring to the tail of it. The word 'Brahman' occurs in the latter sentence and not in the former, and as it is proper to say that the subject-matter of Brahman is chiefly, and not subordinately mentioned in the sentence referring to the tail, and that brahmanaya denotes dejected Brahman at all,



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D A T. VI

Our conclusion that Brahman is treated as the chief subject-matter in the sentence, 'Brahman is the real and the support,' gains strength by what is told in the verse which immediately follows it, viz., 'If he knows the Brahman as non-existent, he himself becomes non-existent; if he knows it as existing, he himself becomes so' (Thu. 3, 6). Without any reference to *brahmanya* which is known to all, this verse tells us what one may gain or lose, if one only knows the being or the non-being of Brahman. The word 'real' is not to be taken literally and construed as merely a member; it is to be taken in the sense of support or resting-place of all the *brahms* known to the world. As the *Ugahad-Brupada* says, 'All the created beings live only on a very small portion of that Brahmanic *brahms*' (U. 3, 33).

Notwithstanding the above, if we are to consider the *brahmanya* as Brahman, then because it is endowed with qualities like joy etc. as its members, we shall have to consider it as *satvika* or *saguna* Brahman, as opposed to *nirvika* or *nirguna* Brahman, "from which the speech and mind turn away being unable to comprehend it. One who gets the *brahms* of that Brahman fears nothing" (Thu. 3, 5). Besides, '*brahmanya* abheda' as *bheda* means that it contains a little measure of gun-*tan*. But to hold that view about Brahman is to hold it in contradiction to another *Śruti* passage which tells us that "that is *brahms* or Brahman where nothing else is heard, seen or known" (Thu. 3, 24, 1). Moreover, as joy differs from man to man, the *brahmanya* too will be different. Brahman, on the other hand, is 'undivisible, truth and knowledge and as cannot be divided' (Thu. 3, 1). 'It is the all-pervading God, the hidden inner Atman of all beings' (Sya. 6, 11). It is to be noted again that it is not the word *brahmanya* but the word *brahms* which is repeated, (as we have already seen in Sūtra 12), and that the word '*brahms*' stands for Brahman as clear from *Taittiriya* as well as other *Upanishads* (Thu. 2, 7, 2, 8, 2, 9, 3, 4, Bg. 3, 9, 18). It does not stand for

ānandamaya, which, as we have seen, is not Brahman. The passage in which the full word 'ānandamaya' is repeated only tells us that it too, like other preceding adjectives such as 'anāmaya' etc., is to be discarded. No doubt the stage of ānandamaya is to be attained in order to reach the Brahman. The passage, 'Let me be many, let me create,' (Tis. 2, 6) is never the sentence which refers to Brahman as the tail and support (Tis. 2, 3) than to the sentence which refers to ānandamaya, and so does not tell us that ānandamaya is the Brahman. Similarly, 'He is one,' (Tis. 2, 3) refers to Brahman and not to ānandamaya.

As for the objection that Brahman is the neuter gender is referred to by the masculine pronoun 'he' in the sentence, 'He wishes to become many,' we reply that the masculine word *Ātman* means 'from that Ātman has come forth *idam*' (Tis. 2, 1) refers to Brahman, or *idam* is Brahman is the subject-matter of the chapter. As for the word 'ānanda' mentioned in the *Philosophical Vākyā Vidyā*, in the sentence 'He realized ānanda as Brahman' (Tis. 2, 6), it denotes Brahman alone because there is neither the affix 'maya' nor any mention of the limbs such as joy as 'head' etc. Nowhere in the chapter is there any intention to refer to the *anagata* Brahman having qualities or members, on the contrary, as already said, it runs as having the knowledge of *anagata* Brahman which transcends speech and mind. The conclusion therefore is that the affix 'maya' does not mean 'abundance' but means only modification or product, and so ānandamaya like 'anāmaya' etc., does not refer to Brahman.

The *Sūtra* should therefore, be explained as follows: *Sūtra 12*—Brahman is the chief and not subordinate subject-matter, as is clear from its reference as the tail

1. In other words it is to be discarded only to be discarded, just as the present subject-matter is the subject only to be discarded as subject of logical sense. The sentence, however, is to be reached only to be discarded by support of the tail and support. i.e. 46. (Newidge Ballman).

and support of the *śrādhakarmas* (Tat. 1, 5) and from the repetition of the word 'Brahman' in the immediately following verse, 'he becomes himself constant or permanent who knows Brahman to be so' (Tat. 2, 6). Sūtra 13—If Brahman is not to be considered as the chief topic on account of the word 'maya' meaning 'modification' or member (the tail e.g.), then the meaning 'abundance' too can be construed as standing for a group of members (such as head, wings, etc.). But the word 'tail' is not to be taken literally as a member, but as a sign for Brahman, which is the real support of all. Sūtra 14—Brahman is said to have 'crossed all that exists' (Tat. 2, 6), all the modifications including the '*śrādhakarmas*.' Being itself the cause of '*śrādhakarmas*,' it cannot be said to be at the same time only a member of that *śrādhakarmas*. So also other *śāstras* refer to Brahman alone and not to *śrādhakarmas*.

ॐ श्रद्धाविशेषम् । (१.-११)

श्रद्धादन्वीकरोष्वम् । २०

[Anuśt—*śraddhā* : tail-*śraddhā*-*upadāśā*—the qualities being mentioned.]

THE STRAIN APPEARING IN (THE END OF THE LINE AND IN THE FIVE IN THE SECOND LINE), BEHAVES THE QUALITIES ARE MENTIONED. 20

In a passage of the *Chandogyaopaniṣad* (1, 6, 6), we are told that "the person seen on the sun has bright golden beard and hair, and appears golden in the very

[Sūtra 13—If the *śraddhā* and the *śrādhakarma* persons are not to be considered, then Brahman is the chief subject matter in the *śrādhakarma* or the passage relating to the tail (and not merely as a member) as seen in the words, 'Brahman is Brahman, the tail, is not the Brahman or Brahman.' Sūtra 14—Brahman is not *śrādhakarma*, because the *śrādhakarma* is mentioned. Sūtra 15—It is not proper to infer that because Brahman is mentioned in the first verse and in the *śrādhakarma* passage in the same or *śrādhakarma* which is mentioned in the third, the last of the verse of '*śrādhakarma*.' 'no' in the *śrādhakarma*. For the other '*śrādhakarma*' meaning modification in the word '*śraddhā*,' says that we have the *śrādhakarma*. Sūtra 16—What is stated is that Brahman is declared in the tail. This is clear from what *śraddhā* tells us, the *śrādhakarma* person becomes one with Brahman, the person is his the knowledge of it.

type of his will, that his name is 'Uṭ' inasmuch as he is free from every kind of evil, and that one who knows this becomes himself likewise free from evil." And we are further told that the 'same person' is seen in the eye' (1, 7, 3). The question which arises here is whether this person who is recommended as the object of devotion is merely an individual soul who has raised himself to eminence on account of knowledge and good actions, or whether he is the perfect and eternal God.

From the viewpoint of the pārapakṣa, the person in question is the individual soul for the following reasons. In the first place, the person is described as having some form and features, such as golden beard etc.; the highest God, on the other hand, is spoken of as "impenetrable and without form, sound, or touch" (Kos. 1.3.23). Secondly, the man and woman are mentioned as the abode about the abode of God. Śaṅkaraśāstrī tells Nārada that "He lives in his own glory, and that he is all-pervading and eternal like the ākāśa" (Chā. 7, 24, 1). And thirdly, the limit of the power of the person in the sun is indicated by saying that he is the lord of the people beyond the sun and of the devas of gods. Similarly, the power of the person in the eye is indicated by saying that he is the lord of the people below it and of the devas of men. On the other hand, "unlimited is the power of God. He is the Lord and protector of all beings, and acts like a bridge or hand, so that the worlds may not come to a chaos" (Bṛ. 4, 4, 23).

In reply to this we say that the person on the sun must be God and not person, because the qualities of God alone are mentioned. In the first place, the person in the sun is named 'Uṭ' and declared to be free from all evil; the same name then is extended to the person in the eye. This freedom from all evil is the characteristic of the highest Ātman alone (Chā. 8, 1, 1). Secondly, the person in the eye who is declared to be "Ek, Eśvara, Uṭtha, Yajna, and Sakṣaṇa," is no other than the highest

God, for it is God alone who is the inner Ātman and the cause of all. Besides, having just mentioned with reference to gods and men that the Rā and Śīman of each are the earth, fire, air and speech, breath etc. respectively, it is further said that with reference to both the gods and men, the Rā and Śīman are the points of the feet of the two persons in the ear and the eye. (Chā. 1, 6, 8 and 1, 7, 3) This description too of the *śābhadra* and the *śābhadra* types of devotion¹ is applicable to the highest Ātman alone, on account of his being all-pervading. Similarly, the passage which tells us that 'people who sing unto Him as the Vāsa become wealthy' (Chā. 1, 7, 6) refers again to the same God, for as the Bhagavadgītā tells us, 'whatever wealth, power, or strength one may have, it is produced from a portion of his glory' (10, 41).

As to the features and golden form of the person, we have to remark that God may assume, on account of his *līlā*, any form for the sake of showing his grace to his devotees. When the imperishable Brahman is described as without form, sound or touch, it is the negative aspect of it (Kā. 1, 1, 13), but for the sake of devotion the same may be described as *śyāma*, as 'having all colours, scents, tastes and tastes' (Chā. 1, 14, 2). Similarly, the Ātman who resides in his own glory, may be described as having an shade like the sun or the eye for the sake of devotion, or be described as having limits to his power and glory, in order to make him accessible to gods and men.

देवमर्षेयान्मानवः । २१

[*Deva*—deities; *arṣeṇa*—being mentioned; *ca-* and, *anyathā*—another.]

1. In the beginning of the Chāndogya-sūtra, the *līlā* or the *līlā* of the *śābhadra* which is the cause of all the *līlā* is described as the *śābhadra* of the *śābhadra*. Here, *śābhadra* is the *śābhadra*. *Śyāma* and *śyāma*, for example, which are the *śābhadra* of the *śābhadra*, as the *śābhadra* of the *śābhadra* and the *śābhadra* and the *śābhadra*, as the *śābhadra* of the *śābhadra*.

ON ACCOUNT OF THE DISTINCTION BEING MENTIONED (THE STAFF WHO APPEARS ON THE SUN IS KNOWN) FROM THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL ABIDING IN THE BODY OF THE SUN. 2

The Bhodāśāmpaka passage is clear on this point. 'He who dwells in the sun but whom the sun does not know, who lives inside the body of the sun and controls him, is the Ātman who lives in you too, pale and is immortal' (A. 3, 5). The Ātman who resides and rules from within is different from the individual soul as well as different from the body, whether in the case of the sun or of man.

अकारणमद्वयमविविक्तम् । (११)

अकारणमविज्ञम् । ११

[*Ākāraṁ*, *at—dāt*, *hant—on account of signs*]

ON ACCOUNT OF THE CHARACTERISTIC MARKS (OF BRAHMAN BEING MENTIONED) THE *Ākāra* (IN BRAHMAN). 21

On being asked by Jñānasya, a Brahmin, as to what the support of these worlds may be, the king Prañishva Jivāli replied (we are told in the Chāndogyaopaniṣad 1, 8, 1), that it is *ākāśa*, for it is out of this that all the beings have come forth and into this they shall return. *Ākāśa* alone is the greatest of all and is their support. There arises now a doubt as to the meaning of the word *ākāśa*. Is it to be taken in the sense of element or Brahman? The former meaning is well-known, but the latter too is possible, as, for instance, in the passages. 'If this *ākāśa* is not the same as *ānanda* etc.' (Tm. 2, 7), '*ākāśa* is the cause of this world consisting of names and forms; it is the Brahman in which names and forms appear' (Chā. 8, 14, 1). In the first passage, the extraordinary quality '*ānanda*' is mentioned, on account of which, *ākāśa* is taken to mean Brahman and not the element in which there is no possibility of *ānanda*, as that second, the principal sentence involves the word Brahman as a substitute for *ākāśa*. Therefore

it is that there arises the doubt as to whether the word *Ikita* means the element or the Brahman.

The paragraph states thatasmuch as the primary sense of the word *Ikita* comes readily to the mind, we need not take it to have the secondary meaning of Brahman. That all these beings come from *Ikita* can very well be explained without recourse to Brahman by reference to the element itself; for after the 'coming forth of *Ikita* from the *Āman*', we are told that 'from *Ikita* itself comes forth air, from air fire, etc.' (The 1, 2). And with reference to other beings below it, viz. air, fire, water, etc. *Ikita*, the element, can be considered as the greatest and as the shade of all.

To this we reply that the characteristic marks which are mentioned are applicable to Brahman alone. In the first place, all the Vedānta-passages agree with the above mentioned statement of the Uliology-*śāstra*, viz. 'all these beings spring forth from *Ikita* only' (1, 2, 3). If the element of '*Ikita*' be considered as the cause of wind, fire, etc., wind too can be considered as the cause of fire, water, etc., and fire too in its turn, be considered as the cause of water, earth, etc., and and the word 'only' would lose all its meaning. But if by *Ikita* we mean Brahman, the word 'only' will exclude all other lower causes like the elements of *Ikita*, wind and others, and restrict the word '*Ikita*' to Brahman only as the cause of all beings, including the element of *Ikita*. Secondly, the word 'all' in the above passage would unnecessarily narrow down the meaning to 'beings except the element of *Ikita*,' if the element and not Brahman is to be taken as the proper meaning. Secondly, the clause, 'they return into the *Ikita*,' likewise points to Brahman alone. Thirdly, not only Brahman alone is, relatively greater, just as the element of *Ikita* is with reference to wind, fire, etc., but is absolutely greater than all; for the *Āman* alone is said to be 'greater than the earth, the sky, the heaven, and all these worlds' (Chā. 3, 14, 3). Fourthly, the

Accon alone can be said to be the final support and resting place of all, because it is the ultimate cause of all, the Brahman is knowledge, and *Isanda*; it is the abode of rest for him who gives alone and wealth' (Bg. 1. 9. 20). And finally, the *Itita* is mentioned as infinite which is an additional exclusive characteristic of Brahman. When Datta and Sribharya were engaged in discussion with the king Jurek as to what may be the support of the *On* or the *Udgita* which comes at the beginning of *Samarveda*, Datta declared that it was heaven. Sribharya pointed out objection that it must be the earth, because the harvest now is gathered on account of the actions performed on the earth. But being dissatisfied with the views of both of the brahmins, Jurek said to Sribharya that his view too about the *Itita* was wrong, because the earth and the objects on it had all sprung up from *Itita*. Now, if by *Itita* we are to mean the elemental substance, then Jurek too stands self-contradicted, inasmuch as he commits the same error of pointing out a perishable thing as the support, as was committed by Sribharya. The object is only to preclude the possibility of *Itita* being understood as the element. Jurek brings it under the concept of *On* and declares that it is this *On* or the *Udgita* with the eternal *Atita* as its basis, which 'is the greatest of all, and which is endless' (Iti. 1, 8, 8). In other words, the *Udgita* was stationary, infinite and greatest on account of *Atita* or Brahman which alone has got these characteristics.

So, on view of all the prominent marks of Brahman which are presented to the mind in the principal chapters of the *Upanishads* passages cited above, we need not stick to the view that the original meaning of the word '*Itita*' as 'an element' should alone be taken because it comes readily to the mind. It will be more appropriate to take the secondary meaning of the word as Brahman, as noted above. Besides, synonyms used for *Itita*, such as '*Vyoman*' and '*Kha*' are used for Brahman, and so it is not a rule that *Itita* must always mean the

elemental substance. For instance, 'Bh and all other Vedas, as well as all the gods are secret in the highest and the imperishable system or *Ekim*,' (Bh. Sat. 1, 264 B). 'This knowledge, which was imparted by Varuna and achieved by Dyaus, culminated in *Ekim*.' (Til. 3, 6), similarly, 'Om, Ka is Brahman, Kha (i.e. *Ekim*) is Brahman' (Til. 4, 20, 5), 'Kha is the oldest' (B. 5, 1). So the meaning of the word '*Ekim*' is to be taken as Brahman, just as the word 'Aga' in the sentence 'Aga studies a chapter' is to be taken in the sense of a 'boy' named Marveda, who on account of his intelligence shines like the sun, and not in its literal and primary meaning as 'ice.'

१. अथर्वविष्णुसूक्तम् । (२३)

अथ एव एवमः । २३

[*Ata*—*hava*, *ava*—*aha* | *prasa*]]

FOR HIGHER KNOWLEDGE PRASA (OR BRAHMAN), 23

There is a passage in the Udgitha chapter of the Chândogoparash (1, 12, 5) which makes us aware of the reply given by a certain Brahman, named Chândogya, to the priest Pravasi¹ who began the beginning of the mantra certain hymns of Marveda known as the *prastava*. The duty of this *prastava* is '*Prasa*' For 'all these beings merge into *prasa* alone, and from it they arise' (1, 11, 4-5). Now here too there arises a doubt as to the meaning of the word '*Prasa*'. Are we to understand thereby the air we breathe, or Brahman? Passage like, 'mind is harnessed to *prasa*,' (Ch. 6, 8, 2), and the '*prasa* of *prasa*' (B. 4, 4, 12), indicate that *prasa* means Brahman.

1. He was a sage and the name *Ekim*. Another 'Ka' was 'Kha' he itself is Brahman, he while more worldly yet is manly; more elevated, such is *prastava*, it is the embodiment of 'Ka' and 'Kha' i.e. the embodied state is the form that can be and so he should Brahman.

2. Pravasi is the child who is among the Brahmins. The other three words known as *Udgitha*, *Prastava* and *Chândogya* are subdivisions of *Udgitha*. The first three are singing, respectively the first three portions of the hymns of Sama-Veda known as *Prastava*, *Udgitha* and *Chândogya*. The last portion of the hymns known as *Chândogya* is to be sung in silence by all the four priests.

The *pūrvagatā* wishes to take the word *prāṇa* in the sense of the air we breathe; for when a man sleeps, the breathing alone continues, and so it can be said that all the organs of sense like the tongue and others, and the organs of action such as the eye, the ear as also the mind and intelligence merge into the breath, and that they all come out of breath alone when man awakes' (Cat. Br. 13, 3, 1, 6). The merging and coming out of the organs of sense and action is not in reality different from the merging and coming out of the beings, because the former are nothing but the members of the latter. Besides, *manuṣya* is the 'man' and the 'food' are told by Cāṇakya as the duties of *edgīṣa* and *pratikīra* (the two later portions of hymns) immediately after he tells *prāṇa* as the duty of the *pratikīra*, and *manuṣya* as the two duties of the *śro* and the *food* do not represent the Brahman, it is natural to suppose that *prāṇa* too cannot mean Brahman.

To this we reply that *prāṇa* means Brahman, because the characteristic marks mentioned in connection with *prāṇa* are applicable only to Brahman. In the first place, whereas the merging and coming out of the senses alone are spoken of with reference to breath during sleep, in the passage quoted at the beginning, the merging and coming out refer not only to the senses, but also to all beings including their bodies and senses, and so the reference to *prāṇa* will not be adequately interpreted as reference to breath, it is a reference to Brahman alone. Secondly, even if the word 'Bhūta' be interpreted as 'element' and not as 'being', the word *prāṇa* would mean Brahman. Thirdly, the argument that a passage in Kaṇḍikā Upaniṣad (3, 8) speaks of the 'merging of the senses and its objects and of the union of the *prāṇa* with *prāṇa* during dreamless sleep,' is not, as is supposed, in favour of identifying *prāṇa* with breath, but on the

¹ *Bhūta* is nothing but a modification of the element of 'mind', and so *prāṇa* in the sense of the mind.

context, is in favour of identifying it with Brahman. 'Possibly, mere contiguity of the word 'praja' with the words 'sun' and 'food' need not be taken as a reason for a regular interpretation of the three words, as 'not standing for Brahman', but in the principal sentence there are clear indications to the characteristic marks of Brahman. And finally, as pointed out in the previous Sūtra, the words 'only' and 'all' in the Sām passage, 'All these beings merge into praja only, and from it they arise,' will serve no purpose, if Brahman is not to be taken as the meaning of praja.

As in certain other passages such as, 'the praja of praja' (Br. 4, 4, 18), 'joined as fastened to praja' (Ud. 6, 8, 2), quoted by certain Upanishads, there is no point in discussing these, inasmuch as there is no doubt or ambiguity regarding the meaning of the word praja. The grammatical position of words, and the context clearly indicate that the meaning of the word 'praja' is Brahman and nothing else. The word 'praja' used in the cosmogony is distinctly used for some thing different from that which is signified by the word praja used in the previous, the former is used for Brahman, and the latter for the air we breathe. Similarly, in the second passage the context shows that "praja" is used for Brahman. If the context shows that we are dealing with *prajapatis*, sacrifice, then the word 'praj' in that context clearly stands for '*prajapatis* sacrifice,' as in the passage, 'let us sacrifice 'prajapatis' in every spring.' So the word 'praja' means Brahman.

१. ज्योतिष्कण्डविधानम् । (२४-२५)

ज्योतिष्कण्डविधानम् । २४

[*Uyat*—light, *ca*—and, *raśas*—food, *abhradhat*—being measured.]

1. Perhaps too, there are no characteristic marks of Brahman which are associated or being connected with praja, but is the capacity of the air we breathe and with Brahman, and the other is the indication for the means by which everything else comes being in the state of dissolution.

ON ACCOUNT OF THE BEING QUESTIONED, (THE WORD)
 PROVED (I E. LIGHT ILLUSTRATES BRAHMAN) 34

Here we are concerned with the doubt: whether the word 'jyoti' in the following passage of the Chândogya-parash is used in the sense of the light of the sun etc. or of the highest Ātman: "That jyoti or light which shines above the heavens, above the beings, in the world beyond which there are no better worlds, is the same light which is within man" (3. 13. 7)

According to gōvindaśāstra, the word 'jyoti' means the light of the sun and the fire, and the arguments advanced are:—(1) It is well known that jyoti means light. Light and darkness are the opposites of each other; darkness of the night, for example, obstructs the activity of the eye, while that which helps it is the light of the sun, etc. (2) The word 'shines' too refers in ordinary life to the sun, light which has form and which is physical in nature. Brahman, on the other hand, neither possesses body nor form and so cannot shine. (3) Jyoti must mean the physical and the limited light, the effect of the sun, for a physical boundary is mentioned with reference to it. It shines beyond heaven. There can be no boundary to Brahman which is the cause of all, and the Ātman of all. Now if some one would say that it is possible for the physical light of fire also to be seen on the side of the heaven, when there is no light of the sun, we may then assume that the light spoken of is the original, irresistible first principle or deity of light in its own nature, and not the visible light, which is made up by mixing its own half portions with the non-fire-like portions of the original, irresistible principle or deity of water and earth. But this pre-tripartite original light is of no use, because being irresistible it cannot either be made as the object of devotion or be used to dispel darkness. And as the tripartite nature of the three deities of light, water and earth was conceived by God in the very beginning (Uhl. 6, 3, 5), it serves no purpose to assume a pre-tripartite light, existing before the ordinary

light which is known to all. Besides, there is no evidence that the pre-tripartite light is spoken of as having a boundary. So, the light here is the ordinary light of the sun or the fire, seen either on this side or the other side of the heaven. (4) That it is described as shining beyond or below heaven is for the purpose of derivation. On the other hand, 'beyond heaven' or 'on this side of heaven' cannot be an adequate description of Brahman, which is undivided and unsupported. (5) That this light beyond the heaven is not Brahman is also clear from the fact that it is said to be the same with the abdominal light, which in its turn is purely physical on account of its being known by the warm touch of the body and the sound we hear when we shut our ears (Chh. 3, 13, 7 and 8). The identity of one light with the other is possible because both are physical in nature. (6) One more reason why the light is not Brahman is that meditation on it makes a man celebrated and beautiful. This is incomparably less a fruit compared to the fruit of moksha which one may get by devotion to Brahman. (7) Besides no special characteristic mark of Brahman is mentioned in the passage dealing with the light. (8) Nor does the previous section deal with Brahman. It deals with Gilyani alone (Chh. 3, 12). And even supposing that the earlier section deals with Brahman, there is nothing in the present section which may enable us to say that the same topic is continued, for in the earlier passage the heaven is referred to as the 'upper part or place where' His immortal three feet 'are said to rest, while in this passage the heaven is spoken of as the boundary. So in the absence of the characteristic mark of Brahman, the 'yoti' means the physical light of the sun.

To this we reply, 'The word 'yoti' means Brahman, for in the preceding passage Brahman has been spoken of as having four feet, 'three of which constitute the immortal Being in the heaven and the fourth is all these beings. Such is His greatness, he is greater than what has been manifested etc.' (Chh. 3, 12, 8). And we have

the recognition of Brahman in this passage because the heaven, above which jyoti is mentioned as shining, is mentioned in the previous passage not in the place in which the three feet of Brahman are said to be identical. Notwithstanding this, if we interpret jyoti as light, we leave aside the subject under discussion and begin a new one without any reason. Not only Brahman is the topic under discussion at the end of the earlier passage, but it is also the topic of the next passage starting with Śāśvato-Vidyā.

When the general topic of three continuous passages dealing with Udgāt, jyoti and Śāśvato-vidyā respectively is Brahman, and further when Brahman alone is indicated on account of the relative position "which" (Yat) used for it, and on account of the characteristic marks such as "heaven" and the "four feet," it will serve no purpose to argue that the words "light" and "illumination" are commonly used to denote the physical light of the sun and the like. And supposing that this light is the physical effect, even then it can be construed that the light points not to itself but to its cause, viz. the Brahman, as is clear from the motto: 'That (Brahman) on account of which the sun becomes shining first and then shines everything else' (Tat. Brh. 3, 12, 2, 7). Nay, Brahman is not merely indirectly indicated as the cause by the word jyoti, but is also the direct meaning of it, as is clear from, 'a person utters' and believes by the "light of words only", which he may hear from another person in darkness and when he cannot see the light of his own eyes (Br. 4, 3, 3). Similarly, 'the mind of man who utters glows becomes light' (Tat. Brh. 1, 4, 3, 3), points out that the word 'jyoti' can be extended to anything which has the capacity of illuminating something else, and as such, it can necessarily be applied to Brahman, because it is intelligence and gives light to the whole universe. The same has been emphasized in the Śrauta: 'Everything shines after He shines,' and to exclude the possibility of other things being self-luminous, it is further said, that 'by His light, everything

MENTED (BY MEANS OF THE METRE); THIS IS ALSO KNOWN AS AUM). 25

In section twelfth of the third chapter of the *Chândogoparashad*, the *pārashaka* mentions that *Gīpatrī* is mentioned as constituting all the things which have been created, and that it is this *Gīpatrī* metre which has been further described as *unifold* and *four footed*, *unifold* because it is described as the being, the earth, the body, the heart, the speech, and the breath, and *four footed* because it consists of four parts of six letters each. Naturally, the "grammar" mentioned in the *maṇḍa* (Chā 3, 12, 6) is with reference to *Gīpatrī* and not to *Brāhmaṇ*. How can the *maṇḍa* refer all of a sudden to *Brāhmaṇ*, when in the *Brāhmaṇa* portion the *Gīpatrī* alone is described? The *maṇḍa* and the *Brāhmaṇa* do not give us different versions. No doubt the word "*Brāhmaṇ*" occurs immediately after this *maṇḍa*, but here too by *Brāhmaṇ* we are not to understand the highest *Ātman*. In keeping with the content of *Gīpatrī* we should mean by it the "*Veda*" and as pointing to *Gīpatrī* which is a part of *Veda*. Besides the meaning of the word *Brāhmaṇ* as "*Veda*" is allowed by an earlier passage in the *Chândogoparashad* itself (3, 11, 1). "For him who knows that *Brāhmaṇ* there is no rising or setting of the sun; it is one everlasting day." In short, so much as the *Gīpatrī* metre is mentioned, *Brāhmaṇ* is not the topic under discussion.

In reply to this we say that if by *Gīpatrī* we are to understand a kind of metre, then it is nothing but a collection of letters, and so it cannot be said to be the *Ātman* of all. But if we take *Brāhmaṇ* as the general topic of the section under consideration, then *Gīpatrī* would mean nothing but *Brāhmaṇ* in the form of *Gīpatrī*, in effect, for "All this is verily the *Brāhmaṇ*." (Chā 3, 14, 1). To consider the metre of *Gīpatrī* as the *Ātman* of all is mere imagination, but to consider *Gīpatrī* as *Brāhmaṇ* is to consider the *Brāhmaṇ* in the name of all, including even the *Gīpatrī*, and to give it the correct explanation.

of things by pointing out the identity of cause and effect (Bh. Śā. 1, 1, 14). Besides, the Gāyatrī metre is intended to direct the mind on the Brahman. Just as the mahayānas, i.e., those who follow H-yōda, consider the highest *Ātman* to be present in the great Uchha, as the *Advaitayānas*, or the followers of T-yāg-veda, consider it to be present in the cardinal fire, and as the *Chāndogya*, or the followers of Śāṅkara-veda, consider it to be present in the Mahādevata sacrifice (Aut. Ar. 1, 2, 3, 11), even so, in this passage concerning Gāyatrī as in the passage concerning *prāṇ*, Brahman alone is meant to be the object of devotion.

Or, as the *Vyākṛāntas*¹ think, Brahman is directly the meaning of the word Gāyatrī, and is not merely suggested or implied by it. The four feet of the metre are, in a manner of fact, the four feet of the Brahman, one constituting the movable and the immovable world, and the three being the universal nature of it. Another word having the meaning of metre is used elsewhere also (Chā. 4 3, 8) in a different sense on account of similarity of number, and as the word Gāyatrī need not be said to be used in the sense of Brahman by way of exception, because both of them resemble in having four feet. The word 'Vāc,' for example, means a metre having ten letters in each of its parts (foot). 'Kṛta' also is assumed to mean the number ten, and so used for the collection of two groups of five, one indicating the *śikṣāśāstra* entires of wind, fire, the sun, the moon, and water, and the other indicating the *śikṣāśāstra* entires of breath, speech, eye, ear, and mind. So this collection of ten entires is also spoken of as 'Vāc,' as in the *śraṇa*, 'these ten are upon the Vāc, which eats the food' (Chā. 4. 3, 8). Just as Vāc, therefore, means (and not simply suggests) the collection of the ten entires and not the particular metre, even so, Gāyatrī means the Brahman and not the metre.

¹ If the interpretation of the *Vyākṛāntas* is accepted, the *Śraṇa* will be translated thus: 'It is to say that Brahman of ten (mentioned) entires the metres are meant! But truly it is not so, because (owing to similarity) between Gāyatrī and Brahman they both are, Gāyatrī the metres of which the mind is created (or Brahman, means Brahman), this is seen elsewhere also.

chooses a boon. On being advised by Pratyakṣa to bestow upon him such a boon as would conduce to the highest good of man, Indra asked him to meditate on Indra himself as the 'Immortal Life' because as he was the 'Pṛiṣṭa, the intelligent Ātman,' which 'makes the body rise up,' which is the 'speaker,' and which is 'without age and death' (Kṛa. 3, 1, 2, 3 and 8). Though in an earlier Sūtra (3, 1, 11) Pṛiṣṭa means Brahman, we are presented here with marks which do not exactly point to it. In the first place, the word 'pṛiṣṭānā' (intelligent Ātman) as an adjective negates the meaning of pṛiṣṭa as ordinary breath, and the reference to 'nāśa' meaning Indra himself as the object of devotion negates the highest Ātman too. In other words, pṛiṣṭa means the deity of Indra himself. Secondly, the reference to pṛiṣṭa as the cause of the movement of the body indicates that pṛiṣṭa means the breath. Thirdly, the reference to the 'speaker' and not to speech as the object of meditation makes the word refer to the individual soul. As opposed to this, the description of pṛiṣṭa as intelligent Ātman, as breath, and as without decay and death, makes it a synonym of Brahman. A doubt arises therefore as to which of these meanings should be taken as the proper meaning of pṛiṣṭa.

If the pārasakya chooses to understand thereby the ordinary breath because it is the well-known meaning, then we reply that pṛiṣṭa must mean Brahman, if all things are to be duly considered. To begin with, Pratyakṣa asks for a boon which will be of highest good not to him alone but for man as such. It seems highly improbable that the highest good should be of the changing nature of pṛiṣṭa. It cannot be achieved by any means except the knowledge of the Ātman. 'A man who knows has gone beyond death, there is no other path to mokṣa' (Gṛa. 3, 8). 'If anyone knows me, then nothing can hinder him in his way of mokṣa, neither shall any follow me' (Kṛa. 3, 1). 'No work will bind him, who has won the Brahman which is both the higher and the lower.'

(Mā. 1, 1, 8, CĪ. B. C. 4, 37). How can air which is non-intelligent be intelligent, unless it is identified with Brahman? Besides, the characteristic marks of 'kṣaṇa,' 'immortality' etc. which come at the end of the passage cannot be fitted with the nature of any other thing or being, except the Brahman. Pṛiṣṇa again is spoken of as unaffected by good or bad actions, but as responsible for making men do such actions as well lead them (as he likes) to higher or lower worlds. He is described again as the guardian, the King and the Lord of the world (Mā. 1, 4). From all this, it is clear that Pṛiṣṇa means Brahman.

३ पशुनाभेनेहोक्तिरि चेदप्यत्रात्मनोवाक्यं तस्मिन् । ३९

[No—not . . . *vaśya*—of the speaker, *śaśvadbhāṣita*—because of reference to himself, as one—of an *āśvāttha*—another *śāśva*—reference to *Ātman* being numerous, in *śāśva*—because in this.]

It is held that Pṛiṣṇa does not pronounce [Brahman] because the speaker refers to himself (we hold that it is not so). Nor will (p. 6. in this chapter) references to *Ātman* are numerous. 39

It may well be contended by the opponents thatasmuch as Brahman is described as "without speech or mind" (Mā. 1, 8, 4), and as such cannot be said to be the speaker in the legend of Indra and Prajāpati, andasmuch as, on the contrary, Indra, the speaker, mentions himself as pṛiṣṇa, as the intelligent being, and asks Prajāpati to meditate on him, pṛiṣṇa cannot be Brahman. Besides, Indra has praised himself for having killed the three-headed Brahman, Viśvarūpa, the son of Tvaṣṭā, and for having stream before the waters the bodies of persons who have renounced the world but are avowed to 'Veda'. Pṛiṣṇa means 'power' and it is well known that Indra is the deity of power; and if there be any deity of power, people call it the 'deity of Indra.' All these things are not possible in the case of Brahman which is without body. That Indra calls himself as pṛiṣṇa

is in keeping with the unobscured knowledge of god. The highest good of man may be inferred from the position of Indra himself as deity and as the object of devotion. As a deity, he is not affected by action, nor a resident in heaven, he has friends; and as having knowledge of the universe he can be said to be without old age and death. So, *Prāṇa* must mean the soul of Indra and not Brahman.

We refute this by saying that if the *Śaṅkapaṇḍit* 'Life exists as long as *prāṇa* lasts in the body' (Ka. 3, 1), is not a tautologous proposition, we must mean by *prāṇa* the inner *Ātman* who has got the power of bestowing or taking away the life, and not a particular deity which comes into being in course of time. It is this *prāṇa* in the sense of *Ātman* that is described as the nave round which go forth the spokes of the wheels, which in their turn are the support of the various alights (Ka. 3, 1). And, further, we have another *Śaṅkapaṇḍit* which tells us that the '*Ātman* is the omniscient Brahman' (Bh. 2, 3, 10) whereby we can say that *Prāṇa* is nothing but Brahman.

Why then has Indra made a reference about himself? To this the *Sūtrakīrti* replies :

वाचस्पत्यादौरेयो वामदेवम् । ३०

[*Vāchस्पत्यादौ*—as declared in *Śaṅkapaṇḍit*, *am*—but, *apodictic*—*maxim*, *Vāmadewa*—the *Vāmadewa*.]

AS IN THE CASE OF *Vāmadewa*, THE STATEMENT (MADE BY INDRA ABOUT HIMSELF IN BH.) WAS INDUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE AS RECORDED IN *Śaṅkapaṇḍit*. 30

Just as the great *Vāmadewa* said about himself after having realised the Brahman that he was the *Manu* and the sun (Bh. 1, 4, 10), even so, Indra can be said to have instructed *Prasthāna* to know him only, because he himself must have first realised that he was the *Ātman*. The inductive knowledge, must have come to him on account

of spiritual efforts like *dravya* and *manas* done in previous lives. But this much is certain, that "whatever among the gods realises the Brahman, becomes the Brahman" (Bṛ 1, 4, 18). The reference to the slaying of Tvaṣṭi's son is not so much to glorify himself as to state the system, the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. In order to emphasise this very point, Indra tells immediately afterwards that 'not a hair' of his 'is harmed, in spite of the horrible deeds' done by him, simply for the reason that he had become 'one with Brahman'. Nay, Indra tells us further that no other person too, who realises Indra (in the same way in which Indra had no hand the Brahman) would in any way be robbed of his merits for having committed horrible deeds (Kau 1, 3). So, the object of knowledge which is pursued by Indra is not his own self, but the Brahman alone, as mentioned in the sentence, 'I am *prīṇa*, the profligate.'

वीनद्वयमव्ययमित्येति वेद्येनादित्येभ्यस्तद्विलम्बिता कद्वीपाद् ॥ ११

[*Uta dvayam avyaya-mityeti*—an attempt of *avayam* of soul and chief (soul . . . ut . . . et . . . et . . . et), explained (*pratyakṣa*)—because of three-fold mediation, *dvaitatvā*—being accepted, *du*—two . . . *advayam*—being connected with that.]

IF IT BE SAID THAT (BRAHMAN) IS NOT MEANT, BECAUSE THE CHARACTERISTIC MARKS OF *IVA* AND THE PROCEDED *PRĪṇA* (ARE MENTIONED), (WE SAY) NO, BECAUSE (THERE WOULD RESULT) THREE THINGS OF NOTHING; (BECOME ONE WITH) IS ACCEPTED (ALTERNATIVE); AND BECAUSE (CHARACTERISTIC MARKS OF BRAHMAN ARE) OBSERVED. 11

The purvapaka may still insist on saying that though there may not be any reference to Indra as a deity, the reference to the 'speaker' as the object of knowledge is clearly a reference to the individual soul, and not to Brahman. Similarly, the reference to *prīṇa* or the intelligent being as the cause of the support of the body

is the reference to the principal *prajna* itself. The parable of the principal and the lesser *prajnas* tells us the same truth. When the lesser *prajnas*, i.e. the speech, the eye, the ear and the mind, become detached to see the impending fall of the body as the principal *prajna* was about to depart from it, the latter came forward and said to them, "Do not be infatuated; for it is I who divide myself fivefold, and support this body" (Ita. 3, 3). Or the *prajna* may be said to support the body, because it first supports the intelligent *jiva* and the sense organs, which are the instruments of the intelligent being; and so *prajna* too may rightly be described as 'prajñātmā'. Whether *prajna* is the same as the individual soul, as in the *Śruti* "What is *prajna* is *prajñā*, and what is *prajñā* is *prajna*" (Kau. 3, 3), or different from it, as in the *Śruti* "together they live in the body and together they depart" (Kau. 3, 4), the words "*prajna*" and "*prajñātmā*" may mean the individual soul and the principal *brahmā* separately or taken together. If by '*prajna*', on the other hand, we mean Brahman, then who would depart from whom? No, *prajna* must mean either the individual soul or the principal *brahmā*, or may mean both, but, in no case, it means Brahman.

The above interpretation, we reply, is inadequate because it would mean that three kinds of devotion are recommended in one single context. That it is not single context is clear from how the passage begins and ends. "Know me alone, meditate on me as Life and Inner calm, for I am the *prajna* and the intelligent *Ātman*," is the beginning of the passage; and that "*prajna* is with the intelligent *Ātman*, the *brahmā*, and is without old age and death," is the end of the passage. As the beginning and the end of the passage are one and the same, it is natural to suppose that only one kind of devotion is mentioned, and not three. And whereas the ten *bhūtmānas* and the ten *prajñātmānas*, or whereas the atoms and their objects have their support in Brahman alone, the characteristic marks of Brahman including the word '*prajna*,' can hardly be attributable to the *jiva*. Besides, the 10

former to the ' highest Good ' of man in what Pṛagyaḥna adds for powers to Brahman alone. The function of *prāṇa*, again, in supporting the body, being itself due to the Ātman, can be ascribed only to the latter. As the Śvetā tells, ' no one lives by the up-going *prāṇa* or the down-going *apāṇa*, but by Him, the Other, in whom they take their support ' (Ka. 2, 3, 3). Again, the statements, ' I am Brahman,' ' Thou art that,' indicate that the *jīva* is not essentially different from Brahman. On the contrary, Brahman itself is known as the *jīva*, and as the doer and enjoyer of actions on account of the limiting aspects of *baudhā* etc. So, the intention of sentences like ' Know the speaker etc.' is to direct the mind on the Brahman by getting away the distractions of *upādāna*, and thereby make the individual soul come face to face with the Ātman and to show that it is the same as the Ātman. That the *prsthāna* which is involved in speaking and other activities is Brahman itself is clear from another Śvetā: ' That which is incapable of being spoken by speech, but which enables one to speak, know that alone is Brahman; not that which people worship ' (Ka. 1, 3). Finally, inadequate is the argument that *prāṇa* does not mean Brahman, because *prāṇa* and *prajñāna* are said to be separate, though together they live in the body and together they depart from it. For *baudhā* and *prāṇa*, being the sources of cognition and activity, and being the *upādāna* of the Ātman, can very well be spoken of as separate from each other. But the Ātman, being non-differentiated in its nature in spite of the two *upādāna*, the *upādāna* too, in the light of this oneness of the Ātman, may be identified as *in' prāṇa* as *prajñā*.

The Vyākṛāna explain the latter part of the Śloka in a different way. According to them, there is no logical flaw in stating along with the characteristic marks of Brahman, also those which belong to the *jīva* and the principal *prāṇa*. For they hold that the devotion to Brahman is recommended under the three aspects of *prāṇa*, *prajñā* and Brahman itself. The meditation on ' *śā*,

immortality of the 'atma' (strictly as 'atma' i.e. which causes the movement of the body) refers to the *prajna* aspect of Brahman. The *prajñā* aspect stands symbolically for the *jiva*. The *prajñā* or *buddhi* has ideas and signs (words and meanings) as the objects of knowledge; the *nama* being created by speech, and the *rūpa* by the sense-organs. It is the *jiva*, in short, who by the means of his intellect makes use of his organs of sense and action, and thus experiences the various objects (Kau 3, 4, 5). As for the devotion to Brahman itself, it consists in the cognition that *Prāṇa* or the Brahman is the ultimate support of both the atoms and its objects. As the portion of the wheel at the circumference takes its support on the spokes, and as the spokes take their support in the nave, similarly, the objects are dependent on the atoms, and, the atoms in their turn are dependent for their support on the *Prāṇa* (Kau 3, 8). Thus, Brahman alone is the object of devotion, whether in its own nature or in the form of its two *upādhis* of *jiva* and *prajña*. In the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* too (3, 14, 2), Brahman is recommended as the object of devotion in the form of one of its *upādhis*: 'He is of the form of mind, *prajña* is his body.' Thus Brahman alone is the general topic of the section, because, in the first place, the beginning and the end of the section are the same, and secondly, the characteristic marks of *prajña*, *prajñā* and Brahman are present.

But (as against this view of the *Vijñāni*) we hold that Brahman alone is the topic (of knowledge, and not of devotion).

Adhya First

Pada Second

१ सर्वं प्रतिद्वन्द्वम् । (१-८)

In the first *pāda* Brahman has been shown as the cause of the origin, substance and dissolution of the world including gods and other elements. It may be presumed therefore that we have also pointed out by way of explanation that Brahman possesses the qualities of all-pervasiveness, eternity, consciousness, and of being the Atman of all. It was further pointed out that all those Vedic passages where the characteristic marks of Brahman were clearly manifest, but about which there was some doubt on account of some words which ordinarily do not mean Brahman, referred to nothing else but Brahman. Now in the second and the third *pāda*, we shall be concerned with certain other passages which too are doubtful on account of their not containing in them characteristic marks of Brahman. In the second *pāda*, we shall deal with Brahman as the object of devotion, and in the third, with Brahman as the object of knowledge.

सर्वं प्रतिद्वन्द्वम् । १

[SARVA—sarvabhūta; prasthita-upadehi—what is well-known being said.]

BECAUSE WHAT IS WELL-KNOWN EVERYWHERE IS INTUITION (Brahman is the object of devotion). 1

In a passage of the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, we are told that after death man becomes that to which he is devoted in this life. He is therefore asked to meditate with a composed mind on the Brahman, which is verily

all this world, and which is the cause of the origin, the movement and the end of this world, and is not affected by desire, anger, etc. He should perform the *Kṛti*, i.e. he should meditate, because 'the Ātman, which consists of mind and of *prajña* as its body, is *rupādhya*.' (S. 10). The doubt which arises here is whether what consists of mind etc. and is the object of meditation, is the individual soul or the Brahman.

According to the philosophy it is the individual soul, for it is the ruler of the body and the senses, and its connection with the mind and *prajña* is well-known. Brahman, on the other hand, is said to be 'pure, without *prajña* or mind' (Sūtr. 3, 1, 2). The reference to Brahman in the three mentioned passages of the Chhândogya viz. 'All this is verily the Brahman,' is not with a view to induce the devotion to Brahman, but to urge the man to keep his mind calm. For in the pure, homogeneous Brahman from which all this world arises and in which it ends, there is no room for emotions like love and hate. One and the same sentence cannot at once signify the meditation on Brahman and the cultivation of mind. The sentence 'He who consists of mind etc.' follows immediately after the sentence 'One should perform the *Kṛti*,' so it is clear that the performer of this *Kṛti* or devotion is the individual soul suggested by the characteristic marks of 'mind' and '*prajña*'. Further the description that 'he is the doer of all actions,' and that 'all devices belong to him' (Chh. 3, 14, 4), is also applicable to the individual soul, though not actually at any particular moment, yet in successive periods of time and of love. Besides, there are mentioned two more characteristic marks of the *jīva* in the *Śrauta* 'This Ātman, which is smaller than a grain of rice or of barley reaches to my heart' (Chh. 3, 14, 3). This lodgement in the heart and the sensitive nature can adequately be said to belong to the *jīva* whose size can be compared to the point of a pin; they are not the marks of the limitless Brahman. No doubt, the Ātman is immediately afterwards described

as 'greater than the earth etc.', but this greatness too can be said to belong to *jīva* in a secondary sense, inasmuch as the minute *jīva* becomes as great as Brahman when it attains mokṣa. The use of the word Brahman in the end of the passage, 'This is Brahman' (Chā. 3, 14, 4), can also be said to refer to *jīva* because the previous points to nothing else but *jīva*, and the word 'Brahman' may be said to indicate the future status of the emancipated *jīva*.

To this paragraph, our reply is that the object of meditation is Brahman alone, because the meaning which is attributed to the word 'Brahman' in the passage 'all this is Brahman etc.' is the same meaning, which has been taught by all the Vedānta-passages viz. that Brahman is the cause of the world. If we are not to avoid the topic under discussion and turn to a new topic without any cause, it seems appropriate that the Brahman spoken of here is qualified by mind, *prajñā* and *hanta*. It may be said the word 'Brahman' is used, not for its own sake, but for the sake of making us aware of the existence of mind that is recommended afterwards. But it should be noted that the relative pronoun 'which' occurring in the disjunction of the compounds '*manomaya*, and '*prajñahanta*', e.g. that which is qualified by the upādes of *prajñā* as body, refers to the prominent word 'Brahman' alone in the previous sentence. The word denoting *jīva*, on the other hand, is neither prominent nor anywhere directly used.

निर्विद्युपेक्षितः । ५

[*Vidyā*—worthy of being wanted, *prajñā*—*prajñā*—*prajñā* being available, *ca*—and]

AND BEING QUALIFIED WORTHY OF BEING WANTED
IS AVAILABLE (IN THE CASE OF BRAHMAN ALONE). 5

Now the qualities which will be useful for man in his meditation are such qualities which can belong to

Brahman alone. For example, the quality of water, which belongs to Brahman or the highest Atman on account of its unobstructed power in translating in itself of creating, maintaining and dissolving the universe, into an actuality. Similarly the Atman is said to be "free from sin" (Chā. 8, 7, 1) ; Brahman, again, is said to be "like Akāśa" on account of its omnipresence ; its being "greater than earth" points to the same fact ; that it is the "cause of all activity" and "of all deities" (Ch. 14, 4) runs again the Brahman thread. Brahman is the inner Atman of all, and so the upholders of mind and prāṇa can be said to belong to Brahman. Hence it is that Śaṅkara and Śaṅkari say about Brahman, "They are women, they are men ; youth, maiden and an old man walking by the aid of his stick, all are these ; with thy face turned in every direction, these ; as honey in all things" (Chā. 8, 3) ; "What its hands and feet everywhere, with eyes, ears, mouth and nose everywhere, it stands supreme, having engulphed all these" (B. G. 13, 10). The only difference one can point out is between a Śaṅkara which refers to nāga or pure Brahman, and a Śaṅkari which refers to nāga-Brahman. Nāga or pure Brahman is described as "without prāṇa, without mind, and as being when (jagat)" (Chā. 2, 1, 2) ; nāga-Brahman, on the other hand, is described as "manomaya," "prāṇakāya" etc. (Chā. 2, 14, 2).

अनुपपन्नं न कर्तव्यं : १

[An-upapannaḥ—being not available, an—but ; na—not ;
kṛtvāḥ—enjoined etc.]

BUT AS (THE QUALITIES INTENDED TO BE EXPLAINED DO NOT BELONG [DO JNA, THE ATMAN INTENDED IS "MAHIMAYA" ETC.] IS NOT THE ENJOINED ONE : 1

The present Mūla is intended to show that mantras or descriptions such as, "he whose purposes are bound to come out true, who is like Akāśa, who is without sport

and other senses, who is ever content, who is greater than earth, 'are applicable only to Brahman, and cannot be made applicable to the jiva or the embodied soul, the qualities like 'manomayitva' etc. too do not belong to the soul that resides inside the body. No doubt, God also resides inside the body, but he is not simply inside but outside as well and is all-pervading, as is clear from the Śruti : "He is greater than the earth, greater than space, eternally present everywhere like light." (Chā. 3, 14, 3). The jiva, on the other hand, resides within the body alone, because the body is the only place where he can experience the effects of his actions in the form of pleasure and pain.

हर्म्यकर्म्यकदेशव्युत्पत्तिः । ४

[Karma—activity, harmy—agent; vyutpatti—being remembered ; as—and]

AND BECAUSE THE AGENT AND ACTIVITY ARE [IMMEDIATELY] REMEMBERED. 4

The word 'him' in the passage, "When I shall have left this body, I shall obtain him" (Chā. 3, 14, 4) refers to the Ātman or Brahman as the object fit to be obtained by meditating upon him and as possessing the qualities of 'manomayitva' etc. The object of meditation is thus clearly stated to be different from the meditator or the jiva indicated by the words 'I shall obtain.' One and the same thing cannot be the subject and object ; and hence the jiva, which is embodied, cannot possess the qualities of 'manomayitva' etc., nor Brahman which possesses these qualities be the embodied self.

हर्म्यविशेषकः । ५

[Vibhā—word, viśayā—being specially used]

ON ACCOUNT OF WORDS BEING SPECIFICALLY USED. 5

In another passage dealing with the same topic, we read that 'this golden person is made the individual

soul, and is like the grain of rice or barley or of money" (Śā. Brh., 10, 6, 3, 2). Hence the Brahman indicated by the word 'person' as the nominative is distinct from the five indicated by the locative. Hence, the being possessing 'manomayurva' etc. cannot be the embodied soul.

सुप्रोक्तम् । ५

[Sūptak]—on account of sūpti, as—and.]

Also on account of sūpti. 6

There is the evidence of Sūpti too for holding that the highest Ātman and the embodied soul are different. For instance the Bhagavadgītā tells us that 'God, seated as he is in the hearts of all beings, moves them all by his magical power, as if they were placed on a machine' (18, 61). It may be said, no doubt, to the strength of both Śruti and Smṛti, that there is 'no other god' but the highest Ātman (Bg. 3, 7, 23), or that the 'Knower of all these bodies' is God alone (B. G. 13, 1), and so it may be pointed out that the embodied soul is not different from the Ātman. This is true indeed. But just as the unlimited Īśā appears limited on account of the upādhis of jar and youth, similarly, the Ātman is spoken of by the ignorant people as embodied, on account of the upādhis of the body, the senses, the mind and intellect. So long as there has not dawned the consciousness of the Ātmanic unitive life, there exists the practical difference between the objects of activity and the subject. But the moment one realises the Ātmanic life of unity which is contained in the advice 'Thou art that' (I. 6, Brahman), 'there is an end to all the practical view of the world and its distractions, like bondage and release.

अर्थाद्वैकल्यादुपपत्तेरुक्तम् मेति चेन्न निवाप्यसुपदेवं योगवत्तम् १७

[Arthadvaitakalyāṇādūpapatteḥ uktam meiti चेन्न निवाप्यसुपदेवं योगवत्तम् १७
[Arthadvaitakalyāṇat—artha being small ; ut—that, upāde-
dhit—being mentioned, as—and, as—not, as—to,
as—of, as, upāpattau—being motivated ; meiti—that,
upapattat—like āpāta, as.]

IS IT BE SAID THAT (BECAUSE THE JOY AND BRAHMAN ARE ONE) THERE MAY ALSO EXPERIENCE (OF BRAHMAN AND

The argument of the pārapada, (as noted in Sūtra 1) also) that the reference to the small shade of the heart and to the very small seed of a grain of rice or barley, would naturally point to the jīva and not to Brahman which is all-pervading, deserves to be examined a little further. It is true that a small thing like the embodied soul cannot be said to be omnipresent; but the omnipresent Ātman can be said to occupy a small space in order to actually serve some purpose. The ruler of the earth may also be called the ruler of Ayodhyā a part of it. Similarly, the intellect of man can conceive the existence of the all-pervading God within the lotus of the heart, and please Him by meditating upon Him. Just as the worship of the statue of a god stands for the worship of Hari, even so God is represented as occupying the heart for the purpose of devotion. Or, just as the all-pervading Ikṣvā is said to occupy the eye of a needle, even so with Brahman. It is to be remembered however that the shade and the small seed of Brahman have meaning only with reference to devotion; otherwise, from the viewpoint of Brahman they are unreal. This consideration will dispose of the possible argument that like parrots in different cages and with different perishable bodies, Brahman also may be impermanent because it resides in different hearts and is likely to assume different bodies. But the shade and the seed being both imaginary Brahman is free from this defect.

नैवेद्यमिदं नैव नैवेद्यम् । ८

[Naiḍḍyaṃ idaṃ naiḍḍyaṃ, id—so; na—of;
na, naiḍḍyaṃ—because of difference]

IF IT BE SAID THAT (BECAUSE THE JOY AND BRAHMAN ARE ONE) THERE MAY ALSO EXPERIENCE (OF BRAHMAN AND

FAIR FOR BRAHMAN HIMSELF, WE CAN SAY, AS THERE IS DIFFERENCE IN THE NATURE (OF THE TWO). ॥

The pūrvaśālin may say that inasmuch as the all-pervading and sentient Brahman is in the hearts of all beings and is identical with the jīva, it too must experience the pleasures and pains of life. If there is 'no other knower than the highest Ātman' (Bṛ 3, 7, 23), the pleasures and pains of individuals do belong to the Brahman itself.

In reply to this we say that there is no logical association between Brahman's residing in the hearts of all and its being made the subject of pleasures and pains. For there is difference between the embodied soul and the highest God. While the former acts and reaps the fruits of his acts, acquires merits and demerits, and becomes subject to pleasures and pains, the latter has the opposite characteristics, such as being free from acts, and from pleasures and pains. If mere proximity of things were to produce similar effects, lightning also will begin to burn on account of its proximity with fire.

Those who believe that the individual souls are many and all-pervading, may contend that the soul of one man will also be inside the bodies of other men, and as the pleasures and pains of one will be experienced by the others. Our reply is that a particular man becomes subject to pleasures and pains in his own body, because he has got that body as the fruit of his actions, and not because of the proximity of his soul or body with the souls or bodies of other men.

Let us further request of the pūrvaśālin as to the source of his information that Brahman will become subject to pleasures and pains on account of its identity with the individual souls. If it is the Śruti passages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but the Ātman,' then you cannot accept or reject the

authority is for pleasure. The Śruti sentence 'Thou art that,' as a matter of fact, removes the possibility of the individual soul itself being subject to pleasures and pains, inasmuch as it teaches us that the soul is nothing but the wireless Brahman. Where then is the possibility of Brahman being subject to pleasures or pains? If, on the other hand, the knowledge of the pārvapakṣa is not due to Śruti, we have to tell him that the individual soul becomes subject to pleasures and pains on account of ignorance in him, and not because the pleasures and pains are in any way connected with Brahman. Just as the sky, which has really no physical surface or colour, is said to have a blue surface, even so the Śāstrakṛts say that it may be conceived through ignorance that the embodied soul becomes subject to pleasures and pains. From the same point of true knowledge, however, the Jīva and Brahman are identical, and as both are free from one and from pleasures and pains. There is a fundamental difference between ignorance and knowledge. And so there will be no connection between the identity of Jīva and Brahman apprehended through knowledge, and experience of pleasure and pain apprehended through ignorance. God can never be imagined to have any connection whatever with pleasures or pains.

१ अविनिर्मुक्तम् । (५-१८)

अविनिर्मुक्तम् । १

[And—not ; avinirā—movable and removable; prakṛt—being taken.]

[THE ĀTMAH IS THE WATER, FOR (AS IS MENTIONED IN) TAKING IS RELATIVE, IS MOVABLE AND REMOVABLE. 9]

A passage in the Upanishads (I, 3, 20) raises the question as to who may be there, 'who knows the dwelling place of Hwa is where the Brahmanas and Kṛtyas are but free, and death itself is like the sprinkling (of glass) on the food.' This implies that there must be some

eater. But there arises the doubt as to whether the eater is the fire, the individual soul or the highest Ātman; for a discussion involving questions and answers regarding all the three is available in the same Upaniṣad.

According to puruṣaśa, the eater must be the fire as is mentioned by Brūti (Bṛ. 1, 4, 12) and as is known by every one in ordinary life. Or if the mention of fire is out place in a metaphysical discussion and as the fire is only the destroyer, the eater may be the individual soul. It cannot be the highest Ātman, because as the Māṇḍūkyaśa tells us, 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, and the other merely looks on without eating' (Ka. 1, 1). The Ātman alone must be the eater, we reply. For there can be no other being except the Ātman who will consume or absorb in himself the whole movable and unmovable world as his food. No doubt the two castes of Brāhmanas and Kṣatriyas alone are mentioned as the food, but these two being the best things of all stood as representatives of the whole world as food, and the glass of death which is sprinkled over the food characterises the world as perishable or consumable by the Ātman. It may be said that the Ātman is merely a 'looker on' and no eater, but the context of the passage in the Māṇḍūkyaśa shows, by way of contrast, that the Ātman, unlike the jīva, does not become subject to the effects of actions. The passage does not aim at denying the absorption of the world into the Brāhman, for like creation and substance, absorption too of the whole world into Brāhman is declared by all the Vedānta-passages. Therefore, the eater is Brāhman alone.

अव्ययः । १०

[Puruṣaśa—eater is constant : 10]

AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACTS UNDER DISCUSSION, 10

The passage that the 'Ātman is not born, that it does not die' (Ka. 1, 2, 14), and the passage quoted in the

last Sūtra indicating the knowledge of the Ātman as exceedingly difficult to achieve, shows it clearly that the topic under discussion is the Ātman.

१. गुहाप्रविष्टविभक्तम् । (११-१२)

गुहां प्रविष्टान्प्राणौ हि वयस्यम् । ११

[Dakṣiṇ—into cave, praviṣṭas who have entered, dvau—
—the two selves, hi—for, hi, dvau—being mentioned]

The two who have entered into the cave are Jīva and the highest Ātman, for (from. sense of the same sentence) is dvau (or dvau, being mentioned). 11

In the Kāṭhavalī, we read that "these two who taste the dust of truth, and reside in the world's c. the body which they have acquired by good deeds, and who have entered the cave of the heart, the excellent seat of the Brahman, are like shade and light. This is what those who know the Brahman say, as also those house-holders who keep the fire-fire or those who are tyāgīs" (1. 3. 1)

The question that arises in this connection is whether these two are buddhi and jīva or the jīva and the highest Ātman. As a matter of fact, both the alternatives are possible. We read in an earlier passage (Ka. 1. 1, 20) that Naciketas asks Death to tell him by way of granting his third boon whether there is not such a being as jīva who is different from body, senses, mind and buddhi and who takes a new birth after death. This means that in the present passage too, buddhi and jīva are intended to be different and hence referred to as having entered into the cave. Or it may be that the two are the jīva and the highest Ātman. For a question regarding the highest Ātman also has been previously asked vii. to tell him that which is different from mind and elements, effect and cause, and the past and the future (Ka. 1. 3, 10).

Now someone may say that there is, as a matter of fact, no question of doubt to be solved, because there is no possibility of either of the two alternatives. In the first place, the statement of 'drinking the truth' (*grāhṇa*) or 'tasting the fruit' cannot be predicated of the non-intelligent *buddhi*, though it can be predicated of the *jīva*. The statement however is stated to belong to both of them and not to one only. Therefore, the two beings who have entered into the cover cannot be *buddhi* and *jīva*. Secondly, they cannot be the individual soul and the Ātman, for the latter is spoken of as merely a looker on and not as an eater (*śūla* 3, 1, 1).

The question or the doubt mentioned above cannot however be thus brushed aside. It does exist. For just as a group of people is spoken of as having taken an *atikūṭa*, even though only one of them has taken it, similarly the two are mentioned as 'drinking the truth' even though one of them is actually doing so. The dual form of the verb 'drink' (*grāhṇatva*) meaning thereby that there are two beings who perform the act of drinking, can be explained as having reference to the *jīva* who actually tastes (*grāhṇati*) the fruits of actions and to *Īśvara* who, in spite of his looking on merely without eating, is said to drink because he makes the *jīva* drink. The chief of the cooks, for instance, is said to cook even though he sits silent and makes his subordinate cook. Or the dual form of the verb may refer even to *jīva* and to the non-intelligent *buddhi*, for like a cook, the non-vegetal fuel also is spoken of as cooking the food. Hence in the presence of both the alternatives, there is room for doubt.

The *pramāṇa* is in favour of the first alternative, the two agents referred to are the individual soul and the *buddhi*. The reasons he gives are : In the first place, it is the cover (whether we mean by it 'body' or 'heart') wherein they have entered. The cover being a soul and a special place, it will be more appropriate to think

of finite agents as having made the entry than to think of the infinite and all-pervading Brahman. Secondly, the words 'in the world of good deeds' have definitely a reference to *buddha* and *jiva* which are within the sphere of karma, but not to the highest Atman who does not grow large by merit, nor does he become smaller by demerit (B. 4, 9, 13). And thirdly, like shade and light, they are opposed to each other as being intelligent and non-intelligent.

To this we reply that the mention of the number 'two' makes us aware, in the first place, that the two beings must be of the same nature. And when one of them (as even the *purusha* says) is the *jiva*, then the other also must be an intelligent being, and so, it is no other than the highest Atman. A bull requires another bull as its companion, neither horse nor man. *Buddha* and *jiva* being disparate in nature, the relation of the subordinate and the superior is merely external to them. Between the *jiva* and the Atman, on the other hand, there is the internal relation of intelligence. It is present in both and is indicated by 'prajña'. That a special local position of the cave of the heart has been assigned to the omnipresent Brahman, is also, in the second place, quite appropriate. It serves the purpose of meditation, so that we should have a clear vision of the Brahman. *Siva* and *Śaṅkṛa*, too, speak very often of the Atman as residing in the cave. For instance, 'The man who leaves off both dejection and joy, when he comes to know the august Puruṣa hidden in the cave, etc.' (Ka. 2, 2, 11). 'He who knows him hidden in the cave of the heart, is the highest Ikita, experiences all bliss' (Tia. 2, 15). 'Search for the Atman who has entered into the cave.' Similarly, in the third place, though the attribute of resting in the sphere of the results of good deeds, i.e. of being embodied, belongs to the individual soul only and not to Brahman, yet it can be said to belong to the Brahman too—in a figurative way, just as a group of men is described as one having an umbrella though only one of them has

it. And lastly, the jiva and the Brahman being also disparate in nature are appropriately described as shade and light. The jiva is subject to darkness on account of veils, while the Ātman is not because it is real. Therefore, the two beings who have "entered into the cave" are the individual soul and the highest Ātman.

निवेदनम् । १३

[Vidvagsaḥ—because of distinctive qualities, as—and.]

AND BECAUSE THE DISTINCTIVE QUALITIES (OF BOTH ARE MENTIONED, THAT WHO HAVE ENTERED INTO THE CAVE ARE THE JIVA AND THE BRAHMAN), 13

A subsequent passage of the Kīśkotsaśrauti (1, 3, 3 and 9) speaks of the body as the chariot and the individual soul as the charioteer, who is making his journey through worlds to the final release. Another passage (1, 3, 9) speaks of the highest Ātman as the place of Vignā, and as the destination of the journey. Similarly, in the passage already quoted (in the commentary of the previous Sūtra) the jiva and the Ātman are distinguished as the mediator and the object of meditation. All this goes to show that the two beings who have got distinctive characteristics and who have "entered into the cave" are the individual soul and the Ātman. Besides, the general topic is of the highest Ātman itself. And again, the reference is just the previous passage to the authors of those who have realized the Brahman, proves that the subject-matter of discussion between these persons must be Brahman alone. So, when one of the two beings who have entered into the cave is the individual soul, the other must be no other than the highest Ātman.

By parity of reasoning, the passage from the Muṇḍakyaśrauti also (3, 1, 1) speaks about the jiva and the Ātman and not about two ordinary birds. "The eating of the sweet fruit" refers to the individual soul, and the

abstinence from eating and the intelligence required as mere looking on, refer to the highest *Ātman*. In the subsequent matter, again, the same difference is shown to exist between the two (Mā. 3, 1, 2). The individual soul is represented as moving because he is influenced by the wrong notion that he is important, while the *Ātman* is represented as the object of meditation, which is said to be the cause of the removal of 'the grief' of the *jīva* who meditates on it.

A different interpretation of the passage from the *Mundakopaniṣad* is also possible. The *Paṇḍarabhāṣya* Bhāṣya, for instance, describes both the interpretation of the *pūrvapakṣa* as well as of the *sūttānta*. The two *brāhmaṇa*s do not stand either for *buddhi* and *jīva* on the one hand, or for *jīva* and *Ātman* on the other. On the contrary, they stand for *buddhi* and the released soul. The being which eats the sweet fruit is the *ātma* or the internal organ by means of which a man desires, and the being which merely looks on without eating is the individual soul who, really speaking, is not the enjoyer, but is identical with Brahman. It is this meaning which is found to be correct even according to Śaṅk and Bhāṣa, e.g. 'That thou art' (Uhl. 6, 8, 7), 'Know me also to be the *Kartavya* or the individual soul' (B. G. 13, 7). The attribute of being an enjoyer has been simply superimposed upon *buddhi*, on account of want of discrimination on the part of the soul at the difference in contact between the two. Neither of them can be called an actor or enjoyer, neither the non-intelligent *buddhi*, nor the non-modifiable individual soul. Besides being the product of *avidyā* *buddhi* is all the more incapable of being an actor or enjoyer. And yet, it is in the sphere of *avidyā* that *duḥkha* exists, and 'one sees the other' as elephants in a dream. But 'when all this becomes the *Ātman*, how should one see the other?' (Bg. 4, 5, 13). So this passage as well as the one from the *Mundakopaniṣad* tell us that for one who has realized the Brahman, there is an end to all the distinctions of the practical worldly life.

४ अक्षरिणश्च । (११-१२)

अक्षरं उपलभे । १३

[*Adarsan*—Perceive without, *aparokṣa*—being available.]

THE FRAMES WITHIN (THE EYE, IN BRAHMAN) ON ACCOUNT OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF BRAHMAN ARE AVAILABLE. 13

A passage in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* states that 'the person seen in the eye is the *Ātman*, that being in the fearless, the immortal, Brahman. If ghee or water is sprinkled over the eye it is wiped away along with the eyelid' (6, 13, 1).

According to *pārasakya*, the person in the eye is the image of some person standing before the eye. Or it may be the individual soul, for it is he who sees the forms of objects through the instrument of the eye. Besides the word '*Ātman*' in the passage indicates that it must be fire. Or, again, it may mean the sun, the deity of the sense of sight which causes the eye to see, as is clear from 'he (the sun-deity) resides in the eye, by means of his eye' (Bṛ. 5, 5, 2). Qualities like 'immortality' etc. which are mentioned in the passage may be attributed to the deities as the sense that they live far longer than men. The passage however does not refer to the omnipresent God, because a special place like the eye is mentioned as if it is the seat of God.

To this we reply that the person in the eye must be the highest God: for the word *Ātman*, as it occurs in the *Śvetā* 'That is the *Ātman*,' 'That thou art' (Chā. 6, 8, 7), refers properly to God. Immortality and fearlessness are repeatedly spoken of as his characteristics. The eye too is strongly described as his residence; for just as God is free from the stain of sin, even so the eye is not stained by water or ghee. Besides He alone is known as *Śaśipada*śiva, that is, 'one towards whom all (vīna)-fruits

of course go. He is also called Vimala, and Bhīmanā, that is one who distributes the fruits to all, and shares in all worlds (Chā. 4, 13, 2). So it is that the person in the eye is God alone.

सर्वत्रादिष्वपदेकस्य च । १३

[Svatra-iti—place and other things, svapada-iti—being everywhere, etc.]

AND BECAUSE PLACE AND OTHER THINGS ARE MENTIONED (THE EYE CAN BE THE PLACE OF GOD) 14

It is no objection to say that the eye cannot be a fit place for the omnipresent Brahman to reside; for just as the omnipresent Īśā can fill in the eye of a needle, even so the Brahman can reside in the eye. The objection could have carried some weight, if the eye alone were mentioned as the place of residence. The 'world' etc. are also mentioned as fit places. Besides not only place is mentioned, but form and name also are mentioned as characteristics of Brahman which is, really speaking, devoid of names and forms. His name is said to be 'U' and he is spoken of as possessing 'golden beard' (Chā. 1, 6, 7, 6). The assumption of a special place, name or form to the Nitya Brahman is, as we have already seen, for the purpose of meditation.

दृष्टमपि विदितवान्मतेन च । १४

[Dṛṣṭam, i, t, a—known, etc.—abhidhāt being measured, etc., etc.]

AND BECAUSE THE EYEFUL (BRAHMAN WHICH HAS BEEN THE TOPIC UNDER DISCUSSION) ALONE IS MENTIONED (WELL, THE PERSON IN THE EYE IS BRAHMAN ONLY). 15

As a matter of fact, there ought to be no dispute regarding the person in the eye being Brahman alone,

much as the same section of the Chândogyaopaniṣad which deals in its latter part with the person in the eye, deals with the nature of Brahman and with the path of Brahman as told by the Guru, in its earlier or introductory part (4, 12, 5 . 4, 14, 1 . 6, 13, 1-3). On being told by the guru that 'breath is Brahman,' Ushosha, the disciple of Jibila, said that prize being great he could understand that it was Brahman, but could not understand how the conscious pleasure and the elemental Īkṣa denoted by 'Ka' and 'Kha' respectively, were Brahman. To this the guru replied, 'What is Ka is Kha, and what is Kha is Ka,' meaning thereby that neither mere conscious pleasure which is transitory and dependent upon sense-object contact, nor mere elemental Īkṣa which is non-sentient, is Brahman, but that a combination of Ka and Kha, one of them being substantive and the other adjective, is Brahman. In other words, that bliss which arises in the Īkṣa of the heart, for instance, and which is not transitory and dependent on senseless objects, is Brahman and is therefore the fit object of meditation. Thus it is that the blissful Brahman is introduced as the topic of discussion in the beginning of the section. After the Chândogya and other Īśa tell their own glory and say, "This is knowledge regarding us, and this again is the knowledge of the Ātman. As for the path, your teacher will guide you." This means that there is no room for introducing another topic. Add to this the words of the teacher, Jibila, "As water does not cling to the leaf of a lotus, so no one will cling to him who knows it," which show that the person within the eye is the Brahman itself, possessing the qualities of Satyadvaita and others. It is clear therefore from the context, as well as from the common characteristics of not being stained, that the person within the eye is Brahman.

सुतेनैविलम्बमनिवाप्य ॥ ६५ ॥

[*Ute-upanagāḥ-gaḥ*—The path of one who has heard the Upaniṣads, *ānāhāḥ*—being unobscured, *ca—and*]

AND BECAUSE THE (SAME) PATH BY WHICH ONE WOULD
HAY HEARD THE UNGUARD (SOON AFTER DEATH) IS
MENTIONED (HERE ALSO, THE PERSON WITHIN THE EYE IS
BRAHMAN) 16

The Prainoparaud (3, 10) describes the path of
the gods : ' Those who seek the Atman by penance,
celibacy, faith and knowledge go (after death) by the
northern path to the sun. This is the shade of the pines,
the immortal fearless and the highest support of all,
reaching which none returns ' The Bhagavadgītā too says,
' Those who know the Brahman go as Brahman after
their death by the path of fire, light, the bright fortnight
and the six months, when the sun is on the north ' (2, 24)
The same is the path of those, we are told, (Udd. 4,
13, 1) who know the person in the eye. ' Let people
perform obsequies for such a person or not, he first goes
in the world of the fire, and thence to the sun, to the
moon, and to the lightning. A celestial being leads
him further by the path of gods to Brahman ' It therefore
follows that the person in the eye is no other than the
Brahman

अवनाशितोऽर्थवानप्य मेवः । १७

[Ananāśat—being not permanent] anāśāt—
being imperishable, ca, ca, atarā—other]

{THE PERSON IN THE EYE IS NO OTHER (THAN THE
HIGHEST ATMAN), BECAUSE (AND OTHER REASON) IS NOT
PERMANENT AND ENDURING (IT CANNOT FORM THE
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PERSON IN THE EYE) } 17

If the person in the eye were only an image of some
one else standing before the eye, then the devotion to it is
nearly impossible, because the image will last only so long
as the object before the eye will last. The intention of
the Śruti must be that the person in the eye is capable
of being seen by the mediator, and as such must be
located in his own eye, rather than in the eye of another.
But on the supposition that the person in the reflected

image, we have to remain satisfied with one of the two absurd alternatives. Either the devotee has to meditate on the image of his own person reflected in the eyes of another (who must be available at any time), or he has to meditate on the image of another object reflected in his own eyes. Besides, as the Śruti tells us this image perishes along with the body (Ukṣā 8, 9, 1) in other words, it does not possess immortality, fearlessness, etc. which are the characteristics of the person in the eye.

The *jīva* *brahman* cannot be the person in the eye. For it is vitally connected with the whole body and the sense-organs, and not merely with the eye. It may be suggested that this applies equally to the all-pervading Brahman, if it is taken as the person in the eye. But we have to remember that it is for the sake of meditation that Brahman is conceived as occupying a particular place like the eye or the heart. The *jīva* too, like the image, does not possess the qualities of immortality, fearlessness etc. No doubt, the *jīva* is not different from the highest Ātman, but so long as desires, works etc. are ascribed to it on account of *avidyā*, it will continue to be mortal and be full of fear. And because it lacks the glory of God, it cannot possess the qualities of superdivine and others.

The suggestion that the person in the eye may be the divinity in the man appears plausible because the Śruti tells us that he resides in the eye by means of his rays (Bṛ 3, 5, 2). And yet he cannot be called Ātman, rather he is an-Ātman because he shines by the lustre of the Ātman. As Śruti speaks of his origin and dissolution, he cannot be called immortal etc. The deathlessness of the gods is only nominal, only as compared with human life, they live longer. They derive their glory from the highest God, as is clear from: 'Through fear of the Brahman, the wind blows, the sun shines, fire and Indra do their work, and Death runs' to kill those whose life is no end (Tā. 3, 8).

Hence the person in the eye must be the highest God alone. And when it is said that he is "seen," it should be understood to mean that he is capable of being realized by those who rely on Jyoti, and that it has the further notion of creating in the mind of the ignorant a desire to 'see' him.

५. ईशानमिदंविश्वं (१८-१०)

ईशानमिदंविद्वदिति सत्यंमन्त्रोक्तम् । १८

[Anantaryātra—controller within, all-knowing Jyoti—in gods and others, sarthamantropakṣaṭ—his marks being mentioned.]

THE CONTROLLER OF GODS AND OTHERS FROM WITHIN (IN THE ĀTMAN), FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THAT (ĀTMAN) ARE MENTIONED. 18

A passage from the Śvedāśirovṛkṣopaniṣad tells us that the being who lives inside thus and other worlds and in all beings, as well as inside the earth, the gods, the Veda, the sacrifice and the bodies of all, is immortal and the Īman; the earth does not know him, though it is his body, he lives inside and controls all. (S. 7, 1) Now whom the anantaryāman? Is he the Ātman or some deity, or a yoga endowed with powers, or a new being altogether?

The pīrvapakṣa may hold that the anantaryāman is a new being altogether, inasmuch as the name used for it is not familiar. But it serves no purpose to suppose the existence of a thing whose nature is not known at all. The word, however, is not absolutely unfamiliar, because it means 'one who controls from within.' It may mean, then, some deity ruling over the earth, etc., for each a deity may have 'earth as its dwelling, fire as its sight, and light as its mind, etc.' (Śy. 3, 8, 16); that is, it may be endowed with organs of action and so become capable of ruling. Or the being may be some yoga who is able to enter within all things on account of his supernatural powers. In no case, can the being be the highest Ātman.

because the Ātman is not endowed with body and sense-organs which are necessary for ruling.

To this we reply that the overruler must be the Ātman, for the quality of controlling all can belong to the Ātman alone, who not only renders visible all the created things including gods, earth, etc., but is the cause of them all. Immortality belongs to the Ātman alone. The fact that the deity of earth does not know him, even though he is inside, shows that the Ātman is different from the deity. The being is described in the passage as "unseen" and "unheard," indicating thereby that it is the Ātman alone which is devoid of name and form. Supposing that the body and senses are essential for the act of ruling, it is possible likewise to suppose that the Ātman is, in respect of wisdom, related to the bodies and senses of those whom he wants to control and rule. As a matter of fact, by means of the unfathomable power of his mind, the Ātman can control all things, even though he has no body. To suppose that the Ātman may necessitate the existence of another being superior to it, and so on ad infinitum, is not relevant. For really speaking, there is no difference between the individual soul and the Ātman. So the universal ruler is no other than the Ātman.

॥ ५ ॥ एतन्महद्ब्रह्मविज्ञानम् । १५ ॥

[Na—not; ca—and, Śaṃvartat—found in Śaṃv., at—contrary to it, Bhava—becoming, abhijyot—not being mentioned.]

FOR IT (PRADHĀNA) AS THOUGHT BY (THE LIBERTY) BODHI (THE INTERNAL CONTROLLER); FOR CHARACTERISTICS NOT BELONGING TO (PRADHĀNA) ARE MENTIONED HERE. 15

That pradhāna is not the cause of the world has already been shown while dealing with Sūtra 1, 1, 5. We deal with pradhāna here again, because a follower of the Śūndhya may say that as the qualities of "not being seen or being devoid of form etc." belong to pradhāna as

well, the predikins may be considered as the anurypinun. As the Master Sutra says the predikins "is not discovered by inference, nor is perceivable by the senses, but being unconscious has spread in all directions, as if in sleep" (B. 3). The attribute of being the controller may belong to it because it is the cause of all.

To this we reply that this is not possible, because qualities not belonging to predikins are mentioned as belonging to the Atman. The predikins cannot be seen, nor is it able to see because it is an unconscious element. On the other hand, in the concluding sentence of the section dealing with the anurypinun, the Atman is characterized as "unknown but seeing, unheard but hearing," unthought of but thinking, and unknown but knowing" (B. 3, 7, 24). Besides the word "Sutra" cannot be applied to the unconscious predikins.

The opponent may take a turn and say, if not predikins, then let us suppose that the individual soul is the anurypinun; it is conscious and is therefore the seer, the hearer and the thinker, it reaches inside and therefore can be described as the Atman, it has to reap the fruits of its actions, if not in this life, in lives yet to come, and therefore unlike body it must be considered immortal, and being the seer etc., it is natural to say that it is at all times. The Great too tells us, "you will not be able to see the seer of the sight" (B. 3, 4, 15). Lastly, being inside and having got to taste the fruits of actions, it possesses naturally the quality of controlling the body and the senses. For all these reasons, the opponent may hold that the individual soul is the anurypinun.

The following Sutra comes as a reply to this

ज्ञातृसंबन्धेऽपि हि वेद्यैरवर्तमाने । १०

[Jñātṛsambandhe—*the embodied soul, as—and, uttara—in both; apī—in ; hi—for ; vedāiḥ—as different ; avartamāne—*that, avartate—is studied.*]*

THE EMBODIED SOUL TOO (CANNOT BE THE APPARENT SELF); FOR IN SOUL (THE FIELD BLANCHES OF ITSELF), IT IS URGENT AS DIFFERENT (FROM THE ANTARYĀMIN) 20

The qualities of seeing, thinking etc. may belong to the individual soul; yet like the *līlā* confusions etc., it is limited on account of the *upādhis* like the body and the senses. It cannot therefore dwell inside the earth and the several worlds, and control them from within. The *Kṛishṇas* and the *Mithyāntarīyās* moreover, make the distinction between the individual soul and the antaryāmin, and speak as much of the former as of the earth and other things as being worthy to be controlled by the latter. They are the dwelling places of the antaryāmin. The *Kṛishṇas* say, 'he resides in the *vyṁśā*;' and the *Mithyāntarīyās* say 'he resides in the *śarīra*.' (Bg. 3, 1, 20) ; and the words, '*vyṁśā*' and '*śarīra*' stand for *śīrṣā* and the embodied soul respectively.

The objection that may arise here is that there would be two seers in one body ; one the embodied soul and the other, the God as the antaryāmin. Śruti itself is against this possibility, 'There is no other seer but he,' (Bg. 3, 1, 20) . It denies the existence of any other seer, besides *ātma*, except the one antaryāmin under discussion.

In reply to that we say that what appears as a difference between the two seers, the *śīrṣā*, and the antaryāmin does not exist as a matter of fact. It arises on account of *upādhis* of body, senses etc., the effect of *avidyā*. There is only one *Ātman*, the experience of which can be had in the *śarīra*, 'I am.' Anything else which is not the content of this experience is an-*Ātman*. But owing to *upādhis*, the one *Ātman* is treated in practical life as if it were two, just as the one *līlā* is considered as two (*māhātma* and *ghṛāhītma*) on account of the *upādhis* of a jar. So, it is on account of the *upādhis* of *avidyā* which create an interest in the practical world that Śruti makes the distinction between the knower and the known, the

affirmations and the prohibitions, and the means of knowledge like perception and experience of *brahmā*. Or as Śaṅkara says II, it is in order to explain the practical world of *avidyā*, 'that there is the appearance of duality, and that one sees another; but when the practical world vanishes before *vidyā*, when all this becomes the *Ātman* to him, then who should see whom?' (Iy. 2, 4, 14, and 4, 3, 13). Hence too, on account of the distinctions of *avidyā*, there exists a controller as different from the controlled, otherwise there exists only one supreme *Ātman*.

५ ब्रह्मवत्त्वविशेषणम् । (११-१३)

ब्रह्मवत्त्वविशेषणोक्तोक्तोक्तः । ११

[*Adṛṣṭavān*—*aparokṣa*—one who possesses invisibility and other qualities, *divatvān*—qualities being mentioned.]

THAT WHICH FURNISHES THE QUALITIES OF INVISIBILITY AND OTHER { IS *Brahman* } ON ACCOUNT OF CHARACTERISTICS { *POURNA* TO IT } BEING MENTIONED { ALONG WITH INVISIBILITY } 21

A passage in the *Mūṇḍakopaniṣad* tells us that 'the higher knowledge is that by which the Immutable is realised; that which is invisible, which cannot be seized, which has neither organ nor qualities, which has neither eye nor ear, nor hands nor feet, which is everlasting and yet manifold, which is all-pervading, subtle, imperishable and which is regarded by the wise as "*Brahman*," the source of all' (1, 1, 3, 4).

Now the qualities like invisibility being common, a doubt arises as to whether the *Brahman* means the *Īśvara* or the *pradhāna* or the embodied soul. According to *pūrvaśāka*, it must be the non-intelligent *pradhāna*, because in the passage subsequent to the one quoted above, it has been compared with non-intelligent things, e.g. 'just as a spider creates and takes back the threads, or just as the herbs grow on the earth, or just as iron from the

body of a living man, even as the world arises from the Immutable' (Mā. 1, 1, 7). Our need not say in this connection that the spider and the man are instances of intelligent beings, for it is impossible that the threads and the hairs will be produced without the non-intelligent bodies. The bodies may be governed by intelligence, but it is out of the bodies that the hairs and threads are produced. Similarly, the world must have been produced by the non-intelligent prakṛiti, even though it may be guided by the intelligent Paraśa. Besides, not only qualities like invisibility are found to belong to prakṛiti, but there is also no mention of a quality which does not belong to it. Qualities like 'knowing all,' 'perceiving all,' which are mentioned in the concluding portion (Mā. 1, 1, 9), may however be pointed out as contrary to the nature of prakṛiti; but it must be remembered that the earlier reference to the Immutable as invisible (1, 1, 5-6) is different from the reference to that which is higher than the Immutable (Mā. 1, 1, 11). Now that which is 'higher' may be 'all-knowing' and 'all-perceiving', but that which is Immutable at the Bhūtapara must be prakṛiti. Or if the word 'para' were to mean the efficient cause, then Bhūtapara may mean even the embodied soul, for by resorting to merit and demerit the jīva too can be called the cause of the origin of things.

To this we reply that the Bhūtapara is the highest God only. For consciousness can neither belong to the non-intelligent prakṛiti nor to the embodied soul which is limited. Besides, the same Immutable Bhūtapara, which is first said to be the original cause of all created things (1, 1, 7), is further spoken of as unchanging and as the cause of the created things: 'From him, who is constant and whose power consists of knowledge, come forth the Brahman in the form of subtle elements, the gross elements possessing names and forms, and food such as barley and wheat' (1, 1, 9). From the identity of reference, we believe that the same immutable Bhūtapara is constant also.

and is therefore Brahman; it is neither perishable nor false. Now again in the passage (Ma. 2, 1, 2) which refers to 'that which is higher than the high immutable,' is there anything meant except the immutable, intelligent Brahman under discussion. For prior to this passage, there is another passage from the same Upaniṣad (1, 2, 12) which commends the Guru to impart the Brahman-vidyā to his disciple, so that the latter may realize that truthful, immutable being. As to why the word 'immutable' has been used in the śloka, and as to what the 'higher than the high immutable' may mean, we shall make it clear when we deal with the next śloka.

We reach the same conclusion in another way. The Māndūkyaopaniṣad begins with the topic of Brahman-vidyā by telling us (1, 1, 1) that it was first imparted by the Creator to his eldest son Atharva. It is said to be both the foundation and the culmination of all other vidyās, for it being known, everything else becomes known. (1, 1, 2). It differs in kind from all other types of knowledge, such as the knowledge of the Vedas, grammar etc. It is therefore known as *parā vidyā*, due to which the immutable being or the Brahman is known (1, 1, 3), as distinguished from the *aparā* which is only a preliminary to the *parā*. The one leads to bliss, the other to mere worldly prosperity. Fools alone may consider the *aparā* or the lower vidyā as the Sumatī. *Sumatī*, and so become subject to old age and death over and over again. Unless one considers the 'house of wisdom, and the righteous' Brahman required for a sacrifice, as final,¹ *manasā*, unless one turns away with disgust from the lower knowledge which, by contrast only brings out the glory of the higher, and is convinced that the eternal Atman cannot be achieved by means of transient actions, one does not become fit to receive the higher knowledge. But once he knows the futility of the lower knowledge and of actions, he should with humility,

¹ The righteous Brahman, which the ancient priests secured for any sacrifice and the sacrifice and the ritual.

and with that in hand, surrender himself unto the Guru or the Spiritual Teacher who is not only learned but also sanctified in the realisation of Brahman. (I, 3, 7, 1, 1, 13).

All this points out that the immeasurable source of all, or the Brahman, is Brahman alone. If this were not so, the knowledge of Brahman would not be considered as *pari-vṛṭti*. And if Brahman is to be understood as *pradhāna*, there would result a third kind of *pradhāna-vṛṭti* besides the two mentioned in the Upaniṣad. At best, the knowledge of *pradhāna* will lead to the knowledge of its non-sentient effects viz. the things of equipment, but not of the conscious undivided soul; and the knowledge of the soul will not likewise lead to the knowledge of things. In other words, the knowledge of *pradhāna* or *śiva* will not give rise to the knowledge of everything else, as it happens in the case of the knowledge of the Brahman. And above all, the knowledge of *pradhāna* has never been acknowledged by anyone as leading to *mokṣa*.

Lastly, the argument that Brahman must be non-intelligent because things compared to it, by way of illustration, are non-intelligent, is not sound. For there is no such rule like this. Even on the Sākhya theory, the *pradhāna* is not considered as gross as nature, because in the example taken for comparison the earth is a gross element. For all these reasons, the source of all or the Brahman which possesses the qualities of *avivakṣit* etc. is the highest God.

विशेषतोऽन्वयदेष्टव्यं न वेत्ति । २२

[Vidvats—qualified, śāstra—different, vyapadīśībhūti—the two being mentioned, na—not, tathā—the two alike.]

(Brahman alone) does (mean) the two others (i.e. the individual soul and the *pradhāna*); the special qualities and difference are mentioned. 22

The cosmogonic person who is the same as Brahman, is described as "effulgent, bodiless, the same inside and outside, unproduced, without mind or organs and parts" (Sho. 3, 1, 2). The individual soul, on the other hand, which wrongly considers itself as being limited by name and form, cannot possess the attributes of effulgence etc., and is therefore, different from the Brahman. Similarly, the same passage which mentions the highest Atman as "higher than the high Immovable" distinguishes the prakriti from the Brahman. The word "Immovable" (ghana) means here the unmanifest potential source of names and forms, the support of the whole five elements, that which is lodged in God and forms his upādhā, and which transcends all other effects but is not itself an effect. The intention of the Śāstra is not to admit the independent existence of prakriti, so that we may first say that the ākṣara and prakriti are one and the same thing, and then distinguish the prakriti from the Atman. The intention is rather to distinguish the Atman as transcending the ākṣara or the immovable. If at all the prakriti is to be assumed, then we have no objection to its being assumed in such a way as will not contradict the Śāstra or in the way in which the ākṣara has been defined above. Then, too, as said above, the Brahman is different from the prakriti, and is nothing else but God.

And for what reason, again, does Brahman mean God? This is told in the following Śāstra :

इतिह्यपरात्मनः । १३ ।

[Itape—form ; aparyakṣit—being unproduced, re—and.]

AND BECAUSE ITS FORM IS UNPRODUCED. 13

In the passages which follow the mention of the Being which is higher than the ākṣara, there is first the description of the creation of all things from pṛaṇa. Then comes a statement of the form of this very Brahman

as : " Fire is his head ; the sun and the moon, his eyes ; quarters, his ears ; the Vedic, his speech ; the universe, his heart ; the wind, his breath ; the earth, his feet ; he is surely the inner Ātman of all " (Mā 2, 1, 1-4). In view of the entire context, it is proper to hold that this form belongs to God alone, and not to the Īśa who is of a limited power, or to position which cannot be the Ātman of all. This bodily form, however, instead of contradicting the quality of unreachability, is intended to show that the Hīstayoni is the inner Ātman of all. For does not a person who has realized the Brahman say the slogan " I am the food, I am the inner of food " (Tā 1, 10, 4), only to indicate that the Brahman is the Ātman of all, even though he has no desire to eat the food himself ?

Some scholars say in this connection that the passage quoted in the beginning (2, 1, 4) does not refer to the source of all things but refers to creation, the inner self of which is not the Ātman but the Hiraṇyagarbha or Prajāpati. For in the passage 2, 1, 3 and again from 2, 1, 3 to 2, 1, 5, are mentioned only the things that are created such as, pṛiṣṭa, mād, aruṣa, the five elements, bodies, and parts. It seems improbable that, all of a sudden, in the midst of the two passages (2, 1, 3 and 2, 1, 5), there should be a reference to Hīstayoni, as the Ātman of all. So in the intervening passage too (2, 1, 4), it seems reasonable to hold that a being born from the ultimate source of all, and not the source itself, i.e. the Hīstayoni or Brahman is mentioned. That being must be the Prajāpati or the Sūktānā, about whose birth we get reference in Agveda and other places. " Hiraṇyagarbha was (born) in the beginning, as the first lord of the beings with the three worlds as his body, he made the earth and the sky. him alone as God, we worship by offering oblations " (Rg 10, 121, 1). Being the first-born Person with body, he too may be called the internal Ātman of all other created beings, in the sense, that he lives in the form of the thread of pṛiṣṭa (Sūktānā) in all beings (Rg 1, 9, 9, and Mā 2, 1, 4). The reference to Hīstayoni or the Ātman, therefore, as the source of all created

in the end after the description of the whole of creation. In 2, 1, 15, for instance, he is described as the Puruṣa, who is all that universe, including karma, penance etc.

वैश्वानरविश्वरूपः । (१३-१४)

वैश्वानः तत्प्राप्तमन्त्रविश्वरूपः । १४

[*Vaiśvānaraḥ, viśvānara—ordinary, jishā—word, vidhātā—owing to qualification.*]

Vaiśvānara is (the ancient *Ātman*) an account of a spiritual quality according to (two) different words (viz. *Vaiśvānara* and *vīśv*). 24

The *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* tells us that six brāhmins approached the king, *Asvapati Kāśya*, in order to learn from him the nature of *Vaiśvānara Ātman*, and on being asked as to what beings they worshipped, they said turn by turn, that the heaven, the sun, the wind, the lightning, the water and the earth respectively were the objects which they worshipped. Hearing this the king replied that these correspond respectively the head, the eye, the palm, the mid-portion of the body, the bladder, and the foot of the *Vaiśvānara*, for they indicate the heaven, the firmament, the motion, the space, and the wealth, which are in the *Vaiśvānara*. Besides, his chest is the altar, hairs, the grass on the altar, and his heart, mind and mouth the three fires, *Āgneya*, *Arvīḍhya* and *Alamāhya*, respectively. The king then deprecated their mode of worshipping the *Vaiśvānara Ātman* in parts, and advised the contemplation on it, as required by a *ṛg*, so that the deities would be the eater of food in all the worlds and beings (3, 11, to 3, 15).

Now both the words in '*Vaiśvānara-Ātman*' are ambiguous. The word '*Vaiśvānara*' may mean 'the abandoned fire,' 'the abandoned lot' or 'the Fire-divinity', and the word '*Ātman*' may mean the individual soul of God. Which of these five meanings, then, are we to have

by "Vaisnava-līman?" According to purāṇas, we may mean by it, in the first place, the abdominal fire or 'the fire inside the human body, by means of which the food is digested' (Bg. 3, 12). Or secondly, it may mean the ordinary fire, 'as a sign of the day, i.e. the sun which the gods made for the world' (Bg. 10, 88, 12). Or thirdly, as the passage 'May the god Vaisnava, the king of worlds, favour us with pleasure and prosperity' (Bg. 1, 98, 1) shows, we may take it to mean a deity. With reference to the word *līman* which is used along with Vaisnava, it may mean the individual soul. The proximity of the abdominal fire, and measurement by a span, indicate that it must be the embodied soul. But on no account, would Vaisnava mean the highest God.

To this we reply that because the heaven, the sun etc. are the head, the eye, etc., the Vaisnava must be the God or the līman of the world, though he is described thus for the purpose of meditation. This is the distinctive meaning of the "Vaisnava-līman," and shows the meanings put forth by the purāṇas. As the cause of all, God possesses within him all the stages of all the effects, and so the description of the several worlds and beings as the limbs of God is adequate. The statement regarding the result of meditation on the Vaisnava, viz. "He eats the food in all worlds, beings and self," has meaning only with reference to God. Similarly, the statement, "all his senses are burnt etc." (Chd. 5, 24, 3), regarding one who meditates on the Vaisnava and knows him, shows that Vaisnava is nothing else but God. To add to this, the topic of the passage under discussion is the nature of the *līman* or *līman*. For all these reasons, Vaisnava means Brahman.

भक्तियोगप्रमाणं पञ्चमः । ५५

[*bhakti-yoga-pramāṇa*—what is told in words, arrangement—reference, god—may be : 55—Brahman.]

BECAUSE (THAT) WHAT IS TOLD IS TRUTH, THE INFER-
ENCE MAY BE (TO WHAT IS TOLD IN ŚRĪTĪ, VIZ. THAT
THE VAIŚNĀVĀRA IS THE HIGHEST GOD). 35

A verse from the Śantiparva describes the highest
God as 'the liwan of the world, and as one whose mouth
is fire, whose head is the heaven, whose feet is the hills,
and whose feet, eyes and ears are the earth, the sun and the
quarters' respectively (M. Bk. 43, 68). The Śaṅk-
raites use to infer a Śrīta corresponding and prior to it
as its authority, because the Śaṅk has in it the presence
of the ego viz. 'the heaven as head, and feet as mouth'
etc., which is also present in the Vaiśṇavara Śrīta of
the Cāṇodāyoparagad. Even taking for granted that
Śaṅk passages are sometimes given as cologues, we say
that such a grand cology cannot be without the sanction
of a prior Śrīta Vaiśṇavara, therefore, is the highest God.

कदादिन्योऽन्तः क्षीप्यमानं मेति चेन्न त्वात्तदुपेक्षारहितं
दुर्लभं विवक्ष्यते । १६

[Kādādinnyo—because of word and others, anta—inside,
kṣīpyamāna—on account of presence, ca—and, na—not,
iti—so, ca—if; na, tādā—by then, āpta upaśānti—
being recommended to behold, durlabha—not being
possible; parapaśa—person; ap—also, ca, tādā—then,
adīyate—is studied.]

IF IT IS SAID (THAT VAIŚNĀVĀRA IS NOT THE ATMAN)
ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORDS ETC. (HAVING A DIFFER-
ENT MEANING) AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EVIDENCE WITH-
IN (OF THE), [WE REPLY THAT IT IS NOT SO, BECAUSE IT
IS TOLD UNQUESTIONED TO BECOME (THE AN GOD),
AND BECAUSE IT IS DECEIVER (TO THOSE OF HEAVEN AS
HEAD OF FIRE), AND BECAUSE HE (THE VAIŚNĀVĀRA) IS
REFERRED TO AS PURUṢA (BY VĪRĀGĀRTHIN). 36

Vaiśṇavara cannot be the highest God, because
entirely the word Vaiśṇavara means fire. In Śatapatha

Bṛhadāraṇyaka (10, 8, 1, 11) the word *Agne* is offered to *Vaiśvānara* and there it means fire reaching within man. In the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* (3, 18, 2), again, the three fires are mentioned as the heart, the mind and the mouth of *Vaiśvānara*, and in the same *Upaniṣad* (3, 19, 1) it is mentioned as the place where oblations of food to *pitṛa* are to be offered. For all these reasons *Vaiśvānara* is to be understood as abdominal fire. Or in view of the qualifications, "heaven as the head etc." (*Chā. 3, 18, 2*), *Vaiśvānara* may be taken to mean elemental fire. This is clear also from the mantrā, "The sun who has by his light covered both the earth and the heaven and the intervening space, is fit for being meditated" (*Ṛg. Sūta. 10, 88, 3*). Or again, the heaven etc. may be the limbs of the powerful *Pitṛ*-deity, if not of the elemental fire.

All these arguments are incorrect, we say in reply. For what is recommended here is that the abdominal fire itself should be meditated upon as a symbol of the highest God, just as the mind is recommended for being meditated upon as the symbol of Brahman (*Chā. 3, 18, 1*). Or, what is recommended here is the meditation of the highest God as qualified by the abdominal fire, just as God is recommended to be meditated as qualified by the *spṛṣṭā* of mind, *paiśa* and light (*Chā. 3, 14, 2*). Had there been no intention of the Śrauta to refer to the highest God, and had the aim been merely to point to the abdominal fire, there would have been no specific references to "vastuous heaven as the head" etc. in the passages quoted above. This applies equally, as we shall see while dealing with the next *Sūtra*, when the *Vaiśvānara* is interpreted as meaning the elemental fire or the deity of fire. The abdominal fire can be said to be within man, and not as the same as man or *Parapa*. The *Vijñāneya* however say that *Vaiśvānara* is *Parapa*, and that one who knows him as residing inside eats the food in all places (*Chāra. Sūta. 10, 8, 1, 12*). So the highest God alone can be the *Parapa* as well as be made the body of man.

There are some who read the last portion of the Sūtra, not as 'Vaiśvānara is the Puruṣa,' but as 'like Puruṣa.' Then the Sūtra of the Vaiśvānara or the highest God, with Puruṣa will be explained thus. With reference to the external world, it can be said that the heaven is his head, and the earth is his feet, while with reference to man, he will be said to be located, as if between the chest and the head of the devatā.

अस्य हृदयं यः देवताः कुर्वन् यः । १०

[Aśya—heart; sa—his, ya—not; devatā—devy, his; kurvaṁ—element, to—end.]

FOR THE SAME REASON (THE VAIŚVĀNARA) IS WITH-
THER THE DEITY (OR FIRE) AND (THE ELEMENTAL) FIRE. 10

The elemental fire which gives only heat and light cannot be supposed to have the heaven as its head, etc.—The fire-deity too cannot have them as its limbs, because it has not produced the heaven etc. The power of production is derived from God. So it will be more appropriate to call the heaven and the like as the head etc. of God, rather than of the fire-deity. Besides, the word Suman in the 'Vaiśvānara-Sūtra' (as seen before) is thoroughly applicable to elemental fire, the elemental fire and the fire-deity.

अस्यैवमपि विविचिः । ११

[Aśya—directly; aśa—not, avivachāt—without con-
sideration; Jaganat.]

NO CONTRADICTION, SAME JAGAT, EVEN IF (THE
HIGHEST GOD IS TAKEN AS THE OBJECT OF WORSHIP)
CONCERN 11

According to Jaimini there will be no logical flaw if, instead of taking Vaiśvānara as the symbol or upādhi of God, we mean by it God himself, and so worship him

directly rather than worship him as a symbol or as limited by upādhis. The possible objections against this view are (as already considered under Sūtra 35) : That the words *Vaiśvānara* and *fire* have different meanings, and that the *Vaiśvānara* resides inside the man, and that these suggest that *Vaiśvānara* means the abdominal fire. Apart from the refutations we have done while dealing with Sūtra 35, Jambhika says that the passage from the *Śaṅkapaṭha* *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (10, 6, 1, 11) does not at all refer to the inner residence of the abdominal fire, because it is not the topic of discussion and contains no word which is a synonym for that particular fire. On the contrary, it refers to the supposed similarity of the highest God to man, and to his existence inside man, that is, on the portion of human body viz. the portion from forehead to chin. What is 'on' and 'of' the body can be said to be 'inside,' because it is a part or a limb of the whole ; just as a branch of a tree can be said to be within the tree. Or, the passage may be said to refer to both the *śarīra* and the *narāyaṇa* aspects of the *Ātman* ; *narāyaṇa*, so far as he is said to be 'the man', on account of his *līlābhāvika* and *līlāyātsaka* similarity from head to feet to the external world and to man, and *narāyaṇa* so far as he is a mere onlooker, and is residing within all, without being affected by the upādhis. In keeping with this interpretation, the word '*Vaiśvānara*,' can be explained to denote the highest *Ātman*, that is, (1) *Vāre*—all, and *Nara*—five ; as *Vaiśvānara* means 'one who is the ātman of all things including the souls' ; or, (2) *Vāre*—all modifications, and *Nara*—creator, so it means the cause of all, or again, (3) One ruler whose subjects are the souls. Thus the word *Vaiśvānara*, which is the same as *Vaiśvānara* means the highest *Ātman*, the cause, the ruler and the eternal self of all. The word '*Agni*' too means the highest *Ātman* ; *Ag*—'towards the āgṛ' is towards the end or frons of actions, and *Ni*—to lead, so it indicates 'one who makes the souls approach the frons of their actions.' In other words, *Agni* or *Agṛiṇi* (one who is the leader) means *Ātman*. Briefly, the idea of the three fires in the heart, the mind and the mouth,

and the offering of food as oblations appear to be adequate if *Vaidika* is to mean *Ātman* alone.

If *Vaidika* is to mean God, how is it possible to measure him by a span? The *Sūtrakā* answer:

अविमर्शेति वाचस्पतिः । २५

[*Ādivimārṣe*ti—because of non-measurement; *av*—that, *ādiva*—without.]

Ādivimārṣa says (that God is said to be measured by a span) because of (his) manifestation (to devotees). 25

God transcends all measurements, no doubt; yet he shows his grace to his devotees and manifests before them in a form which may be a span in length.

वसुमतेर्नौपमि । २६

[*Vasumatē*r—on account of manifestation, *śānti*—]

As *vāsumatē* says (God is said to be measured by a span) on account of manifestation (of him). 26

Just as the case of barley which has its own size, is said to measure a 'prastha' (two pounds), because that particular measure is used, even so God, who is beyond measure, is said to be measured by a span. For he is manifested upon by devotees in their heart, which is measured by a span. Or, God is said to be a span in length, because the motive may be that he should be mediated upon, as if he has a form which is measurable by a span.

सर्वभूतेषु विविदितायादि सर्वमसि । २७

[*Sarvabhūteṣu*—supposition; *śarvabhū*; *vividita*—the name; *śarvapa*—all.]

ACCORDING TO JANAKI, (GOD IS SAID TO BE A SPAN OR LIGHT) ON ACCOUNT OF MENTAL SUPPRESSION; (ŚAUN TAC) TELLS THE SAME. 31

In the *Vijayavāgīśa* *Beṭṭamāna* where the same topic is being discussed, the various *śāchedavikā* members of the *Vaiśvānara*, such as the heaven and earth, are identified with the *śāchedavikā* members such as the forehead and eye of the human body, and the meditation of God is being recommended on the portion of the human body which measures a span, and which is between the forehead and the chin. 'The highest God was thus obtained by the several gods,' we are told, 'because they meditated upon him as if he was of the measure of a span.' And we are told how the King *Aśvapati* too used to his disciples that 'he would show unto them how the *Vaiśvānara* had that measure, and then, pointing by his finger successively to his forehead, eyes, nose, span, navel within the mouth and to the chin, he said that they were respectively the heaven, the sun, the wind, the *śāśā*, the wealth or water in the bladder and the feet of the *Vaiśvānara*.' All this account goes to show that the *Vaiśvānara*-valya of the *Vijayavāgīśa*-*Beṭṭamāna* (*Śa. Be. 12, 6, 1, 11*) is the same as that of the *Chāndogya*-*opaniṣad* (*Ch. 11, to 5, 11*), in spite of the minor differences between the two. The heaven and the sun are spoken of in the one as 'standing above,' and as 'possessing light,' while they are spoken in the other as 'possessing light' and as having 'rūpa' forms. Both the texts make the identical use of the expression 'measured by a span'. So, as *Janaki* says, it is appropriate to call the highest God as '*Prādeśavikā*', because Śaun within Him to be so inspired for the purpose of devotion.

आत्मनि वैश्वानि । ३२

[*Ātmanī—thy thou; ca—and; eva—him; ātmī—
in him*]

MEKURDVS (THE JĀLLĀS) THINK THAT HE IS THE
HIGHEST GOD (VHS) IN IT (I. I. THE SPACE BETWEEN THE
FOURHEAD AND THE CREAT). 32

The infinite, unmeasured *Atman*, says *Tigdavalhya*,
resides in the souls which are not released, and he says
to *Atm* that the place of the soul is between the *Mai*
(man) and the *Varuṇ* (gryhrow), for it is the *Varuṇ*
and the *Mai* which ward off and destroy the soul of the
man. It is this place which is the junction of the
heaven (head) and the earth (chin), and a contemplation
in which, as if in God, destroys the soul. So what *Sou*
speaks of God, viz. as *pridekumtra* is quite appropriate.

God is also known as *abhyranika*, because, he is
known as the subject of every individual soul, or because,
being everywhere, he transcends all measurements,
or because he is the creator of all. From all this, it follows
that *Vatvritam* is the highest God.

ADITYA YA FIRST

PĀDA THIRD

१ पुन्नाद्यविकारम् (१-७)

पुन्नाद्यविकारे सत्यम् । १

[Dya—(heaven), bhū—(earth), adi—beginning with, dyo-
bhaṁsa—stroke; sat—stable—in account of the word 'sat'
(सत्)]

THE SUPPORT OF THE HEAVEN, EARTH ETC. (A
BRAHMAN), BECAUSE THE WORD "SAT" (A BRAHMAN WAS
HERE MENTIONED). 1

The Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad (3, 2, 3) speaks of the being
'as whom the heaven, the earth and the Akāśa, as well as
the mind and prāṇa are woven' and asks us 'to know
that Ātman alone, and to leave off all other talking,
for he is the bridge leading to immortality.'

According to pārvapakṣa, the being as the support
referred to in the passage must be different from the
Brahman. For the word 'bridge' reminds us that there
is another bank towards which it leads; Brahman, on the
other hand, being eternal and all-pervading 'is without
end and has no other bank' (Ep 3, 4 12). It can be
said that pradhāna, as told by Sāṃya, is the support,
because it is the cause of all. Or, it may be the word,
for the word is said 'to be the thread on which all these
worlds and beings are strung together' (Ep 3, 7, 2). Or,
again, inasmuch as the word 'īśan' is used with reference
to the support, it may be the individual soul. For though
it is finite, it can be said to be the support of the objects
of experience, on account of its being the author of actions.

To this we reply. The use of the word "Ātman" on account of its pervasive and sentient character, is adequate only with reference to Brahman, and not to the non-sentient prakāsa, or the base word. Corresponding to this word "Ātman" of the Māndūkya, Brahman is designated by the word "Sat" in the Chāndogya-panjapī : "All these creatures have their root in the Sat, their residence in Sat, and their support in Sat" (2, 1, 4). Again, in the passages preceding (2, 1, 10) and following (2, 1, 11) the passage from Māndūkya quoted in the beginning (2, 2, 5), Brahman alone is mentioned by various terms such as "Paraśa," "parameśa," "para," "amśaral," and others. "The Paraśa is all this, amśaral, parameśa, Brahman, the highest and the amśaral." "That amśaral Brahman is before and behind, to the right and to the left."

It is likely that one may think at this point that the support will make us aware also of other things which have this support, and that the expression "Brahman is all that" implies that Brahman is manifold in nature, just as a tree, in spite of its unity, consists of different parts such as branches, stem and roots. In other words, there may arise a dualistic conception of the world and the Brahman as separate from each other, Brahman considered as the substantives and the world as adjectival. It is therefore in order to ward off this suggestion that, in the passage under discussion, we are told to know him as the support or as the one Ātman only. The Ātman is not to be considered as many and as quibbled by the world of manifold effects, rather it is to be known as one homogeneous substance or support after removing from the mind the false knowledge of this worldly existence. If one is used to bring the seat on which Devadatta is seated, he brings the seat and not the man. So the passage "Know him alone as the Ātman," "Brahman alone is all this," "The Ātman is, like a piece of salt altogether, both sweet and salty, full of knowledge" (By 4, 1, 13), all aim at removing the wrong notion of the reality of this world. "From death to death he goes, who sees

any duality here' (Ka. 2, 1, 10) has been described the fate of the believer in the unreal world. That which is 'all' is said to be in reality nothing but Brahman; not that which is Brahman is intended to be 'all' or many. The 'all' is to be cancelled, and the Brahman retained. As for the word 'bridge' (samyak) we must not be led away by what it suggests viz. that there is another bank, just as we must not suppose it as one made up of wood and clay. Rather, must we catch the meaning of it, the idea of holding together or lending support, which is in the etymology of the word, viz. 'to lead'. Or, as suggested by some others, the bridge here indicates the means of attaining immortality, which consists of the knowledge of the Atman and the leaving off of all talk, as recommended in the passage. It does not refer to the support of the heaven, the earth etc., and therefore the question of taking the word 'bridge' to mean produce or something else than Brahman does not arise.

दुर्लभं दुर्लभं नन्दयेत् । २

[*Durlaba durlabam-āpadyate*-(to be achieved), *syāpadyati*—because it is achieved)]

BECAUSE IT IS MISTAKEN AS IT TO BE ACHIEVED BY THOSE WHO ARE DELUDED, (BRAHMAN IS THE SUPPORT OF THE HEAVEN AND THE EARTH, ETC.). 2

It is a common experience of us all that we become subject to love and hatred because certain things which promote the well-being of the body please us, and certain other things which are harmful displease us. Desires and death to the body fill us with love and infatuation, and yet being misled by avidyā, the feeling, that 'I am the body and other things of the not-self', leads us to perpetual misery. As against this condition of bondage, it is pointed out that the destruction of the deluded is the Brahman. It is fit for them to resort to the support of heaven, earth etc., because 'When He who is both the cause and the effect is seen, the knots of the heart are

broken, all doubts are solved, and the actum comes to effect (Mā. 3, 2, 8), and because, being free from the bondage of name and form, the wise man reaches the self-effulgent Person, who is greater than the great ayatna." (Mā. 3, 2, 8). Other Śruti passages too mention the Brahman as the fit abode of the released — "When all the doubts go away from his heart, he becomes immortal, and attains to Brahman in this very life" (Bg. 4, 4, 7). Pradhāna and other entities, on the other hand, are not admitted by any as fit objects to be adjoined by the released. Besides, the condition of hearing off all speech, in order to know the support of the heaven and the earth etc. as told by the Māndūkopaniṣad, is exactly the same condition as told by the Bhṛgudīśopaniṣad to know the Brahman. The two upanishads prove clearly that the support of the heaven etc. is Brahman alone. "The wise man should first know the Ātman and fix his mind upon that alone, and should cease to talk many words, for it is nothing but weakness" (Bg. 4, 4, 31).

अनुमानवत्कृतम् । ६

[No any independent-reference, attributing-cause to want of any word indicating it.]

On account of there being no word to denote, the support of the heaven etc. as) not what is intended () a Pradhāna. ॥

There is not a single word which will exclusively denote pradhāna, or rūpa, we cannot therefore take them as support of the heaven etc. On the other hand, terms like "Omamant" etc. indicate that the support is an intelligent being (Mā. 1, 1, 5).

आयतनम् । ७

[Purāṇic-idea of āyātana-and].

(Not) the object of religion (i. e. the ceremonial work) etc. ॥ ४

The individual soul is cannot be the support of heavens etc., because though it can be called an intelligent and living, it is not conscious. Besides being limited by upādhis, it is not all-pervading. The jīva may be considered as an instrumental cause of this world, because the unseen store of merit and demerit of the jīva requires the world for enjoying the fruits; but on no account the jīva can be called the material cause of the world.

विष्णुसहस्रनाम् ॥ ५

[Viṣṇu-sahasranāma-śloka-śloka-śloka-śloka]

THE ACCOUNT OF DIFFUNCTION BEING GIVEN (THE JĪVA IS NOT THE SUPPORT OF THE HEAVENS ETC.). 5

The passage 'Know him as the Ātman' indicates the knower as the jīva, and the known 'Ātman' as separate from it. The jīva is that which has the desire of mokṣa, hence Brahman is called by the word 'Ātman' as the support of the heavens etc.

विकल्पसूत्र ॥ ५

[Vikṣepa-sūtra-śloka-śloka-śloka]

THE ACCOUNT OF THE CONCEPT (THE JĪVA IS NOT THE SUPPORT OF THE HEAVENS ETC.). 6

The whole chapter deals with the nature of the highest Ātman. It begins with the inquiry as to what it may be, which when known, everything else becomes known (Mu. 1, 1, 3). So it is the knowledge of the Brahman which is referred to here.

पितृपुत्राभ्याम् ॥ ५

[Pitṛ-puṭra-ābhyāṃ-śloka-śloka-śloka-śloka]

And because the two conditions (of the) Brahman and Jiva (infinite Brahman and Jiva respectively).

That Brahman is the support of the heaven and the earth etc. (as mentioned in the passage under discussion: 1. 2, 2, 3) is again strengthened by a further passage in the Mundakopaniṣad (3, 1, 1) where 'the two birds, the inseparable companions of each other' are mentioned as the *Ivara* and the *jiva*. One of them is referred to as being merely present, and the other as eating the fruits of actions. Had there been no reference to *Ivara* but in the passage 2. 2, 3, as the support of the heaven etc., a reference to him, all of a sudden, in 3, 1, 1, and in distinction from the *jiva*, is entirely without meaning. The same is not however, true of the *jiva*, who unlike *Ivara* is an object of common experience. Therefore, even a casual reference to *jiva* afterwards without a prior reference need not strike us as unreasonable. The motive of the Śaiva is to make us acquainted from the very beginning with the fact that *Ivara*, who is not the object of common experience, is the support of the heaven etc. and that he is distinct from the *jiva* who is limited by upādhis. To take the *jiva* to be the supporter of the heaven etc. in the first passage is to render the reference to *Ivara* in the second passage out of place to support the *Ivara*-to-be-so, however, is not to render the reference to *jiva* as called for, but to explain the fact that *jiva* though identical with Brahman is considered as separate because it eats the fruits of its actions.

Our conclusion remains unaffected even though the two birds are taken to mean the bodhis and the upādhis-less *jiva*, as stated in the Paṇḍa Upaniṣad. For, just as the *śikṣā* compared in a par is nothing but the inferior *śikṣā* without the *par*, even so the *jiva* is nothing else but the highest *Ātman*, when viewed without the adjuncts of internal organ, body etc. Our contention is (1) that the *jiva* as limited by the upādhis is not the support of the heaven etc., but (2) that the highest *Ātman* is the

support. According to Paings Upaniṣad too the *śiva* that appears different in different bodies is not the support, but the space-less *śiva* who is identical with the highest *Ātman* is the support. The conclusion of the two passages therefore is the same as that of an earlier passage still (Mā. 1, 1, 3-6), viz. the *Brahman* is the highest *Ātman*, for 'in it the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven.'

१. दृष्टान्तिरूपम् । (८-१)

तु वा वैश्वानरादभ्युपगच्छम् । ८

[*Brahmā*, *Sakṣatānti-rūpa* after state of deep sleep; *upadehita*-being mentioned.]

THE *Brahman* (is *Brahman*), FOR (IT IS MENTIONED AFTER *Sakṣatānti*) I. E. THE STATE OF DEEP SLEEP IS WHERE *Brahman* BECOMES AWARE). 8

The seventh chapter of the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* begins with a dialogue between Nārada and Śaṁkhaśrīmān. Approaching with humility as a disciple, Nārada requests Śaṁkhaśrīmān to initiate him in the knowledge of the *Ātman*, so that he may be relieved of his worldly encumbrances. In the course of the conversation, Nārada asks if there was anything greater than name, and Śaṁkhaśrīmān says in reply that it was speech. Then there is a series of questions and answers as to which is greater and greater still, so that, every succeeding member of the series becomes greater or higher in importance than the one preceding. Following the name, we get the series consisting of speech, mind, *śakānta*, *atta*, *dhīma*, *vyākāra*, power, food, water, fire, *śakti*, memory, hope and *prīya* (7, 1 to 13). And a little later (7, 26 and 28) Śaṁkhaśrīmān says: 'One must know the *Brahman* (the great) which when known, one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, and when one sees something else, hears something else, that is 'little'.

Now what is meant by ' *Brahman* ' ? Whether, on account of the proximity of passages, we should mean by

is the *prajna*, or whether, in connection with Nirvāṇa's grief, we should mean by it the highest *Ajman*, knowledge of which alone would remove that grief?

According to paragraph the 'Bhūman' means the *prajna*, for, (1) though there is series of questions and answers as to what is greater and greater still, from the name to the *prajna*, there is no such question or answer after the pointing of *prajna* as the greatest of all. (2) But soon after, the Bhūman is so described as to mean *prajna*. (3) Śaṅkarācārya calls the person who knows the *prajna* as the 'atvīṇa' : i. e. one who can make a statement regarding the greatest of all things, and recommends that such a person need not choose that he is an 'atvīṇa' (2, 13, 4). (4) Therefore, the sentence which follows that, but provides the description of Bhūman, viz. 'For this person who speaks the truth is the real atvīṇa' (2, 16, 1) does not refer to something else but refers to the greatness of *prajna* alone. The person 'this' or 'this person' refers to the person who knows the greatness of *prajna*, so without breaking away from the topic of *prajna*, the description goes on from the atvīṇa of *prajna*, through another series, so to say, from truth to Bhūman. Bhūman therefore means *prajna*. (5) That Bhūman indicates a condition in which one does not see or hear anything else need not offer any difficulty, because the same may be seen to be applicable to *prajna*. In deep sleep when all other senses become merged in *prajna* (Pr. 4, 2, 1), it is the *prajna* that keeps awake. (6) The 'Bhū' of the Bhūman (Ch. 7, 23), again, can be explained as belonging to *prajna* because in deep sleep, when the *prajna* has no dream, there is happiness (Pr. 4, 6). (7) Similarly, the 'immortality' of Bhūman (Ch. 7, 24, 1) may refer to *prajna* also (See 3, 4). (8) That the Upaniṣad begins with the statement, that the knowledge of the *Ajman* enables one to overcome grief, need not again deter us from holding that *prajna* alone is considered here as the *Ajman* of all, for in the seventh chapter itself (13, 1) we are told that *prajna* alone is the

'father, mother, brother, sister, teacher and Brahman.' (2) Besides, *prajña* is conceived as the 'man' of the wheel in which all the 'spokes' of the things in the world are fixed; *prajña*, therefore, is conceived as Brahman.

To this we reply: (1) The sūtra clearly states that the reference to Brahman comes after the reference to 'śuṣupti' or the joy. That *śuṣupti* points to deep sleep and not to five is clear apart from its separate mention along with the waking and dreaming conditions (Br. 4, 3, 13). As *prajña* alone is awake in deep sleep 'śuṣupti' then indicates the *prajña* to which it belongs to the Brahman which is described later than *prajña* must indicate an entity different from *prajña*. (2) On the other hand, if Brahman were the same as *prajña*, there would be no sense in saying that *prajña* is mentioned after *prajña*. The series of members beginning with 'name' and ending with 'prajña' has in it every term as different and new from its preceding term. It is natural therefore to hold that what is told about Brahman is different and new from what is first told about the person. (3) The statement regarding the 'śrīṣṭin' is not made exclusively with regard to the man who has the knowledge of *prajña*, as our opponent suggests, but it is made a second time and by way of contrast regarding an altogether different man with special reference to his knowledge of truth. (4) This too may be challenged, and it may be pointed out that a truth-speaking Agribotro is not an Agribotro because he speaks the truth, but because he performs the agribotro, and yet truth-speaking is his special quality. Similarly, truth-speaking may be pointed out as a special quality of the person who is called *śrīṣṭin* on account of his knowledge of *prajña*, not that the person is *śrīṣṭin* simply because he speaks the truth. But to offer this explanation is not only to give up the direct meaning of the Śruti passage according to which the *śrīṣṭin* becomes so 'on account of truth', but also to ignore the meaning of the particle 'but' which intends to break away, by way of contrast, from the context of *prajña*, and to begin

with the new topic of the person who is known as *śravidhā* through truth. In short, the quality of being an *śravidhā* does not rest to the knowledge of *prajñā*, but to that of *brahman* through the series of truth and other things. (5) Nor does it stand to reason to suppose that a new topic has not been introduced simply because the question-and-the-answer form is not there. When the conversation goes on regarding a *brahman* who has studied one *Veda*, if someone says about another, 'but he is great who has studied four *Vedas*', we do understand without the question and the answer that a new topic has been introduced. Similarly, even though there is no new question asked by Nārada, after the hierarchy of entities was closed by the mention of *prajñā*, Śaṅkhaśāstra, being filled with compassion, tells as if, of his own accord, that the quality of being an *śravidhā* is a false thing, if it arises merely on account of the knowledge of a false thing like *prajñā*, but that he alone is an *śravidhā* who becomes so on account of truth. Now this truth is nothing but *Brahman*, for as Śruti tells 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tat 2, 1). It is in this way that Nārada is led on beyond *prajñā* by a series of steps of *Vijñāna* and to *Brahman*, which is the same as the highest *Ātman*, of the truth, the knowledge of which would really make a person an *śravidhā*. (6) This interpretation of *eva* is quite consistent with the process of the whole discussion in the grief of Nārada and his desire to put a stop to it by means of the knowledge of the *Ātman*, as also with the result of the inquiry, viz. 'his faults being removed, he was shown the other side of darkness' by the control Śaṅkhaśāstra (Chd. 7, 1, 3 and 7, 26, 2). The word 'knowan' cannot be applied in the real sense to *prajñā*, and the mention of grief cannot take place without the knowledge of the *Ātman*. 'There is no other path to *niche*' (Ibr- 6, 15). (7) That *prajñā*, again, is not the last word of Śaṅkhaśāstra's teaching is seen from the fact that it is further told that the 'prajñā springs forth from the *Ātman* alone' (Chd. 7, 26, 1). Neither can it be said that the topic of *Ātman* comes last of all, and that therefore one

is free to say that 'Brahman is *prajña*'. For being asked by Nārada as to the shade of the Brahman, Śaṅkaraśāstrin answers that he resides in his own glory (7, 24, 1), and further continues the same topic of the Brahman to the end of the chapter, with the only change of the word *Ātman* for Brahman. The greatness of the Brahman as well as its self-contentment are far more fittingly applicable to the *Ātman* than to *prajña*.

परमेश्वरत्वम् । १.

[Difference-attributes, unperceptible-being (4), eternal.]

AND BECAUSE THE ATTRIBUTES (OF BRAHMAN AND ĀTMAN) AGREE, (Brahman is Ātman) ?

(1) The inapplicability of ordinary perceptions and other sense-activities to Brahman is found to be the same in the case of the Ātman too. 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else etc. That is the Brahman' (Chā. 7, 24, 1). Identically the same we read in another Śrauta passage regarding the Ātman, 'When all this becomes the Ātman, who should see whom?' (Bg. 4, 3, 12). Regarding *prajña*, too, it can be said that during deep sleep there is the absence of activities, but if we remember that the topic under discussion is Ātman, we shall see that the alleged absence of activities, instead of referring to *prajña*, merely means the inapplicability of them to the Ātman inasmuch as the Ātman is not attached to anything. (2) The bliss of deep sleep, again, does not refer to *prajña* but to Brahman or Brahman, because it is 'great' and not 'little' (Chā. 7, 23, 1). And because it removes the ordinary pleasures which is mixed with misery, the bliss of the Ātman is also spoken of as the 'highest' and a, considering its very nature, 'an small portion of which all the creatures live' (Bg. 4, 3, 32). (3) The immortality of Brahman again (Chā. 7, 24, 1), as distinguished from the relative immortality of long life of *prajña* or other things, is intended to remind us that Brahman is Brahman

or the ultimate cause of all, excepting which, as the *Īśāhasūktas* say, everything that is perishable (3, 4, 2) (4) Similarly, the qualities of truth, omnipotence, self-existence and being the Self of all, mentioned as 'belonging to Brahman, can belong to the highest Atman also

२ अक्षरविशेषम् । (१-१४)

अक्षरमक्षरम् ॥ १-१५

[*Akṣara*—the syllable *Om*, *akṣara*—*letter*, *akṣara*—*end*;
akṣara—*because it supports*]

[*Akṣara* is *Brahman*]; *akṣara* it supports (all things) mentioned *Īśā*. 10

"What is that" asked Gārgi, "in which the *Īśā*, as its form, is filled in all directions?" "It is *Akṣara*, as the *Īśāhasūktas* say", replied Yājñavalkya, "it is neither large nor small etc." (Ep. 1, 3, 7, 8). Now the doubt that arises here is whether the word '*akṣara*' means a syllable or the highest Atman.

The paragraphic view is that *akṣara* means by convention a syllable. The '*akṣara-manditāya*' (or the collection of fourteen *Sūtras* which Pāṇini, the grammarian is said to have received from god Śaṅkara) contains in it each syllables. Śaṅk mentions that 'all is *Om*' (Ud. 1, 13, 4), and as a symbol of Brahman, it is said to be the Atman of all, and as such, it is to be meditated upon.

To this we reply that *akṣara* means the highest Atman. Having first mentioned that all the things in the world, either of the past, the present or the future have their support in the *Īśā* Yājñavalkya further tells Gārgi that the *Īśā* too finds its support in the *akṣara*, but to be the support of all things cannot be the quality of any being except Brahman. *Akṣara* therefore means, in the first place, that which is not *akṣara* or perishable,

and secondly, that which pervades (from the root 'vā' is 'pervade'?) *Ākṣa* then means Brahman. That *Om* is said to be all this is simply a sort of praise, because *Om* is considered as a symbol of Brahman for meditation.

A follower of the Sāhitya school may say that if *Om* can be used to be the support of all its effect, then the *śloka* too may be construed to mean *pradhāna*, and not necessarily Brahman. To this the Śrīvakara replies:

न न प्रधानात् । ११

[*Ni*-that, *an*-and, *pradhāna*-because of command.]

That (*pradhāna* or *support*) is due to the command (*an* *an*). 11

'It is due to the command of this *śloka*, O *Śiṣya* that the sun and the moon were supported (Bq 3, 8, 9), and the command must be the work of God alone, and not of the non-intelligent *pradhāna*, for otherwise they also may be called to produce a preaccount of a command.

अव्यक्तात्मनोऽप्येव । १२

[*Avyakta* (described)-*Ātma* (nature)-*apya* (and)-*eva* (being included).]

AND BECAUSE THAT THING FORMING A DIFFERENT NATURE (FROM BRAHMAN) HAS BEEN INCLUDED, (THE *ĀTMA* IS BRAHMAN). 12

The *śloka* has been described as 'unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving etc' (Bq 3, 1, 11). No doubt, the qualities of being 'unseen,' 'unheard' etc. may be used to belong to the *pradhāna*, but the other opposing qualities which, at the same time, belong to the *Ātma* are found lacking in the non-intelligent *pradhāna*. *Ātma*, therefore, is not *pradhāna*. Similarly the same passage which tells us that "there

is no other part but the akâra, no other hearer or knower but the akâra, excludes the possibility of the plurality of individual souls. Nay, the upâdhis too are excluded from the nature of the akâra, for it is said to be "without eyes, without ears, and without speech or mind etc." (3, 5, 8). So the akâra does not mean the embodied soul at all. Undoubtedly, then, it is nothing else but Brahman.

४ धितिकर्मणवेदप्रविकारम् । (14)

धितिकर्मणवेदप्रविकारः । 14

[*dhiti-karmṇa, jñāna-karmṇa, vyavahāra-karmṇa*—being mentioned
not—be.]

BEING MENTIONED AS THE OBJECT OF MEDITATION, HE (is the highest) BRAHMAN, WHICH IS ADORNED BY IDEAS OF OM. 15

During the course of the discussion of meditation on Om, in the fifth section of the Prâpanasâra, the sage Pippalâda tells Satyakama that it is by means of this "Om which is both the sagara and the nargaya Brahman, that a person attains to one of them," and that he, who meditates on Om with its three parts, a, u, m, goes to the highest Parapa (3, 3 : 3, 8). The doubt that may arise in this connection is whether the object of meditation is the lower or the higher Brahman.

According to the pârâyasika, it is the lower Brahman, for one who meditates on Om consisting of three parts, enters first into the sâra, and from there he is carried by the Sâman to Brahmaloka, a locality which is restricted by limits, and which therefore cannot be the fit reward for one who has known the higher Brahman. No doubt, such a man is said to reach the "highest" or "para-Parapa"; but the word "para" has got only relative significance with reference to the physical body which is gross. So the "para-Parapa" is nothing but the Pârâparagatâ or the

Śāstrīśa-*puruṣa* or the lower Brahman, or the lord of Brahmanāśa.

To this we reply, The *anugama* or the highest Brahman alone is the object of meditation. For, this most object of meditation is spoken of afterwards as the object of sight. The man who meditates "beholds the Person of his meditation too," the person who dwells in the town of body, and who is greater than the *śṛṅgha* or the *Hareṣyagurūḥ*. If it is a question of meditation alone, it matters little if the object of meditation is even imaginary, a rope can be meditated upon as a serpent. But if the meditation of a thing is to turn into a vision, the object must be real and existing. And so the transcendent Being which is spoken of as the object of sight of the devotee who meditates upon it, must be an existing entity. It is the highest Atman, the object of both meditation and the perfected sight or intuition; it is not the lord of Brahmanāśa for he may be the object of meditation, but not of intuition because the reality that belongs to him is imaginary and due to *spandha*.

An objection may be raised in this connection. It may be pointed out that so far as meditation is concerned the person is said to be "transcendent" simply; but when the person is said to be intained, he is described as "transcending the transcendent *śṛṅgha*." How should one know then that the person as the object of meditation and the person as the object of vision are not two but one and the same person?

The persons appear as two, we say in reply, if the "*śṛṅgha*" is supposed to be the object of meditation, so that the Person "transcending the *śṛṅgha*" will be a different person as the object of sight. What we hold is that the *śṛṅgha* is not as all the object of meditation, as is clear from the two words "*puru*" and "*para*" which are both present in both the passages dealing with meditation and vision. It is the "true

greatest Puruṣa 'or the highest Ātman which is the object of meditation and vision as to be the object of vision too. As for the meaning of the word 'jyoghaṃ' which again is said to be 'transcendent,' we solve the compound as to that which is 'composed of (ghaṃ) the fire,' but as 'one having the characteristics of the fire.' Now the jyoghaṃ or fire, though, in reality, it is the same as the Ātman, is to be understood as limited on account of its upādhi, just as a piece of ash, though it is in essence nothing but ash in general, is a specific different portion from it on account of its being limited. And the jyoghaṃ is said to be 'transcendent,' because it transcends the atoms and their objects. And yet we have to remember that in spite of the transcendent character of the jyoghaṃ, it is not the object either of meditation or of vision. As said above, it is the Puruṣa or Brahman which transcends the transcendent jyoghaṃ, and is the object both of meditation and of vision.

Or, jyoghaṃ may be interpreted, as some others do it, as the Brahmaloka, the residence of Brahmanādeva or as Brahmanādeva himself. The Brahmaloka is said to be higher than all other lokas or worlds, and the Brahmanādeva or the Itarasyaṁbha is said to be the same Person including in him all the jīvas. So when it is said that the man who meditates upon the Om with us three persons lifted by the power of the Sāman-hymns to the Brahmaloka, it means that he does not stop here, but goes further along with the jyoghaṃ or Brahmanādeva in having the vision of the highest Ātman which transcends the jyoghaṃ and jīva is the controller of all the bodies. Thus also, we come to the same conclusion that the highest Ātman, who transcends the transcendent Brahmaloka along with the Lord of that loka, is the only object both of meditation and vision.

Boudha, Śvetāśvara also tells us that para-Puruṣa means Brahman, 'higher than the Puruṣa there is nothing, and that is the best, the end of all' (Ka. 1, 3, 11). So it is the highest or the uparoga Brahman which was first distinguished

from the lowest or the supreme Brahman, but which was said to be along with the latter identical with Om, is said afterwards as the object of both meditation and vision. "That a man becomes free from sin, as a snake becomes free from slough." (Pt. 3,3) shows us further that this freedom from sin may be supposed as a result of meditation on the highest Ātman, and not from meditation on anything different from the highest Ātman. Then, again, the man who meditates on Om as the supreme aspect of the Ātman need not be said to receive a small reward by way of his being lifted to Brahmaloka, either it is his first reward. For in course of time he may get the highest reward, viz. the clear vision of the Ātman and become free. In other words, he seems to merge by degrees along with the lord of the Brahmaloka.

५. दक्षशिक्षणम् । (१४-२१)

दक्ष इषोम्वा । १४

[Dakṣa-small, unadityaḥ—due to what follows.]

THE SMALL PORTION OF ŚHĪLA IN THE HEART IS THE SMALLEST ĀTMAH (ON ACCOUNT OF THE FOLLOWING REASON). 14

In a passage of the Chāndogyaopaniṣad (3, 1) one is recommended to 'search and understand that small portion of Śhīla, which is made the small house-like palace of the City of body (Brahmapura)'. Now, inasmuch as the word Śhīla means both the elemental Śhīla and Brahman, we must settle in which of the two senses the word "dakṣa" is used. Similarly, the word "Brahmapura" which means the city of Brahman may mean either the city of the jīva or of the Brahman, and so may give rise to a further doubt as to whether the jīva or the Brahman is the lord of the city.

According to pūrvaśruti, (1) the dakṣa or the small śhīla means the elemental śhīla (the bhūbhūvaḥ), for that is the conventional meaning of the word Śhīla. No

double, the *śrīrāṣṭhī* is all-pervading, yet it is spoken of as small, because it is located in the heart. And though there is one *śrīrāṣṭhī*, it is conceived for the purpose of meditation as two, one inside and the other outside; and hence a comparison is possible between them and they are said to be equally large allowing 'heaven and earth to contain' in them (*Chā. 8, 1, 3*). (2) Of the word '*dakṣiṇ*' may mean the individual soul, inasmuch as the word '*Brāhmaṇ*' means *Īśa* in a subsidiary manner, and hence the word '*Brāhmaṇapura*' would mean the city in the form of body of that *Īśa*; and the *Īśa* in the man, would be known as the lord of the city of body, inasmuch as it has acquired it as a result of actions. It dwells in the heart, because it is the seat of mind, and it is spoken of as small because it is compared to the point of a pin (*Śuc. 5, 4*). That it is compared with the all-pervading *śrīrāṣṭhī* only shows that it is not different from *Brāhmaṇ*. (3) Or again, the '*dakṣiṇ*' may be an other line of something else residing inside the small *śrīrāṣṭhī* which itself is inside the heart. But on no account can it be said that '*dakṣiṇ*' means *Brāhmaṇ*, because *Brāhmaṇ* is not connected with the body.

In reply to this we say that *dakṣiṇ* means nothing but the highest *Ātman*, for as what follows after the statement of *dakṣiṇ*, a possible question regarding the nature of that which is to be searched and understood is anticipated on the part of the disciples, and the reply which the teacher ought to give is stated thus, 'the *śrīrāṣṭhī* within the heart is as large as the discoidal *śrīrāṣṭhī*, and hence contains within it heaven and earth, fire and wind etc.' (*Chā. 8, 1, 3-5*). This means that the teacher's reply is intended to silence the possible doubt of his disciples who must have thought that the heart is small, that the *śrīrāṣṭhī* within it must be smaller still, and that, therefore, it may contain nothing which is to be searched and understood. In other words, the teacher first wishes to cancel the erroneous idea that the '*dakṣiṇ*' is small because the heart inside which it is located is

small, by declaring that it is as large as the elemental *likhi*; and secondly, because he compares the inner with the outer *likhi*, it can be said that he wishes to cancel the equally erroneous idea that the *dakṣa* means the elemental *likhi*, and thereby suggest that the two are different entities. Comparison requires two things which have a real difference between them and which at the same time are similar. *Likhi* being one cannot be compared with itself, and even supposing that there is a difference between the inner and outer *likhi*, the two cannot be compared in point of extent. We may suppose an imaginary difference, only when there is no possibility of an actual difference which, however, is possible if by *dakṣa* we mean the highest *Ātman*. If some one would say on this account that the highest *Ātman* (supposing *dakṣa* to be the *Ātman*) too cannot be compared with the *likhi*, inasmuch as 'the *Ātman* is greater than *likhi*' (Sat. Br. 10, 8, 1, 2), we have to reply that the intention of the comparison of the *dakṣa* with the elemental *likhi* is only to negative the smallness of the *dakṣa*, which is erroneously assumed to it on account of its being enclosed by the lotus of the heart, and not to indicate its extent. Nor can it be said that the purpose of the comparison is twofold, viz. to negative the erroneous idea and to indicate the extent, for the sentence of *Mīmāṃsā* forbids us to have two meanings of one and the same sentence. Besides, if *dakṣa* means only a small portion of *likhi* enclosed by the lotus of the heart and is so conceived as to be different from the elemental *likhi* on account of the upādhī, it is impossible that it will contain within itself the heaven and the earth etc. And finally, the *dakṣa* cannot be the *śrotrālikhi*, because the qualities, which belong to the *Ātman* and are ascribed to the *dakṣa*, cannot belong to the non-intelligent *śrotrālikhi*. The *dakṣa*, which, in the immediately following passage, referred to as the *Ātman* by the preceptor 'that,' is mentioned as free from sin, oldage, death, grief, hunger, and thirst; it is mentioned again as one whose purposes and desires are the embodiment of truth [Ud. 5, 1, 1]. The *dakṣa* then is the highest *Ātman*.

Dhara does not mean the individual soul also, though the word *hrim* may mean it. For, in the first place, being enclosed in the small lotus of the heart, and being exceedingly small like the point of a quill, how can it be compared with the elemental *dhara* which is all-pervading and is the support of heaven and earth etc.? If, to escape this difficulty, it be said that the individual soul is in reality not different from Brahman, and therefore it is that one may ascribe these attributes to it, the reply would be that they may be more appropriately ascribed directly to the Brahman itself rather than to the individual soul. The *dharādhikā* then would connote the Brahman and not the *jiva*. Secondly, the word '*Brahmapura*' need not mean the city in which the individual soul resides, but with reference to the word '*Brahma*', it means the city of Brahman. In the *Pratyaṅgama* we are told that the devotee "beholds the transcendent Puruṣa dwelling in the city of body" (C. 8). "That Puruṣa dwells in the bodies of all" (Bṛ 3, 5, 26). We learn from Śruti, then, that the body is not only the abode of Brahman but is useful for its realisation. And even supposing that *Brahmapura* means the city of *jiva*, the Śruti passage stands to inform us primarily that Brahman resides in the body in close proximity with the devotee, just as the image of Viṣṇu is said to be available in the *Sāgama* stone. Add to this, in the third place, what is told in a further passage of the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* regarding the imperishable nature of the results which accrue from the knowledge of the *dharādhikā*, in contrast with the perishable nature of the results of works, and it becomes absolutely clear that the *dhara* means the highest Ātman and not the individual soul. "Those who, after having realised the Ātman, which is the only imperishable object of desire, depart from this world, become free to move anywhere they like" (Chā. 5, 1, 6).

As regards the further point of the *pārapada* that the object to be sought for and understood is not the

deharikāḥ but something else contained in it, we have no point out that the comparison of the outer with the inner Ikāḥ then will not serve any purpose. Instead of comparing the two Ikāḥ, the teacher might have, in that case, given some information regarding the contents of the deharikāḥ. If the deharikāḥ is told to be as large as the bhūṭikāḥ, for the simple reason we should become aware that heaven and earth, etc. are held within it, which is inconceivable on the face of it, the remaining portion of the section which deals with the deharā would be mostly out of place. The words 'This' and 'and' which refer to the entities Ātman and to persons who attain freedom by knowing the Ātman and the deharā located in the Ātman, refer respectively to the previously mentioned deharikāḥ and the heaven and earth etc. contained in it. In other words, both the beginning and the end of the Śrauta section intimate to us that the deharikāḥ means the highest Ātman only.

चिद्व्यापकं तदा हि तत् स्थितिः च । १५

[*Chid-vyāpakaḥ tada hi tat sthitiḥ ca* | 15
[Inevitably/tydāt because of movement and word, together
the same, āpāt-sam, lapaḥ-sam, ca-and]

(Dharma is Brahman) because movement (movement is) and the word (Brahmaloka used as synonym for it are available); this is seen (explained) too, reason for inference (too is available). 15

In continuation of the context of deharā, we are told further that 'all the beings go unto Brahmaloka, everyday, but are not able to find him,' because they are attracted outside by sensory. (Ch. 5, 3, 2). It is clear that here the word 'beings' is used for individual souls, and the word 'Brahmaloka' for deharā. So, deharā means Brahman. In another place of the Chandogyaopaniṣad (6, 8, 1) we read that 'during sleep the Jīva becomes one with the Truth.' In the light of the Śrauta meaning, probably, we say of a man who has gone to sleep, that he is taking

rest in Brahman. Some may like to dissolve the compound Brahmaloka as 'the loka of Brahman' and so mean thereby the world of the Brahmins etc. But instead of treating the compound as *ṣaṣṭa-tanupura*, if we take it as *Karmadīpaya*, we shall dissolve it as 'Brahman, the state as Brahmaloka'. And the reason for not accepting the first meaning is that it is absurd to believe that people go everyday to the world of Brahmaloka. Brahmaloka, therefore, which is put for debate is nothing but Brahman. Debate then is Brahman.

तुल्यं तद्विनिर्वाणसिद्धिपुण्यम् । १६

[Dissolved because of support, as-and-mannered because of position, *arha* of the, *arha*-in form, *apalābhit* because it is found.]

AND BECAUSE THE DEBARKING OF LIMITED SUPPORT (ATTACHED TO DAKṢA) IS FOUND IN HIM § 4, THE HIGHEST GOD, DAKṢA MUST BE THE HIGHEST GOD. 16

The same debarkability which was first characterised as being inside the lotus of the heart, which was compared then with *śāśāṅkita*, and shown as the support of heaven and earth etc., and which was then declared as the *Arman* and so being free from *man*, is further said to be the support and the bank which prevents the world from coming to a chaos (Chā 8, 4, 1). Just as a dam prevents the flood of water from carrying away the crops in the fields, even so, this *Arman* prevents the various people who differ in caste, language and mental equipment, from being mixed together and confused. It is this greatness of *debark* which has been shown by Śraut as belonging to the highest God: "It is by the command of this Akṣara, O Īśa, that the Sun and the moon are held up (Br 3, 8, 1). "He is the highest God, the Lord and the protector of all beings, the support and the dam to prevent the people from falling into confusion" (Br 4, 4, 22). Dakṣa, therefore, is the highest God.

अविद्येयः । १०

[Praviddhāḥ-being well-known, or-and]

Also *vedānta* (विद्या) is known to mean (Brahman, *vedānta* is Brahman) 17

Śruti passages like 'Ātmā alone manifests the names and forms' (Chā. 8, 14), 'all these beings spring forth from Īdā' (Chā. 1, 3, 1), show that the word *īdā* means Brahman. It will lead to no meaning if we take *īdā* as the sense of individuality, for we have already seen that *īdā* cannot be compared with itself.

ह्यन्यथाप्यस्य हि केचननिरासः । १८

[There-other person(s)-not-saying as-reference, and-for in-that con-ct., no-not, another(s)-being impossible.]

It is to be said that it (i. e. the individual soul is meant) on account of the reference to the other one, (we say) no, for it is impossible (that *īdā* mean in the *śva*). 18

If *īdā* means the highest God on account of a reference to the lower in a passage subsequent to the one in which *īdā* is denoted, then the word *īdā* may mean the individual soul also, on account of a similar reason. The purvapakṣin may say so, and bring forth the evidence thus: 'It is this "Śuśrūṣā" which after having risen from this body meets the highest Light and appears in one's own form, that is known as the Ātman (Chā. 8, 3, 4). Now the word "Śuśrūṣā", which usually conveys the meaning of deep sleep according to other Śruti passages, must convey the same meaning in this passage also, and so refer to the individual soul who alone is said to be quelled by deep sleep. And just as word and other elements are said to arise from *īdā* which is their support, even so the individual soul rises

up from this body, and just as the word *Itihā* means the highest God (as shown by the Vedāntins in the previous Sūtra) even though it is not ordinarily done so, because the word is used along with the qualities of God, even so, the word *dharmā* may denote the individual soul, because the qualities of "Sargamūlā" etc. (as shown above) refer to it only.

We say in reply that this is not possible. For, in the first place, the individual soul which falsely thinks itself to be limited by the adjuncts of buddhi etc. cannot be compared with the unlimited *Itihā*. And secondly, qualities such as freedom of an etc. cannot belong to a being which erroneously thinks itself bound by upādhis. This has already been explained, in the first Sūtra of this *Uddhṛṣṭa* (I, 2, 14), but we mention it again only to remove the additional doubt of the soul being thought of as different from the Ātman. That the so-called reference in the individual soul is, as a matter of fact, a reference to the Brahman will be shown in Sūtra I, 2, 31.

उक्त्यापेक्षविर्मुक्तमवस्य । १५

[Uktā-due to what is subsequent, etc.], *Avasthā* becomes manifest, *svatpā*-one's own nature, *sa-bhāva*?

IF IT BE SAID (THAT *DAHARA* IS *ĪVA*) ON ACCOUNT OF SUBSEQUENT STATEMENTS, WE SAY THAT IT IS. HOWEVER, (ONLY THAT *ĪVA*) WORDS *DAH* NATURE HAS BECOME MANIFEST. 15

The aim of the preceding Sūtra was to show that *dharmā* cannot be the *jīva* inasmuch as qualities such as freedom from an etc. which are spoken of as belonging to *dharmā*, and which are found only in the highest Ātman, are not found to belong to the *jīva*. And yet the argument of the paragraph may be revived, and presented in a new form, in some of the dialogue which opens after *dharmā-vijyā*, between *Indra* and *Virocana* on the one

hand, and Prajapati on the other. The utterance of Prajapati at the outset (Ud. 3, 3, 4) is dealt with reference to the Ātman who is free from sin, old age, death, hunger, thirst, mourning etc., and it is this Ātman, says Prajapati, who must be sought for and realized. And yet, again and over again, promising that he would explain the nature of the Ātman, he points to the existence of the individual soul only. For instance, he first tells Indra and Varuna that the person seen in the eye is the Ātman, thereby indicating that it is nothing but the individual soul in the waking condition (3, 7, 4). He again refers to the same individual soul in its dreaming and sleeping conditions by pointing out to Indra its joyful wanderings and perfect repose (3, 10, 1, and 3, 11, 1). And yet he says that the individual soul is the immortal, everlasting Brahman. Further when Indra complains that the sleeping soul recognizes neither itself nor anything else, Prajapati once again promises to instruct him in the true nature of the Ātman and nothing else. But once again, concerning the body he exhibits the fire alone as the "excellent Purusa," inasmuch as it is the fire, as he says, which rises in the form of 'Svapnāśāśā' from the body, means the highest Light and appears in its own form (3, 11, 3 and 4, 12, 1). From this it appears that the qualities of the highest God are possible in the individual soul, and so one may say that the dharmaśāśā within the heart means the individual soul.

We say in reply that what Prajapati means to convey is not that individual soul which, as the *pūrvapokṣa* has understood, is qualified by the three states of waking, dreaming and sleeping consciousness, but that individual soul which has manifested its real nature, or its own form, after rising beyond the consciousness of body and after coming in contact with the highest Light, viz. the Brahman, which is free from sin etc. The individual soul referred to in the Sūtra (and in the preceding Sūtra as against the *pūrvapokṣa*) is nothing but the highest Brahman, the nature of which is eternal, unchanging consciousness

or pure intelligence and is expressed by such propositions as 'I am Brahman,' and 'That art thou.' It is not the *dhya* individual, the aggregate of body, sense and mind, the nature of which arises as an aspect of *avidyâ*, and which therefore can be compared to the wrong notion arising out of dream. 'The person who has "knows the Brahman and has therefore" become the Brahman' as the *Upanishad* pointed out (3, 2, 5), is the only type of the individual soul as meant by *Prajapati*.

One may raise an objection here. If the individual soul in its original real status is Brahman itself, what then is meant by saying that it gets its own real nature? It cannot be said that its real nature is concealed, so that it should be revealed afterwards; for what can there be which will outshine the eternal light of the consciousness of the Atman? Then, again, how like the Atman remains ever unaffected by anything. It cannot be compared with gold which shines in its true form after it has been separated from dross by means of acid, nor with the stars, which though self-luminous become invisible on account of the outshining light of the sun, but again re-appear in their own glory by night. The individual soul is, in its nature, endowed with the activities of seeing, hearing, thinking etc., and it is not necessary that it should rise beyond the body in order to exhibit this nature. The whole practical life will be impossible without these activities of the soul, and without its connection with the body. What then is meant by the so-called rising of the soul beyond the body? And what is meant by the appearing of the soul in its own form?

We meet the question by saying that just as a piece of crystal which is white and transparent is not deemed to be separate from the tints of the red or blue colour, even so the individual soul which is in reality pure consciousness or light appears to be of the nature of the tints of body, sense and mind, and so to be endowed with the activities of hearing, seeing

etc., on account of absence of discrimination. But the moment the discriminative knowledge arises, the crystal which was already white and transparent appears so, as if for the first time, even so, the seeing of the individual soul beyond the body is nothing but the dawning of the discriminative knowledge on the part of the soul, whereby it does not understand itself any more as made up of body, senses, mind etc., but understands itself as the pure *Ātman*. As a result of this knowledge, the individual soul appears, as to say, in its original form of the *Ātman*.

From this it follows that the embodied or the disembodied condition of the soul is the result of the absence or presence of discriminative knowledge. To have or not to have the body is irrelevant from the view-point of the *Ātman*. For as the Bhagavadgītā declares (13, 20), 'The *Ātman* is not affected by anything, even though it resides in the body'— 'It has no body, though it dwells within the bodies' (Ka 1, 2, 20). Notwithstanding the possession of body, the soul is without the body, only if it has the knowledge that it is one with the Brahman and has nothing to do with the upādhis. It manifests its real, original nature of the *Ātman* if it possesses this knowledge; it remains as an individual soul, different from *Ātman* and bound up with the upādhis, if it has no such knowledge. And though due to ignorance, the individual soul and the highest God appear as separate and two, from the view-point of the highest God, they are identically the same. Whether manifest or unmanifest, there is only one *Ātman*; the distinction between the *jīva* and the *Ātman* as two is false.

All this becomes clear from what Puriṣaṭi has told Indra and Varuṇa. Having first referred to the *jīva* as the person in the eye, Puriṣaṭi characterises it as the fearless, immaterial Brahman, meaning thereby that the two are not different. Thus Puriṣaṭi has refrained from saying that the reflection in the eye is the symbol of Brahman only speaks about his honesty of purpose. And

as, when he goes on to describe as to what happens in the dreaming condition, he refers to the same person of the type, as is clear from the assurance he gives to Indra that he would explain the nature of the self-same jiva further. And this need not be doubted because, it is a common experience that a man who does not claim to see is asking like the elephant he saw in the dream, claims, however, that he is the same person who continues to exist in the two states. Therefore what Prajapati means is that the person in the dream, being the same person as the ego, cannot be different from Brahman. Again, when he passes on to the description of the sleeping condition, the "destruction" he speaks of is the destruction of specific knowledge of a thing during sleep and not of the knower or the Self. As Gṛhi says, "There is no destruction of the Knower's capacity to know" (Bṛ. 4. 3. 30). And finally, when Prajapati repeats the assurance that he would explain the nature of the same being, and comparing the body as material, describes the "Sarvajidhi" as being beyond the body and appearing in its own form when it approaches the highest Light, he refers to the self-same jiva of the earlier stages as being always in essence identical with the highest Brahman.

Some people are of opinion that instead of taking the individual soul as the topic of what Prajapati had said on the first three occasions, and the highest Atman as the topic of what he said on the fourth occasion, it would be appropriate to consider that the highest Atman alone which is spoken of as free from sin etc. is the topic of the whole of his speech from the first to the end of fourth occasion. But this is incorrect. For, in the first place, the previous 'this' in the sentence which Prajapati speaks, viz., 'Thus I shall explain to you again', refers to the previous subject-matter viz. the jiva. Secondly, the word 'again' refers back to the topic once discussed, and does not indicate a new topic each time. Had Prajapati done so he would have been accused of practising deceit. Hence what we hold stands correct, viz. that the topic

of the speech of Protagoras to the individual soul. The only thing to note is that the individual soul is gradually being shown as nothing but the highest Ātman. Just as the knowledge of the rope destroys the serpent which appears on it through ignorance, even so, the illusory nature of the individual soul, so far as it is erroneously understood to be separate and distinct from the highest God, and on account of which various evils and distinctions of desires, fears etc. arise, vanishes the moment there arises the true knowledge. The so-called individual soul then is nothing but the highest God, who possesses the qualities of wisdom and others.

In the opinion of some others still, (Mīmāṃsākas as well as Vedāntins of a different school), the individual soul is a real entity by itself. In order to silence such people by expounding unto them the unity of the Ātman, the Śrīrāṣṭra has begun the Śrīrāṣṭra-sūtra. It aims at teaching that there is one eternal unchanging highest God; there is none else except him who is knowledge incarnate (Bṛ. 1, 7, 23), and yet, like a magician, he appears in diverse forms on account of *avidyā* or *māyā*. Some may hold the view, but what about the Śrīrāṣṭra, one may ask, who has suggested the existence of difference between the individual soul and the Brahman, when, e. g. he says that *chāruṭkṛtā* is not *īva*, but the highest Ātman (Śānti: 1, 3, 18; 1, 2, 16)? The Śrīrāṣṭra, we reply, makes the difference only because he has to disprove the erroneous doctrine of duality. He believes that the highest Ātman is one, eternal, pure, intelligent, free, unchanging, formless and unaffected by anything, and yet he finds that apparent characteristics of the individual soul are erroneously ascribed to it, just as blue colour is ascribed to the colourless *lālita*. It is to refute the current doctrine of the practical world that the Śrīrāṣṭra makes use of such arguments and of *śraut* sentences such as "That thou art", "there is nothing else but the Ātman". And though he makes the difference of the highest Ātman from the individual soul, he does not make the difference of the individual soul from the

Ātman. The Ātman as the support is certainly different from the things imagined to be existing; but the imagined things cannot exist apart from the support, on account of which, they are imagined. The rope exists by itself and is different from the serpent. The serpent, however, which is imaginary cannot exist apart from the rope. The difference, then, which the Śāṅkhya allows between the highest Ātman and the *jīva* (and not *vicar* *vicar*) is only with the view of making people aware that the whole of Karma-kṛdya with its prohibitions and injunctions implies a dharma which is purely imagined and non-existent, and therefore does not affect the Vedānta position that there is one Ātman alone. The Śāṅkhya has already referred to this unity of the Ātman in Sūtra 1, 2, 36 and to the difference in sphera of Karma-kṛdya and jīva-kṛdya in Sūtra 1, 1, 4. Performance of sacrifice may be said to affect the soul, so long as the consciousness of body etc. exists, but the same learned man, if he comes to know that the Ātman is not at all affected by action, may, without performing a sacrifice, remain content with the knowledge of the Ātman.

अथासौ सत्त्वः ॥ ३०

[*Ātma (sāt) satthah (sattvaḥ), ca sat, pādmasattho va (sattvaḥ)*]

AND THE REFERENCE (TO THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) IS EXTENDED TO BRAHMAN OTHER (THE ĀTMAN). 30

Having pointed out that the purpose of the Ityāgama passages is not to describe the nature of the individual soul, but to prove that the individual soul is nothing but the Brahman, the Śāṅkhya points out now that in the subsequent sentence to the 'dharma-kṛdya' too, the reference to the individual soul is extended to mean the Brahman. The individual soul, which is described by the word 'Ityāgama-kṛdya' becomes fused with the activities during the waking and the dreaming conditions of life,

and so being desirous of taking rest goes beyond the consciousness of the gross and subtle bodies, during deep sleep, it then reaches the highest Light or Brahman, and so appears in its own real nature. Here too, the reference to the individual soul is for the purpose of making us aware of its real nature, which is manifested by reaching the highest Light and reappearing through it in its own form as the very subtle Brahman.

अल्पाक्षरं ब्रह्म ॥ २१

[Alpa (small)-Brahm being mentioned by Śruti, at-tham, at-sā, sat-that, which-said.]

It is so said that (Brahm cannot mean the highest BRAHMAN) on account of its being mentioned by Śruti as small, (we reply that) it has been already explained— 21.

The argument of the pūrvapakṣa that the highest God cannot be meant by dahara, because of his all-pervasive character, but that it may mean the individual soul because of its comparison with the point of the god, has already been met with while dealing with the Śruti, 1, 2, 7. It was shown there that God, though all-pervading, is capable of being mediated even in the small heart. Besides, Śruti itself has contradicted the nullifier, by saying that the internal deity is as large as the external one. So the dahara means the Brahman.

५ अनुकूलविशेषम् । (२२-२३)

अनुकूलत्वम् ॥ २२

[Anukūla-] Because of action sāra, sāra-kā, at-sā.]

(The account of (Brahman's) action (i. e. creation) after (him), and of (the word) 'sat'. (Brahman is the source of the light of all). 22

The *Maṇḍūkya* and the *Kāṭhaka Upaniṣads* give us the verse: 'The sun does not shine there, not do the moon and the stars and the lightnings, much less the fire. After he shines, everything else shines, all this is lighted by his light' (*Mā. 3. 2. 10, Ka. 3. 3. 17*). The doubt that arises here is whether that being, which when shining everything else shines, is some luminous entity or the *Prāṇa Ātman*.

According to philosophers it must be some luminous substance other than the sun, moon etc. For, firstly, it cannot be anyone of the latter, since it is said in the above mentioned verse itself that these do not shine 'there'. Secondly, just as the moon and the stars do not shine when the sun is shining, even so there must be something else which when shining, the sun too does not shine. And thirdly, the words 'shining after' indicate that motion is possible only when there is some-body else whom to imitate. One can imitate walking when another walks. Therefore, there must be some luminous body other than the sun, moon etc. referred to in the passage.

To this we reply that it must be the *Prāṇa Ātman*, for as the *Śruti* says, 'Light is his nature, and his thoughts are true' (*Chā. 3. 14, 2*). On the other hand, experience does not show that the sun, the moon, etc. shine after some other luminous body. Besides, luminosity being the common nature of all, there is no need that one should shine first and the rest should shine afterwards. One leap need not shine after another leap. It is not a rule, upon, that motion should depend upon equality of things. Iron is different from fire, dust is different from wood and yet a red-hot iron ball burns things like the fire, the dust on the ground blows after the blowing wind. The word 'his' (*yaṁ*) in the fourth part of the verse, makes us aware that the *Prāṇa Ātman* is the cause of the light of the sun and the moon etc. As the *Śruti* says, 'the gods worship Him as the light of lights, as the in-

mental Being" (Bp. 4, 4, 16). This obviously does not refer to the physical light of the sun, the moon, etc., for, as said above, facts experience show that these physical lights are there on account of some other physical light. As a matter of fact, on the other hand, one physical light is superseded by another physical light.

Or we may not restrict the meaning of the verse as referring to the cause of the light and the shining of the heavenly bodies, but understand it as referring to the cause of 'all that' (Sarvathā śakti) world which consists of names and forms, and of persons and their actions and fruits thereof. Just as the sun's light is the cause of the manifestation of colour, even so the light of Brahman is the cause of the all, including the light of the astric Bodies. The word 'there' in the verse shows us the context on account of which also we take the Brahman as the source of all. The word 'there' is used by way of a reply to the question, 'How is Brahman the light of lights?' which arises in view of an earlier verse in the Upaniṣad (Mu. 1, 2, 9) : "In that transcendent golden sheath, there is that passionless and partless Brahman, it is the stainless light of lights, and is known by those who have realised the Ātman." That Brahman is the topic under discussion is shown by an earlier verse still (Mu. 1, 2, 9) where it is mentioned as that, "in whose the heaven the earth and the intervening space are woven."

So Brahman being the only self-luminous entity beyond the sun, and the moon etc., every thing that exists and shines does so on account of the light of Brahman. It manifests everything, but is not manifested or perceived by any other light. For, 'The Ātman is unapproachable', 'It is by the light of the Ātman, that a man sits, and goes etc.' (Bp. 4, 2, 4 ; 4, 3, 6).

अपि च सर्वदे । १३

[Apostrophe, it-and, everyone-is told in many.]

AND THAT TOO BEARS (OF ME IN THE SAME WAY). 13

We read in the Bhagavadgītā, "That is my highest abode, reaching which none returns, neither the sun, nor the moon nor the fire illumines that." And yet, "that light of the sun which shines all over the world, and that light which is on the moon, and on the fire, know that all to be mine" (11, 6 and 12).

ॐ तदिदंविमलम् । (१४-२५)

सम्पदोऽयं तमिहा । २४

[*Ididit—that is I-ness, not-only, puruṣaḥ—is measured.*]

THE (JYĀMA) MEASURED (OF A THUMB, IS THE SMALLEST JYAMA) ON ACCOUNT OF LAST-WORLD LIFE (YET THE JYAMA IS THE CONTROLLER). 36

The Kāthopaniṣad tells us that "the person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the body, and is like unobscured light. He is the controller of the present and the future; he sustains the same, today and tomorrow. This is that (Brahman)." (2, 4, 12, 13).

According to pūrvaśāka, the person referred to is the individual soul, for no measure can be predicated of the Ātman who has infinite length and breadth. But the Vyākṛāntman or the Jīva being limited by Upādhis can be spoken of as somehow being measured by a thumb. In the Śukta too, Yama is told to have dragged out forcibly by his nose the thumb-sized, helpless person out of the body of Saryavān (M B 3, 302, 17). It is impossible for Yama to have taken out the Ātman, as Yama himself admits that Viṣṇu is his controller. So, the Śukta, too, is in favour of taking the thumb-sized person as the owner of "antah-jīva."

The person must be the Ātman alone, we say in reply. For there is one who can consciously control the present and the future. Besides, the words "this is that" in the end of the passage, come as a reply to

Maṇḍana's question as to what it may be "which is neither this nor that which is seen, which is neither the effect nor the cause, and which is neither the past, nor future" (1, 2, 14). This means that Brahman was the topic under discussion, and so the word "controller" as used in the Śāstra itself is a far greater evidence than the words "thumb-sized person" to indicate that the person is the highest God and not the individual soul.

How then can the all-pervading Ātman be spoken to have the small dimension? To this the Śāstrīkara replies:

हृदयेऽवस्थां ह्यवस्थान्मनसि च । २५

[Hṛdī—in the heart, avasthā—with reference to, avasthā—manasī—man, avasthā—having a right.]

WITH REFERENCE TO THE HEART, HOWEVER, (THE ĀTMAH IS SAID TO BE OF THE SIZE OF A THUMB), FOR MEN HAVE A RIGHT (TO STUDY THE VĒDAS). 25

We have seen above that though the size of a thumb can more appropriately belong to the finite jīva and not to the infinite Brahman, yet the word "controller" as used by jīva is indicative of Brahman and not of jīva. Therefore, the small dimension of a thumb can be said to belong to Brahman in a secondary way, with reference to its lodgment in the heart, just as the Hṛdī is spoken of as having the measure of a cubit with reference to a person or a bamboo stick. The hearts of different animals may be varying in dimensions, but by "heart," here, we mean the heart of man, for men alone have a right to the study of the Vēdas. They alone have got the capacity to learn, have certain desires, and are not prohibited to learn. The upanayana ceremony can be performed only amongst men. As Jaimini has examined the question as to who has got a right, (Pūrva Mi Śi 6, 1), we need not say anything further. The heart then of a man has the size of his thumb.

In view of such statements, then, as 'That is the Brahman' 'That thou art' etc., we have to understand that the *śiva* or the *ananta* real which is of the size of a thumb is in reality the Brahman. The aim of the passage under discussion is not to describe the dimension of any thing in particular, but to bring home the identity of the *śiva* with the Brahman, by reference to the whole of the latter in the heart. A Vedānta-passage of this type has therefore a different aim from another whose aim is to make us aware of the Nitya Brahman directly; this makes us aware of it by reference to individual real which is nothing but Brahman in reality. That is why Śaṅkara comments on 'to draw out with strings that Person from inside his body as one would take out the delicate fibre from inside the block of grass, and to know it as the great immortal disembodied Atman residing in the heart of people' (Bh. 2, 8, 17).

८ देवतानिवात् । (१५-१६)

सदृशानि वास्तव्याः देवताः । १५

(GODS ARE LIKE (A. B. MEN) AND (HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW THE VEDAS) AS BIRMALITANA WOMEN, AN ASSURANT OF POSSIBILITY OF (SIMILAR BELONGS). 25

Gods too, as Śāṅkarāya holds, have a right to the knowledge of Brahman, for they too may become disgusted with indulgence in sensual pleasures, and may hanker after mokṣa. They are known to be endowed with bodies, from the descriptions we read about them in Śrīdharm, Purāṇas, mantras, and arthavāda, and from paintings and images in ordinary experience. They are not prohibited like Śiddhāntas having the knowledge 'Vedaḥ bhāṅgmanant' to them, no āgnyasoma-ceremony is needed in their case. They accept discipleship, e.g., Indra lived as a disciple of Prajāpati for one hundred and one years (Ud. 6, 11, 5). Bṛhas approached his father Varuṇa with the request

no track has the knowledge of Brahman (Tai 3, 1). Gods and sages may be incapable of action such as a sacrifice, as Jaimini holds (Purva Mi. Śū. 6, 1, 1), because either there are no further gods whom they should please, or there are no other sages to whose family they may belong. But so far as knowledge of Brahman is concerned, no action is to be performed either with reference to any god or by the help of any sage. So far as the act of the Purusa is concerned, it may be measured by the thumb of a god, just as in the case of men, it is to be measured by the thumb of a man.

विदितः सर्वमिति वेदान्तोक्त्यादिभिः ॥ २०

[Vedānta—observation, Karmas—on action, id—id; at—of; na—not; anyā—others, jñāpānī—due to assumption, darśanā—being observed.]

IF IT IS SAID THAT (POSSESSION OF KNOWLEDGE BY SOME WORLD-EXISTENT) CONTRIBUTES TO (MATERIAL) ACTIVITY, WE SAY THAT IT IS NOT SO, FOR IT IS OBSERVED THAT (NONE) AMONG VARIOUS (FORMS) 20

If gods have bodies, it is conceivable that they should be present like priests on the occasion of a sacrifice. But how well it be possible for the god Indra, for example, to remain present at every sacrifice, if they are performed at the same time?

The reply to this is contained in a passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakaopaniṣad* (A. 9, 1, 1), which beginning with the number of gods as 303, and again as 303 declares a little afterwards that these are nothing but the powers of gods, who, however, number thirty-three only. These thirty-three gods are again reduced to six, then to five and finally to one God viz. the Pṛjāp. This means that

1. The 32 gods are: 11 devas, 12 rishis, 11 ādityas, 4 gods and 4 goddesses. The six gods are: Pṛjā, varuṇa, viśva, śakra, agni and uruṇa. 2. The deva and the rishis are deva and the ādityas, etc. are ādityas, they are devas only. These three again are reduced to five viz., deva, ādityas, and finally pṛjāp. that is the one god.

it is the one God of Prāga who assumes various forms. In the Śaṅga śāstra, it is mentioned that the yojin, who acquires supernatural powers like possession of mobile body etc., can divide himself in thousand forms, and can have various experiences in life, such as enjoyment, penance etc. at one and the same time, and can collect back all these forms into himself, just as the man takes back all his rupa within himself (Adh. Śāṅ. 12, 110, 62). If this is possible for a man, how much more it should be so, the case of a god who has naturally got all these powers? So, a god may divide himself in many forms and remain present in various sections at one and the same time, himself remaining uncut.

Or we may offer another explanation. Just as a Brahmapu who cannot be fed by different people at the same time, can nevertheless be bowed by them all simultaneously, even so, one God can, without leaving his place, be the common object of reverence of several persons who may, at the same time, give their offerings to him. The unbodyhood of gods then is in no way a hindrance to the sacrificial activity.

यम् इति चेन्नः इत्यादिप्रमाणानुवाकम् । १८

[*śāṅ.—word,as—that,as—(i.e.—not,as) —from this, proof,as—because of origination, pratyakṣa—immediate, āgama—[from perception and inference]*]

It is as said that the [Vedic] words [will be contradicted owing to the supposition that Gods have bodies] we reply that it is not so, because perception and inference show that everything originates from the word. 28

Even though there may be no hindrance to sacrificial activity, the supposition that gods have bodies may be pointed out as being inconsistent with the position of 'word' in the Vedas. According to the 'Āstapadika

Śāstra' and *Pūrva Mimāṃsā* (I, 1, 8) the Vedas are considered to have self-validity: for the words which constitute the Vedas are said to be eternally related with their meanings. Names of gods such as, *Vasava*, *Rudra*, *Aśvins* etc. being words in the Vedas, they too must therefore be supposed to be eternal. But if gods possess bodies, they become subject to birth and death just as men are. That is, the names of gods being connected with transitory meanings will themselves be untrustworthy. In other words, the Vedas will lose their self-validity, and shall have to depend on something else for being authoritative. Even if we reply that the whole world, along with the gods springs forth from 'word' it may be pointed out that, in the first place, as against our present position, *Brahman* was once said to be the origin of the world (B. B. I, 1, 2), and that secondly, as it was an common experience, the word or name comes into existence after the thing which is given that name. A child is born first, and then the name *Yajñadatta* is given to him. And just as the things are transitory even so the words or names denoting them will not only be not self-valid but not eternal too.

The objection cannot stand. For these would arise from Substance, Quality and Action, individuals only and not species. The *śūla* or the *species* is eternal, and the words are connected with the species and not with individual objects, which may be infinite in number and transitory in nature. Words like '*Vasava*,' '*Aśvins*' etc. are names of eternal species, and not of transitory objects. Besides, the words connote some permanent meanings on account of the presence of which they may be extended to new individual objects. Whoever leads the army is the '*army-leader*'. The name will be applied to the individual object, if it presents the *śūla* or holds the permanent meaning. And it is in this sense that the individuals are said to originate from the words, and not in the sense that the word is, like *Brahman*, the material cause of the universe.

The evidence, however, for believing that the universe arises on account of the efficient cause of the word lies in perception and inference. By 'perception' we mean *Śruti*, for the validity of perception is not dependent on anything else; and by 'inference' we mean *Smṛti*; for though inference is based on an observable sign, yet as far as the origin of the universe is concerned, inference or *Smṛti* must be backed by perception or *Śruti*. The *Āgveda* describes (9,40) how the god *Asvins* produced the different deities, because the word 'ete' (these) reminded him of the deities who provide over and do good to the various creatures, how he produced men on account of the word 'asya' (his), and how he produced the rivers, the planets, the hymns, the weapons and the beings from the words 'bha' (being), 'tanuṣvanta' (Concealer of holy things), 'da' (which includes), 'Dān' (which means) and 'alīkṣasvanta' (beneficial) respectively. The *Bṛhadaranyaka* mentions him as having thought over the union of mind and speech (1, 2, 4), meaning thereby that thinking is inseparable without word. The *Śaṅkara* (M. B. 5. P. 233, 24) too mentions the 'Self-born Being' as having first produced the eternal, eternal Vedic word which again, in its turn, produced all activities. What is meant by production of the beginningless and endless Vedic speech is that it is being imparted orally from the teacher to the disciple. So it is 'the Vedic words through which Brahman has produced the names and forms of all beings, and has set forth activity' (M. B.; *Saṅkara* 135, 29, and *Māṇḍūkya* 1, 20). As in common experience we find that a jar is made after conceiving the meaning of the word jar, even so, there occurred in the mind of the Creator first the Vedic words and then corresponding to them, he created the universe. He created the earth, for instance, after uttering and knowing the meaning of the word 'bhū', the heaven after the 'diveṇi' (The *Śrī* 2, 2, 42).

1. What occurred in man, the manifestation of the word, the deity that the believers and led it as their being, the form which was (appeared), separate of the whole word into a number, separate as heard.

What then must be the nature of the word, and how may it be said to cause the universe? According to grammarians, it is the 'sphota' which first arises in the mind after a word is uttered, and it is on account of this that the sense of the word becomes known. To them, the sphota, which is different from the letters as the eternal entity, the word made up of letters is not eternal, for as soon as the letters are uttered, they perish. Gods etc. cannot arise from the perishable words, but from the imperishable sphota. That the letters are perishable can be seen from the fact that on different occasions they are perceived in different ways. The voice of Devadatta sounds differently from the voice of Yaśodatta; the letters uttered by one person vanish, though similar letters are uttered by another afterwards. As for the meaning of the word, we get it from the sphota and not from the letters of the word. For, (1) if every letter is to give us a meaning, the letters 'ga' in *ga* and *gata* ought to give us the same meaning, and if we have it, then the letters which follow would be useless. (2) Nor can all the letters taken together be said to produce one meaning, for the letters come one after another. (3) Nor again can it be said that the perception of the last letter combines with the mental impressions of the previous letters and produces the sense, for in order to understand the meaning of a word, it is necessary to become aware of the connection between them, just as we understand first the smoke that rises, and then from the knowledge of the connection which the smoke has with fire, know the meaning of fire too. But the impressions on the mind are incapable of being perceived, and as such, except the last letter of the word, there will be no perceptual knowledge of the word. (4) Though not perceivable, the impressions can still be inferred, one may say, from the fact of their being remembered, and so it may be established that the meaning of the word becomes manifest on account of inference when the impressions become combined with the last letter. But this too is impossible. For the remembering of the successive letters is not still

a single event which happens in one moment of time ; but, on the contrary it is made up of different events of remembering the successive different impressions of letters. As such, the inferred impressions too cannot simultaneously be combined with the last letter and produce the meaning of the word.

The word then is of the nature of *apoha*, and the manner in which it presents itself to builder is this. The several-letters are, as it were, the seed of impressions in the mind, and when with the combination of perception of the last letter, it becomes mature, then appears all of a sudden the *apoha* in the form of one single mental apprehension, which however, is not the remembering of the several succeeding letters. The difference that appears between two or more voices of men is due to the letters of the word, and not to *apoha* which is recognised as essentially the same. It is *apoha* therefore, and not letters, which manifest the meaning of the word and it is *apoha*, therefore, which can be considered as the cause of that world, consisting of actions and the doors and results of actions.

As against this view of the grammarians, Upanish holds that the word is made up of letters only, inasmuch as there is no separate perception of the *apoha* over and above the perception of the letters. The letters too are not short-lived, because they are recognised to be the same, and because this fact of recognition is neither based on similarity, as in the case of hares, nor contradicted by any other means of knowledge. Again it is not the recognition of the species or *jati* of a letter, so that we may say that we hear a letter similar to the one heard before, both of which belong to a class. On the contrary, we hear the same letter as being uttered more than once. The word 'cow', when uttered twice, can never mean that two different words belonging to the same class are uttered. The letters are not different individuals

that *ga* forms a class, just as there are different individual cows which belong to one class. The letters *c*, *a*, and *w*, are each one of them the same on different occasions. That they appear to be different on account of pronunciation of different men is not then due to their own inherent nature, but to the fact that they are dependent for the sake of pronunciation on the contact or otherwise of the wind with the palate, teeth etc. The grammarians too who maintain that letters are different individually have to admit, for the sake of explaining the fact of their being recognised as similar, the existence of a species or class to which they belong; they have to admit again that the differences, such as 'softness' and 'hardness' in the manner of moving them, are due to external conditions such as contact etc. Instead of making these two admissions, is it not a simpler way of explanation that the individual letters have their own inherent nature on account of which they are recognised as the same, and that they appear to be different on point of being "soft" "hard" etc. by external conditions?

Recognition of a letter as the same is thus the refutation of its being conceived as being different on different occasions. And yet, the same 'ga' when pronounced by different persons at the same time, appears to be different as softness, hardness, smooth, nasal and non-nasal, because the expression of it is connected with the contact of the abdominal wind with the various parts of the mouth, such as palate, teeth etc. Or else, the difference may be attributed to the difference in *diversa* or tone. A sound, which is indistinct because it is far off, becomes clear and distinct as it comes nearer. Though recognised as the same, it is differentiated as 'soft' or 'hard'. So the better way of explaining would be that the distinctions of softness, hardness etc. are due to *diversa* rather than to the process of conjunction and disjunction, which is not a matter of perception. In any case, the letters are recognised as the same in spite of their appearing different on account of difference in *diversa*.

Besides being recognized as the same, it is the letters which have got the meaning of the word, and so there is no necessity to imagine the existence of *apheps*. The object of cognition is not *apheps*, an additional something which is suddenly perceived after the accumulation of the successive perceptions of the letters as the grammarian supposes, it is the letters themselves which constitute the word. For if *apheps*, which is something different from the letters of a word were to be the object of cognition, then the meaning of those letters or word like the meaning of any other word or group of letters would not be apprehended at all. But that is against experience. So what appears to the grammarian as the *apheps* is in reality nothing but an act of remembrance of the letters of the word. Besides, experience tells us that we may have one single cognition of a number of objects grouped together, e.g. we speak of numbers as two, hundred, thousand etc. Similarly, the many letters in a word go to express meaning only. This does not however mean that the letters in a word if written in the reverse order would mean identically the same. For then the word 'dipī' (king) would mean the same thing as the word 'pīdi' (a peedipie), as the word 'pukā' (teacher) would mean the same thing as 'kāpu' (monkey). The letters though many, will have one meaning only when they succeed some fixed order.

The theory then that the letters of a word which succeed each other in a certain order give all the meaning they have directly to the *buddhi* is one single act of cognition is simpler than the *apheps* theory which disregards that which is given in perception directly, viz. the letters, and something new which is never perceived, viz. the *apheps*. It is unnecessary to imagine the additional factor of *apheps* to explain the manifestation of meaning from the letters of the word. Anyway, whether the word is of the nature of letters, *jīva* or *apheps*. The theory that the gods originate from that eternal words remain unaffected.

अथ न च विज्ञानम् । २९

[Apath—Hence : ca—and ; ca—and ; vidyānām—
science]

AND BECAUSE OF THE LACK REASON, THE SCIENCE
[OF THE VEDAS] 29

The preceding Sūtra was devoted to meet an objection against the theory of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, viz. the identity of the Veda. The objection that the word (Veda) too must have been produced in the same manner in which the world of gods etc. has been produced from the word, was refuted by pointing out that the eternal speech of gods etc. came out of the eternal words. The present Sūtra too confirms the same conclusion, viz. that the Veda is not merely the source but the eternal source of the universe. The Rg-Veda (10, 71, 3) tells us how the eternal speech which was dwelling in the sage was found out by those who performed the sacrifice. Vedāngas too says that "being persecuted by Śaṃsṛtiśāli, the sage obtained by means of penance the Veda and the [hymns which were hidden at the close of yaga]" (Ch. 5 Śānti-Pāra).

अथानवसकृत्तान्वादादप्यविरोधो दर्शयामस्तु । ३०

[Anavāda (anavāda—tāpāva—because of release and firm, ca—and ; āpāva—repeated cycles of birth and death, apā—away, āpāvaśānti—freedom from contradiction, darśayām—show, āstus—[from] Śānti, āstus—[from] Śānti, ca—and)]

NOTWITHSTANDING THE REPEATED CREATION AND ANNIHILATION (OF THE UNIVERSE), THE IDENTITY OF THE WORD IS NOT CONTRADICTED ON ACCOUNT OF SIMILARITY OF NAMES AND FORMS, AS (IS CLEAR) FROM ŚĀNTI AND ŚĀNTI. 30

The identity of the Veda will not indeed be affected if words like lokas etc. would denote not the individuals

but the eternal spectra, and consequently there would be an unending succession of several Indras and other gods one after another. But if, as Brata and Saṅga tell us, all the three worlds of names and forms including Indra and other gods are some time to undergo complete dissolution and are to be born again, how indeed can there remain the same meaning attached to words like "Indra," and how can *Vidua* be believed to be eternal? The reply to this is also found in Brata and Saṅga. The eternity of the *Vidua* is not affected, because the names and forms of such new creation are the same as those of the preceding world that was dissolved. The wheel of *Sakti* as a whole is eternal, in spite of dissolutions and creations,—a point to be explained later on in Sūtra 2, 1, 36. Just as a man who has awakened from sleep goes on with the affairs of the world as he was going on before he slept, even so one creation of the world is connected with the previous one without being hindered by the intervening dissolution of the same. That dissolution and creation are like the sleeping and wakeful conditions of man is seen from what the Kaṇṭaki Upaniṣad tells us (1, 3), viz. that when a man is in dreamless sleep, he becomes one with *prajā* and that all his senses and the objects of the senses become merged in *prajā*, but when the same man awakes, the *prajā* and everything else spring forth from the *Ātman*, like sparks from fire, and occupy their respective places.

It may be said that the *mahāpralaya* or the utter dissolution of the universe resembles death rather than the sleeping condition of man, and so the idea that a new creation should be continuous with the old seems as improbable as the idea that the present life of a man is continuous with his life in the previous birth. Besides all men do not sleep at the same time, so that when a few of them become awake, they are reminded their preceding wakeful life by looking to the persons who are already awake and are busy in doing something. The *pralaya*, on the other hand, destroys everything at the same time

The objection is invalid. For we must remember that the higher beings and gods cannot be said to have the same deficiency as men have. Though all the beings including men are animated, knowledge and power are said to decrease as we pass downwards from men to animals, and from animals to trees, or what is the same thing from another point of view, they increase as we rise up from man to Hiranyagarbha. It is possible then, just that the Hiranyagarbha and other gods may remember all that was going on in the preceding Kalpa, and so, having received the grace of the highest God, may continue their existence, as if they are coming in the wretched condition after sleep. We are told in the following story that this is possible: "Being anxious to be released, I surrender unto God, who delivered the Vedānta the Brahmadeva after having first created him, and who illumines the bodies in order to impart the knowledge of the 'Ātman' (Ist. 6, 18). 'The hymns of the ten mandalas of Rg veda were seen by Madhusūdana and other sages,' as Śaṅkara and other gṛas tell us. This vision of the Vedas by the gods and gṛas appears to be an indisputable fact, that a person, who performs a sacrifice by means of a man, without knowing the gṛa, the man and the duty of that man, is said to fall into a pit, or be born as a pillar of a stone.

Having discussed under that aspect of time involved in the period of dissolution or death of the universe does not stop the continuation of the same, inasmuch as there is the certainty of the perpetual vision of the Vedas by Hiranyagarbha and by other gods and gṛas on account of the grace of the highest God, we give the additional reason of *Adhyāsa*. Dharma enjoins and prohibits actions in order that man should get pleasure and ward off pain. The desire for having pleasure and avoiding pain is therefore the motive which leads men to act. The present world then is nothing but the result of actions of beings done in the preceding creation, secondly, it allows them to reap the fruits of their actions in the form of pleasure

and pain ; and thirdly, it induces the beings again to do certain actions and proposes thereby the way for a fresh creation of the same nature. So, the whole of samsāra including the worlds, gods, animals, men, devas, humans, duties and their fruits, appears in the same form again and again, because it moves perpetually from desires to actions, from actions to pleasures and pains, and from pleasures and pains to desires again. Like actions produce like results ; and according as they are right or wrong, harmless or cruel, there arise like desires or impetuousness to do similar actions. So there remains always a potentiality of the world to rise again into actuality by the same causes and forms, and by the same desires and actions, in spite of its apparent dissolution. The new creation is not an effect without a cause. Just as there is a necessity that governs the relation of the five senses with their objects, even so, the actuality of the present creation is bound up with the potentiality of the earlier creation which is hidden in the period of dissolution. That is why the whole world including the sun, the moon etc., is arranged by the highest God, on the pattern of the arrangement of the previous world (Bh. Sam. 30, 190, 1). That the names and forms of that created world are exactly those of the previous one is seen from what the Tattvayogya-pada tells us regarding the genesis of the god of Part II, 1, 4, 1). The person who desired to become Agni in a succeeding world offers oblations of cooked rice by placing them on eight earthen pots in the god Agni spreading over the Kṛtāṣṭra stupa. This shows that the names and forms of the two Agnis are the same. Similar is the case with the other gods. In short, like the seasons coming after one another with the same characteristics, change of the world too appears and reappears with identical names and forms.

वभ्वादिभूतं जगदव्ययम् त्रैविभिः । १ ।

[*Abhayaḥ*—as *Abhaya*—bold and valiant; *asatya*—being imperishable, *asatya*—without decay, *traya*—3.]

JANANI MAM (WHEN DOES AND) UNOATHABLE OF
(JANANĪ BHAKTĀ-VYATĪ) BECAUSE IT IS IMPOTENTIAL (FOR
WHEN TO LEARN) MADHĀ-VYATĪ ETC. 31

In the third chapter of the *Chāndogya-sūtra*, we read that the sun is conceived as the honey of gods, the hills as the beehives, the Vedic hymns as the bees, the sacrifices as the flowers, and the offerings of soma, milk, etc. as the honey itself. The sacrifices are conceived as producing five kinds of honey or nectar which get themselves deposited in the different portions of the sun as red, white, blackish, dark and pearl-like in colour. Led by *Āgna*, *Indra* and others, the gods like *Vāsu*, *Rādha*, *Aśvins*, *Māru* and *Bhūdya* live upon this nectar. We are further told that whoever thus meditates on the sun becomes satisfied even by the sight of the nectar, and is endowed with all the glory of gods like *Vāsu*. Now this is possible only for men and not for those who are already gods, for they will require the conception of another or even of another *Vāsu* as the objects of meditation for the existing sun and the existing *Vāsu*. How can gods themselves become at once the meditators and the objects of meditation? And again, when certain deities, such as Fire, Wind, Sun, Directions, are each declared to be a part (one foot) of Brahman, and as such, are recommended to be the objects of meditation for the sake of men (*Chā. 3. 18, 2, 3, 19, 1, 4, 3, 1*), it is not possible for them to meditate on themselves. Similarly, the right and the left ears are to be meditated upon as *Chakras* and *Bhāradvāja* respectively (*Īg. Up. 3. 4, 2*), but it is not possible that they can should meditate on themselves. Therefore it is that Janani holds that gods and you are incapable of learning the *Brahma-vyāpti*.

अथैतानि वक्ष्यामि । १३

[*Upaśya*—learn these bodies; *śikṣat*—on account of being used, as—and.]

AND BECAUSE (THE WORDS *Āditya* AND *Ādityā*)
MEAN (THE SPHERE OF) LUMINOUS BODIES, (THE GODS HAVE
NO CAPACITY TO LEARN *Brāhma-vyākṛt*). 32

It is known from ordinary experience as well as from
Vedic usage that the words *Āditya* and others refer to the
sphere of luminous bodies, which are revolving day and
night and illuminating the world. 'The *Āditya* runs in
the east and sets in the west', so says the *Śrau* in the
later portion of *Mādhu-vidya* (Chā. 3, 6, 4). This clearly
shows that *Āditya* means the sphere of light or of the sun,
which being non-intelligent like clay, has no connection
whatsoever either with the body or heart of a god, or
with intelligence or wish of any being. Similarly, the
word *Āgṛa* means fire only.

It is well, no doubt, that mantras, *artha-vāda*, *vidhāna*,
puṣṭi and ordinary experience are all in favour of the
belief that gods have a body. Indra, e.g., has the thunder-
bolt in his hand, says the mantra. 'The fire-worm' is the
artha-vāda, the *vidhāna* and *puṣṭi* describe gods as
being pleased by sacrifices, and even show the playings
of Yama or Varuṇa as having a staff or a noose in hand.
But it is to be noted that what goes by the name of ordinary
experience is not an independent means of knowledge,
either its value depends on perception, inference etc.,
which, however, are not available with reference to the
descriptions of gods. *Īkṣāna* and *puṣṭi* are human
works, and so may be tested by independent means of
knowledge upon. The *artha-vāda* is nothing but the praise
of certain Vedic passages which recommend the doing or
non-doing of actions, and, as such, have nothing to do
with the embodiedness or otherness of gods. And lastly,
the mantras are meant to make up aware of the manner
of performance and the various things involved directly
in the performance of sacrifice. The mantras therefore
have no authority to say whether the gods are embodied
or not. In short, the gods and other beings have no capa-
city to have the knowledge of *Brāhma*.

यवे तु ब्राह्मण्यौभित्तिः ॥ ११

[*Yave—Yavastat*, *tu—on the other hand*, *Brahmṇyau*, *aiti—iti*, *as—certainly*.]

Brahmṇyau, on the other hand, hold (that gods and others) are capable of (having the knowledge of Brahman) for there is (evidence to show this) 33

It may be that gods and others are incapable of participating in the *Madhu-vidyā* etc., because they themselves happen to be the objects of meditation or worship in those *vidyās*, but so far as knowledge of pure Brahman is concerned, there is no reason why they should not be capable of having it. For as Śāṅkara holds, their capacity for the knowledge of Brahman is revealed by several facts such as their wish to know it, the way of enquiry and non-attachment which some of them could keep, the necessary strength which they possess, and the absence of any mention that they are not fit for *Brahma-vidyā*. Because they are excluded in one sphere, it does not follow that they are excluded in all spheres. A Brahmin, for instance, is not allowed to perform the *Rasajña* sacrifice, but is not prohibited on this account to perform all the sacrificial-brides, the *Īśadīkṣavalkya* makes an explicit statement with reference to gods and *ya* along with men that whoever amongst them, whether, god, *ya* or man, knows himself as the Brahman, becomes one with it (I, 4, 15). The *Chāndogya* goes a step further and describes the gods and the demons too as hankering after the knowledge of the *Ātman* which would fulfil all their desires, and mentions how Indra and Virocana, the representatives of gods and demons respectively, went to *Prajāpati* for the purpose (II, 7, 2). Again too describes, for the same purpose, the *Carakharṇa Yājñavalkya-sūtravideh*.

As for the objection that the words *śūnya* etc. mean only the non-intelligent spheres of light, we say in reply that over and above this meaning, they also

stand for the intelligent and powerful devatans who reside in the form of light. This is possible because gods can assume any form they like. Indra, for example, assumed the form of a man and carried away Māhābhīṣa, the descendant of Kṛgaṇa (Śaṅkara Bṛh. I, 1). Aśvins approached Kuntī after having assumed the form of a man. Even such substances as earth are regarded as being ruled over by intelligent beings, as is clear from 'the earth speaks,' etc.

To deal now with another objection regarding *magāḥ* and *arthavāda*. It was pointed out by the *pūrvapakṣa* that they cannot be looked upon as trustworthy evidence for believing in the embodiment of gods, because what they refer to is not their own meaning but some thing other than that, viz. the things mentioned in the sacrifice, or the eulogy of some action. We say in reply that the question, whether a sentence has its own primary meaning or not, is not necessarily determined by the reference or otherwise of that sentence to something else. Further, it is determined by the fact whether or not an alleged primary meaning is contradicted by some other experience. In other words, it is not the absence of reference to something else, but the uncontradicted presence of meaning, which gives the reality to a sentence. As opposed to this, it is not the presence of reference to something else but the absence of any meaning (or which is the same thing as contradicted meaning) which gives unreality to the sentence. The grass and the leaves seen by a traveller by the side of a road and given expression to in a proposition, have all the reality and meaning, even though the purpose of the traveller is something else, viz. the journey.

The objection may intervene, and say that the grass and the leaves become the objects of direct perception, but this is not possible in the case of an *arthavāda* type of sentence, because its purpose being merely to say 'some thing by way of eulogy, is so intimately connected with the *veda*-*veda* or the main sentence which recommends

an action, that the meaning of one is included in the meaning of the other. Just as the words 'one should drink wine' cannot be detached from the word 'not' in the given sentence 'one should not drink wine', and thus interpreted as if they have a separate informative meaning over and above the given negative meaning, even so the arthavāda has no separate meaning of its own over and above the meaning of the *vaidhī-vākya*.

To this we reply. The prohibitive sentence quoted above cannot be split into two parts, because all the words in that sentence together make up one meaning. The words of the arthavāda sentence, on the other hand, can have a distinct and complete meaning of their own inasmuch as they describe a thing which already exists. It is only after-words, when we think about the purpose which they subserve, that the same words are seen to be used in order to glorify some *vaidhī-vākya*. To illustrate what we mean. Every word in the *vaidhī-vākya*, 'He who desires to have prosperity, should offer a white animal to Vīṣṇu' (Tai. 2, 1), is connected with the intended action. But the words in the arthavāda sentences, such as, 'Vīṣṇu is very swift deity, towards which he approaches fast; Vīṣṇu leads him on to prosperity' (Tai. 2, 1), are not in like manner directly connected with the action. The words of the two types of sentences are not so connected with each other as will enable us to have such absurd sentences out of them as 'Vīṣṇu should offer', or 'the swift deity should offer'. Rather they form two independent entities of their own, which in their turn get related in order to serve some additional purpose. The arthavāda sentence, in other words, which has an independent and complete meaning of its own and which refers to an already existing fact, is found to be related in a subordinate manner to the *vaidhī-vākya*, because it fulfils the additional purpose of glorifying the intended action. The arthavāda sentence referred to above, for example, has got a complete meaning of its own, inasmuch as it refers to the swift nature of Vīṣṇu; it is only after-

words that it comes in relation to the *vikṣa-vikṣa* when it serves the purpose of praising the *Vikṣa* and making an offering to that deity.

Further, the *arthavāda* sentences may be of two types. Either it is a statement of fact which already exists and is known through other means of knowledge, or it is a statement of some quality only, because the factual knowledge which is conveyed by it is contradicted by experience. "Fire is the medicine of cold" is an example of the first variety known as '*anuvāda*', experience confirms that fire is a remedy against cold. "The sacrificial post is the sun" is an example of the second variety known as '*guṇavāda*', for this makes us aware only of the *guṇa* or quality of luminosity of the sun which is seen on the post. The sentence is not to be interpreted literally for it runs contrary to experience, the sun is not the post. Where however experience is not contradicted, or what is said is not proved by any means of knowledge, it is better to interpret the *arthavāda* sentences as belonging to the first variety rather than to the second. It is not *guṇavāda*, because it is not contrary to experience, but the freedom from contradicting other means of knowledge leaves room for supposing that such means though not known must be available, inasmuch as the sentence is from *Śruti*. For example, 'Indra has a thunder-bolt in his hand' is a statement which can neither be proved nor disproved by the ordinary means of knowledge. And yet, as it is a *Śruti* statement, it leaves room for supposing that there must be some other means of knowledge for taking it as a fact; and so construed, it is an '*anuvāda*'. "The thunder-bolt is in the hand," therefore, suggests that Indra is a god having body. The *mantra* sentences too, in short, have meanings of their own corresponding to facts (e.g. the embodiedness of gods), though they fall beyond the ordinary means of knowledge.

There is another reason still for believing that gods are embodied. The very *aparaṇvāsa* which recommended

certain offerings to Indra and other gods imply that gods have some form. The sacrificer is asked to 'take in his hand the offering and remember the god to whom it is to be given at the time of offering up it' (Ae. Br. 3, 8, 1). Without this mental representation, there would be no offerings to gods. The mantras by themselves cannot be considered as constituting the instances or the forms of gods, for the mantras are merely words. It is the meaning of the words which convey to us the forms which the gods possess. Therefore all those who believe in the utterance of the word cannot but admit the existence of gods like Indra, which is spoken of as *mantra* and *arhavāda*. And *mantra* as *mantra* and *arhavāda* are the foundation of *arhina* and *parika*; the latter too are manifestly evident. Besides, they owe their origin to the personal knowledge of Vīra and other sages who, it is told in Śvetas, were holding conversation with gods. To deny this is to deny the variety of the world. There is at present no single ruler of the whole earth, from this it does not follow that there was no such ruler in the past too. For in that case, the *ṛigveda* sacrifice which is to be performed by one who claims to be the ruler of the whole earth, will be without any purpose. The whole of the Dharmashāstra too will be useless, if one were to argue from the disorderly condition of *varga* and *kṛama* at the present time that they must have been so even in ancient times. It is therefore appropriate to hold that on account of their different excellent, people of the ancient times were capable of conversing with gods, which fact is also vouchsafed by the *yoga-sūtra* (2, 46). That yoga enables one to acquire extraordinary powers cannot simply be denied. The *Śvetasvatersopaniṣad* speaks of the greatness of yoga: "When the five qualities of earth, water, fire, wind and ether arise in the body by the power and fire of yoga, then no more will illness, old age or pain overtake that body (3, 13)." It is wrong to infer from our ability the ability of *ṛṣi* who had the power to visualize the mantras. Naturally, the *arhina* and *parika* which have been

composed by them must be trustworthy. Our ordinary experience too, if based on *mithya* and *pariṇāma*, can also be possibly taken as true.

The result is that *mantra*, *arthis* etc. go to prove that gods and others have got bodily forms; and being endowed with desires etc. they can be considered as having the capacity to know the Brahman. Besides the conception of gradual release,—viz. that after death man first becomes *Caandharma*, then *Prāna*, and then god,—is possible only on the view that gods too get the release or are capable of having *Brahma-jñāna*, otherwise even after attaining godhood, man would be deprived of *mokṣa*.

५. अवाद्याविदमम् । (५४-५८)

तुमस्य उदनादभवात्तद्वचसाद्वचने द्वि । ५४

[*Śāṅk.*—*grāh.* *avādyā*, *ad-vachana-jananta*—bearing his disrespectful words, *ud-dhat*; *abhava*—due to approach; *dvaya*—is reduced to—only.]

THE WORDS WHICH HE (JĪVĀNĀT) SAYS ON HEARING THE DISRESPECTFUL WORDS OF THAT (DIVAN ŚĪDRA) IS ALONE REDUCED (BY THE WORD ŚĪDRA) FOR THAT (ŚĪDRA) MADE HIM SILENT (TOWARDS BRAHMA). 34

If gods can learn *Brahma-vidyā*, what can we say about the *Śīdra*? Or are the twice-born alone capable of doing so? According to *pīrāpāṇa*, the *Śīdra* has a claim to it, because he has got a desire and capacity to learn. Besides, nowhere has he been debarrd from learning it, just as he has been debarrd from performing *mudra* because he does not preserve *sacred fire* (Tis. Sat. 7, 1, 1, 5). So far as *Brahma-jñāna* is concerned, the preservation of the *vedic* and other fires is not necessary. Besides, the circumstance that *Rākṣa* calls Jīvanāt by the epithet "*Śīdra*" (Chil. 4, 2, 5) is connected with *Saṁvarga-vidyā* or *Vijñāna-vidyā* (a part of *Brahma-vidyā*), and asks him to take away the chariot, wealth and cows which

he had brought as presents shows that the Śūdra is fit to have the knowledge of the Brahman. Śūdra like Vaisya too are spoken of by Śaṅkara as possessing Brahma-jñāna.

We reply that the Śūdra cannot be considered capable of studying and understanding the Vedas even though he may be physically sound and has a desire to learn. For he is not allowed to undergo the upanayana ceremony which is considered as the necessary condition of the studying of the Vedas, which again in its turn, if not properly done under the guidance of a Guru, makes him unfit both for sacrifice and knowledge. Besides, the mere presence of the word 'Śūdra', without any backing of argument will not enable us to say that the Śūdra as such will be considered fit for studying and other Vidyā. At best, he may be fit for learning Vidyā alone, but this too is not possible, because the word 'Śūdra' occurs in the unbroken sentence alone viz. 'This vidyā cannot be obtained by money'. Or the word 'Śūdra' may be interpreted in altogether a different manner, so that it may refer to a twice-born and not a Śūdra by caste. The word may refer to the grief of Jāmiṇi and not to Jāmiṇi himself. Śaṅkara alludes to it only to show that he had the knowledge of the grief, though Jāmiṇi was far away when he hit it at the disrespectful words of the kamaṇḍali. 'Śūdra' means the Śūdra, the rushing forth of 'dā' or grief. Whether Jāmiṇi came to grief or grief fell on him, or whether he rushed unto Kāśī on account of grief, the word 'Śūdra' points to one of the three things and not to the caste.

कृतिवत्परोक्षोक्तं वैदिकेन शिष्यम् । ३५

[Kṛti-vat-paroṣa-ūkta of a Kṛtrīya being known, ca-and-
serving-like on, Cātrāśrama-with Cātrāśrama. Inqit
-dat to apt.]

AND BECAUSE OF THE TERM (HE IS MENTIONED) LATER ON ALONG WITH CĀTRĀŚRAMA, IT IS KNOWN THAT (JĀMIṆI) IS KĀTRĪYA (AND NOT ŚŪDRA). 35

In the archaic language of Sadanga-Vidyā, *Minstru* is mentioned along with one *Kaṣṭha*. *Abhaya* is known as *Caṣṭha*. *Asaṣṭha* mentioned together, we gather that *Minstru* also is a *Kaṣṭha*. We have the same inference, from the power and glory which *Minstru* exhibited by sending men in search of *Kaṣṭha*, as also by the numerous prisoners he sent to him.

निम्नोद्योगीयद्वयमिदं नः ॥ १५

[*Minstru*—*asasṭha*, *asasṭha*—being mentioned, *asasṭha*—*as* *asasṭha*, *asasṭha*—being mentioned, *as*—*and*.]

THE *MINSTRU* BEING MENTIONED (IN THE CASE OF THE TWICE-BORN) AND THEIR ABSENCE BEING MENTIONED (IN THE CASE OF THE *ŚĪMA*, THE LATTER ARE NOT TO BE STUDY THE *VĪRA*). 35

In various places, where the *vidyā* are being discussed, mention has been made of an *asasṭha* like *asasṭha* etc. in the case of the twice-born. For example, Sat. Br. 11, 5, 5, 13, Chā. 7, 1, 1, Pā. 1, 1. In the *Chāṇḍogya* (3, 11, 7), the King *Asasṭha*, we are told, did not insist on the *asasṭha* ceremony being performed in the case of certain Brahmins. An exception like this proves only the existence of a rule which applies to the twice-born. The *Śāma*, on the other hand, is said to be born once only, and not a second time because there is no *asasṭha* in his case (*Māra* 10, 4). He is said not to incur sin, just as the twice-born incurs by doing what ought not to be done (*Māra* 10, 130).

उद्योगिणीये न ज्ञेयः ॥ १६

[*Udyoginī*, *asasṭha*—being mentioned, *as*, *asasṭha*—*as* is being acted.]

AND *RELATIVE* (*Udyoginī*) PROCEEDED (TO) *Udyoginī* AFTER BEING OBSERVED THAT (HE) WAS NOT THAT (VIL., A *ŚĪMA*). 37

The Chāndogopaniśad tells us that Gostama was pleased to know that Jibhā spoke the truth when he said that he did not know his *gotra* or the family name, and that Gostama concluded from this that inasmuch as Jibhā possessed the quality of speaking the truth, he must have come from Brahmin parents. So after being convinced that he was not a Śūdra, Gostama showed his willingness to initiate Jibhā (8, 4, 5).

अथवाचपयार्थं श्रित्वैवापदुषः । १८

[*Śhrutvā*—hearing, *adhipayana*—study, *artha*—meaning, *pratyakṣat*—being proclaimed, *apadūṣa*, *ca*]

AND BECAUSE (THE ŚŪDRA) IS PROHIBITED BY SCRIPTURE TO READ AND STUDY (THE VEDAS) AND (HE KNOWS) THAT WRITING— 38

From the prohibition to hear the Vedas follows the prohibition to study and to know their meaning. For how will one know the meaning without study and how again one will study without hearing what he studies? We find however explicit statements regarding these things in Gostama-Dharmasūtras. 'The ears of the Śūdras who hear the Vedas are to be filled with molten lead and lac' (12, 4). 'If he utters a Vedic word, his tongue should be cut, etc.' (13, 3, 6). 'The twice-born alone are entitled to study, sacrifice and to the receiving or giving of gifts' (15, 1). 'Knowledge should not be imparted to the Śūdras' (Mitra 4, 80). Vedic and Dharmavyākhyāna had knowledge, but it was the result of deeds in their previous births and the fruit of knowledge now is inevitable. Though the Śūdras are prohibited to study the Vedas, they may however get the knowledge through *śikṣā* and *paṭyāna*.

१ = कर्मवर्णिजनम् । (१५)

कर्मवार्त्तः १५

[*Karmavārta*—On account of working.]

On account of tremor (for the world, the *prajña* is Brahman) 39

After having momentarily considered as to who is fit for receiving *Brahma-jñāna*, let us return to our main topic of the inquiry into the purpose of the vedānta passages. We read in *Kāṇḍikopaniṣad* (2, 4, 6) that 'The whole world trembles in the *prajña*; that this *prajña* is a great carrier, a raised thunderbolt as it were, and that those who know it become immortal.' Now the *pūrvaśloka* maintains that *prajña* means the air we breathe with its five modifications, and that the thunderbolt too is a manifestation of wind when it assumes the form of rain and lightning. And he tries *frat* to explain immortality: 'One who knows that air is everything, compares death (Bṛ 3, 2, 1)

We reply that *prajña* means Brahman, because both before and after the passage under discussion, Brahman is the topic of enquiry. How can, all of a sudden, air intervene as a relevant topic? The preceding passage describes the Brahman as the immortal, independent support of all beings, transgressing which none can go (Ka 1, 1, 10). So on account of proximity, as also on account of its being the support of all, Brahman alone can be the topic in the passage under discussion. 'The whole world trembles in *prajña*,' means that *prajña* or the Brahman is the support of the world. That *prajña* means Brahman or the highest Ātman is stated in the expression '*prajña of prajña*.' (Bṛ 4, 4, 10). To crush the whole world crumble is possible for the highest Ātman, and not for the mere wind; for it is not by means of the wind, '*prajña and apāna*, that anyone knows, we live on account of another being in whom these two *prajña* and *apāna* find rest' (Ka 2, 1, 3). In the passage subsequent to the one under discussion, the wind, the fire and the sun, as also Indra and Death, are spoken of as doing their duties through the force of Brahman. The *Taittirīyopaniṣad* says exactly the same thing (2, 1, 1). So, once again, on account

of proximity and on account of the cause of fear, the mixed thunderbolt and the terror referred to in the passage under discussion denote the general fear of Brahman which may fall on the heads of the disobedient beings. That *prajña* means Brahman is due to one more reason mentioned in the passage, viz., the knowledge of it leads one to *mokṣa*. This is borne out by another *Śruti* passage, 'A man who knows him alone goes beyond death, there is no other way' (Ive 6, 15). The immortality of the word spoken of by the *pārasphuṭika* is not absolute but relative only with reference to the life-span of man, for immediately in the next chapter of the *Bhāṣya* the wind and other elements are said to be perishable. And, finally, the subject-matter of the passage under discussion, started by Nachiketas in his request to tell him that 'which is neither past nor that, neither effect nor cause, neither past nor future,' makes us aware that the word *prajña* means the highest *Ātman*, and not wind.

११ ज्योतिरहितवत् (४०)

ज्योतिर्हितवत् । ४०

[*Jyotir*—light, *derहित*—being seen.]

BECAUSE (BRAHMAN) IS SEEN, THE LIGHT (JYOTIR
BRAHMAN) 40

A passage in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* tells us 'that the *śrotra* being or the *antaryāmi* rises from the body, and appears in its own form as soon as it meets the highest light' (8, 12, 3). Now the word 'light' in this passage is understood by the *pārasphuṭika* as meaning the ordinary physical light of the sun which dispels darkness. No doubt, the word 'light' from the third chapter of the same *Upaniṣad* was decided (Śānta 1, 1, 24) to mean Brahman, because the topic of the *Gyāna*-passage is Brahman; but there is no such reason to take that word here too in the same sense. Besides, in the chapter known as the *Nādikāya* of the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*, it is

stated that when a man saying 'for release,' departs from his body he is drawn upwards by the rays to the Sun' (8, 6, 1).

We reply that the word 'light' means Brahman only. For in the whole chapter Brahman is the topic of discussion. It is introduced in 8, 7, 1, as the 'Atman which is free from sin,' and is said to be the object of inquiry. It is again referred to (8, 9, 3 ff.) as the object requiring explanation, and as is said to be the disembodied being to which pleasure and pain do not touch (8, 12, 1). Now this disembodied condition is not possible except in the case of Brahman. The sun, on the other hand, is an embodied divinity. Finally, the light is spoken of as the 'highest light', and as 'the highest person' (8, 12, 3). True release, as we shall see later on, does not involve departing upwards to the Sun.

(६ अर्थात्तद्व्यपदेशादिभिरपि। (४१)

अवयवोऽर्थोऽनान्वयिभ्यपदेशात्। ४२

[*Artha*], *avayavato* etc.—being different in meaning from ; *vyaśaṅgāt*—because it is unconnected.]

Artha is (*Avayava*), as it is intended to be different etc. 41.

'What is known as *Artha* is the cause of the manifestation of names and forms. That in which these are contained is the immaterial Brahman, the *Ātman*' (Chā. 8, 14, 1).

According to philosophy, the word *Artha* stands for the *Pratīkṛti* because this is the accepted conventional meaning. The *Pratīkṛti* can be said to be the cause of the manifestation of names and forms, because it affords them room to exist. Besides, there is no clear and distinct indication on account of which the *Artha* can be said to

be the cause of the creation etc. of the world, so that we may interpret it to mean Brahman.

We reply that the container must be different from the-contained. The Brahman contains within it the names and forms, therefore the latter must be nothing else but Brahman. Nothing except Brahman can be different from names and forms. The *Viśvākṣa* too is included in the world of created things having names and forms, and as it cannot be different from them. Besides for the manifestation too of names and forms, the creative power of Brahman is ultimately responsible, as is clear from the *Śruti*, 'Let me enter into them in the form of *jīva*man and manifest themselves and forms' (*Ītī* 6, 3, 2). Though the *Viśvākṣa* is said to afford room for all the objects of names and forms and so to manifest them, yet this is possible only in the case of objects which have been already created by the highest *Ātman*, and not in the case of those which have not been created. The mention of *jīva*man in the *Śruti* passage is only to show that the *jīva*man is not different from the Brahman. Besides the words 'Brahman, *brahmanā*, and *Ātman*' are indicative of Brahman alone. The present *Śloka* is only an additional explanation of what was told in *Sūtra* 1, 1, 32.

॥ दृष्टानुशान्तनिर्गन्धः । (४२-४३)

दृष्टानुशान्तनिर्गन्धः । ४२

[*Dṛṣṭānuśāntanirgandhaḥ*—during sleep and departure, bodiless—because of deficiency]

AND BECAUSE OF DEFERENCE (BODILY MENTIONS OF THE HIGHEST *ĀTMAN* FROM THE *śva*) IN THE STATE OF SLEEP AND DEPARTURE (FROM THE BODY). 42

A passage in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* describes the *Ātman* as 'he who is within the heart and the prāṇa, and the person consisting of light and knowledge' (4, 3, 7). Now the *prāṇa* being the *śūkṣma* of the *jīva*man, the reference

in the person having knowledge as this as well as in the concluding passage, 'this great unborn Ātman, consisting of knowledge and residing in the prisons' (4, 4, 23) is, according to pūrvaśloka, the reference to the Brahman only. The intermediate passages too which deal with the waking and other states must be taken as referring to the embodied soul.

We say in reply that the passage does not give any additional information regarding the Jīvaśman, but tells us only about the nature of the highest God. In the first place, the God is pointed out as being different from the individual soul by reference to what happens to the latter in deep sleep. 'Being embraced by the subtle Ātman, this person knows nothing either inside or outside' In other words, it is during the condition of sleep, that the Jīvaśman forgets everything of the nature of un-Īśman. It forgets itself and becomes one with God, who is always intelligence or knowledge. Similarly, the Jīvaśman is spoken of as growing while he is passing away from the body, because he is being preserved out by the highest God. Here too God is mentioned as distinguished from the embodied soul.

The so-called characterisation which, according to pūrvaśloka, indicate the nature of Jīva are, as a matter of fact, merely used to indicate, the Jīva as identical with the highest God. Śaṅkara gains nothing by describing the nature of Jīva which is already so well known. His aim is to make us aware of the unknown nature of the Brahman from the known nature of the Jīva, and of the fact that the Jīva is nothing else but Brahman. That is only immediately in the subsequent passage, the Ātman is described to be 'thinking as it' or 'moving as it', when as a matter of fact the Ātman neither thinks nor moves. That which thinks is the budhi, and that which moves are the indriyas. Similarly, in the concluding passage, the words which appear to indicate the Jīvaśman, viz. 'the person consisting of knowledge and residing in the

prajña,' indicate, as a matter of fact, the highest God, because the same person is referred to as being the 'great, un-born Ātman.' And if both in the beginning and in the end of the chapter, the aim of Śruti is to describe the nature of the highest Ātman, then truly that in the intermediate portion of the same, the jīvanmukta is described is to affirm the possibility of a man who has gone in the east being found in the west. The description of the wretched and other conditions is not intended to refer to jīva, but to the highest God who is free from such conditions. The reference to these only serves the purpose of denying them in the case of the highest Ātman. So have too Śruti makes the progress from the known nature of the jīva to the unknown nature of the Ātman. This is further evident not only from the repeated request of Janaka to tell him only what concerns mokṣa, but also from the reported answer of Yājñavalkya that 'the puruṣa being unattached to anything is not, affected by any of these enjoyments' (Bṛ. 4, 3, 14-15). The Ātman is further described 'as having nothing to do with merit or demerit, because it then overcomes all the sorrows.' We therefore conclude that the aim of the passage is to describe the nature of the Ātman alone.

पञ्चविंशोऽध्यायः । २५

[Pātyakṣ—My Lord and others, Śāhśāyag—on account of words.]

AND ON ACCOUNT OF WORDS LIKE "LORD" ETC. 43

The words 'pati,' 'raja,' and 'Mitra' used in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka (3, 4, 21) further make us aware that it is the highest God who is spoken of as the Lord, the controller and protector of all. Obviously they cannot refer to jīva, because it is not possible for him to control and protect all beings. Similarly, the quality of being neither greater by good deeds nor smaller by evil deeds is not ascribable to any being except God.

ADHYĀYA FIRST

PĀDA FOURTH

१ ब्रह्मनिवृत्तिवद्वत्त्वं (१-७)

ब्रह्मनिवृत्तिवद्वत्त्वं चेन्न तद्विज्ञानवद्वत्त्वं विद्वद्वत्त्वं ।

[*Ātmanirvṛtīyam*—that which is referred; *ape*—even; *śūnyatā* of some; *na ca*—if it be said; *na*—not; *darśan*—body *nirvṛtīyam*—revoked, *viśvato*—referred, *grahat*—because it is mentioned; *darśanāt*—from *ape*, *ca*—and.]

IF IT BE SAID THAT (PRAGHĪNA) TOO WHICH IS REPELLED (IS MENTIONED BY THE WORD "ANTARĪTA") ACCORDING TO SOME, (WE REPLY THAT) IT IS NOT SO; FOR (THE BODY) WHICH IS MENTIONED IN THE MENTION OF THE BODY IS REFERRED (THEREAT); AND (SAID) TELLS (THE SAME). 1

Starting with the inquiry into the nature of Brahman we defined it as the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world (Sū. 1, 1, 2). We then noticed that pradhāna can not be defined in this manner, because Śruti does not mention the 'being' in its case, as it mentions it in the case of Brahman (Sū. 1, 1, 3). And further we proved that the common purpose of all the Vedānta passages is to show that Brahman, and not pradhāna, is the cause of the world (Sū. 1, 1, 10). And yet as long as the view that there are still some Śruti words which appear to favour the doctrine that pradhāna is the cause, has not been shown to be erroneous, our own theory that the causeless Brahman is the cause of the universe cannot be said to be firmly established. So, we now proceed to show in this chapter that the passages containing such words really have a different meaning than that which is sought by the Sāhityas.

The doctrine of *pradhāna* is said to have got the authority of Śruti because the three entities admitted by the Śāṅkhya Sūtri, viz. the mahat, the *avyakta* and the *parava* are exactly the entities which are named and mentioned in the same order in Śruti. The Upanish, for example, reads: "Beyond mahat, there is the *avyakta* and beyond *avyakta*, there is the *Parava*" (1, 3, 11). Now, the word '*avyakta*' is accepted to mean *pradhāna* according to the Śāṅkhya Sūtri, and *pradhāna*, being without the qualities of sound, touch etc. is said to be the meaning of *avyakta*.

We say in reply that the passage from the Kichaka does not refer to *pradhāna* though the word '*avyakta*' may refer to anything subtle and difficult to discern. Besides the meaning of a thing does not depend upon the mere position it occupies or the order in which it comes. It is foolish to argue that a cow is a horse, because it is told in the place of a horse. On the contrary, if we judge from the general subject matter, we shall find that *avyakta* does not refer to the imagined entity of *pradhāna*, but to the body mentioned in the metaphor of the chariot.

The passage under discussion comes after another passage in which there occurs the metaphor of the chariot, and the various entities, viz. the soul, the body, the budhi, the manas, the senses and their objects are respectively conceived as the lord of the chariot, the chariot, chariot-horse, the reins, the horses and their way of going (1, 3, 3-6). It is told that a man who has no control over his mind and senses returns to *saṁsāra*, but that a man who has got it goes to the excellent abode of *Vigra*. Then, while describing this abode of *Vigra* as the end of all, it has been further mentioned that "beyond the *āyana* are their objects, beyond objects the mind, beyond mind the *buddhi*, beyond *buddhi* the great *Isana*, beyond the great the *avyakta*, and beyond *avyakta* the *Parava* ; but that beyond *Parava* there is nothing, and that *Parava* is the highest goal, the end of the journey" (Ka. 1, 3, 10, 11). Now if

we are to avoid the mistake of leaving the topic in hand and pursuing a new one, we must suppose that we are dealing with the same entities in this passage as were previously mentioned in the metaphor of the chariot. The senses, the mind and the buddhi are commonly referred to in both the passages, under the same names. The objects of the senses refer to the ways of the horses. That the objects go beyond the senses is confirmed by what Śaṅkara has said, viz. "The senses are grihaḥ," i.e. those which catch hold of; but the objects of the senses are greater still in this respect, because the senses are dependent for their attractive power on the presence of the objects (Bṛ 3, 1). In the same way, mind is superior to both the senses and their objects, for both these depend on the perception of the mind. The mind too, in its turn, being dependant on the discriminative power of buddhi the buddhi is superior to or goes beyond mind. Higher than buddhi is the great Īman or the soul, which is referred to in the earlier passage as the lord of the chariot. It is natural that the objects of the soul that enjoy should go beyond the means of enjoyment; he is like the master to his servants. Of the words 'mahān Īman' may mean the buddhi of Brahmanādeva or Hiraṇyagarbha who was the first to be created, and was given the vedas (Śiv. 6, 14), for it is his buddhi which can truly be considered the support of all the intellects of beings. So though in the former passage, the word 'buddhi' seems once here it is referred to twice, and so by 'buddhi' we may mean the human intellect, and by 'mahān Īman' the intellect of 'Hiraṇyagarbha'. Then the word and or joined in the former passage has its corresponding word 'Puruṣa' in the second passage, because puruṣa and puruṣīnā are in reality one and the same. Dismissing the five words from the first passage with the corresponding five words,—as a matter of fact six words as shown above—from the second passage, we get only one word as the remainder from the first passage, viz. the 'body' which must be equated with the one word which remains from the second passage viz. the 'vṛkṣa'. It will be un-

possible therefore to bring out any meaning of the *Śvet* passage, if according to the Śākhya view, the *vyakta* is to mean *pradhāna*.

The aim of the entire section of the *Upaniṣad* is to show how owing to *avidyā* the *jīva*man is bound to the body, senses, mind etc., but how in reality it is nothing but Brahman. The metaphor of the chariot shows us the activities of the soul, but we know its final destiny too, viz. the highest and the endless shade of *Vijñāna* which though hidden in all beings is seen by those who have a subtle and one-pointed intellect (*Ca. 1, 1, 12*). The way to know him is through the practice of *yoga*; it consists first in controlling the activities of speech and other senses and resting in *mudrā* only, then to control and stop the doubtful mental activities too and rest in the decrease of the intellect; then again restrict the personal *baḍhā* into the fundamental, great intellect of the *Hiranyagarbha*, and finally to compose this too in the calm of the highest *Ātman*, the end of all. If we thus consider the full context, we find that there is no place for the hypothesis of *pradhāna*.

उक्तं च व्यक्तम् : २

[*Ukta*—*ukta*, said—*uktam*, what is said; *vyakta*—*vyakta* is *vyakta*.]

(THE WORD *vyakta* MEANS) HOWEVER THE LITTLE (*roḍha*), BECAUSE THIS IS THE PROPER (*śānta*) OF THAT (*roḍha*). 2

So, with the help of the context and the process of clarification employed while comparing the two passages regarding the chariot and the shade of *Vijñāna*, it has been shown in the preceding *Śūra* that *vyakta* means the body and not *pradhāna*. Yet it may be suggested that the actual physical body being perceptible, it ought to have been denoted by the word '*vyakta*' and not *vyakta*.

To this the reply of the Śāṅkhya is that the word *avyakta* means the subtle causal body, which consists of the subtle parts of the elements, and as such is further applied to the effect thereof i.e. the gross, physical body. This usage of naming the effect by the same term by which the cause is denoted is not uncommon. 'Mix the soma with cows' (Bg. 9, 46, 4) means 'mix the soma with milk of the cows'. 'Hare cows means 'the milk of the cows'. Similarly, 'all this was then not manifest' (Bg. 1, 4, 7) means 'all this world of names and forms was in a former condition merely potential or unmanifest, i.e. devoid of names and forms'. In other words, the present manifest world is referred to by the former unmanifest condition of the world.

व्यक्तीभावोऽर्थस्य । १

[Tad-avivakṣit-*being dependent on him without-ones*
the subject]

BEING DEPENDENT ON HIM [I.E. GOD, THE FORMER WHO WAS THE CONDITION OF THE WORLD BEFORE HE WAS, AND] IT BECAME THE SUBJECT [OF MAKING GOD RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATION].]

May not this antecedent condition of the world in which nothing is manifest be called as *pradhāna*?

It is not *pradhāna*, we reply. For the previous condition of the world is not an independent cause. It is, on the other hand, dependent on the highest God. It is the power of God, with which he creates the world. It is this potential, primordial power of the highest God which is known by several names, such as, '*avyaktā*', '*māyā*', '*avyakta*', *śakti*, and *śvara*. It is the great sleep on account of which the individual souls being ignorant of their real nature become engrossed in materiality. It is known as *śakti*, because of its unlimited extent, or because of its being the cause of *śakti*. It is *śvara* because it does not cease to exist until there is knowledge

It is known as *anāpī* on account of its wonderful creation, and finally it is known as *avyakta* because being the power of Brahman it cannot be different from Brahman, nor can it be non-different from Brahman, because Brahman is knowledge, while its power is of the nature of ignorance (Bk. 3, 8, 11; and 2, 12; Gov. 4, 10).

The *avyakta* is said to be beyond *māhāt* according to the *Kāphalepanand*, because *māhāt*, in the sense of the intellect of the *Hiranyagarbha*, originates from the *avyakta*. Or even if we understand by *māhāt* the individual soul, the *avyakta* is beyond it, because the soul is dependent on *avyakta* or *anāpī*. The very being and consciousness of the soul is on account of its relation to *anāpī*. Now as the cause and the effect are identical, the quality of transcending the *māhāt* has been transferred from *avyakta* (the cause), to the body (the effect of it), and as the word *avyakta* too is mentioned in the sense of body. Such a transference of quality and name from cause to the effect is not made in the case of other products of *avyakta* because the *akāśa* etc. are mentioned by their own names in the two passages of the *charaṇ* and the *śloka* of *Viṣṇu*. It is body alone which has not been so shown by its own name, and so has to be denoted by the word *avyakta*.

Some people give a different interpretation of the last two *ślokas*. According to them, both the gross and the subtle bodies are previously compared to a *charaṇ*. But the word '*avyakta*' means here the subtle body only. The bondage and release of the soul again are possible on account of this subtle body. For it is due to the subtle body that deities bind the soul after death, and it is due to the destruction of the subtle body by means of knowledge, that the soul gets its release.

To this we reply that just as the word *charaṇ* would stand for both the gross and the subtle bodies, even so, the word *avyakta* may stand for both of them. There seems no sufficient reason, excepting the word *avyakta*

meaning subtle as to why both the bodies, gross and subtle, should have been mentioned first, and only one of them, viz. the subtle, be mentioned afterwards. The context is the same, and if we are to avoid the fault of leaving the subject on hand and taking to a new one as well, we must so interpret the two Śruti passages as to make a complete whole of meaning. And this can be adhered only when the passages concerned give a common topic. Therefore it is that both the bodies must have been referred to by "avyakta", just as they were referred to by "dharat". Besides, the question is not regarding the distinction between the gross body and the subtle body; it is rather to point out a series of things in order of excellence, and thus to show that beyond the highest shade of Vīpa, though hidden, there is nothing superior. And yet, even taking for granted that the word "avyakta" denotes the subtle body, the one conclusion, about which there is no uncertainty, is that the Kṛhika passage has no reference to pradhāna.

विष्णुसूक्तप्रमाणम् । ४

[*Viṣṇu*—a thing to be cognised, avyaktā—That being unmanifest.]

AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO MENTION OF (KṛTARJĀ) AS A THING TO BE COGNISED [IT CANNOT MEAN PRADHĀNA]. 4

According to the Śākhya, the knowledge of pradhāna or the constituent *guṇas* as distinct from *Puruṣa* is considered to be essential for achieving the liberation of the soul. On the other hand, as held by others sometimes, the pradhāna is to be meditated upon for the sake of obtaining extraordinary powers. But, so far as the passage under discussion is concerned, the *avyakta* is not mentioned either as an object of knowledge or meditation. In other words, the knowledge of it serves no human end. *Avyakta* therefore cannot be said to mean pradhāna. On our view, on the other hand, the word *avyakta* has been

merely mentally used for body after the passage of the character is over to show the nature of the highest abode of Viṣṇu.

कदापि चेन्न लोको हि वक्रणालः ५

[Vāda-says, an on-ū it be and na-not, prajñā-hi-
loka-*hi*-for, prajñānt-from context.]

AND IF IT IS SAID THAT (PRAJÑĀNA AS THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE) IS MENTIONED (BY ŚAṬI), WE SAY THAT IT IS NOT SO, FOR, ON ACCOUNT OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT-MATTER, THE INTELLIGENT ĀTMA IS MEANT. 5

The Śikṣhā may again quote a passage from the same Upaniṣad and say that the entity described therein is that which goes beyond what is nothing but predikṣa, i. e., 'he who perceives that which is without sound, touch, form, decay, taste, or smell, which has neither beginning nor end, and which is beyond the mortal soul in contact, is freed from the jaws-of-death' (Ka. 2, 2, 27).

We reply that the object of perception described in the passage is not predikṣa but the intelligent highest Ātman, which alone goes to form the general subject-matter. The Puruṣa alone is said to be the goal, for there is nothing beyond him. Though he is hidden and therefore difficult to be known, the wise people can have a vision of him by resorting to the control of senses and other means, and thus achieve the liberation from the jaws of death. On the Śikṣhā theory, too, liberation is not possible by merely perceiving the predikṣa, they too believe that the release from death is possible after the knowledge of the intelligent Puruṣa, as distinct from predikṣa. Besides qualities such as being without taste, smell etc. are said to belong to the highest Ātman alone in all the Vedānta-passages. Predikṣa, therefore, is neither spoken of as the object of knowledge, nor referred to by the word 'anyājan'.

अथापानिष विद्युत्कथातः प्रारम्भः । ५

[Trepidation—of them, and—only, as—and : each—then;
astonished—reply, profound—question, as.]

AND THEN THE QUESTIONS AND REPLIES REFER TO
THREE THINGS ALONE (AND NOT TO PARADISE). 6

In Kaphavalk there occurs the story of Nachiketas and Death. Being sent by his father, Nachiketas approached Death and got three boons. In this connection, Nachiketas asks him three questions regarding the sacrificial fire (I, 1, 13), the individual soul and the highest Atman. The second question seeks to know as to what happens regarding the individual soul after death (I, 1, 20), and the third is a query regarding that 'whether a creature dies nor that, neither cause nor effect, neither upon past nor future' (I, 2, 14). The god of Death, we are told, has given three corresponding answers to these questions. Firstly, he tells Nachiketas that fire is the beginning of the world, and so tells him the number of bricks etc. required for the sacrificial altar. Secondly, promising him to reveal the hidden knowledge of Brahman, he tells Nachiketas that according to merits or demerits, some souls enter the womb in order to have a new body after death, and that others appear in the form of trees or stones (I, 2, 7). And thirdly, he answers the third question by saying that the Atman has no birth or death etc. (I, 2, 18). There being therefore no separate question or answer regarding paradise, it cannot be said that it is either the object of knowledge or is indicated by the word *arpana*.

An objection may be raised at this point. If the second question is resolved as the third, then there are only two questions and not three; and if the third is a distinct and new question from the second, then taking into consideration Nachiketas' first boon regarding his father, there will be four questions and not three. And if it is so much so, a question is additional to the three

boons conferred, then it is likewise no mistake to have an additional explanatory answer regarding problems.

To this we reply that the number of questions asked is in no way greater than the number of boons. The first boon does refer to the wished-for kindness to him from his father; the second refers to the fire, and the third to the nature of the soul and Ātman. Now so far as the three questions are concerned, the first refers to the fire, and the second and the third refer to the soul and the Ātman taken together as the subject-matter of the third boon. Manabhinava himself says after making inquiry about the destiny of the soul after death, that it constitutes his third boon. So, the first boon takes the form of a demand, and the second and the third boons the form of three questions, as explained above. This means that the second and the third questions relate to the single topic, only with this difference that the second deals with it under the aspect of individual soul, and the third under the aspect of the Ātman. And this is possible because the individual soul and the Ātman are really one and not two.

We see the proof of this unity of the jīva and Ātman in a number of ways. (1) Passages like 'That thou art' affirm it. (2) In the present Upaniṣad again, the denial of birth and death in the case of the individual soul is itself an assertion of the non-difference of the soul and Ātman. For there is no point in denying them of the highest God where there is no possibility of their existence. Denial of something has got meaning only when that something has the possibility of existence somewhere. The embodied soul, for example, has got the possibility of birth and death on account of its connection with the body. Therefore the denial of death in the case of the individual soul means that the real nature of the individual soul is to be disembodied. The denial, in other words, points out the unity of the soul and the highest God. (3) Similarly, another passage, which declares the constant

of all sorrow by knowing that the real 'perceiver of all the objects in the waking and the dreaming conditions is the great and omnipotent *Ātman* itself,' clearly suggests that the *jīva* is not different from the *Prāṇa* (2, 4). It is a doctrine of the Vedānta that the knowledge of *Prāṇa* puts an end to all sorrow ; and that is achieved by the knowledge of the real nature of the *jīva*. (6) Again, the passage (2, 5, 10), 'what is here is there and what is there is here', he who finds any difference goes from death to death, contains a message of a person who holds that the *jīva* and *Prāṇa* are different. (5) The fact that Nachiketas remains firm regarding the choice of his third boon, viz. the question relating the condition of the soul after death, in spite of the various temptations offered by the god of Death, and the fact of subsequent praise of Nachiketas for his question, and the form of answer given by the latter, show that the *jīva* and *Prāṇa* are not different from each other. Knowing that Nachiketas was not moved by desires for pleasures, the god of Death imparts him the knowledge of the destruction of *Vidyā* and *avidyā*, and of the pleasant and the Good, and tells him how by the process of meditation the wise people find out with great difficulty that ancient and hidden God and go beyond both joy and sorrow (3, 3, 4 : 1, 1, 12). (6) If Nachiketas had left the question which had earned him so much praise, and asked a fresh question, it would have simply meant that the praise was wasted on him. His sticking on to the same question only means that the third question about the highest *Ātman* is really the carrying forward of the second question regarding the individual soul. (7) And, finally, a slight difference in language need not be construed as a difference in the subject-matter of the two questions. For we hold that whereas the second question is with reference to the existence of the soul as apart from the body, the third is merely with reference to its being or not being subject to *avidyā*. So long as *avidyā* is there, the *jīva* appears to be endowed with attributes etc., but the moment *avidyā* vanishes the soul too is seen to be one with the *Prāṇa*, as is told by the Śruti, 'That thou art'.

As a matter of fact the thing itself does not undergo any change by the presence or absence of avidyā. The rope itself remains as rope whether it appears as a snake or not. Even so, the jīva is, as revealed nature, one with the highest Ātman, though it appears to be different in connection with the attributes, the body and the Śarīra.

In short, in the Śāstra as well as in the Śruti, the questions and the answers are said to refer to three things only, viz. the ātman, the individual soul and the highest Ātman. As against this, there is neither the mention of a question, nor of an answer, which may favour the theory of pradhāna.

सद्गुणम् । ३

[Māhāt-mā—līp māhāt : ca—and.]

AND (THE WORD *MAHĀTMA*, IS) LIKE (THE WORD) *MAHĀ* (IS NOT BEING ABLE TO REFER TO *PRADHĀNA*) ?

The Śālikyans have used the word *māhāt* in the sense of *virtue* or *buddhi* because it is the first product of *pradhāna* and because it is *buddhi* which enables a man to achieve both prosperity and *mokṣa*. The vedic meaning of *māhāt*, however, is *Person* or *Ātman* knowing whom there is no end to all sorrow. This is clear from the passages, 'The great Ātman is beyond the intellect' (Ka. 1. 2, 23) : 'I know that great Person' (Sā. 3, 8). The Vedic word *avyakta* too like *ma* cannot mean *pradhāna*.

२. अव्यक्तमित्यम् । (४-१-२)

Just as the word *avyakta* is shown to have been put for its effect, viz. the body, and not *pradhāna*, even so, the attributes, red, white and black colour, fire, water and food respectively, and not *pradhāna*.

अवयवविशेषः १८

[Carnations—like the cup, a cupola—there being no special characteristic !]

AS IN THE CASE OF CARNIA, (AŚI CANNOT BEAN FLAMELINA) BECAUSE NO SPECIAL CHARACTERISTIC IS MENTIONED. 8

The followers of Kapila may yet find the support of Śruti for their theory of prakāśa in the manta (Ivā. 4. 1), which speaks of 'one up (the-point) of red, white and black colours and of her innumerable similar offspring.' We are further told that 'she is loved by one great but abandoned by another.' Now, obviously, the word 'up' does not mean a 'the-point.' It means the un-born source of all, the prakāśa or prakṛti, which an account of attachment to it deludes some souls into believing that they are subject to pleasure and pain of samsāra, but which cannot affect the other souls because they achieve their release through discrimination and non-attachment to it. The colour is said to be white, because it is purest shining, the cupa is red because it colours the mind, and carnā is black because it envelops the mind like darkness.

We reply that taken by itself the manta is unable to justify any particular doctrine. For the words, 'up' etc. have different meanings, and there is no special reason, like context for instance, why any particular meaning can be selected and shown to be favourable to any particular doctrine. A parallel example of this occurs in the Śhālistasāyābhāṣya (1, 2, 3): 'Carnā is a cup with its mouth below and bottom upwards.' Taken by itself, the manta cannot determine any particular cup. But the sentence that follows determines this, and we get the sense that the so-called cup is the 'head.' Even so, may we not be able to determine the meaning of the word 'up' with reference to some other passage? The next Śāstra comes as a reply

अप्यपिहमका ह वा कर्षित एते । २.

[*Apya-pi-hamaka h va karsita ete*—*happany with light, is—has, under—*
in that manner, is—because; alityata—study; the—
same]

(A₁2) HOWEVER (MEANS THE THREE ELEMENTS) BEGINNING WITH LIGHT, FOR SOME WERE THERE THAT IN THIS MANNER. 9

As we discuss, we can determine the meaning of the word 'api' in the *Śvetāśvataraopaniṣad* by reference to what has been said in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* (8, 4, 1) viz. that the colours, red, white and black are the colours of the three elements of air, water and earth and that these elements have sprung forth from the highest God. The words red, white and black are used to denote their primary meanings, viz. the colours of the elements and not the secondary meanings, viz. gases that go to form the *prāṇa*. The same conclusion is therefore possible to be inferred in the *Śvetāśvataraopaniṣad*. For generally a doubtful passage is interpreted in the light of another passage whose meaning is accepted as beyond doubt. Starting with the question of the Brahman as the cause of the world, the *Upaniṣad* tells us, just previous to the passage under consideration, how those who had taken resort to meditation could see the power of the highest God, though it is hidden by his quietude. It is this power which is described in this passage (Sv. 1, 1) as creating the entire universe, and subsequently described as *śūṣṭi* or *prāṇa*, and as belonging to the *Māyā* or the *Mahatma*. He is the one lord and support of not only the original *yonis* or *śūṣṭi* but of several *śūṣṭi*s which are the effects of the original one (4, 10-11). Naturally, in the passage which introduces (4, 3) the word 'api' cannot mean the *śūṣṭi* or *prāṇa* or *pradhāna* as the independent cause of the world. Rather, the context or the subject-matter shows that, as in the *api* passage also, the same divine power in which

the names and forms have not become manifest is the cause or the antecedent condition of the world of name and forms. Now this divine power or *māyā* is said to possess three colours because the three elements of fire, water and earth, which are the effects of *māyā*, possess the three colours of red, white and black respectively. Just as is the effect so please the name.

If 'ajl' is taken to mean the three elements according to the Chāndogyaopaniṣad, and not original *māyā* which is really (ajl) unproduced, a doubt may arise as to how the three elements can either be conceived as having the form of the she-goat or be thought of as unproduced, inasmuch as the three elements are the products of *māyā*. To this the Śāṅkhya replies —

कल्पोददेवान् यन्त्रादिवर्णिषः । १०

[*Kalpaḥ udadevān yantṛādivarṇiṣaḥ*—being mentioned under the image of .
is—and, makes do not—like honey and others, a-cumulative
—not constitutive.]

Like the (MAYANON OR) HONEY ETC. HERE IS NOTHING CONTRADICTION IS MENTIONING (THE HONEY FORM) UNDER THE IMAGE (OF AJL) 33

Just as the sun is imagined as honey, or the speech as cow, or the heavenly world as fire (ajl ३, १; ३४ ३, ४, ६, १, २), even so, the prakṛti which consists of fire, water and earth, is imagined as she-goat. The prakṛti can neither be conceived as having the form of a she-goat, nor as unproduced. This original ajl is simply imagined like an ordinary she-goat to produce all the material and animate beings possessing the three colours of the elements like herself, and as being loved by some ignorant souls who are held in bondage by *māyā*, but abandoned by those who have attained true knowledge. This distinction between souls and souls does not however mean the doctrine of the multiplicity of souls as the Śāṅkhya believe, but is merely meant to distinguish bondage

from release. The distinction itself is not real but is due to *upādhis*, which are there on account of false knowledge. As the Śruti says, "He is the one all-pervading God who is hidden in all beings as the inner Atman of all" (Ive. 6, 11). It stands to reason then that *ajl* means fire, water and earth taken together.

॥ संख्योत्तंश्चापिकल्पम् । (११-११)

न संख्योत्तंश्चादपि गणनायोग्यमित्येवम् । ११

[*Na—na*—number, *apikalkpatah*—being mentioned, *api—then*, *saṅkhyōtānt*—an account of many different, *ajl*—due to nature, *et—end*]

Nor even on account of the numbers being mentioned [can it be said that *pradhāna* has the authority of Śruti], for the principles are different (several one of them), and on account of *ajl* (over the number) 12.

To show that his doctrine of *pradhāna* has got the authority of Śruti, the Śāṅkhya again, cites the mantr, "I believe has alone to be the Atman, in whom the finite and the *panca paṇḍaras* live, knowing him as the immortal Brahman, I become immortal." (Bg. 4, 4, 17). Here the word '*panca*' means five, and so, the two words together mean five groups of five, i.e. twenty-five. Thus, says the Śāṅkhya, is exactly the number of the principles as mentioned in the Śāṅkhya-Kārikā, 3—'The original *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is not an effect, *satva*, *rajas*, *shadow* and the five *tanmātras* are the seven effects of *prakṛti*, but are cause too of the *satva* which are effects only, viz. the five gross elements and eleven *indriyas*, and the *paraśa* who is neither the effect nor the cause.' Thus the common element of the number twenty-five in both the Śruti passage and the Śāṅkhya-Kārikā is taken to mean as the ground for believing that *pradhāna* has got the support of Śruti.

To this we reply,

Sams cannot be shown to be the authoritative source of the probability-theory in this way. For (1) each one of the twenty-five principles of the *Sāsthyas* is different from the others. (2) They cannot be classified into five groups of five principles, there being no common quality in the members of any group, for, a classification into groups presupposes that the members of a group, whether two or three or more, must have some common quality. (3) The words 'pauca, pauca' are not to be used as forming the number twenty-five by multiplication, just as the words 'five' and 'seven' in the statement, 'Indra did not rain for five and seven years,' can be used to indicate the number of twelve years by the addition of five and seven. For where it is possible to mention the number directly as twenty-five, it is not correct to say that it has been indicated indirectly as five groups of five. (4) Besides, the second word 'pauca' is not independent like the first word 'pauca,' so that we can mean by both of them the number 'five.' The second word 'pauca,' on the other hand, enters as a member in the compound word 'pauca-pauca' as in the passage first so referred to (Tā. Sam. I, 6, 7, 8), and therefore has not got a separate positive case-termination as the first word 'pauca' has got it. The word 'pauca' then is not alone repeated twice so as to indicate five times five. Nor can the first word 'pauca' be an adjective of the second word 'pauca,' which also is an adjective. (5) Nor can it be said that inasmuch as the word 'pauca' qualifies the compound word 'pauca-pauca,' the expression 'pauca-pauca-pauca' would suggest the number twenty-five on the analogy of the expression 'pauca-pauca-pāṇi,' which means twenty-five wooden or other number-words. For the word 'pauca-pāṇi' is a 'samāhita-dvaya' compound and means a collection of five words; and so, if some one were to ask us to how many 'pauca-pāṇi' are mentioned, the answer that there are five (pauca) such groups or twenty-five words in all would naturally take the form of the expression 'pauca-pauca-pāṇi.' But the word 'pauca-pauca,' on the other hand, instead of indicating a 'dvaya' compound indicates directly

the idea of five distinct persons. In other words, there being no idea of groups, there arises no occasion to know the number of groups, and as the word "panca" cannot be said to be an adjective of another compound word "panca-jana" meaning a group of five persons. The expression "panca pancajana" does not indicate then even indirectly the number twenty-five which may be useful for the Śāṅkhya to denote the number of their principles. (6) Besides, in the passage where the expression "panca pancajana" occurs, the words *Ātman* and *Śakti*, which are already included in the twenty-five principles of the Śāṅkhya, are again mentioned separately. So if the intelligent principle of the *Ātman* as also the *Śakti* are to be counted again along with the supposed number of twenty-five indicated by the expression "panca pancajana," the total number would be twenty-seven. The *Ātman* which is mentioned as the immortal abode in which the "panca pancajana" live cannot itself be taken again as one which lives in the abode. Similarly, the separate mention of *Śakti* would increase the number of the Śāṅkhya categories. (7) Again, the base reference to a certain possible number as mentioned in the expression "panca pancajana" can in no way lead us to the number twenty-five of the Śāṅkhya, for the simple reason that it has been mentioned elsewhere also in the *Śruti*. Besides the word "jana" does not mean a principle or a category. (8) And if arbitrarily we are to interpret the expression "panca pancajana," then it may mean any other group of twenty-five things, and not necessarily the Śāṅkhya principles.

Now, then, it may be asked, are we to interpret the word "pancajani" ? It is a name, we reply. For, according to Pāṇini (3, 1, 36) words indicating direction or number are compounded with other words and then mean only a name of something or person. So the word "pancajani" does not signify the number five, but indicates only a particular class of beings, and as such, the expression "panca pancajani" does not indicate the

number twenty-five of the Śālikya principles, but indicates that things known by the name "pañcagana" are five in number, just as the things known as "sapṭagana" are seven in number.

Now to the question what these 'pañcagana' things are, the text Śūtra comes as a reply

पञ्चदशो वानपदेनाह । ११

[*Pañcādaśa-panja and others, vānapanā-haṁ-complementary sentence*]

PANJA AND OTHERS (ARE THE PAÑCAGANAS, AS IS CLEAR) FROM WHAT FOLLOWS. 11

With a view to describe the nature of Brahman, the mantras which come immediately after (Bṛ. 4, 4, 18) the mantras in which the pañcagana are mentioned (4, 4, 17) tells us that "those who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of ear, the food of food, and the mind of mind, are alone able to ascertain the nature of that special Brahman. So it is clear that the pañcagana are no other but the things which are mentioned so closely upon them, viz., the breath, the eye, the ear, the food and the mind. The argument that the word 'jana' does not mean breath etc., tells equally against the word 'jana' being taken in the sense of the Śālikya categories. But our interpretation has this much in its favour, viz., (1) the two mantras as shown above are in close proximity: (2) The breath, the eye, etc. have got an actual connection with 'jana' i. e., a being or a person, (3) The word 'panjan' which is a synonym for 'jana' is used in the Upaniṣads to denote jana etc. e. g. "Those are the five Brahman-panjanas", "Breath is father, mother etc.". (Chā. 3, 12, 6, 7, 13, 1), and finally (4) The word jana can, without any contradiction, be taken in its conventional meaning, just as we do in the case of the words 'Udāhad', 'Tāpa', and 'Veda'. A word of unknown meaning becomes known in possessing some meaning because we see it used in

connection with another word of known meaning. For instance, the word 'adhiśat' in the sentence, 'he is to sacrifice with adhiśat', enables us to know that 'adhiśat' is the name of a sacrifice, the word 'yipsa' in 'he cuts the yipsa', means a wooden post, and the word 'veda' in 'he makes the veda', means the altar of sacrifice. So once we decide that the word 'pancapāra' is a compound which is formed according to the above mentioned rule of Pāṇini and therefore means the name of a thing or person, it is very easy to show, as is shown in the above instances, that the same refers to priya and other beings.

The word 'pancapāra' has been taken by some commentators to mean the five beings of gods, fathers' gādharva, sūras and rṣiṣas. Others say that it means the four castes of Brahmins etc. with Nāyaka added to them. We find it used in Nigveda to denote the created beings in general (A. 33, 7). We may take any meaning we like, but what the Śāṅkhya intends by choosing the meaning as priya etc., is only to show that (whatever else may be the meaning) the word 'pancapāra' does not mean the Śāṅkhya category.

Now it is a fact that the Kāṇva recension of the Upaniṣad does not mention the being of food, while the Mādhyandina mentions it along with the other four. To this the next Śāṅkha comes as a reply.

लोहितोष्णमक्षयम् । ११

[Hot-by light. slight-of some. heat—when not
mentioned, none-food.]

ननु यद्येवमुक्तं तदा भूयः सौ (अस्त्येवम्) इत्युक्तं, प्रत्येवम् (अस्त्येवम्, तस्य भूयः इत्युक्तं) इत्युक्तं । १२

The Kāṇva recension no doubt, makes no mention of the being of food, but we must remember that just as the

preceding mantras, the *gyoti* or the light of the sun has been mentioned only to remind us of the nature of Brahman and the way of direction to it. But it may be pointed out that if 'gyoti' refers to Brahman, it cannot at the same time refer to the light of the sun; and that there is no reason why the *Mādhyaṃdina* ceremony should not include it to make the number five, but that the *Kṛtva* one should include it, even if both the ceremonies refer to *gyoti*. The reply is that the choice to include the *gyoti* or not to include it is dependent on the requirement of the followers of the two branches. The *Mādhyaṃdina* get all the five *homa*s of *palāṇa* and others in one and the same mantra, while the *Kṛtva* do not, and so it is that though the former do not, the latter do require to include the *gyoti* in order to make the number five. This is consistent with a similar *Māhātmya* usage of either accepting or not the *Śaṅkha*-cup at the *śrāddha* ceremony.

It has been proved so far that *pradhāna* is not mentioned in *Śaṅkha*. That the doctrine of *pradhāna* has neither been backed up by *Śaṅkha* nor by reasoning will be shown here on:

४ वामदेवविश्वसद् । (१४-१५)

वामदेवेन वामाग्निं वामाग्निर्होतुः । १४

[*Kṛtva* *pradhāna*—as *other*, or *not*; *śrāddha*—*śrāddha*—of *śrāddha* and *other*, *pradhāna*—as, *vāmadāgnirhota* is used as it is mentioned.]

As (in case, so in all other *Vaidika*-*mantras*, *Brāhmaṇa*) being mentioned as the cause of *śrāddha* and *other*, (there is no conflict in the *mantra*). 14

What we have seen so far from the very beginning is—
(i) The nature of Brahman, as stated in the *Śākhā* [*śrāddha* *pradhāna*] (I, I, 14) (ii) That Brahman is the uniform type of all the *Vaidika*-*mantras* which we have so far

considered while discussing Śūtras from 1, 1, 1 to 1, 1, 46, and that (a) the doctrine of *pralīna* is not in all mentioned in Śūtras, as has been clear from the last thirteen Śūtras of this pīṭh.

Now, however, there comes forth a new objection. It may be said that it is neither proved that Brahman is the creator nor that it is the uniform topic of all the Vedic-pasages, inasmuch as they are seen to contradict each other. For instance the order in which the creation has been mentioned is said to have taken place varies from place to place. In one place, we are told that *Itiā* has come forth from the *Ātman* (Tai. 3, 1); in another the *Śat* is said to have produced the *five* (Chā. 6, 2, 5); in another place still, the *Purusa* is said to have produced the *prāṇas*, and the *pañcā* the *hehā* etc. (Pru. 6, 4). Against all these statements in which some order of creation is mentioned, we get also an account of creation in which there is no mention of order, for instance, in the *Antaryoginī*, we are told that the *Ātman* has produced the three worlds of heaven, earth and *pīṭh*. The creation is also said to have begun from *non-existence* (Tai. 3, 7; Chā. 3 18, 1). As opposed to this, *non-existence* is discredited, and *existence* mentioned as the beginning of the world (Chā. 6, 2, 1—2). Spontaneously, again, the world is said to have come into existence. That which was merely undeveloped originally has itself become developed by the means of names and forms (Br. 1, 4, 7). Thus, there being various contradictions regarding creation, and inasmuch as Brahman is already an accomplished fact, the Vedic-pasages cannot be trusted so far as they claim that Brahman is the cause of the world. Rather, taking our stand on *Śūtra* and reasoning, we should accept *pralīna* or some other entity as the cause of the world.

To this we reply. Though there may exist contradictions in the Vedic-pasages regarding the order or otherwise of the created things, such as *Itiā* and others, there is no such contradiction regarding the creator. For,

as in one passage, so in all other Vedānta-passages, the creator is described as one who is omniscient, the lord of all, the great Atman of everything, and as the one and the only cause, without a second. Consider, for instance, the description of Brahman as the cause in the Taittiriya-śāstra. The words 'knowledge' and 'desire' which are used with reference to Brahman, indicate that it is endowed with intelligence. The description that it is 'independent' of anything else applies only to God. The fact that it is this God who has further been referred to as the Atman and as residing in the universe shows the known as made up of body, organs etc. clearly indicates that he is the internal soul of all. The statements 'Let me be many', 'Let me produce the beings', show us how the Atman himself has become many and is therefore not different from what he has become. And finally, the passage, 'He created all this', tells us that before the creation of the world, he alone existed as the cause (Tā 2, 1, 6-8). Now as in this passage, so in other passages too Brahman is described as possessing the same characteristics. For instance, in the Chāndogya, 'Being alone, and nothing else' is said to have been 'in the beginning, it thought to become many and to grow; it produced fire' (Chā 6, 2, 1-3). We have the same idea in another passage of the Aitareya-śāstra: "All this was the Atman in the beginning, there was nothing else neither movable nor immovable; he thought to produce worlds" (1, 1). So, even if there are conflicting statements regarding the order of creation, all the Vedānta-passages are thus seen to agree in saying that Brahman is the cause of the world. No doubt, these contradictions regarding creation will be removed by the Śaṅkara later on, in the first 500 of the third pāda of the second sūtra. For the present, we are, in no way, concerned with these contradictions. For to describe the order or nature of creation is not at all the aim of Śruti. The welfare of men does not depend on these matters. Taking into consideration both the introduction and conclusion of several such passages, we

find that they are only subservient to the main topic of Brahman. The passage, for instance, which tells 'to seek after the root of food, viz., water, and then to seek after the root of water, viz. fire, and then again to seek after the root of fire, viz. the truth' (Chā. 6, 3, 4), leads to the search of Brahman alone. All accounts of creation, which involve the illustrations of clay, iron, sparks etc., are in the opinion of the experts who have the knowledge of Brahmā, only the means for the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman, in which there is no difference whatever (Mā. Upan. 12, 3, 5). Knowledge of Brahman, on the other hand, is mentioned to cover its own fruit: 'He who realises it reaches the highest' (Tā. 2, 1). 'He who realises the Ātman overcomes grief' (Chā. 3, 1, 10). 'One who realises him goes beyond death' (Śuc. 3, 2). Dharma is the fruit of the experience of this knowledge; for the moment the truth of the statement, 'That thou art,' is realised and the Ātman is seen to be not affected by the rounds of birth and death, that very moment, realises the Brahma of the Śaṅkara.

As for the assertion that there exist contradictory statements even with the nature of the cases, e.g. whether it was existent or non-existent in the beginning, we shall relate it in our discussion of the next Sūtra.

अस्त्यस्यैव । १५

[*Āstyaśasyaiva being linked up.*]

As (THE WORD 'ASTAT' IN THE PREVIOUS PARAGRAPH) IS LINKED WITH THE WORD 'AST' IN THE NEXT PARAGRAPH, 'ASTAT' INDICATES BRAHMAN AND NOT NON-BEING 15.

A passage in the Taittiriyaopaniṣad (2, 1) tells us that 'all this, verily, was in the beginning, non-being (asat)'. But the 'asat' used here means absolute non-existence, for, in the preceding passage of the same Upaniṣad, we are told on the authority of those who have realised the Brahman that 'one who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing, while one who knows it to be existing exists himself' (2, 6, 1). This

is at once a clear denial of the absolute non-being like that of the born of a born and the affirmation of the being of Brahman alone. It is this same being or Brahman which is further referred to as the innermost Atman of the various sheaths of food, prāṇa, etc., as the creator because he 'desired to become many', and as the ultimate Truth. It is only after this assertion of the nature of Brahman, and therefore is connected with it, that we get the motto: 'non-being indeed was this in the beginning'. If, instead of the generally accepted necessary connection between the Brhāgama portion and the motto of the Upaniṣad, the word 'sat' were to mean absolute non-existence, there will be no continuity of concept at all. The conclusion therefore, would be that if the word 'sat' indicates the being of Brahman with all the manifold forms and names, the word 'asat' indicates the same being of Brahman without the names and forms. It indicates, in other words, the condition of the world prior to its origination, the condition in which Brahman appears to be 'asat', as if

The passage in the Chāndogyaopaniṣad now must be construed in the same manner. The statement, "This was originally sat", is immediately followed by "it then became asat". It means therefore that the non-being referred to by the pronoun 'it' cannot be the absolute non-being, but on the contrary, means the sat or the Brahman (A. IV, 1). Similarly, the reference to the opinion of others in another passage of the same Upaniṣad viz. that 'non-being was this in the beginning' (B. 3. 1), does not mean the optional assertion of absolute non-existence, but means, on the contrary, the refutation of such a vulgar doctrine with a view to strengthen the position that Brahman alone was in the beginning. For there cannot be any optional view with regard to reality, as there can be with regard to action.

This enables us to interpret another passage still from the Iṣaṭisopaniṣad (1, 4, 7) which may

appear to favour the view that the world came into existence without a creator. The reference to the world which was originally without names and forms, but which developed in course of time into one with names and forms, is not a reference to the world which came into being of its own accord and without a ruler. It is rather a reference to the world in which the author of it is said to have entered to the 'very tips of the nails of the fingers.' If the world is to be supposed as having come into existence by way of natural evolution, and if the authorship of the *Ātman* is to be denied, the pronoun 'he' in the sentence 'he entered into the effects' would serve no purpose. On the contrary, we are immediately told that the being which has so entered is known by various names, such as, the eye, the ear and the mind, because it does the function of seeing, hearing and thinking. We are told, in other words, that the being which has entered is no other than the intelligent *Ātman*, and it is clear that the authorship of the *Ātman* was much necessary for the manifestation of names and forms at the beginning of the world as it is today, if at all we are not to assume something against experience. The *Chāndogya-sūtra* also tells us that the evolution of the world has taken place under the supervision of the conscious *ātma*. 'Let us evolve the names and forms by entering into the beings by means of the *jīvanmān*' (3, 1, 3). No doubt we have the intrinsitive expression, 'The world evolved itself', but it only shows the ease with which the Lord must have created the universe. We know it as the farmer who sows the seed, and yet we sometimes say that the 'field sows.' Or else, the expression 'the world evolves' may be said to imply an author who evolves it, just as the expression, 'the village is being approached' implies some person who approaches the village.

५ वाक्यव्यवहारम् । (१६-१८)

वाक्यविवादः । १६

[*śruti*—world ; *śāstra*—being denied.]

BECAUSE (THE WORD "KARMA" MEANS THE WORLD, (Brahman IS THE AUTHOR OF ALL THIS IN ITS KARMA) 18

There is a dialogue in the Kaushika-Brahmaga between the king Ajatasatru and a Brahman, by name Bṛhika, and in the course of it the king tells the Brahman that 'verily he is fit to be known, who is the master of the persons and of this work' (4, 18). Now the question to solve is whether the object to be known is the individual soul, or the chief priya or the highest *Ātman*.

The pāramparika holds that what is meant is the chief priya, for, in the first place, 'priya' is the support of the activity or movement which it used to be its work. Secondly, the word 'priya' which is used in the immediately following complementary sentence, viz. 'The jīva becomes one with priya, during sleep' (4, 20), is well-known as denoting the chief priya. Thirdly, as Bṛhika had already declared, priya is the master of the persons in the sun, the moon etc., or as the Bhāradvājya says, (3, 9, 8) the sun and the other deities are nothing but the modifications of the one God, viz. priya or Brahman.

On the other, according to the pāramparika, the being fit to be known may be the individual soul. The 'work' of the soul then would mean the deeds of merit or demerit and the soul itself will be considered as the cause of the persons in the sun etc., monarchs in the sun, the moon etc. can be said to be the sources of planets and part to be experienced by the soul. Besides, a little further we get a characteristic mark of the individual soul. In order to instruct Bṛhika that the being which really experiences the planets and parts is not priya but the soul, Ajatasatru went near a sleeping man and shouted at him by different names of priya to wake him up. But the man was not awakened at all. Ajatasatru then pushed the sleeping man with a stick and woke him up, and thus proved that the jīva is different from the priya. Again, a little further, in section 20, we get another characteristic mark of the individual soul. The individual

self as well as the other selves as the sun and the moon etc. are doing mutual obligations on each other. The individual soul is known as *prajña* only in a secondary manner, inasmuch as it is the support of *prajña*. And as there are no characteristic marks of the highest God, we must conclude that it is either the individual soul or the *prajña* that should be considered as the fit object of knowledge.

To this we reply. The beginning itself of the section is sufficient to show that God is the author of the persons mentioned as the sun, the moon etc. and is therefore the object of knowledge. It is Bṛillik who begins the conversation with the statement that he would tell what Brahman is, but remains silent only after mentioning the persons residing in the sun, the moon etc. [4. 1]. Aṅgīśāstra thereupon rebuked Bṛillik for having vainly said that he would describe the Brahman, and told him in return that the creator of these persons must be somebody else, viz. the Brahman. If Aṅgīśāstra too, who censured Bṛillik for his boast, were also simply to mention some non-Brahmanic persons and remain silent, then there would be no point in the genuine and the introductory statement of Bṛillik regarding Brahman. Therefore it is that the creator of these persons is none else but God. Besides, God alone, unlike *prajña* and *jīva*, can be said to be truly independent in creating the persons as the sun etc. The word 'Karma' too does neither indicate the movement nor the merit and demerit accruing from it, so that we may refer to it as *prajña* or *jīva*. For neither of the two meanings, movement or merit etc. is the topic under discussion. Nor can the word 'Karma' denote the persons as the sun etc. for the word *paraśa* is masculine and is used in generic plural, while the word 'karma' is of neuter gender and is used in the singular number. Notthat, again, the activity of producing the persons nor the result of that activity can be the meaning of the word 'karma' for both these are included in the agent or the author without whom they would not exist.

Examining, then, all the possible alternatives, we conclude that the persons' thus' and the word 'harman' in the sentence, 'He of whom this is the harman,' point out the world that we see before us, even though there is no explicit reference to it. For the reference to the entire world can be inferred, not only from the explicit reference to a part of it, as constituted by the persons in the *śūta* etc. but also by the additional words in the *Śūta*, viz. 'Of, this harman.' The reference to the 'persons' in the *śūta* etc. as being created is meant to exclude the possibility of their being construed as Brahman, as BŪDDH suggested, and to make them only a part of the entire world which is nothing but the work of God. When one says that both the *Parivṛtṭakas* (i.e. the Brahman who have renounced the world) and the Brahmanas should be fed, what he means is that all the Brahmanas should be fed. Similarly, the reference to a specific part of the world, and again to the entire world, is to affirm only emphatically that the highest God alone, as indicated by all the *Vedānta-sūtras*, is the creator of the whole world.

जीवद्वयप्रधानसिद्धयेति विद्वन्वाक्यमाह । १७

[*Jīva*—soul, *vaśīṣa*—principal; *prāṇa*—breath, light—due to wind; *vi*—not; *et*—and; *et*—if it is not; *et*—that; *vyākhyāta*—already related.]

IF IT BE SAID THAT IT IS NOT SO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE CHARACTERISTIC MARKS OF THE *JĪVA* AND *PRĀṇA* (JĪVA MENTIONED IN A CONFIRMATORY PASSAGE) WE HOLD THAT THAT HAS BEEN ALREADY REFUTED 17

As already explained while discussing Sūtra 31 of the first pīṭha, there may arise three objects for misapprehension, viz. the *jīva*, the *prāṇa* and the Brahman, if along with our view the view of the *parivṛtṭakas* is also to be adopted. But this is not acceptable to us. For, as seen in the preceding *Śūta*, the beginning of the *Śūta* passage shows that the topic under discussion is Brahman and nothing else. The conclusion of that section too shows that Brahman is

the topic, for he who knows Brahman is said to have been receiving the highest reward, viz. liberation among all beings, supremacy over all, and independence (Kṛa. 4, 30).

If the relation has already been made in 1, 1, 34, while dealing with the statement of Pratyakṣa, where then, it may be asked, is the necessity of the Śloka? The reply is that the 'work', viz. the creation of the world, was not referred there to Brahman. But as the doubt may arise whether the 'work' is referred to *prajña*, on account of its one meaning viz. movement, or to *jīva* on account of its other meaning viz. the universe (part of it), it was felt necessary to have this Śloka, and settle that the word 'work' refers to Brahman. As for the word '*prajña*' in a subsequent passage, we have to remember that it is used in the sense of Brahman, as in the passage, "the mind becomes tied with the *prajña*." (Chā. 8, 3). And similarly, if the beginning and conclusion of the passage justify us to say that the topic deals with Brahman, then, whatever characteristics we may have about *jīva*, we shall be justified in considering them as indicative of Brahman, inasmuch as the *jīva* is identical with Brahman.

कथमेव तु विधीयते इत्यन्वाक्यप्रामाण्यमिति चेन्नयेवे । १.८

[*Aspirant*—for another purpose, *an*—but, *joined*, *prajña-vyākhyāyitvāt*—on account of question and answer, *ape*—also, *an*—and; *evam*—so; *ape*—some.]

JANAKA, ON THE OTHER HAND, (THINKS) THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE QUESTION AND ANSWER (THE REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) HAS ANOTHER PORTION; SOME ORIGINATOR (HARITHA TEXT TO INDICATE THE PERSON) IS

There is no reason, according to JANAKA, to dispute whether the topic under discussion is the individual soul or Brahman. For he holds that even accepting that there is a reference to the individual soul, it is so indicative

the knowledge of Brahman. And the reason for his opinion is the nature of the question and the answer in this connection. After having proved to Śhukla that the soul is different from *prajā*, Aśvatara asked us as to where the person was asleep and whence he came back to the waking life. And the reply we got is that 'during dreamless sleep a person becomes one with the *prajā* (Brahman) alone', and that it is 'from this Atman alone that all the *prajā* depart to their abode; and that from *prajā* depart the gods, and from gods the beings' (Kau. 4, 15 and 20). And it is the Vedānta doctrine that during sleep the soul becomes one with Brahman, and that from Brahman it is that the world and the *prajā* proceed. Therefore that, in which the sleeping soul becomes devoid of cognitions of the waking life and enjoys a tranquil life, is Brahman itself; and so it is the only object it is to be known. The *Vijñāneśvara*, especially, in their part of the dialogue between Śhukla and Aśvatara, ask a similar question regarding the nightmystory as the soul is distinct from the highest Atman, and have the reply that it lies in the *śūta* within the heart (Śr. 3, 1, 16 and 17). Now the soul Śhukla is nothing but the highest Atman (Chā. 8, 1, 1); and because the empirical selves are said to have come forth from the Atman (Śr. 2, 1, 20), the *Vijñāneśvara* suggest that the Atman alone is the source of all. Thus, the question and the answer are not only able to intimate to us the existence of the soul beyond the *prajā*, but also the existence of the Atman beyond both *prajā* and *jīva*.

१ वाक्यान्वयविग्रहः । (१५-२२)

वाक्यान्वयः = १५.

[*Valpa*—sentence, analysis—on account of connection.]

THE ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION OF THE SENTENCES, (THE WRAPPING OF THE WORD "ATMAN" IN "THE ATMAN IS TO BE KNOWN" ETC., IN THE HIGHEST ATMAN ALONE) 39

In the *Māndūkyīkōśhasāra* of the *Bhāṣābhāṣya* school, we are told that nothing becomes clear for its own

also, but that everything becomes dear for the sake of the Ātman, and that therefore all this becomes known when the Ātman is seen, heard, thought about and meditated (Bk. 3, 3, 6). Now there arises the doubt whether the object to be seen etc. is the individual soul, on account of the dear things such as, husband, etc., with which it is connected as the subject of experience, or the Ātman on account of the fact that everything else becomes known when the Ātman is known.

The *pārvopakya* maintains, as indicated above, that all the objects of enjoyment in this world, such as, husband, wife, riches and son, are dear on account of the individual soul, and therefore it is the object of sight, etc. Besides, the section begins with the discussion of the individual soul and if, in spite of this, the object is to be considered as something else, there would be no sense in making the beginning with the topic of the individual soul. Towards the middle of the dialogue, again, the great being or the Ātman which is endless, unlimited and full of knowledge is shown as sprouting forth from the five elements in the form of the individual soul, and meeting with destruction after them, so that there remains not a trace of knowledge in it after death (Bk. 2, 4, 12). What this means is that the object of sight, etc. is the individual soul endowed with experience and not the highest Ātman. And further at the end of the dialogue, Tīrtavallīya refers to the individual soul again, when he raises the question as to how one should 'know the knower', for the knowing involves the experiential aspect of the individual soul alone. As to how one may know everything else by knowing the individual soul, the *pārvopakya* says that this is not to be taken in a literal sense, but must be understood as meaning that the world of objects is to be known through its relation to the soul.

To this we reply. If we look to the mutual connection of the passages in the dialogue, we shall find that the

object of sight etc. is the highest Ātman. We must remember that it is only after Mātareṣī was found to be thoroughly disgusted with riches which she thought was unable to carry her to immortality, that her husband Yājñavalkya imparted her the knowledge of the Ātman (Bṛ. 2, 4, 1 and 5). And as Śaṅkara and Śaṅkṛ tell us, immortality cannot be attained without the knowledge of the Ātman. Nor can everything else be known without such knowledge, for the Ātman is the highest cause of all. Therefore the view of the pūrvaśākhins, that it is not a literal truth that everything else becomes known when the Ātman is known, is not adequate. On the contrary, it is to point out that it is a literal truth, and that therefore it is inadequate to hold that the objects of the world are different from the Ātman, that we are told in the subsequent passage, that those who erroneously think that the causes of Brahman etc. and the objects of the world are different from the Ātman are abandoned by them all. This means what is immediately stated further in the passage, viz. that all these things in the world are non-distant from the Ātman (2, 4, 5). Just as the different sounds of the musical instruments can be said to be included in the prominent sound of the drum, even so, all these things are the Ātman. To say that 'Bṛveda is the breath of this great Being' (2, 4, 50) is only to point out that the Ātman is the cause of names, forms and actions. It is this Ātman again which is further declared as the support or the destination of the whole world including the objects, the organs and the mind, and is characterized as neither having inside nor outside, and as one, full, homogeneous mass of intuitive knowledge. From all this it is clear that the object of sight etc. is the highest Ātman alone.

As for the arguments of the pūrvaśākhins that the introductory part of the dialogue contains a reference to the individual soul, let us examine it in the next three Śūtras.

अविद्यया विवर्तयते । १०

[*Pravṛtta-māyāṃ, adbhūt- of* : *praj- mark, Advaita-śloka*.]

ADVĀITATVA THINKS (THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AS THE OBJECT TO BE REMOVED INDICATES THE PROOF OF THE STATEMENT). 20

If the individual soul having cognitions were to be different from the highest Ātman, then the knowledge of the latter will not involve the knowledge of the former as also of the other things in the world, nor will the other statement, 'all this is the Ātman,' will be fulfilled. It is therefore to secure the fulfilment of this statement as well as of the knowledge of all other things by the knowledge of the Ātman, that Advaitatva thinks that the individual soul mentioned in the beginning is intended to imply its non-difference from the highest Ātman.

उपनिषत्पुत्रा एवावधारितोऽन्यथोक्तिः । ११

[*Upaniṣad-putra- of* : *one who runs up, root- as, Hindu- because of being* ; *an- thus, Anyathatva*.]

ANANYATVA THINKS THAT THE FACT THAT THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS NON-DEPENDENT FROM THE HIGHEST PERSON IS REFERRED TO IN THE BEGINNING OF THE SECTION BECAUSE THE SOUL WILL BE SUCH WHEN IT DEPARTS (FROM THE BODY). 21

In view of the Upaniṣadic statement that 'The serene Being appears in its own form, as it departs from the body and emits the resplendent light' (Chā. 8, 12, 3), as also the statement that 'Like events passing into the sea, the wave soon loses his name and form and becomes united with the highest Person' (Māṇ. 3, 1, 6), Ananyatva thinks, that the reference to the individual soul is not different from the highest Ātman, as the beginning of the *Śāstrosya-bhāṣaṇa* is appropriate. The individual

soul is contaminated by the upādhis of body, senses, mind etc. ; but when it becomes pure by means of knowledge, devotion etc. , it leaves behind all the adjuncts of body and other things and is united with the highest Ātman. It is in view of this future condition which is acquired by the individual soul, that it is described in the beginning as non-different from the highest Ātman, in spite of the fact that the soul is described as if possessing name and form, only to make it comparable with the river which loses its name and form when it runs into the sea.

अविर्भावोऽप्यवस्थानः । २३

[*Avasthāḥ*—because of existence, vi—then, *Kāla*—[time].]

ELIYASWAMI (THINKS THAT THE REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AS NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE HIGHEST ĀTMAN IS ADMISSIBLE) BECAUSE (IT IS THE HIGHEST ĀTMAN WHOSE) NAME IS THE CONCEPT (OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL.) 23

In view of the *Bhikṣaṅga*-text that 'The diversity of the Ātman wished to manifest the names and forms by entering into the created elements under the form of the individual soul' (*Chā* 6, 3, 2), and in view of the mantras, such as, 'The omniscient Ātman, having created the names and forms of things after first entering into them as the individual soul, calls them by these names' (*Tā* 3, 12, 2). **ELIYASWAMI** thinks that the individual soul is nothing else but the highest Ātman. The soul is neither a modification of the Ātman, nor a created thing like the five elements. The names and forms do not in reality belong to the soul, but are imposed upon it on account of the upādhis of *śradyā*. **ĀMARATHYA**, too, it may be said, believes in the non-difference of the individual soul from the highest Ātman, but he believes so for the sake of believing in something else, viz. the possibility of the knowledge of all things consequent on the knowledge of the Ātman, and the unity of the Ātman in spite of apparent diversity. Besides, his belief in the non-difference is not absolute

but relative ; for, he does believe to some extent at least in the relation of cause and effect between the highest Ātman and the individual soul, and not in their identity. Śaṅkara goes a step farther and admits that the soul and the Ātman are different in the condition of ignorance, though they become identical when knowledge arises. Śaṅkara also puts forth the correct view of Śrī Viśva "Thou art that", and it is on this view alone that immortality can be said to follow from the realization of the Ātman. For if the soul were a modification of the Ātman, it will simply be lost by being merged in its cause, and there would be left no soul to experience the material life. Similarly, if immortality is to be understood as the permanence of the names and forms, they ought to have truly belonged to the individual soul ; but it is seen that they disappear with the body, the senses, etc., meaning thereby that they are falsely attached to the soul. May, the very creation of the souls from the highest Ātman, as if they are sparks emanating from the fire, has no basis in reality but refers to the work of the *upādhis* of *avidyā*.

As for the refutation of the second point of the *pūrvapraśna*, viz., the great Being which emerges in the form of the individual soul from the elements, and which, in the form of the soul itself, is therefore declared in the middle of the *brāhmiṇi-Brāhmaṇa*, as the object to be seen, etc., the three Śūtras will again give three different answers thereto. According to *Ānandashya*, the emergence of the highest Ātman in the form of the soul is an indication of the proof of the statements that all the things of the world arise and dissolve in the Ātman, and are known through the knowledge of the Ātman, and that they are non-different from the Ātman, as their cause. To Śaṅkara, it is the future possible condition of the soul which is responsible for its being described as non-different from the Ātman. The soul becomes purified by means of knowledge, devotion, etc. and becomes one with Ātman, at the time of its departure from the body. It is with reference to this future, non-different condition

of the soul that it is concerned that the Ātman emerges as the soul. Kāśhikyaṇa, on the other hand, thinks that the soul is described as non-different from the Ātman, because it is strictly the Ātman itself who lives in the form of the soul.

One may say however, that the soul is described as wandering after the elements and as being destitute of all knowledge after death. How, then, it may be asked, can the soul be said to be non-different from the Ātman? But the reply is that it is the destruction of the specific cognitions of the soul, and not of the soul or the Ātman. This reply comes from Yājñavalkya himself when he finds that his wife was awfully bewildered at the extinction of knowledge and the consequent destruction of the soul after its departure from the body. 'The eternal, steadfast, ever-conscious Ātman is imperishable; what was consumed by *avidyā* is merely dispersed by *vidyā*. It is simply the dissociation of the individual soul from the *milāna*, i.e., the elements and the sense-organs' (Bṛ. 2, 4, 13).

The third point of the pūrvaśloka should also be related only by what Kāśhikyaṇa says. The argument of the pūrvaśloka was that the word 'knower' in, 'how should one know the knower?' in the concluding portion of the dialogue, implies a subject as the knower is distinct from the object known, and therefore the action of knowing etc. must be ascribed to the individual soul. But as the Śāhāśrīyāgopaniṣad says, 'One can see the other, so long as there is duality'; there will cease till then the various specific cognitions of the individual soul. But when, on account of *vidyā*, all this becomes the Ātman, then who should see whom? (2, 4, 14). Except the fact that the word 'knower' is used to mean the great Being as the Ātman or the Self-consequence itself, there remains in this non-dialectic condition, no specific cognition, nor the empirical distinction of the subject and object, nor again the difference of the individual soul from the highest Ātman.

This view of the Vedānta is fully supported by Śruti and Smṛti. "Being only one in the beginning: one without a second" (Chā. 6, 2, 1); "The Ātman alone is all this" (Chā. 7, 13, 2); "Brahman alone is all this" (Iśa. 1, 2, 14); "There is no other self but he" (Iṅ. 3, 7, 13; 3, 8, 11). Smṛti too says: "Know me to be the knower in all bodies" (B. G. 13, 27). There are other Śruti passages which support the above view by denying all difference: "He who considers himself and Ātman as different is like a beast who does not know anything" (Iṅ. 1, 4, 15); "He who sees many multiplexity moves from death to death" (Iṅ. 4, 4, 18). The same conclusion is again strengthened by denying every kind of action or modification on the part of the Ātman. "This great unborn Ātman is without old age and death, he is the deathless immortal Brahman" (Iṅ. 4, 4, 14). Besides, there will be no certain knowledge, release or satisfaction of desires, as are reached for those who have "fixed themselves in the knowledge of the Ātman" (Jñā. 3, 2, 8). "What tribulation, or what sorrow will there be for him who sees the unity of the Ātman in all?" (Jñ. 7). The Bhagavadgītā too suggests similar characteristics of one who is fixed in the higher knowledge of the Brahman (2, 54-68).

If, therefore, right knowledge, according to us, is the absolute identity of the individual soul and the highest Ātman, there would be no room in admitting the plurality of souls, or difference, except in name, between the soul and the Ātman. That is why the cave in which the soul, infinite, unconscious Brahman is said to reside (Tai. 2, 1), does not refer to any other cave except the heart of the soul. Neither can it be said that something other than the Brahman resides in the cave; for we are further told that the "creator himself entered into the things after creating them" (Tai. 2, 6). Those therefore who insist on making a difference between the soul and the Brahman not only go against right knowledge, but also make the final beatitude impossible. Release to them is the fruit of

actions. Notably relevant to them is temporary, or, if presumed to be eternal, they will contradict their previous position viz. that it is the fruit of action.

॥ ब्रह्मवर्तिन्यसम् ॥ (१३-१४)

ब्रह्मस्य तद्विज्ञानान्नानुसंगेना १३

[*Pratyak*—material cause, *as*—and, *pratyak*—statements; *anūsāngatā*—consequence, *anuparohitā*—not being contradictory]

(BRAHMAN IS) THE MATERIAL CAUSE ALSO, FOR (TO HOLD THE VIEW ALONE) DOES NOT CONTRADICT THE STATEMENT AND EXAMPLE OF IT. 23

We have already said that an inquiry about the nature of Brahman is eternal, because it leads to wisdom, just as an inquiry about religious duty is eternal because it leads to prosperity. We have also characterized the Brahman as that from which the world has come, and in which it rests and is absorbed. But a question may arise as to whether the Brahman is the efficient cause of the world like a potter of the vessels of clay, or the material cause like the clay itself.

The polytheists hold that Brahman is the efficient cause only. For just as a potter, who is merely an efficient cause of the vessels, reflects before producing the vessels, Brahman too is regarded as having first 'reflected' before creating *prajā* (Ira. 6, 3 : 4). Or, like kings of different planes, Brahman too can be considered as the Lord of the world and as possessing only efficient power. Besides, this world, which is the effect of the creator's activity, is non-intelligent, impure and consists of parts; therefore, its cause too must be of the same nature. But as we learn from Śruti, Brahman is "without parts, inactive, featureless and unchangeable" (Ira. 6, 15). Brahman therefore is not the material cause of the world, So, the only alternative that remains is to say, in the first place, that something different from Brahman, viz. the

production of the Śāṅkhya is the material cause of the world, and that secondly, Brahman is the efficient cause only.

As against this, we say in reply that Brahman is not merely the efficient but the material cause also, for it is only then that there will be no contradiction with what is given as illustration. When Aruṇ asks his son, Śvetaketu, if he had acquired from his preceptor as to 'what it was, which when known, one knows that which was not previously heard, and perceives and knows that which was not previously perceived or known,' (Chā. 6. 1. 2), he gives us the knowledge of the truth, that to know the Ātman is to know everything else. And this is possible only in the case of the material cause, for the effect is not different from its material cause. But we cannot say the same thing with reference to the efficient cause, for we find that the palace is different from the carpenter who constructed it. The illustrative examples too have a reference to the material cause alone. 'It is by one clod of clay that all that is made of clay is known, for whatever the modifications or the effects are, they are only names and have their origin in speech.' (Chā. 6. 1. 4), or again, all that is made of gold or iron is known by one lump of gold or iron. Just as 'the plants grow in their cause, viz. the earth,' so there is the Ātman as the cause of all (Śā. 1, 1, 3 and 7); or just as 'when the drum is struck the sound is struck,' even so, 'everything else is known when the Ātman is known' (Śā. 4, 3, 5 and 8). All these and similar examples prove that Brahman is the material cause of the world. The abhivyaṅgaśloka also is 'That from which (yasya) these beings are born' indicates the material cause of the beings (Tā. 3, 1).

That, besides being the material cause, Brahman is also the efficient cause of the world, can be inferred from the fact that there is no other agent or operative cause responsible for guiding the creation, just as once and above clay or gold as the material cause, there are the potter and

goldsmiths as efficient causes responsible for turning the clay or gold into vessels or ornaments. But this says that prior to creation Brahman was one, without a second. On the other hand, if there were some additional guiding principle distinct from the material cause, both the statement and the illustrative examples would be false, inasmuch as, the knowledge of everything else would not follow from the knowledge of one thing. So in the absence of any other operations or material cause, Brahman alone is both the efficient and the material cause of the world.

Other reasons which support this view are

वदिभ्योनेदुह्यत । ५०

[*Abhidhyo—colours, upadhyat—because of statement.*]

AND BECAUSE OF THE STATEMENT REGARDING COLOURS (see the part of this stanza) 24

The freedom to declare to "become many etc." shows that the Ātman is the efficient cause. And since the growth and the manifold nature of the world spring forth from the Ātman, it is also the material cause (Tan. 2, 6, 1, Chā. 6, 2, 3).

सत्त्वोक्तान्मनसु । ५१

[*Sattvāt—directly, ca—and; abhaya—bath, ānadyāt—as stated by Prati.*]

AND BECAUSE (SATTVA) IS DIRECTLY MENTIONED BY JURY, (AS THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF) MIND (THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD) 25

It is said that that from which something comes into being and in which it is subsorbed, is the material cause of that thing. The earth is considered as the material cause of rice and barley for the same reason. Even so, the Ātma, which sustains the Brahman, is said to give rise to and absorb all these beings in it (Chā. 1, 9, 1), and therefore the Ātma or the Brahman alone is the material

cause of the world. Besides, it must be remembered that the effects can never be absorbed by anything but their material cause.

आत्मज्ञोऽपिवापह् । १५

[*Ātmajño*—on account of action concerning self; *apivah*—due to transformation.]

(*BRĀHMAN IS THE MATERIAL CAUSE*) ON ACCOUNT OF ACTION REFERRING TO ITSELF, (THIS IS POSSIBLE) ON ACCOUNT OF TRANSFORMATION. 25

'The Ātman transformed itself into its own self' (Tait. 3, 7), and thus being itself the agent, became its own effect. No doubt the Ātman was full and perfect before its activity, but just as the clay is changed into effects, even so, the Ātman has simply got itself modified into the things of the world. The word 'itself' excludes the possibility of any other cause.

The word '*apivah*' may be taken to constitute a separate Sūtra by itself,—and then it means that Brāhman became 'wet,' and 'hot', i.e. the visible beings of earth, water and light, and the invisible beings of wind and fire, or the defined and the undefined beings. In short, it is the Brāhman alone which has become all this world of effects.

योनिव हि योनिर्गो ॥ १६

[*Yoniv*—origin, *hi*—and, *yo*—because, *gō*—is womb.]

AND BECAUSE (*BRĀHMAN*) IS MENTIONED AS THE ORIGIN (*YONIV*) ALSO. 26

We are told that "The water regard the Brāhman as the source of all beings, and as the maker and the lord of all" (Śāta. 1, 1, 6; 3, 1, 3), and we know from usage that the word "source" means the material-cause. The earth, for instance, is said to be the source of plants and herbs. No doubt, in some passages, the word '*yoni*' means a

place : for instance, Śaṅkha is told that a pot is made for him to sit upon (Bg. 1, 304, 1). But in the same passage quoted above, the word ' pot ' means the material cause, for in the example given a little further (Mk. 1, 1, 7), the spider is said to be the cause of the threads which he spins forth and draws in.

It is not, however, true that whatever is observed in everyday experience must hold true in Vedānta also. So the argument that Brahman must, like the potter, be the efficient cause only, because its activity is preceded by reflection, is not adequate. The evidence of Śruti and not of inference is the final word regarding the nature of Brahman.

८ सर्वमात्मनोऽपि सत्त्वं । (१८)

एतेन सर्वे आत्मनाः आत्मनाः । १८

[These—by this : all—all : spiritual—are ruled.]

HERETIC ALL (THE NON-VEDĀNTIC DOCTRINES) ARE RULED 28

We had several occasions to refute the Śāṅkhya doctrine of production and we gave special attention to it because the less intelligent people are likely to be attracted by it. The doctrine comes close to the Vedānta doctrine on account of certain views, like non-difference of cause and effect, being common ; it is accepted by authorities like Deval and others, and the Vedānta-passages too contain something which may mislead some people. There are other non-Vedāntic doctrines such as, atomism and others. But the adherents of these are virtually vanquished by the vanquishing of the greatest of the sāṃkhya, viz. the Śāṅkhya. These doctrines too are not founded on Śruti and are contradicted by Vedānta-passages. The repetition of the phrase ' are ruled ' indicates the end of the first śloka.

ĀDITYĀYA SECOND

PAĀDA FIRST

In the first *adhyāya* known as 'Brahmavāya', it was shown that the unconscious Lord of all is not only the efficient but also the material cause of the universe, just as gold and clay are the material causes of the vessels made out of them. Like a magician of his world of magic, He was shown to be the controller of the universe, and like the earth which takes back within it the bodies of all the living creatures, He was shown to be the absorber of it in Himself. It was further established that He alone is the Author of us all. This is indeed the *brahmavāya*, the cumulative effect of all the Śruti-passages. Besides, opinions like 'pudhira is the cause of the universe,' were shown to lack the authority of Śruti. Now, in the second *adhyāya*, known as 'Anurodha', will first be dispanted, in the first pīṭh, the apparent contradictions of the conclusions of the first *adhyāya* with what is stated in certain Śruti; secondly, it will be shown, in the second pīṭh, that opinions regarding pudhira and others are based on false reasoning; and thirdly, it will be shown, in the third and the fourth pīṭhas, that the Śruti-passages do not at all contradict when they deal with the cosmology, the individual soul and the origin of sense.

[सद्गुणविग्रहणम् । (१-५)]

सद्गुणवत्त्वसङ्गदीनवर्गेन इति वैश्वानरस्तुत-नवसाङ्गदीनवर्गेणम् ।।

[Sv., etc., are—not, available—reason, do, a—defect, presentable—sensation, is—that, are—of, are—not, says—other.]
Sv., etc., are available—these being occasions for other defects.]

If it be said that (THE VEDICINIA DOCTRINE WILL BE) DEFECTIVE ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NO ROOM FOR CERTAIN SCRIPTS, (WE REPLY), NOT SO, BECAUSE (EVEN OTHERWISE) THERE WILL BE THE EFFECT OF THERE BEING NO ROOM FOR CERTAIN OTHER SCRIPTS. 1

The pāṇḍarāyana says: If the omniscient Brahman is accepted as the cause of the universe, then Kapila's Māhātmya Śāstra is also the Śāstra of Āraṇya and Pāṇḍarāyana which are written after its model and which proposed that the cause of the universe is the non-intelligent, independent prakṛiti, will be useless. These Śāstras are not composed like the Māhātmya Śāstra in order to make us aware of our various duties and rules in life, regarding the thread-ceremony, study, marriage, the keeping of marital life, the four-fold² end of human life and the different stages and steps of life. They are composed with the deliberate intention of imparting the knowledge of liberation; and so, if as the Vedicinians would have it, they contain no reference to Brahman, they would all have to be admitted as useless. But if, as we hold, they serve the purpose of liberation, the Śāstra passages must be so interpreted as will not contradict their philosophical import.

The Vedicinians may contend that an objection of the sort is out of place when it has been already proved by inference to the word "being", (Ādhyāya I, Pāda I, Sūtra 5) that Śāstra is emphatic on the point that the omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the universe. But we submit that some extraordinary persons may interpret the Śāstra by the mere aid of their intellect; the ordinary persons however have to fall back upon Śāstra and purāṇa for a proper interpretation of it. They do so because they have a great regard for the sage like Kapila for their intuitive, unshakered knowledge. Kapila, for instance, is considered even by the author of the

1. The four ends of human life are dharma, artha, kama and moksha.

Saṁskṛtataṁ Upaniṣad (5, 2) as the first among the created beings and as one who was seen and instructed by God. Therefore it is that we say that the *Vedānta* passages must be interpreted in accordance with the teachings of *Brahma*.

To this we reply. This is not correct. For if certain *Śaṅkara* become useless, if *Brahman* is the cause of the universe, certain other very important *Śaṅkara* would be useless if *pradhāna* is accepted as the cause of the universe. The *Śaṅkara* of the *Māhātmya* (314, 25) tells us that the *avyakta* or *pradhāna* which consists of those qualities comes into being and is absorbed in that *śrīraṅga* *Parāra*, who alone is the *Ātman* and the knower of all that is created. In the *Bhagavadgītā* again, we are told that the Lord *Śaṁ Kṛṣṇa* is the cause of the origin and the dissolution of the whole world. Similarly, in many other *Śaṅkara* it has been maintained that God is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.

As to the question, which of the conflicting *Śaṅkara* should be accepted and which rejected, *Jaimini* tells us in the *Māhātmya* (1, 3, 2) that we should reject that *Śaṅkara* which is in conflict with *Śruti*; and if there is no conflict, because there is no *Śruti* with which it should be in conflict, we should suppose that there must have been a corresponding prior *Śruti* whence lending its authority and support to the *Śaṅkara* in question, though unfortunately that *Śruti* is lost to us. *Kapila*-*Śaṅkara* however not only has not got a corresponding *Śruti* prior to it but also goes against the existing *Śruti*, and so deserves to be rejected. *Kapila*'s own intuitive experience cannot be used to be the authority for his *Śaṅkara*. For it is to be remembered that this intuitive experience of the super-sensuous reality is itself the result of religious practices based on the *Śruti* injunctions. So we can never dispense with the authority of the *Śruti*.

Again, the word "Kapla" occurring in the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad need not necessarily mean the author of Kapla-Śaṅga. It may mean another person known as Kapla or Vāṇdeva by name, who, as the story goes in the Māhātmya, burnt the sons of Sugata Śa, when, on the one hand, the reference to Kapla, as the author of the dualistic Śāṅkhya philosophy is doubtful. Śāṅkya on the other hand, is mentioned with honour by the Tattvīya Śāṅkhya (2, 2, 14, 3) as one whose words are as beneficial as medicine. And Maṇu himself appears to have owned the opinion of Kapla while he is eulogizing the person who has realized the Ātman in all things (Maṇu Sm. 12, 51). The Māhātmya too (1, 2, 360, 1-3 and 361, 4-5) goes against the Śāṅkhya-śaṅga doctrine of the plurality of souls, and holds that the one highest Ātman alone is the internal self of all beings, and that it is he who is all-beings, all-arma, all-fact, all-eyes, and who moves through all beings and goes wherever he likes. The Māhātmya also (7) declares the unity of the universal Self, declaring which there will be neither sorrow nor ill-treatment. These and similar passages go to prove that the doctrine of Kapla is faulty in every way. It contradicts the Veda and contradicts the Maṇu-Śaṅga which follows the Veda, by assuming not only the hypothetical independent existence, but also that of the plurality of selves.

As to the validity of The Śruti it is as direct and independent as that of the Sun due to whose light we get the knowledge of form and colour. The validity of human statements, Śaṅga and parāśa, on the other hand, is dependent on the validity of the Śruti. The authors of Śaṅga were endowed with sound memory. They wrote from what they learnt and remembered from Śruti. So, the objection that certain Śaṅga which

* Finally, the important point to be noticed is the fundamental character of the knowledge by which we see Kapla, but the typical fact of the "seeing of Śaṅga" is not of the representative of the typical knowledge, the word Kapla, means seeing for the Śaṅga, the knowledge being.

contradict the doctrine of the Vedas (viz. that Brahman is the cause of the universe) would be useless, as no real objection at all.

इतिहं चादुपलभ्ये । २

[Hereafter of others, as, unperceivable—not being found.]

AND ON ACCOUNT OF ABSENCE OF OTHERS (I) IS OF THE OTHER RESULTS OF PRADHĀNA. 2

Another reason for believing that the objection is futile is given in the second Sūtra. A Śaṅkha is believed if it tells about the five elements and the organs of man for we have an experience of these in our daily life, and we find them mentioned in the Veda. The Kapila Śaṅkha, on the other hand, is not believable because the principles such as, *maheś* and *śaśvata* to which it refers as the products of *pradhāna*, are unknown to the Veda and to experience. They are as impossible as the objects of the sixth sense, which if assumed to exist, contradicts both experience and the Veda.

If the *pārvaṣṭya* points out that in the Kāṇḍa Upaniṣad there is a reference (1, 3, 11) to the technical Śāṅkhya terms, *maheś* and *avyakta*, we reply that we have already shown in our discussion of Sūtra 1, 4, 1, that the words 'maheś' and 'avyakta' denote the material of the Hiraṇyagarbha, and the body respectively, and not the Great one and *pradhāna* of the Śāṅkhya philosophy. Be it the Kapila Śaṅkha is not to be trusted in its treatment of the effects (viz. *maheś* and *śaśvata*), it follows that it cannot be trusted in its treatment of the cause also (viz. the *pradhāna*).

नोदयानुपलभिकामम् । (३)

नोदय नोदयः प्रत्युक्तः । ३

[Error—by the *nyāya* : *pratyakṣa*—is replaced.]

TRUTH IS BEYOND THE PHENOMENAL (PART)
AND 3

Like the Śāṅkhya, the yoga philosophy also maintains that prakṛti is the independent cause of the universe and 'that the great principle' etc. are its effects. This is, as we have already seen, contrary to both experience and the Vedas and therefore stands refuted by our arguments in *Ārśakīyaga* 1. Where then, it may be asked, is the necessity of pointing this out explicitly in this *Sūtra*?

The reply is that we are able to remove thereby an additional doubt that may arise, viz. whether we should accept or not the doctrine of the yoga-system, which it has in common with the Śāṅkhya, that prakṛti is the cause of the universe. The yoga-Śāstra and its teaching of the eight-fold discipline are not only not contrary to the Vedas, but are also considered as pointing out the way of realising the Real. The *Iṣhadīśvarya* (2, 4, 3) recommends that the *Ātman* is to be heard, thought and meditated upon. The *Śvetāśvatara* (2, 8), speaks of the erect posture of the body with the head, the neck and the chest in a straight line. *Kaṭhopanishad* (2, 6, 11, 15) refers to yoga as the unswerving one-pointedness of the senses. The position of yoga, and that of Śāṅkhya, have been strengthened by *Śvetāśvatara* (8, 12) when it says that it is the knowledge of God as the cause of the universe, which can be had by the study of Śāṅkhya-yoga, and which makes a man free from all bondage. In view of this, one is likely to conclude that because there is partial agreement between yoga and the Vedas, the whole of the yoga may be relied upon just as the Śūtra known as *āptakā*, is relied upon.¹ But as the same *Upaniṣad*

¹ *Āptakā* is the name of a scripture which is recommended to be performed on the day of death, *śrāddha*. Corresponding to that day there is a *śrāddha* fire. Just on the *śrāddha* day is known as *śrāddha* day and the *śrāddha* day of the *śrāddha* day.

sūtra (Sū. 3, 11). It is impossible to get at the highest bliss by theoretical knowledge of the Śāṅkhya philosophy or by the mere yoga practices, without at the same time being helped by the Śruti. 'The way to go beyond death is to know the Ātman; there is no other way.' In this passage, there is the definite mention of the unity of the Ātman, a fact which is denied by the Śāṅkhya-yoga. Therefore it is that the Sūtra refers to the reduction of the Yoga philosophy, too, as far as its teachings are contrary to those of Śruti.

In short, if the Śāṅkhya-yoga philosophies tell us something which is also found in Śruti, we do adopt their authority; but if they go against it, we reject them. The Śāṅkhya description of the Puruṣa as pure and free from qualities is acceptable to us, because the Bhāṣya-yoga also mentions the Puruṣa as 'unmixed' or unchanging (4, 3, 16). In its prescription of rules for samyama and in recommending the path of renunciation, the yoga too has followed the Śruti, according to which it is possible for a man who has worn discoloured dress, is shaven, and is without any possession to attain liberation (Jhāṇa, 4).

All that we have said above is also applicable to other Śāstras which have a claim to truth. It may be that they are useful to us in the discovery of truth, but the knowledge of that truth, we assert, can only be had from the Vedāntic passages, such as, 'No one who does not know the Veda knows the highest Self' (Tat. Tīk. 3, 13, 9, 7). 'I ask about that Puruṣa who is described in the Upanishads' (Br. 3, 9, 26).

३ विशद्वयत्वादिभिरन्यद् । (४-२८)

४ विशद्वयत्वात्तदस्य कथं न च दृश्यम् । ४

[Dīk—not; viśadvayatvāt—being different in nature; anyad—of this, Lokāśana—so being by this, an—and, Jāhāt—from Śruti.]

[BRAHMAN] CANNOT (BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD);
BUT THE [WORLD] ISSUES IN NATURE (FROM THE
[BRAHMAN]), AND THAT IT IS SO (IS KNOWN) FROM ŚRUTI. 4

After having refuted the objections based on Śruti, let
us now refute those based on reasoning.

The parāparā holds that even and above the author-
ity of Śruti, reasoning also is possible as a source of knowl-
edge in the case of Brahman. For it is already a fact that
causa and is not to come into existence as a result of some
religious duties, in which case we may depend entirely
on Śruti alone. The conflict between several Śruti-passages
might be resolved by calling them all consistent with
a particular passage; and this is possible if we resort to
sources of knowledge other than Śruti, such as reasoning.
Śruti, reasoning appears to come very near to experiential
because it enables us to know an unseen object on the
strength of its having some similarity with a seen object.
Śruti, on the other hand, appears to be removed from
experience, because it conveys its meaning by reference
to tradition only. Reasoning, then, is applicable to
Brahman, because the knowledge of Brahman is said to
culminate in an actual experience which dispels all ignor-
ance and creates release. It does not simply end in a general
knowledge about an unseen result, like that of a recipe or
practice, and is therefore not based on the knowledge
of Śruti only. The Bṛhadāraṇyaka recommends reasoning
in addition to hearing in the passage (1, 4, 5) "The Ātman
is to be heard, to be thought etc." Hence the objection
to the theory that Brahman is the cause of the universe
is set forth as based on reasoning, in the following manner.

Brahman cannot be the cause of the universe; for
whereas Brahman is conscious and pure, the universe
lacks consciousness and is impure. Cause and effect
cannot be different in nature. Golden ornaments are the
effects of gold and not of earth, and earthen pots are the
effects of earth and not of gold. The universe is impure,
because it consists of pleasure, pain and infatuation, and

as such is the cause of joy, sorrow and gloom. Besides it consists of different grades of shades such as heaven, hell, mortal world etc. It lacks consciousness also; for like the physical body and the organs, it is useful as an instrument for the conscious soul. Had the soul not been equally conscious, it would not have been of any use to the other, just as one lamp cannot be of any use to another lamp. Even in the case of a servant and a master, where both are able on account of their being human beings, it is the non-intelligent part of the servant, viz. his body, senses etc. which are of any use to the master. The consciousness of one person by itself cannot be of any service or detriment to the consciousness of another person. The conscious principle is incapable of growth or decay, of service or disservice, and is therefore devoid of any activity. Hence it follows that what is non-intelligent can be useful as an instrument to the intelligent being. Neither is there any evidence of common appearance to show that things like wood or clod of earth are of the nature of consciousness. The world therefore being heterogeneous in nature, cannot have Brahman as its material-cause.

A Vedāntin may bring an objection to this. Accepting what the Śāstra tells viz. that the material cause of the world is intelligence, he may infer that the world too is intelligent in nature like its cause. The apparent absence of intelligence in the world may be said to be due to a state of modification in the intelligence itself, as may occur during the conditions of sleep and swoon. Things like wood and clod of earth may not exhibit intelligence, even though there is as much intelligence in them as in the individual soul. It is on account of this modification of intelligence that the souls appear to be endowed with intelligence but devoid of form and qualities, and the things of the world appear as endowed with form and qualities but devoid of intelligence. So, it is not necessary that the things of the world must be absolutely non-intelligent in order that they should be useful to the souls as

instruments of action, or as servants to their masters. Just as cooked rice, flesh and soup are usually combined, even so the two apparently distinct but really homogeneous parts, viz: the things of the world including the body and the senses, and the souls may have between them the relation of the subordinate to the superior.

Such a reasoning may do away with the distinction to a certain extent between the intelligent Brahman and the non-intelligent world, but it will not, as the puruṣa-sūtra do away with the distinction between the purity of the one and the impurity of the other. May, it will not, as a matter of fact, replace away even the first kind of distinction. For, as stated in the Sūtra, 'Sūta itself tells us that the world is such', that is, different from Brahman. For example, in the Tattvavaiśaraḍi (2, 6), the Brahman is spoken of as manifesting itself in two forms, the intelligent and the non-intelligent. This may, no doubt, be objected by a Vedāntin. He may quote the Sūta and try to prove intelligence on the part of bodily organs and the elements which are generally considered as non-intelligent. For example, the passages: 'The earth speaks', 'the waters speak' (Br. 4, 1, 3, 4), 'Fire thought', 'Waters thought', (Chā. 6, 2, 3, 4) 'The pelican questioned and went to Brahman to decide who of them was the best' (Br. 6, 1, 7), 'Do thou, oh speech, sing for us' (Br. 4, 3, 2). All these speak directly about the intelligence of the elements and the organs, and not about the manifestation or otherwise of intelligence.

To show the puruṣa-sūtra implies in the following Sūtra.

अविद्याविबुधैश्च विवेकानुपपत्तिनाम् । ५

[*Aviḍāḍā-vibudhaiḥ-vivekaiḥ* as preceding denotes: no— but, *viveka-vivakṣayā*—because of dissipation *vairāgya* and *relaxation*]

THE REFERENCE HOWEVER IS TO THE FATHERS (DEITIES OF THE ELEMENTS ETC.) BECAUSE OF THE DISTRACTED NATURE AND RELAXATION 5

The intelligence implied in the activities of speaking, discussing etc. refers however not to the physical elements and the sense-organs but to the deities which govern them. For, as was pointed out already, there is the clear distinction between souls and the elements etc. in point of intelligence itself, which is present in the one and absent in the other. Besides, the Panchikāli Upaniṣad expressly uses the word 'deities' to denote the intelligent governing souls and not the material elements or organs. 'After disputing as to who among them was the best, all the deities recognised pṛiṣa as the most prominent of them all' (Kūṣ. 2, 14). And we learn from many, undivided, reliable and pertinent that these governing deities are intimately connected with the elements and the organs. The passage, for example, 'Agni became speech and entered into the mouth' (Chā. A. 2, 4, 2, 4) shows that a particular organ is developed by a particular deity. In another passage we read how, after being advised by Prajāpati, the sense-organs left the body one after another, and yet the activity of the body continued (because pṛiṣa had not left the body) but how when the pṛiṣa left the body, it ceased to be active even though the sense-organs continued to function it. (Chā. 5, 1, 7). This shows by the method of agreement and difference not only the superiority of pṛiṣa over the andriyas but also the relation of the governing deities with the sense-organs. This is confirmed in another passage which refers to the offerings made to pṛiṣa by the organs of speech and others (Iṣa. 6, 1, 13). Similarly, the 'sacrificing' done by the brahman (Chā. 6, 2, 3-4) indicates that it is an act done by the highest governing deity, viz. the Brahman, with reference to its effects, the world. In short, the world being different in nature, the Brahman cannot be its material cause.

To this objection of the pāramparika the reply comes in the next Sūtra.

उत्तरः ५

[Dyṅtā-ti kṣaṇ, ku-bhā].

But (the effect) is seen (to be different in nature from the cause), &

That the world cannot proceed from the Brahman because the two are different in nature, cannot be accepted as a universal rule. For it is a common experience that non-intelligent hair and nails proceed from intelligent beings like men, and that scorpions and other animals come into being out of cowdung. Even granting that the hair and the nails come out of the bodies and not out of the souls themselves, and that it is the bodies of scorpions and not their souls which come out of the cowdung, the difference in nature still remains between the cause and the effect, inasmuch as it is the non-intelligent body which is the shade of the intelligent soul, though neither the cowdung nor the hair and nails are the bodies of it. Besides, it is due to the presence of the soul that the body is seen to undergo a vast change in colour, form, etc. before it manifests as the hair and nails, or the cowdung changes into the body of the scorpion. Further, there would be no distinction of cause and effect, if there were complete identity of nature between the two. If a partial identity is allowed, as for example, the identity of the element of earth in the body of the scorpion and the cowdung, then a similar identity in nature can be established between the world and the Brahman, viz. that of the fact of existence itself.

But what after all does the opponent mean by the difference in nature between the world and the Brahman? Does he mean that there is no characteristic of Brahman which appears in the world or does he mean that some characteristics are present in the one but absent in the other, or that the two are different only in the point of intelligence? To accept the first alternative is to negate

the very existence of causal relation, for unless there is some difference between two things they will not be causally connected. The second alternative cannot be proved in the presence of an actual fact, viz. the reappearance of the quality of existence from the Brahman into the world. The third is incapable of proof because no instance which will be admitted by the Vedântins can be shown to illustrate the absence of intelligence so that that particular thing may not be produced from Brahman. For the Vedântins does hold that everything that exists whether intelligent or not is the effect of Brahman as its material cause. Besides, the view of the opponent is against the teaching of Śruti according to which, as we have already seen, Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world.

As for the contention that, unlike religious duty, Brahman being an existing fact, there should be available other means of proof besides the Śruti, we reply that it is merely a wishful thinking. For Brahman being devoid of form and other sensible qualities cannot be the object of perception. Nor can it be the object of inference or comparison, because there is no perceivable sign or similarity in it. Brahman also, like religious duty, is to be known solely through the vedic teachings. Thus is what the Lord of Death tells Nachiketas, "This knowledge of the Ātman cannot be achieved by argument; it is achieved only after another person speaks about it" (Ka. 1, 3, 8). Or, as the Śvetasvatā puts it, "who indeed can know it or say whence this world comes?" (10, 130, 6). It is clear from these two maxims that the cause of the world remains inconceivable even to gods who have acquired great power and knowledge. Such too says the same thing, "One should not employ reasoning with reference to things which go beyond cognition", "He is and to be unmanifest, unknowable and unchangeable". Not all the gods and you have known my origin" (B. G. 2, 25, 30, 3).

As for the opponent's view that thinking also is explicitly mentioned in Śruti after dream as being as useful for attaining the knowledge of the Ātman (Up. 2, 4, 1), we say that it is not the mere dry, independent reasoning which we can introduce under some name. On the contrary, it is such reasoning which comes after the hearing of Śruti and is therefore favourable to its teaching that is recommended in the above passage. It is reasoning which is subservient to awakening or spiritual experience. We can see this illustrated in the following manner: (1) Since the states of dream and wakeful life are exclusive of each other, the Ātman is not connected with either of them; (2) Inasmuch as during deep sleep the jiva becomes one with the Ātman after leaving the consciousness of the world, the jiva is in reality the Ātman itself; (3) The world has come out of Brahman, and because the effect is not different from the cause, the world cannot be different from the Brahman. All these reasonings are useful to know the import of the Śruti, viz. the Ātman or the Brahman is one, without a second and that it transcends the phenomenal world and the three states of dream, sleep and wakefulness. Futility of mere independent reasoning, on the other hand, will be also shown further in Sūtra 11 of this Pāda.

Now, if an opponent were to believe in an intelligent cause of the world and thereby infer that the world too is intelligent, then it would be possible for him to misinterpret the Śruti passage (Tait. 2, 6) 'The Brahman itself became divided into two portions, intelligent and non-intelligent', as meaning the manifestation and the non-manifestation of intelligence in the two portions. But the Mādhyas who believe that the non-intelligent prakṛiti is the cause, will not be able to make any sense of the Śruti passage, because it mentions that the ultimate cause of all remains unaffected as the Ātman of all.

So, the charge against us that we believe that the intelligent Brahman assumes the form of what is different

from it, viz. the non-intelligent world, can be equally had at the close of the Śūphāya who believe that the non-intelligent produces whatever the form of what is different from it, viz. the intelligent world. But, as was shown, and in conformity with Śruti, the cause of the world can be said to be an intelligent one, in spite of its being different from its effect.

अद्विष्टि चेन्न दक्षिणमावन्तम् । ७

[*Asat—non-existent, its cat—of world, tat—that, pratyakṣa—negation, anāntarāt—because it is merely so.*]

Is (THE EFFECT BE SAID TO BE) NON-EXISTENT (BEFORE ITS ORIGINATION, WE SAY THAT) IT IS NOT SO, FOR IT IS A PURE NEGATION (WITHOUT ANYTHING WHICH IS TO BE NEGATED) ?

The philosophers may say that to suppose that Brahman which is intelligent, pure and without qualities is the cause of a world which is non-intelligent, impure and full of qualities, is to suppose, against the vedic theory of the Vedāntins, that the effect did not exist.

We reply that the objection is baseless. It is a mere negation without any object to be negated, i. e., when the effect does not exist prior to its origination in its own form, there is nothing which can be negated. The prior to its coming into being, the effect does exist in the form of its cause, and so cannot be negated at all. And even after its coming into being the effect has no separate, independent existence of its own, except being in the form of the cause. In other words, at any moment in the past or in the present, the effect by itself is a non-entity without the cause. Hence, to say that the effect was non-existent in the form in which it appears (prior to its appearing), is meaningless. On the other hand, the effect being a two-part associated fact, so far as it is looked upon as the one or the other form of the cause, it will

never be negated. Hence, the world which is full of qualities, either existed before nor exists now without its being a form of cause. It is therefore, as truth, that we hold that the intelligent Brahman alone is the cause of the world. Or else 'Whoever will think this all to be separate from the Atman will be forsaken by all' (Br. 3, 4, 6) !

We shall deal with that topic in details while dealing with the non-difference of the effect from the cause in Sūtra 14.

अद्वैती दृष्ट्यात्मनोऽवस्थानम् । ८

[*Ātman-in dissolution: nature of the same nature, possibly—because of an avasthā, avasthāyām—indequate*]

[THE VEDĀNTA-VIEW] IS INADEQUATE, BECAUSE AT THE TIME OF DISSOLUTION, (Brahman will be) OF THE SAME NATURE (as THAT OF THE WORLD) 8

The philosopher says that, in the first place, it is inadequate to hold the Vedānta-view that the cause of the world is the omniscient Brahman, because at the time of the dissolution when the effect becomes one with the cause, Brahman will be polluted by the impurity, ignorance, non-intelligence and limitation of the world. How can we call such a defective Brahman as omniscient? Secondly, if all the distinctions are wiped out, and there remains one Brahman at the time of dissolution, there is left no special cause due to which upon a new world with its distinctions of souls and objects should arise. Thirdly, when the souls become merged in the Brahman, their actions and the fruits thereof also become merged and so there is no return. If, in spite of this, we believe that souls are born again, we may as well believe that the liberated souls too are born again. And finally, if, in order to get away from these defects in his theory, the Vedāntin would say that the world remains separate from

Brahman even during its dissolution, then he contradicts his own view viz., the effect is non-different from the cause. Besides, there would be no dissolution worth the name.

To this we get the reply in the next Sūtra.

ननु महाप्रमाणम् । ९

[No-not, no-but, *dyadhat-samantat*; *śaktiḥ-being available*].

But not so, FOR REASONS ARE AVAILABLE (TO SHOW THAT THE CAUSE IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE NATURE OF THE EFFECT) 9

The Vedānta-view is not inadequate, for, just as pots of clay or ornaments of gold do not impart their qualities of size, and shape to the clay or gold in which they are absorbed, or just as the fourfold beings which come into being from the earth do not impart their qualities to the earth when they are finally absorbed in it, even so, in dissolution the world will not affect the Brahman in any way. The paragraphist, on the other hand, will not be able to advance any instance in favour of his statement. As a matter of fact, if we speak of dissolution, we cannot speak of the effect retaining its own qualities apart from the cause. How the effect is non-different from the cause, (though not *svatantṛa*) is a point which shall be made clear while dealing with Sūtra II, 1, 14.

The objection of the paragraphist that the cause may be polluted by the effect need not have been restricted to the period of dissolution only. It could have been extended to the period of the subsistence of the world also, because our doctrine of the identity of cause and effect holds good at all times, as is clear from the Śaṅkara passages : 'All this is what this Ātman is, (Bṛ 2, 4, 6)

'The Ātman alone is this all' (Chā. 7, 13, 3). 'The universal Brahman alone is all this that is before us' (Chā. 1, 1, 10). 'Verily all this is Brahman' (Chā. 1, 14, 2). And the refutation too of the objection is the same on both the occasions. The effect and the qualities are mere false appearances due to arogya, and so do not affect the cause in any way, either during dissolution or subsistence of the world in Brahman. Just as a magician is himself never affected by the illusion, he creates for others, even as the highest Ātman is not affected by the illusion of this worldly existence. Or, just as a person does not become affected by the changes of his dream, because they do not continue so much rather in his dreamless sleep or wakeful life, even so, the one Ātman who is the eternal witness of the three states of the world, is not affected by any one of them, because each is exclusive of the other two. That he appears to be connected with the three conditions of the world is as illusory as the appearance of a snake on a rope. This traditional truth of the Vedānta has been expressed by some well-known teachers thus: 'The moment the individual soul is accorded from the beginningless chamber of Mūlā, that very moment he realises the non-dual Brahman which is beyond birth, death and sleep' (Ghoshā. Kā. 1, 18).

As for the second objection, we offer the explanation that just as in the case of a man who goes into deep sleep or roya samādhi there remains no consciousness of any worldly distinctions, and yet he becomes conscious of them all the moment he comes out of sleep or samādhi, even as there may arise a new creation and all the distinctions thereof, although they seem to disappear in Brahman during the dissolution of the world. Ignorance persists both in sleep and in dissolution, and so also the false distinctions of the phenomenal world even after dissolution. It is due to ignorance that 'in spite of their being merged in the one Reality, the creatures do not realise that they are so merged, and are therefore born again as lion, wolf, etc.' (Chā. 6, 9, 2-3). This resolves

the farther doubt regarding the rebirth of the liberated souls. They are not born again, because their false knowledge is wiped out by the knowledge of the Real. And finally the suggestion, that the Vedāntins may hold the view, that the world remains distinct from Brahman even in dissolution, is to be simply rejected because the Vedāntins will never accept the dualistic position implied by the suggestion. Hence the Upaniṣadic doctrine is free from every objection.

तत्त्वार्थः । १०

[*tat*—*that's* ; *artha*—*idea* ; *dupit*—*due to defect*,
ca—*and*]

AND BECAUSE THE OBJECTIONS (ADDUCED AGAINST THE VEDĀNTA-VIEW) APPLY ALSO TO THE (ŚĪKHĪYA) VIEW 10

Besides the objections are as much against the Vedāntins as against the Śikṣīya doctrine. For even supposing *pralīna* to be the case, we do find that the world which possesses form, sound, etc. is altogether different in nature from *pralīna* which does not possess form and other qualities. This means that the objection that the effect was non-existent before its origination, is common to both the Śikṣīya and Vedānta schools, both of which are *Saṁśārasiddhānta*. Secondly, inasmuch as the Śikṣīya too believes that in dissolution the effect becomes one with the cause, he shall have also to accept that the cause becomes polluted by the qualities of the effect. And thirdly, the specific reasons which are responsible for the joys and sorrows of different persons being all destroyed in dissolution, there remains no reason why a new creation should arise, or if there can be a creation without any cause, there can as well be the rebirth of those who have achieved their release. And in order to avoid these objections, if it be said that some distinctions remain unabsorbed even in dissolution, then, we say that it is

these very distinctions which must not have been the effects of prohibitions, for otherwise they would have been non-distinct from prohibitions.

The objections being common cannot be brought against the Vedānta view alone. And yet we have answered them and shown that they are not real objections at all.

सर्वविद्वद्भाष्यमन्यवस्तुमेवमिति धैर्यमवशिरोभूतम् । ११

[*Tārka-māṇṇṇya, apatyakāraṇa*—being unswayed, apt—own, anyathā—in another way, ananyasā—in referred, in an—of an, eva, apt. samakṣa—directly of relevant, pratyakṣa—directly.]

NEVERTHELESS AND THE UNCHANGING NATURE OF (YOUR OWN) REASONING, IF IT IS SAID THAT ONE MAY SPEAK IN SOME OTHER WAY, THEN THERE WILL BE ALSO NO CONFLICT OF WORDS. 11

There being no hindrance to human imagination most reasoning cannot be depended upon as matters which must be understood in the light of Śrīti statements alone. The thoughts of some clever men are pointed out as fallacious by some other clever persons, while the thoughts of these latter too are turned down by some others cleverer still. Even men of eminence and philosophical importance, such as Kapila and Kaṇḍa, are seen to contradict one another.

It may be contended that not all reasoning is unswayed, for even this contention must be proved by reasoning alone. And unless we admit the soundness of some kind of reasoning, our whole practical life will be of no value. Men seek pleasure and avoid pain on the supposition that nature is uniform in the past, the present and the future. Even in the Vedic sphere, whenever there arises a conflict among different interpretations of

Śaṅkara plunges into reasoning a boat which ends the voyage by refuting the universal and by fixing the correct meanings of words and sentences. *Mānu* tells us "to know well these things, we perception, inference and śruti, and to apply such reasoning as cannot be contradicted by Veda", in order that we should know what Brahman is (*Mānu Sm.* 12, 103-106). In any way, the fallacy is a point of attraction in reasoning. For we require reasoning both for detecting and avoiding fallacies. It does not follow that because the argument of the pūrvapakṣa is fallacious, therefore the argument of the siddhānta is also fallacious, just as a man does not become stupid because his lost fallacies were so.

To this we reply. Reasoning may appear to hold good in certain cases, but with regard to the unfathomable nature of Brahman upon the knowledge of which depends the final release of man, there will be no use of reason unless it is backed up by Śaṅkara. For, as already noticed, Brahman is neither the object of perception nor of inference; it has neither form nor sound to be seen or heard, nor any sign on account of which it is to be inferred.

Besides, all those who believe in the doctrine of *śaśvata* say that it is the stock of the right kind of knowledge which has a constant and uniform nature. It is knowledge about which there will be no different opinions. A knowledge like that of fire is, "that it is hot." A man's inference may take different forms, and so may leave us in doubt as to the exact nature of object. It need not be universal and constant like the perception of heat in fire. The Śāṅkara who puts his faith in reasoning is not accepted by all as the best among logicians, so that we can trust in what he tells, irrespective of space and time. The Vedic knowledge, on the other hand, being self-evident and eternally the same is incapable of being challenged by any logician. *Mokṣa* therefore is impossible to be attained by any other means except through the right kind of knowledge given to us by the Upanishads.

We have then proved by means of Śaṅkara and by reasoning which is faithful to Śaṅkara that the intelligent Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe.

३ विद्यापीडावधिकरणम् । (११)

एतेन विद्यापिडायां यदि भगवत्पराः । १२

[Ihena—by this, apyāha—authority, aparyakṣaṭ—things not accepted by, apy—even, vyākhyātaḥ—are refuted]

THE ABOVE VERSES (verses 10) HAVE BEEN ALREADY ACCEPTED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY. 12

So far we have refuted the objections against the Vedānta doctrine, we also refuted the Śāṅkara theory that pralaya is the cause of the world. We refuted the latter because, in the first place, it comes very close to Vedānta, in the second it gives of certain of its beliefs, such as the antikyāvāda, the identity of cause and effect, and the independent existence of the Ātman, secondly, because it has used in its support some powerful arguments, and thirdly, because some competent authorities who follow the Veda, like Devaḥ for example, are amongst its adherents. But when other half-witted persons, such as the monists or the naturalists, also raise their heads and bring forth their arguments, the Śāṅkara suggests that he has virtually vanquished them all, inasmuch as he has already vanquished the most powerful of the opponents.

४ शेषवाक्यवधिकरणम् । (१२)

शेषवाक्यैर्विद्यावैतनवाङ्मोक्षम् । १३

[Śāṅkara—teacher, apyāha—being reduced to play, an-
vākyat—no disconnection, cat—of, jāt—may be, bhāṣat—
by ordinary expression]

If it is said that (on the Vedāntic view) there will be no distinction between (the individual soul and their objects of experience) on account of the enjoyment (i.e. the soul) being reduced to the condition (of the objects also vice versa, we say that the reduction) may continue to remain as it now in ordinary experience (3).

There comes another objection from the side of reason alone against the view that Brahman is the cause of the world. It is true, says the *pārvapada*, that Śruti is authoritative in its own sphere, but where the meaning of a Śruti-passage is to be ascertained, and where, according to the available other means of knowledge, the meaning appears to be different, we have to construe the passage as not having the primary meaning but only the secondary. For example, when it is said that the "sacred post is the sun", we have to understand that the post is like the sun and not the sun itself, because it is contrary to actual perception. It is in this way that mantras and arthaśāstra are to be explained. Reasoning too is not authoritative except in its own sphere. For example, it is not competent to say what is *dharma* and what is *adharma*. Suggesting, therefore, that reasoning and Śruti have got equal claims to discuss the nature of Brahmaneyā, the *pārvapada* tells us that if there is a conflict between Śruti and reasoning or between Śruti and some other means of knowledge, it is not proper that Śruti should refuse what has been established by reason or other means, otherwise it may lead to some absurd conclusion. The *pārvapada* illustrates what he means. The distinction between the intelligent, embodied souls and the objects of experience is so obvious and persisting from the viewpoint of ordinary experience, that any attempt to remove it will be objected to. But this exactly is being done on the theory that the world is non-different from Brahman. Even the distinction between the subject and the object, between Devadatta and the cooked rice

be seen would be removed, because both Devadatta and the cooked rice are identical with Brahman. The view that Brahman is the cause would make the subjects and objects pass into each other.

To this we reply that the distinctions may remain from the plain natural point of view even though we accept Brahman as the cause of the world. Modifications of the sea, such as waves, foam and bubbles are not different from the water and yet they do not pass over into each other; they are all related to each other, so much as all of them are in essence water only, and yet they are distinct from each other. Even so the subjects and the objects may remain distinct without passing into one another, and yet be non-different from Brahman. No doubt, the world cannot be said to be the effects of Brahman in the sense in which the modifications of water are; for as Śaṅkara tells us, Brahman is *sa 'which enters into them after having created them'* (Tan 2, 6). Just as the one Śakti appears to be many on account of *jan* and other limiting adjuncts, even so the effects i.e. the subjects and the objects appear to be many and distinct although they are in essence nothing but Brahman.

६ आदिकल्पविकल्पश्च । (१४-२०)

कदम्बफलवर्गविकल्पद्वयदीप्ता । १४

[That—that, *ananyatva*—non-difference, *dvandvopaharaḥ*, *śabdāśābhyas*—from words and others.]

WHEN THE "BRANCH" AND OTHER (PROVE) THE
CONCEPT BETWEEN THEM [ON THE CAUSE AND THE
EFFECT], 14

The distinction we allowed to exist in the previous *Sūtra* between the subjects and the objects, from the viewpoint of ordinary experience, does not however exist as a matter of fact. For both the subjects and the objects along with Śakti and other things are included in the world

which is non-different from its cause, namely, the Brahman. The effect cannot exist, in other words, apart from and in the absence of the cause. In the *Chândogyaopaniṣad* we are told that all the modifications of clay, such as pots and dishes, are in reality nothing but clay, and are real only when looked at from the view-point of clay. But so far as they appear to exist as different individual things apart from clay, they are names only as "originating from speech," and as such are unreal. It is therefore said that to know one clod of clay is to know all its modifications, for there is nothing else but clay (Ch. 1, 4). Similarly, apart from Brahman existing in it as its cause, the world cannot have its independent existence. Other *Śruti*-passages where the word 'linga-rūpa' is not used, tell us about the unity of the *Ātman*. The effects of fire, water and earth do not exist apart from them, namely, these elements too represented by the colours red, white and black, in their turn 'do not exist apart from Brahman which is their cause' (Ch. 6, 4, 1). 'All this is the *Ātman*, the Real, thou art that'; 'the *Ātman* is all this' (Ch. 6, 8, 7, 7, 23, 2). 'All this is the *Ātman*'. 'There is no duality in it' (Bg. 2, 4, 5 : 4, 4, 29). 'Brahman alone is all this' (Osh. 2, 2, 11). In no other way, then, except believing in the theory that the things of the world have no existence apart from Brahman, can we prove our thesis that to know one thing is to know everything else. So just as the several portions of *klāśa*, limited as they are by pots and other things, are not different from one universal *klāśa*, or just as the appearance and disappearance of water in a mirage* are not different from the salty expanse of a desert, even so, the countable things of the world, including the experiencing subjects and their objects, have no independent existence apart from Brahman at any time.

Objection 1. It may be said that just as a tree, though one, presents the aspect of many branches, so the

* The illustration of *klāśa* shows the identity of the *Ātman* and Brahman, that of mirage shows that reality is more important than the illusion.

one out of many waves, or one drop of many jīva, even so, the Brahman may present both the aspects of unity and multiplicity. Its unity will be useful from the viewpoint of achieving mokṣa, and its multiplicity vis-à-vis various activities and powers will be useful to explain the complexity of human life as recommended by the Vedic Karma-kāṇḍa.

We reply that the theory that Brahman may be both-one and-many is not untenable. For the proposition 'clay alone is real', asserts not only the reality of the cause viz. the clay, but also the unreality of things other than clay. All other things have their 'origin' in speech, are mere names, and so are unreal. And again, the passage, 'That is the Ātman, that is the Reality, there are that, oh Śvetaketu', tells us that the highest cause or the Brahman is the only Reality and that the individual soul is nothing other than Brahman. Especially, the sentence 'Thou art that,' shows that the identity between jīva and Brahman is a fact which is already existing and not one which is to be proved on account of some efforts on the part of jīva. Hence it is that this Vedānta doctrine will do away with the idea of the independent existence of the jīva, just as the recognition of the rope will remove the illusion of the snake as a. And then, along with the idea of the independent existence of the jīva, also goes away, *quo facto*, the independent existence of the entire phenomenal world and its dealings and efforts which, according to our opponents, constitute the aspect of manifoldness of Brahman. 'When in the case of some one all this becomes one with the Ātman, who should see whom, and by what means?' (Bg. 2, 4, 11). This is a fact which is eternally true and it does not point to any particular state. Śruti tells us that the unity of the Brahman is the reality, and that the manifoldness of it is unreal. It warns us further by telling us that while a truth-speaking man is released, a liar is punished. If now the unity and plurality be both real, how can Śruti call that man who is engaged with the manifold dealing of this world, as a liar? May

it declares that 'one who sees that there is diversity moves from death to death' (Bṛ. 4, 4, 15). Again, if unity and multiplicity are both true, there will neither be bondage as the result of multiplicity, nor release as the result of the removal of multiplicity, by the knowledge of the unity of Brahman.

Objections 3-5. (3) If everything is real and multiplicity unreal, perception and other means of knowledge will be nullified void, because there will be no objects with which they will be connected. (4) The entire Karma-kṛdā-movell be impossible, because what is requires and prohibits is related with the plural aspect of things. (5) Even mokṣa is, in a way, dependent on the recognition of more than one thing, viz. the teacher, the disciple, etc. (6) And therefore, finally, if mokṣa too becomes impossible in the absence of the aspect of manifestation, what prevents is there for the transcendence of the bondage of mokṣa as far as its teaching of the unity of the Ātman is concerned?

We reply that our position is in no way disturbed by the objections. For so long as the real knowledge of the identity of the jīva and the Brahman has not dawned, it is inevitable that the course of the world should go on undisturbed both with reference to mundane and extraordinary or Vedic activities. A man who dreams never doubts, so long as the dream lasts, that his experience of the various perceptions is false. Similarly, it is under the influence of avidyā that a man forgets that he is Brahman in reality, that Brahman alone is all this, and so he identifies himself with everything he calls as belonging to him. It is natural therefore that he should never think of the world of distinctions and effects, and of the nature and obj-cts of ordinary knowledge as unreal.

Objection 6. If Brahman alone is real, how can the Vedānta-passages, which are then presumably false, lead one to the knowledge of the identity of the jīva and Brahman? No one dies on account of being bitten by the

dreamy snake which appears on a rope; nor is anybody seen using the water in a mirror for the purpose of drinking or bathing.

We reply that the objection is futile. For we do see that death occurs sometimes as a consequence of the mere suspicion that a venomous snake has bitten. And the snake-bite and drinking of water in a dream, from the viewpoint of the dreamer himself, are real as long as the dream lasts. Nay, even after the dream is over, and the events of the dream are contradicted by the waking life and seem to be false, the knowledge about them as events in the dream persists in the waking life also without being contradicted. This continuity of consciousness or knowledge shows not only the emergence of truth from falsehood but also the futility of the view of the Lokāyatikas that the Ātman is nothing but the body; for as that theory, the disappearance of the subtle body in the dream would mean the disappearance of the knowledge of the dream. Events in the dream, though unreal, are sometimes, we are told, indications of actual future events in life. The sight of a woman in a dream is a sign of prosperity for one who undertakes to perform a sacrifice to fulfil some desire (Chd. 3, 2, 4). Similarly, the sight of a black man with black teeth indicates death (Art. Ara. 3, 3, 4, 7). That dreams are further usually connected with happy or unhappy consequences is shown by some experts by means of positive and negative instances. The written representation of an alphabet, though conventional and unreal, is able to make us pronounce the correct sound of that alphabet.

This Upanishadic statement of the unity of the Ātman is moreover the crown of all other arguments; for there is left nothing else with reference to which we may raise questions in order to get ourselves satisfied. The statement "one should perform a sacrifice" makes us desirous

¹ Compare, on the Vedāntic view, even the acquisition of what death entails, and not the losing into possession of new knowledge.

to know the purpose as to why or how it should be performed, but the statements 'I am that', 'I am the Brahman', leave us in no doubt regarding the unity of the *Ātman*, for there is nothing else which remains to be known, even and above this unity. Nor can it be said that no one can have such a knowledge; for Śvetāketra, for example, did possess it and did realize what his father had told him (Chd. 6, 7, 8), viz. that Brahman is *Ananda*. Even the way to the realization of this knowledge is mentioned, for instance, the hearing and the reading of the *Vedas*. It is not useless, for it removes all avidyā. Nor is it of an illusory nature, for there is nothing else which can sustain it. No doubt, so long as there is no realising of it, there will continue to exist the ordinary consciousness which will recognize all the distinctions of the world. But the moment there arises the knowledge of the unity of the *Ātman*, all the distinctions of the *Vedas* or the ordinary life vanish, and there remains no room for the supposed aspect of multiplicity in the Brahman.

Objection 7. It appears from the illustration of clay cited by Śaṅkara that, like clay, Brahman too is capable of being modified into other things.

Not so, we reply. Brahman is not capable of modifications, for it has been declared to be 'the great unborn *Ātman* which is without decay or death, is fearless and immortal', and is described only in negative terms 'as not big, not small etc.' (Ic. 4, 8, 25; 1, 9, 26; 1, 1, 10). Things like this decay and change are the part of Brahman. Capacity to become modified and change becomes being contradictory in nature cannot belong to Brahman at the same time, nor can that be conceived to belong to it at successive,—changeableness, for instance, during the time of absorption, and modification substance of the world. For changelessness alone being true, all modality is a appearance on the *śakti*. Besides, in the *Vedic* passages, which deal with the nature of Brahman as changeless and as devoid of attributes and distinctions, it is clearly stated that the reason of it is the

uncovered. Ātman leads to mokṣa. Jñāna, for example, is stated "to have attained the condition of fearlessness" in the next passage in which the Ātman is first described in negative terms (Bṛ. 4, 3, 4). No such result nor any other is mentioned so have followed from the knowledge that Brahman is modified in the form of this world. This means that the latter kind of knowledge must be supposed to be only subservient to the former; for we have the established rule that a thing or act which has as result of its own but is mentioned in connection with something else which has its own specific result, must be supposed as subservient to the latter. Still, if some one were to say that the knowledge that Brahman is capable of being modified may result in a corresponding modification of the individual soul, because the soul is said to become that which it worships or believes, we say that it will be a very poor substitute for the mokṣa which can be had from the knowledge that Brahman is changeless and without qualities."

Objection 3. The doctrine of the changeless Brahman allows no room for the distinction of a God who rules, and the world and the souls as ruled by Him. How then can it be maintained that God is the cause of the world?

We reply that there is no contradiction between the original assertion we made while discussing the Śūtra 'pramāṇasvayam yajñā' (Bṛ. 3, 1, 1, 4) and the present assertion of the Śrauta-passages regarding the unity of the Brahman. We do maintain even now the original statement we made in connection with the Śrauta-passages, "From that Ātman alone has sprung the *śikṣā*" (Tā. 3, 11, 12) the creation, subsistence and absorption of the world is due not to *pradhāna* but to the pre-existent and omnipotent Lord who is at the same time eternally pure.

* To know that that is modified can result in only *mokṣa* is here, that the *śikṣā* is the *mokṣa*; even so, the knowledge that Brahman is capable of modifying the world is only useful to know that the changeless and qualities Brahman alone is real.

intelligent and free. And we have now said nothing to contradict that, even though we held the doctrine of the unity of the changeless Brahman.

To explain the same. The infinite names and forms are born of avidyā and are no doubt the cause-cause of the phenomenal world, but they cannot be said to be of the nature of God, for while God is intelligent, they are non-intelligent. Nor can they be said to be different from him; for if they are supposed to exist apart from him, they will lose their non-intelligent nature. They are therefore said to be indescribable; or as Śaṅkara and Śaṅkara would call them, they are the *avidyā*, the *śakti* or the *prajñā* of the omnipresent God. And yet God is different from them as is clear from the passages: 'Iśhita (Brahman) indeed is the revealer of name and form; that is Brahman in which these are contained' (Chā. 8, 14, 1); 'Let us produce name and form' (Chā. 8, 1, 2). 'The wise Ātman produced the forms and after giving them names, is calling them by these names' (Tait. Ar. 3, 12, 7); 'He who turns one word into many' (Svā. 6, 12). Just as Iśhita, which is independent and different from you, appears to be limited as account of them, even so, God who is independent and different from names and forms only appears to be dependent on them for the purpose of ruling over them. And just as the portions of Iśhita, notwithstanding their being one with the universal Iśhita, are limited by the will of the you, even so, the individual souls, though one with the Ātman, appear different as account of the bodies or the names and forms of avidyā. Naturally, God too appears in relation to them in the phenomenal world as a ruler, and as being omnipresent and omnipotent. Otherwise, from the turn-point of one who is liberated from upādhis by means of knowledge, the Ātman will never be conceived as presenting the distinction of the ruler and the ruled, or appear as omnipresent, omnipotent, etc. 'Where one sees, hears or understands nothing else, that is the infinite' (Chā. 7, 24, 2). 'When the Ātman only has become all this, what else should

one see, and by what means?" (Bj. 3, 4, 34). As is clear from these passages, the entire phenomenal world does not exist for him who has realized the Atman. The Bhagavad-gītā too tells us that in reality there is no such relation of the ruler and the ruled. "God is not the author of the actions or the fruits thereof, nor does he receive anybody's worshipments. People are deluded because their knowledge is enveloped by ignorance" (B. G. 9, 14-15). The practical point of view, on the other hand, admits the disappearance of the phenomenal world. God is spoken of as 'the king and the protector of all things ; the support and the bridge of the worlds, so that they may not be confounded' (Bj. 5, 4, 2). 'He resides in the hearts of all beings, and by his power turns them all, as if they are mounted on a machine' (B. G. 18, 62). It is from the viewpoint of this highest reality, then, that the Śāṅkhya too has established the identity of cause and effect. What was asserted by him in the previous Sūtra, viz. Brahman is the cause, and the world is the effect, was with reference to the phenomenal world, and this was allowed to be considered as real from the practical point of view. The puruṣārtha life is accepted by the Śāṅkhya (Brh. Sū. 1, 4, 45 ; 2, 1, 38), as far as it is subservient for the purpose of devotion to supreme Brahman. For it is only then that the world becomes real and God is considered as omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent.

यदे वेद्यमन्येः । १५

[Effect—when it arises, is—and, upabhihā—because it is found.]

AND BECAUSE (THE EFFECT) IS FOUND ONLY WHEN (THE CAUSE) RISES. 15

It is possible for a jet to rise only when the clay starts and not otherwise ; similarly a piece of cloth can start only when the threads start and not otherwise. The effect, in other words, is non-different from the

material cause. The presence or absence of a thing, on the other hand, which has no causal connection with another, is not at all dependent on the presence or absence of that other thing. The presence of a jar is equally possible whether the bull is present or not. The potter is the efficient cause of the jar, but the jar can exist in the absence of the potter. The effect can never, however, be independent and different from its material cause.

It may be said that fire and smoke continue to be two different things, though smoke is seen only when the fire exists. But this is wrong, for smoke may be observed in a jar in which it is collected even though fire is extinguished. The argument is not improved even if it be said that a particular kind of smoke which, for example, is seen springing forth from an object does not exist unless fire exists. For what is required in establishing identity is not only the presence of the cause, but also the presence of the concomitance of the cause along with the presence of the concomitance of the effect. The jar inevitably makes us aware of its material cause, the clay; smoke, on the other hand, does not make us conscious of fire.

Or the Sūtra may be taken to read as **सर्वत्र तदवस्थेः** (Eṣaṁvṛt ca upalabdhyā), and then it means that the non-difference of effect from cause is not only to be believed true because Śruti says so, but also because it is a fact of perception. What we call cloth is nothing but threads which we perceive crossing each other breadth-wise and length-wise. The threads again are nothing but collections of finer threads which we can perceive; and the fine threads again, in their turn, are made up of still finer threads, and so on. It is these perceived facts which enable us further to infer that the smallest parts of things are absolutely nothing but the three elements of fire, water, and earth, represented by the three colours of red, white and black (Chh. 6, 4). These three colours further

If it is said that (the effect *śiva*) was (not
 prior to its being produced) on account of its being
 mentioned as non-existent, (we reply) that it is not
 so, for with reference to what follows (the mention
 of non-existence is to be interpreted as only meaning)
 another quality 17

When the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* speaks of 'non-existence
 alone in the beginning' (3, 13, 1), it does not mean absolute
 non-existence of the effect, but means the non-existence of
 any name and form which evolve later on in course of
 time. For that which was first referred to as non-existent,
 was afterwards referred to as existent. A thing which
 is absolutely non-existent can never become an object,
 nor can it assume any form. But a thing which is non-
 existent on account of the unevolved condition of name
 and form, can exist later on, on account of the evolution
 of some name and form. When the effect therefore is
 said to be non-existent, it only means that the name and
 form of the effect was non-existent during the time when
 the effect was existing in the form of cause. Besides,
 the words 'this' and 'was' clearly point out that per-
 ceptions made in the *Śrauta* passage is not with reference to
 absolute non-existence, but with reference to the world
 of names and forms.

Similarly, the being which is spoken of as "non-
 existent" in the *Taittiriyaopaniṣad* (3, 7, 1) does not
 mean absolute non-existence; for it is further understood that
 non-existent being that it got itself manifested into the
 world. This means that there was something, as the
Brahman, before the world of names and forms came
 into existence. In short, if by the word "not" we mean
 the world of names and forms, by the word "and" we
 do not mean the non-existence of it, but the existence of
 it without the names and forms.

युक्तेः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् । १८

[Yukti]—from reasoning, and *pramāṇam*—from another Sans. passage; or—and].

FROM REASONING AND FROM OTHER SANS. PASSAGE.

18.

That the effect exists before its production and that it is not different from the cause can be substantiated from reasoning as well as from Sans. To proceed to reasoning first.

Our ordinary experience tells us that milk, clay and gold are taken by people in order to produce out of them curds, pots and ornaments, respectively. No one who wants curds will expect to have it out of clay, nor will any one expect to have pots out of milk. This means that the effect exists in the cause prior to its production. For had the effect been really non-existent before its production, there is no reason why curds be produced out of milk alone or pots out of clay. Besides, all the effects being equally non-existent, anything might come out of anything else.

In order to explain the origin of effects, an *anāhīryavāda* may say that there exists in each cause a special power to produce a special effect: e.g., milk has the specific capacity to produce curds; clay has got the specific capacity to produce pots. But this is to abandon the *anāhīryavāda* and to assume something prior to the effect which forthwith becomes the effect. If, on the other hand, the specific power also is conceived as non-existent before its appearance, or as different from both the cause and the effect, then, as said above, anything may come out of anything else. In other words, just as there is no reason why a pot only may be produced out of clay, even so, there would be no reason why it should be produced on account of the specific power, if the latter is either non-existent before its appearance or is different

from both cause and effect, viz. the clay and the jar. In, once again, we are led to believe that the effect is nothing but the cause, even though we introduce a third something viz. the causal power between the two. No one, as a matter of fact, is ever conscious of the cause and effect or of substance and qualities etc. in the manner in which one is conscious of two distinct and separate things like a horse and a buffalo.

It may be said that the cause and the effect or the substance and the qualities etc. do not appear different because they are held together by the connection known as *samavāya*, and not because they are identical with each other. But the so-called *samavāya* must itself either be connected with the terms between which it exists or be independent of them entirely. In the first case, to explain the one connection of *samavāya* we have to postulate a second connection, and in order to explain the second connection we have to postulate a third, and so on ad infinitum. In the second case, the cause and the effect or the substance and the qualities will fall apart from each other, and appear as totally disconnected. To avoid this, if it be said that *samavāya* can act alone without being further connected, then *samāyoga* too being a connection between two things may not likewise require the further support of *samavāya*, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hold. As a matter of fact, the nature of the relation of *samavāya* is unclear because experience tells us that substance and qualities, cause and effect etc. are identical in essence.

Again, if the relation between the cause and effect is considered as that which exists between the parts and the whole, and the two are said to be held up together by *samavāya*, we may very well raise the question regarding the manner in which this takes place. If the whole renders in all the parts simultaneously, then the whole may not be perceptible at all; for instance, the other side of a jar will not be in contact with the eye at all. If, on the other hand, the whole is said to reside in some portions or the

parts successively, then no doubt the knowledge of the whole is inferable from the perception of a part; for instance, the knowledge of a part of a sword held in hand makes us aware of the whole of it, even though we have no visual or tactual knowledge of it, on account of the sword being hidden in the sheath. Yet the hidden parts of the sword which come in contact with the made parts of the sheath are admittedly different from those of the sheath. This means that we introduce a new series of parts between the original parts and the whole, or between the cause and the effect. To provide the second series of parts, the whole will again have to be conceived as consisting of a third series of parts of its own, and so on ad infinitum. In short, the effect will be further and further removed from the cause.

The effect as a whole cannot be said to reside in each one of the parts, simultaneously; for otherwise it will be more than one whole. Devadatta cannot reside in Śrughā and Pīlāpota at the same time, that is possible only when there are two men, Devadatta and Yajñadatta. Nor can the whole reside in each one of the parts simultaneously, in the manner in which the one śīmāṅga or jīva of cow is said to reside in each of the cows at the same time. For just as every cow manifests the śīmāṅga, every part of the cause might manifest the whole of the effect. But this is not invariably experienced. Besides if the whole were to reside fully in each part, one may as well have the milk of cow from her horns.

Moreover, if the effect be non-existent before its origination, there would be no action of origination itself because origination implies a reference to the particular effect and to the substratum in which it takes place. Walking is understood as an action with reference to the man who walks. The origination of a jar implies that the jar alone is being produced out of clay; it does not imply that the efficient cause like potter is being originated. But it is there already as a fact. So unless the substance

of the jar is assumed before it is produced, in the form of its cause, viz., the clay, the very sentence 'the jar is originated' will have absolutely no meaning. To say, in reply, that origination instead of being an action is some substance is simply the fact of the object's being connected with existence, is to say the impossible. For, as experience tells us, there can be some connection between two existing things, and not between two things which do not exist at all, nor between two things one of which exists and the other does not. How can a jar which has not come into existence be connected, in a moment prior to its existence, with clay which already exists? Moreover, existing things alone, such as hills and houses, can be spoken of as having partial limitations. But how can absolute non-existence be that which is absolutely limitless he speaks of as 'being prior to' origination? To say that the son of a barren woman was the king before the coronation of Pṛthivārman, has no meaning. For the son of a barren woman is not only non-existent, but is an impossibility, and therefore no temporal limitations can be set to him. Even so, at no time, will the absolute non-existence of the effect, e. g. a jar, be a reality, though there may be the efforts of the potter.

If the non-existent can never become existent, then the *satkāryavādin* may say that there would be no purpose for the operative causes like potter and others which bring the effect into existence. If the effect exists in the cause and is non-different from it, where is the need of the potter to bring out a jar into existence, just as there is no need of him to bring into existence the clay which already exists without any reference to him? But what happens as a matter of fact is that people do seem to bring about the effects, and so it is that one must assume the non-existence of the effect prior to its origination.

We reply that the purpose of the operative agents is simply to arrange the cause in the form of the effect. No doubt, the form of the effect too is present in the cause;

for we have already said that there cannot be any effect without a cause. The form too is not altogether new; and so a mere change in form does not transform one thing into an altogether different thing. Devadatta may bring his arms and legs close to his body, or may stretch them out, and yet he is recognized as the same man. Similarly, people may be seen in changing moods and conditions, and yet they are always recognized as the same, whether as, father, mother, or brother. It may be said that they are recognized as the same persons because their different conditions are not separated by death; the pot on the other hand is said to be different because the clay is as good as being destroyed. But we reply that this is not correct. Milk continues to exist under a different form, when we say that it has become curd. And even where this continued existence of the quest is not perceivable, for instance, when the seed is not seen to exist in the tree, we have to direct our attention to the earlier stages of the tree, such as the sprouts, and find that they are nothing but the later stages of the seed. Because we choose to call arbitrarily the appearance and the disappearance of the sprouts as birth and death of the seed respectively, it does not follow that the seed really dies and the sprouts come into existence as something altogether new. What takes place, as a matter of fact, is that it is the seed which becomes visible in the form of sprout, with the accumulation of particles of matter, and it is the seed again which becomes invisible and not non-existent, when the sprouts or the particles of matter change into something else. If, in spite of this, we believe that the non-existent becomes existent, and the existent becomes non-existent, we may as well believe that the unborn child is the womb of the mother and the same child in the cradle after it is born are altogether two different children or that the same person is different altogether in his childhood, youth and old age. Hence we have incidentally refuted the Brahmic doctrine of momentary existence; for we have proved the eternal, continued existence of cause.

That the operative agents have no purpose to serve is a charge which can be laid at the door of the *satkaryavādin* himself. For non-existence cannot be the object of any activity. It cannot be modified in any way by activity, just as the sky is not modified in any way by weapons. Nor can the cause e. g., the clay, which is said to be actually and essentially, be the object of the activity of the operative agents, for if the effect, which was non-existent, is to arise from a cause which is different in nature, then anything may arise from anything else. And if to avoid these unpleasant conclusions, the *satkaryavādin* would say that the effect is nothing but a specific power of the cause, then he would thereby only accept the position of the *satkaryavādin*. The conclusion we reach, therefore, is that cause like milk and clay become known as effects when they assume the form of curds and pots, and that it is impossible to establish even after hundreds of years that the effect is different from the cause. This leads us to the further conclusion that Brahman is the ultimate cause of all, and that it is Brahman alone which appears like an actor in this or that form of effect and so becomes the explanation of the whole of the phenomenal world.

We have proved so far by means of reasoning that the effect exists prior to its origination and that it is not different from the cause. A passage from the *Chāndogya* उपनिषद्, unlike the passage referred to in the preceding *śloka*, refers directly to the 'existence of the Being which alone was in the beginning, without a second' (6, 2, 6). Then a subsidiary reference is made to the opinion of others who call the Being non-existent, but it is immediately pointed out that the existent cannot come out of the non-existent, and that therefore 'all this was existent alone in the beginning'. But the word 'that' which indicates the world refers by way of identity to the word 'existent' which means the Being or the cause of the world. In other words, the passage also shows that the effect exists prior to its origination in the form of cause.

and is identical with it, and proves thereby the earlier assertion made in the same Upanishad (5, 1, 3) that the Eddiness of the cause being known, everything else becomes known. On the *satkāryavāda* theory, on the other hand, the cause may be known, but the effect being different will remain unknown.

पटवत् । ३९

[*Paṭavat*—like a piece of cloth, ca—and]

AND JUST AS A PIECE OF CLOTH (IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THREADS) 19

Just as a rolled piece of cloth is not different from what it becomes when it is spread out, similarly the effect is not different from the cause. The only difference between the two quadrants is that what is not manifest in the cause becomes manifest in the effect. The length and breadth of the rolled piece of cloth which were not manifest, become manifest only after it is spread out. Similarly, the piece of cloth which is not manifest in the threads becomes manifest on account of the operative agents such as the shuttle, the loom and the weaver.

यथा च शलादि । ४०

[*Yathā ca śalādi*—just as ca—and, *śalādi*—beams and others]

AND JUST AS THE SHALAS (FUNCTIONS SEPARATELY AS SEPARATE COMPONENTS) 20

The different pulses such as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, etc. are not really different from their causal condition in the *maṇu*, yet, so long as they are contained within their cause, their only function is to keep the body alive. But when they manifest as separate from one another, they can only keep the body alive, but also cause the limbs to move. This means that movement which was not manifest in the cause becomes so in the effect. The

whole world then being an effect of the Brahman is not different from it, and as Brahman being known, everything else becomes known (Chā. 6, 1, 3).

ॐ इत्यन्यदेवादीर्वाक्यम् । (११ २१)

इत्यन्यदेवादिर्वाक्यमिदं तेषामपि । २१

[These-the other (sympathetic)-being mentioned, here (here)-sympathetic (things like not-does)-do (defect)-prescribed (would follow).]

THE OTHER (i. e. THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) HERE MENTIONED (AS NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE BRAHMAN), THE DEFECTS (OF THE FORMER), AS, FOR INSTANCE, OF NOT DOING WHAT IS ESSENTIAL WOULD BEING TO (BRAHMAN) 21.

Whether "the other" means the individual soul according to the passage "That thou art, oh Śrīvatsa" (Chā. 6, 8, 7) or the Brahman according to the passage, "having entered into the products, such as, earth, water and light, in the form of *pṛa*, it thought of conceiving names and forms" (Chā. 6, 3, 2), what Śaṅkara wants to convey is that the individual soul and the Brahman are identical. It follows from this identity therefore that the power of creation belongs to the individual soul also. But instead of producing things which might be beneficial, how is it that the individual soul has produced a net work of suffering, e.g., birth, death, oldage and disease? No free person would like to build a prison as his house. How would that pure Atman look upon the physical impure body as part of itself? Would it not free itself of the evil consequences of its actions and enjoy only the rewards? The individual soul would have remembered itself as the author of creation, and therefore withdrawn into itself the entire magical illusion of creation. But the pity is that the individual soul cannot withdraw his own body even. All this therefore goes against the view that the world has been created by an intelligent cause.

अविर्भावो वेदभिर्दिवाद् । २२

[*Abhāvato*—what is more, no-but, black-difference, *vedādir-*
being pointed out.]

BUT (Brahman) IS DIFFERENT (FROM THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), FOR THE DIFFERENCE IS POINTED OUT (BY ŚRĪ ŚAṢI. AND SO THE SUBJECT IS NOT BELONG TO BRAHMAN) 22

But as against the view of the *pūrvapakṣa*, the creator of the world as we consider him is not the *jīva*, but the Brahman which is declared by Śrī, as different from the *jīva*, and as being omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, pure, intelligent and free. From the view-point of such Brahman, there is nothing beneficial to be done or harmful to be avoided. There is nothing which it cannot know or do, creation or destruction it can do with great ease. The individual soul, on the other hand, being different in nature, the various defects mentioned by the *pūrvapakṣa* belong to it. That *jīva* and Brahman are different is evident from various Śrīti passages, such as, 'The Ātman asked is to be seen, heard, thought of and meditated upon' (Bg. 2, 4, 3); 'He should be the object of the desire to know, and of careful seeking' (Chd. 8, 7, 1); 'Then, during sleep, the *jīva* becomes one with the Brahman' (Chd. 8, 8, 1); 'The embodied soul becomes lodged in the perishable Ātman' (Bg. 4, 3, 15). In all these and similar other passages, actions such as seeking, seeing, and meditating on the part of the *jīvatman* point to him as the subject and the Paramātmā as the object.

It may be pointed out that non-difference also of the *jīva* and Brahman is stated by Śrīti in the passage 'That thou art', and so difference and non-difference being contradictory, they cannot both be true. But, we may in reply say that they can co-exist in spite of the apparent contradiction. Just as the false limited *līlā* in the *jīva* can co-exist with its contradictory *ve*—the one unlimited *līlā*, even so—as explained already more than once, the limiting adjuncts of the self such as body, name and

things, which arise out of the names and forms of objects, are felt to be real. But they are seen to be mere illusions, the moment the consciousness of the non-difference of the jīva and Brahman arises in us. Then there comes an end to all the practical distinctions of wrong knowledge, and with them vanish also the actual condition of the soul and the notion of creation on the part of Brahman. Where is the room, then, for the defect of not doing what is beneficial? And where is the room for the creation of the world at all? But so long as the illusion lasts, there is room for the wrong notions such as the self is hurt, or the soul dies. So long too Brahman is different from the jīva, and becomes the object of inquiry and search. So long, too, the jīva is only a creature and not the creator. The defects therefore do not belong to the Brahman.

वस्तुविपर्ययः समुपपत्तिः । २१

[About the variety of stones and others; as—and; not-that, unapparent—cannot be said.]

(THE CREATION) BEING (WONDROUS AND DIFFERENT) LIKE STONES AND OTHERS, THESE (DEFECTS) CANNOT BE OBSERVED. 21

Just as stones present a great variety among themselves, some of them being more or less valuable like diamonds—*lapa lapā*, and 'sarpakūṭa', and some as ordinary and valueless as can be discerned at fairs and markets, or just as the same piece of ground yields different trees like mango and cucumber, which have different leaves, flowers, fruits, fragrance and parts, or just as the same food assumes the form of blood, hair etc., even so, within the same Brahman there may seem to arise the distinctions—various effects, such as the jīva and the jīvas. Brahman however is not at all affected by the defects of the jīva and the world; for as Śaṅkara declares all these distinctions have their origin in speech only, and are like the phantoms of a dreaming person.

८ उपनिषद्दर्शननिबन्धम् । (१४-१५)

उपनिषद्दर्शनोपेक्षी चेन्न वीजसिद्धिः । ११

[Upanishādhina—collection, darśanādhā—being observed; na—not
at all—if it is such; na, tyāgāt—[by] milk, to—for]

It is as said before (Brahman) is not (not even)
because it is (Brahman) observed that (Brahman)
are being-collected (for promotion of Brahman). (We
say) no, for like milk, (Brahman may not also) 24

Potters and weavers are seen to collect the material
and the means such as clay, wheels, thread and shuttle
before they produce the jar and cloth. But Brahman, on
the other hand, though intelligent like a potter, cannot be
thought of as first providing itself with material and
instruments, because it is conceived to be without a
second. Brahman, therefore, it may be said, cannot be
the cause of the world.

To this we reply. Brahman can be conceived to be
the cause in much the same way as milk can be
said to be of curds or ice. It may appear that milk must
be heated first before it is turned into curds. But had
there been no original capacity in milk whereby it changes
into curds, no amount of heat will be able to do so.
Otherwise one could have turned butter or wine into
curds by heating it. What heat does is only to hasten
the process of turning milk into curds. Brahman, on
the other hand, does not even require the much help of
extraneous circumstances to transform itself into man-
nātha effects. For as Śaṅkara says, "Nothing remains to be
done by him, for He is already perfect, nor does He require
any instrument, for there can be none else who is equal
unto him, much less superior to him. Various and
infinite are the powers, knowledge and strength are
natural with him" (Ira. 4, 5).

देवदेवदृष्टि शक्तिः । २५

[*Deva-deh-dṛṣṭi*—*deh* gods and others; *aprasakha*; *deh*—*in* *śiṣya*, etc.]

AND THE GODS AND OTHER BEINGS AS WITNESSES IN ŚĪTALA (BRAHMAN) TOO (MAY BE ABLE TO PRODUCE) 25

The opponent may admit that non-intelligent things like salt may change of themselves without any extraneous help like wind and other things, but he may point out that Brahman being intelligent like potter cannot be compared to create without other external means. We reply that just as gods and sages are reported to have the ability to produce palaces and chariots by the power of their mere will, or just as the spider creates a web of the threads he emits out of his body; or just as the female crane conceives without the contact of the male, or just as, without being transplanted, the lotus travels from one pond to another, even so, Brahman may create the world without any extraneous means.

Our opponent may find flaw in our reply and say, that the material causes of the things produced in all the above instances are not the intelligent souls but the non-intelligent bodies. The palaces and chariots are due to the bodies of gods etc., the web of the spider due to its hardened saliva, the conception of the female crane is due to the hearing of the sound of thunder, and the wandering of the lotus from pond to pond is like the shaking up of the creeper on a tree. To this we reply that Brahman is intelligent like potter and gods, but unlike them is not dependant on any extraneous means for the act of creation. Brahman is unconditionally fit to create.

१. कृत्स्नवत्तत्त्वविकारवद् । (२६-२७)

कृत्स्नवत्तत्त्वविकारवत्तत्त्ववद्देवो वा । २६

[*Kṛtsna* (total)—*pramāṇa* (well marked), *paraprasaṅga*—*and* *parat*; *śiṣya* (śiṣya)—*śopaka* (mediation), *va*—*or*.]

THAT WILL SHEET FINDER (THE CHANGER) OF THE
ENTIRE (BRAHMAN) OR THE VIOLATION OF THE LAWS
WHICH THAT THAT (BRAHMAN) IS WITHOUT FAULT. 26

To emphasize Viroṭa is against Puruṣa, the
Śāṅkhya raises another objection. Quoting Śaṅk-
the objector says that there are no distinctions in Brahman.
"It is partless, atomless, unguage, faultless and measure"
(Sv. 3, 10). "That heavenly Puruṣa is without body, is
both inside or outside, and is unborn" (Ib. 2, 1, 2); "The
great being is endless, unlimited, and consists of knowledge
alone"; "He is to be described in negative terms only, as
neither big nor small" (Ib. 2, 4, 12, 3, 5, 20; 3, 4, 5). As
Brahman is partless, it cannot be said that it undergoes a
change in one part alone; therefore it may be pointed out
that the entire Brahman undergoes the change. But this
would mean that Brahman as the cause of all will cease to
exist, and then there would be no meaning in the exhorta-
tion that one should 'see' the Brahman. There would
also be no meaning in the exhortation, if by seeing the
Brahman we are to understand seeing the world or the
transformed Brahman, for the world is seen even without
anybody's seeing. If the world alone exists, then what
does Śaṅk mean by saying that Brahman is unborn? If
to escape the fault due to transformation of the entire
Brahman, the Vedāntins would accept that Brahman
consists of parts, he would contradict all the Śaṅk passages
which deny parts to Brahman. Besides, that which
consists of parts is of a perishable nature. The Vedānta
doctrine therefore appears to be wholly untenable.

कुतोऽयं वाच्यमस्मात् । २७

[Object of Śaṅk, to say, Śāṅkārācārya-became Śaṅk
in the ground.]

BUT (IT IS NOT SO), ON ACCOUNT OF ŚAṅK (Sv. 3)
AVAILABLE AND BEING THE CHANGER (OF WHOLE OF
BRAHMAN). 27

We discard the objection. In the first place, the entire Brahman cannot undergo transformation. For Brahman is not only spoken of by Śruti as the source of the world, but as existing apart from the world. E.g. 'the Divine Being thought of entering into the other than divinities by its own self and manifest their names and forms' (Chh. 6.3.7), 'Such is the greatness of Gāyatrī, greater than it is the Puruṣa, for one foot of him is all these beings, while his three other feet are in the immortal heaven' (Chh. 3. 12. 6). Again, had the whole of the Brahman been transformed, there would have been no meaning in its being described as 'residing in the heart' and the Jīva being described as 'being one with it during sleep' (Chh. 6, 8, 4). Besides, if Brahman were completely transformed, it would have been visible, just as the world is, but that it is not the object of perception proves that it exists in an unmodified form.

Secondly, we do not see any contradiction between the partless nature of Brahman and its not undergoing transformation as a whole, though both these facts are declared by Śruti, and though Śruti is the only reliable source which will make us know the nature of Brahman. For even when the ordinary things such as guns and bombs produce different and opposite effects on different occasions and in different places and times, and thereby baffle the intellect of man if it is not properly instructed, how much more difficult it must be to fathom the powers of Brahman by mere intellect? Reasoning cannot be applied to what is unthinkable; we must resort to Śruti alone to know the supra-sensuous.

The opponent may then wish the Śruti itself to remove the contradiction. The contradiction, he may point out, is not of the nature of two alternatives suggested in Karma-Kānda so that the adoption of one of them would remove the contradiction altogether. For instance, to accept or not the 'Śodako-cup at the sacrifice

is left to the option of the man, and so there is no contradiction between the two Vedic statements. But there is real contradiction between the partless nature of Brahman and its being transformed in the form of this world. Brahman is either partless or is transformed partially, if it is partless then it must get itself wholly transformed or not at all, and if it is only partially transformed, then it consists of parts. The contradictory statements are not like alternative actions which may be dependent on the choice of man, but refer to the nature of an already accomplished fact, viz. the Brahman, and therefore present a real difficulty.

But this is no real difficulty, we say in reply. A man of defective vision may see more than one moon, but there is only one moon. Similarly, though, in reality, Brahman ever remains the same, without any change, it is still the ground of the multiplicity of name and form of the phenomenal world. These distinctions of name and form are the effects of *avidyā*, and originate from speech alone. They are so illusory that they appear now to manifest, and now as unmanifest, now as different from Brahman and now as non-different from it; and yet they cannot change the nature of Brahman as being without parts. Even the *Śruti*-passages which refer to the transformation of Brahman have the only aim of directing us beyond the fact of creation or transformation to the knowledge of Brahman as being the *Ātman* of all; for it is only this knowledge which will carry us beyond the *mātrā*. The knowledge of the mere transformation by itself, on the other hand, will lead us nowhere. It is this interest in the *Ātman* rather than in any particular effect of creation or transformation which is obviously seen in such a passage of the *Śruti*. "He is not this, He is not that, etc." The negative description is useful to draw our attention from the phenomenal world, and fix it on the Brahman, which when known will make us fearless like *Jnāna* (Bg. 4, 1, 4).

आत्मनि चैव विविक्तम् द्वि । २८

[Ātman—in one; self, co—and, viśva—this; viśvaḥ—wonderful; co, he—even.]

AND EVEN WITHIN THE SELF WONDERFUL (CREATION) LIES THIS (IN ANOTHER). 28

We learn from Śruti that 'There are no changes, births and deaths' during the state of dream, but that the dreamer creates them (Br. 4, 3, 10). Gods and men, trees and elephants etc. without losing their own unity of being. Even so, there may exist a manifold creation in Brahman, without affecting its real nature and unity.

अवयवोपपन्नम् । २९

[Sva—own; paśya—note, doṣaḥ—due to defects; co—and.]

AND BECAUSE (THE SAME) DEFLECTION CAN BE EASILY AGAINST (THE CREATION) OWN VIEW, 29

The problem of the Śāṅkhya, too, it may be said, must either change into the world wholly or partially, and then there remains either no problem at all, or the view that it is partless must be given up. If, to avoid the difficulty, it be said that the three guṇas themselves are the three parts of prakṛti, we say in reply that in no way it solves the problem. For, in the first place as the Śāṅkhya believe, the creation is the combination of all the three guṇas, and so it cannot be said that some one or two of them evolve, and the remaining do not. Secondly, some of the three guṇas is considered by the Śāṅkhya as consisting of parts, so that we may say that some of the parts evolve and some do not. Thirdly, prakṛti will not be eternal, if it consists of parts. And finally to say that prakṛti may be considered as consisting of various powers is only to say what the Vedānta believes and not anything special.

The atom is the case with the atomists. On the one hand, if two particles atoms combine, they can do so easily by entering into each other and by occupying the same space, i. e. together they would form one atom again. If, on the other hand, the atom be conceived as coming in contact with another in some of its parts, the atomists shall have to give up their own view that the atom is particle.

The objections, therefore, which the Vedāntin has already refuted, cannot be held against him alone.

१० सर्वशक्तिवैकल्यम् । (५०-५१)

सर्वशक्तिः च सर्वशक्त्यः । ५०

[Śiva—all, upad—endowed with, ca—and ; śaktiśakti—power—power—for Śiva tells us]

Śiva (BRAHMAN) is endowed with all (powers); for (Śiva) tells us so. 30

The following Śruti-passages describe Him as endowed with all powers. 'He is the doer of all and causes all, he is all fragrance and all taste, he envelops the all, he is without organs of sense or action, and he is fearless' (Chā. 3, 14, 4). 'Whoever he wishes and desires is always true' (Chā. 3, 7, 1). 'He is omnipotent' (Mā. 1, 1, 9). 'It is by the command of the omnipotent Being that the sun and the moon are held up' (M. 3, 1, 9).

विश्वकर्मणोऽपि वैश्वकर्मः । ५१

[Viśvakaṛṇa—on account of absence of organs, vai—not, an ap—if it be said, tad—then, upad—has been said.]

It is he said (THAT BRAHMAN CANNOT BE THE CAUSE) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF ORGANS (WE SAY THAT) THIS HAS BEEN (ALREADY) EXPLAINED. 31

How can Brahman, it may be asked, be endowed with all power, if it is described only in negative terms? And granting that it possesses such powers, how can it produce the world, because it is 'without eyes, ears, speech or mind' (Br. 3, 8, 12)?

We have already considered this objection while discussing *Ādhyāya I* Br. 2, Śū. 18-20, and *Ādhyāya II* Br. 2, Śū. 4. The capacity of one being may not be the same as that of another. Brahman cannot be fettered by mere reasoning, we must know it by means of direct insight. Besides we have already seen that in spite of its being without qualities, Brahman can be perceived as being endowed with powers so long as it is wrongly believed that Brahman is connected with the various distinctions of names and forms of *avidyā*. Śaṅkara says in support of this: 'He holds the things, even though he has no hands, runs without feet, sees without eyes, and hears without ears' (Br. 3, 16).

८८ ज्योतिरनन्तमिदं ब्रह्म । (१२-१३)

॥ ज्योतिरब्रह्म ॥ १३

[Jyoti—*ant*, *jyotiḥśakti*—there being the source.]

(CAUTION IS) NOT (POSSIBLE FOR BRAHMAN) BECAUSE THERE MUST BE MOTIVE (FOR THE ACTIVITY OF INTELLECTUAL BEING). 12

The objector may again point out that no intelligent and thoughtful person begins even an unimportant work without some selfish motive, much less will it be in such a very important work as creating the universe with all the varied contents in it. Śaṅkara tells us that 'everything becomes dear to us for the sake of the self' (Br. 2, 4, 7). If therefore we attribute some selfish motive to the intelligent highest Atman for his act of creation, we shall be doing violence to his selfless nature. If, on the other hand, we say that there is no such motive, there will

be no activity at all, except the activity of a mad man, which of course can never belong to the Ātman on account of his adorned consciousness. Hence, it follows that creation cannot proceed from the intelligent Ātman.

लोडनम् लीलावैराग्यम् । ३३

[Lōḍanaṁ—as an experience, līlā—sport; līlā-vairāgyaṁ—mere.]

(THE CREATIVE ACTIVITY OF BRAHMAN) HOWEVER, IS MERELY SPORT, AS WE FIND IN (OUR) LIFE. 33

Just as boys are sporting for no special reason, or just as the breathing goes on naturally (even during sleep), even so, God's activity in creation is a natural sport with him and so cannot be shown to be due to any other motive, even if we resort to Śrīra or questioning. Nor can we assign any special reason for this peculiar nature or condition of God. It is possible that one may find some motive, however trifling or unconscious, even in the sport of boys or in laughing, but there may not be any motive for the activity of God. For the Śrīra says that he has no desire which is unfulfilled. And yet, we cannot compare his activity to that of a senseless man; for the Śrīra says that he is both conscious and greater. The following points must not therefore be forgotten in this connection:—(1) That creation is not real from the point of view of the highest Reality; (2) That it is only an appearance, and so consists of the names and forms of words; and (3) that the only purpose, which the Śrīra- passages dealing with creation serve, is to show that Brahman alone is the soul of all the created things.

६२ वैराग्यवैद्वैष्यादिविरागम् । (३४-३५)

वैराग्यवैद्वैष्यो न कोऽप्यपानवादि द्वैष्याति । ३४

[Vairāgya-vaidvīṣya—enmity and enmity, na—not; kō'api—being dependent; kō'api—also, he—also; dvaiṣyati—Śrīra says.]

INEQUALITY AND MISERY CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO GOD, FOR (HIS ACTIVITY) IS DEPENDENT (ON WHAT HE PERCEIVES); SHUKRA (ŚAUKYĀ) TELLS THE SAME. 34

Just as a pole is shaken in order to see if it is firmly fixed or not, even so, an objection is again raised to make the Vedānta theory unshakable. It is pointed out that because God has made the devotees extremely happy, the male extremely unhappy, and men partly happy and unhappy it appears that he too like ordinary persons possesses passion and anger, but this is contrary to the goodness which is ascribed to him by Śruti and Smṛiti. He may be considered as being very cruel because he causes pain and the ultimate destruction of all creatures. Brahman therefore need not be considered as the cause of the world.

The blame could have been ascribed to him, we say in reply, had God created the inequality without any reference to anything outside him. But being dependent on the unequal merits and demerits of the creatures, he is free from it. God is like rain, the uniform cause of production. The difference lies in the various seeds of rice barley etc. and not in the rain. Similarly, the various beings have differences among them on account of differences in their merits and demerits, and not on account of inequality on the part of God. Śruti tells us that 'whosoever he wishes to take up from this world, God makes him do good deeds and whosoever he wishes to take down makes him do bad deeds' (Kau- 3, 8). But once again, it is not the unequal wishes of God, but the unequal previous deeds of merit and demerit and the desires of beings that make them good or bad (Bg- 3, 2, 13). Śaṅkarācārya informs us that the punishment or the grace, coming from God, depends on the quality of the deeds of man, and not on God, for he 'treats men in the way in which they show their attitude' towards him (B. G. 4, 11).

॥ कर्मविनाशविनिर्वाणविनाशः । १५

[*Vi-*—and, *hina-*—abolished—owing to absence of dealing, or not-*ing* to be used, *na*, *anashaj-*—being without beginning.]

[If it be said THAT THERE WAS NO KARMA (BEFORE THE FIRST CREATION) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF QUALITY, (WE SAY THAT) IT IS NOT SO, FOR (ANANDA IS) WITHOUT BEGINNING.]

If, prior to creation, there was only 'One being, without a second', then it may be pointed out that there was no merit nor an account of which the creation might be unequal. And to say that God is guided by the merits of the actions is to argue in a circle; viz. action is dependent on body and other conditions, and that the body and other conditions are dependent on action. Indeed, God can be said to depend on the merits, once the distinctions are granted to be there, but the first creation, at least, must be perfectly uniform, because there was no action or merit prior to it.

But the objection is not valid; because the world has no beginning. The word and spirit appear to be dependent on each other, yet there is no logical flaw because both of them have no beginning. Similarly matter and emptiness may continue to operate upon each other because both are without any beginning.

उपपत्तेरनाशोऽप्यनन्तः । १६

[*Upapadyate*—is announced, *na*—and; *anashajate*—is found, *na*.]

[THAT ANANDA IS WITHOUT BEGINNING] IS ANNOUNCED (BY REASON) AND IS FOUND (IN SCRIPTURE).]

For if there be a beginning to *ananda*, there is no reason why it may begin to exist at a particular moment

and no reason why the souls once released may not be born again. And there being again no reason for the inequality of pleasure and pain, rewards and punishments may come without merit or demerit of previous actions. That God is not the cause of the inequality we have already seen. *Avidyā* also cannot by itself be the cause, for it remains the same in all the conditions of life, such as sleep, swoon etc. But the cause of inequality may be *avidyā*, provided it comes in contact with the merits or demerits of actions which the people are urged to do owing to anger, hatred and desire. Moreover to assume that the cause of inequality is the body, is to fall into a circular reasoning; for there will be no physical body without action, and no action without physical body. But if we believe the *śūdra* to be without any beginning, like the seed and the sprout, the causal connection between actions and the inequality appears reasonable.

Śruti and Smṛti also favour the view that the world is without a beginning. The very word '*jīva*' used for the *Ātman* in the passage, 'Let me enter with the *jīva* etc.' (Chā. 6, 3, 2), shows that it has been used to denote the function of sustaining the *prāṇas* in the body of an individual being. It is clear therefore that the *prāṇas* and along with them the bodies of the creatures ever existed without a beginning, if at all the use of the word '*jīva*' is to be justified. The word is not used in order to indicate a future relation with the *prāṇas*, for the future is only a possibility, while the past is already a fact. Similarly, the *smṛti*, 'As the creator thought of the former creation, he created the sun and the moon etc.' (Bg. 10, 102, 3; and the passage, 'Neither the *śūdra* part and form (viz. the *Brahman*), nor the beginning nor the end of this is known' (B. G. 15, 1), show us that the *śūdra* is without a beginning.

११ कर्मवर्गीयमलविद्यमवद् । (५७)

कर्मवर्गीयमवद् । ५७

[विद्यम्—all, विद्यमान—qualified, उपद्रव्यम्—being made-able, etc.]

AND REMOVING ALL THE QUALITIES ARE AVAILABLE (BRAHMAN IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD). ३७

So far, the Śūbrakīrti has removed all the objections, such as the difference in the nature of the world and the Brahman, and has proved that Brahman alone is the efficient and the material cause of the world. That this cause is at once, unobscured and omnipresent, and the ground of all, is sufficient to show that no further doubt be questioned regarding the Upanisadic foundations of the Vedāntic doctrine.

He will now proceed to the second Pāda where the main concern will be to refute the opinions held by other teachers.



ADHYĀYA SECOND

PĀDA SECOND

१ एकवाक्यमत्रविकल्पम् । (१-१५)

एकवाक्यमत्रैव वाक्यमत्रम् । १

[*Ekavākyam-āpāramāṇam*—owing to impossibility of doing
else—*not* ; *ekavākyam*—[reference]]

AND SHOULD THE ORDERLY ARRANGEMENT (OF THE
WORLD) IS NOT POSSIBLE, THE DIFFERENCE (OF THE ŚĀKHĪYA
THAT PRADHĪKA IS THE CAUSE) CANNOT BE (MAINTAINED). 1

The purpose of the Vedānta system is to expound
the meaning of the Upaniṣadic passages, and not to suggest
or refute by means of logic any particular view. And yet,
it is the duty of every student of the Vedānta to refute
the Śākhīya and other systems of thought, because they
are merely obstacles to right knowledge. Therefore it is
that a new plea is begun, after having, as far, established
our own position, which affords the means of escape to
those who desire it. One may counsel us to remain satisfied
with our own position and not to invite hate and anger
by refuting other views. But the refutation too has a
purpose of its own. It is to prevent the ordinary people
of no great intellect from putting their faith in systems
which are intrinsically worthless. The Śākhīya system,
for instance, is very likely to mislead the ignorant people
into believing that it contains right knowledge, because
it appears weighty on account of subtle reasoning used by
competent authorities. No doubt, we have already refuted
the Śākhīya and some others on different occasions
(while dealing with, 1, 1, 5 and 1, 4, 25). But this was
done only to show that the interpretations which they
put on the Vedānta-passages, which they too advanced

for establishing their position, were all fallacious. The refutation which we are now going to do will vigorously deal with the reasonings which they have adopted, and not with the Sanskrit-paragraphs which they have taken for support.

To begin with the arguments of the Mimāṃsikas: Just as mudhamāda of clay have clay alone as their cause even so, the external or the internal world of effects, whether house, body, or mind, endowed as it is with the characteristic marks of pleasure, pain and delusion must be supposed to have arisen from a cause which must also possess these three characteristics. It is these three qualities which together go to form the cause known as the three-fold *pradhāna*. Like clay, it is non-intelligent; but it evolves spontaneously into various modifications, for the sake of fulfilling the purposes of the soul, viz. the enjoyment of worldly pleasures and *mokṣa*. That *pradhāna* is the agent can also be inferred on account of other reasons,* such as the characteristic that things have measurement or dimensions.

* The *Śāṅkhya Sūtra* (2.1) mentions three such reasons.

वेदानां भीमावतलनवधानाभिक्रिहः दृष्टमिव ।
कदम्बकार्पवृक्षिवापद्विद्वन्महामहम् ॥

(a) The stones and other things in the world are the effects of combination of the several parts of these things. A piece of cloth is the effect of combination of several threads. There can be no time for combination in the *pradhāna* itself. *Pradhāna*, on the other hand, causes all these things just as clay causes the clay-composition. The three things of the world therefore have the samefold important position as clay does. (b) *Pradhāna* is the common cause of all the things in the world as all the results produced out of it, *pradhāna* is directed to all its products. (c) The capacity of movement or action is seen only in things which are non-intelligent. In nature, a thing moves as common of products in it of wood and iron, which are non-intelligent things. But can we see the same, because it is intelligent, therefore the non-intelligent substances must be the cause of all activity. (d) Stones and other are of the same nature, which is non-intelligent as the effects of the cause. The clay therefore the clay is non-intelligent as the effects of the cause. (e) The world itself is a product and not the cause. (f) The development of the effects are as results of a cause of nature nature. Cause of clay can only be directed to clay. The non-intelligent world therefore requires for its development a non-intelligent cause viz. the *pradhāna*.

To this we reply. It is nowhere observed in the world that a non-intelligent thing has a cause produced of its own accord anything which may be of use, unless it is guided by some intelligent being. Palaces and pleasure-grounds are prepared by intelligent workmen, and do not come into being of their own accord. How then can the wonderful world, which consists of the five elements, and of the immaterial things such as mind, intellect etc., and which baffles the imagination of even the most talented architects on account of the various species of beings and the arrangement of their organs, and the appropriate fruits for them contained in it, be created by a non-intelligent principle? Vases of particular form and size are produced out of clay, only if a potter is there; even so, the production must be ascribed to an intelligent being only under the guidance of an intelligent being. For the production of a pot, it is not simply the material cause, viz. the clay that is responsible, the efficient cause too, viz. the potter is equally required. Even so the original cause of the world need not be taken to be simply the non-intelligent mixture of pleasure, pain and misfortune; it is rather the efficient cause of an intelligent being. To say so is not to offend any canon of reasoning. On the contrary, we are in agreement with the teaching of Śruti which tells us that there is an intelligent cause of the world.

The word 'and' in the Sūtra is intended to state additional reasons for not believing in production as the cause. In the first place, the external and the internal objects of the world cannot be said to be of the nature of pleasure, pain and misfortune, because the latter are mental states while the former are the causes of them. Sound, for instance, as a mere object is not and the mere-

¹ Just as we perceive the growth of seeds in a season in the presence of the sun, an account of similar observation in a kitchen, even so, we can speak of intelligent cause of the world viz. the Brahman beyond the material cause of it viz. the prakṛti, as nothing as much as just as we see an intelligent potter, even so there the original spiritual cause of it viz. the Brahman.

It is neither pleasant nor painful in itself, yet it affects one person as pleasant, another as painful, and a third as neither pleasant nor painful, on account of the mental condition of the persons. In other words, it only means that objects such as sound are only the occasions of raising the feelings on account of the desires and mental disposition of men. The objects themselves do not consist¹ of pleasure, pain and indistinction, which correspond to the three guṇas of the prakṛiti. Broadly, if the Sāṃkhya can infer from the partial observation that some desires and limited things like spots, sprouts etc. are the result of conjunction of several things, to a generalisation that all the objects of the world are the effects of conjunction of several things, we too can say against them that the three constitutive qualities of the prakṛiti, viz. the attraction and repulsion, also arise on account of previous conjunction of several things, for they too are distinct and separate, and therefore limit one another.² Thirdly, as already pointed out, not all the effects are due to a non-intelligent prior condition; they are also due to an intelligent principle beyond it.

अनुलेखः २

[*Footnote*—because of tendency to activity, at— and]

AND REGARDING THE TENDENCY TOWARDS ACTIVITY
(KINDH LIPCHINA, PRACHINA IS NOT THE CAUSE) 3

¹ If things were in a state of efficient cause and indistinction, such a cause which is said to produce would be as a mother that engendereth a son, or again by analogy, would have been seen by men that such pleasure — indistinct.

² Limitation gives rise to these guṇas, due to difference, duration and inherent nature. The qualification, for its reality we pointed with reference to Hindu which is now, the temporal and does not exist, for it is the subject of the restrictive principles of the limitation, there is no place for time, the three guṇas, on the other hand, may be considered as such having a separate objective order of its own, but then the Sāṃkhya consider them as effects and causal aspects of prakṛiti.

Let us leave aside the consideration of the orderly arrangement of the world. Even the original differentiation of the three gunas from their espoused condition during the causation of the world, and the consequent subordination of two of them to the third one, so necessary for the production of the things of the world as classified into *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*, cannot be attributed to the non-intelligent, independent prakṛiti. We never see the clay changing itself into pots without the help of a potter, nor a chariot moving itself without a horse. So we say that unless there is an ultimate intelligent principle, prakṛiti can never be the cause of the world.

No doubt, it is true that the intelligent principle does not actually seem to be active, but it is a matter of common observation that the non-intelligent chariot is seen to be moving only when it is joined with an intelligent being, such as a horse. And yet it may be said by the Śāṅkhya that we see the activity as the non-intelligent chariot as certainly as we see the chariot itself, and that, on the other hand, we neither see the intelligent principle nor the activity located in that principle. At best, according to them, only the existence of the intelligent principle, and not its activity, is inferred as a cause of the actions which take place in a living body, which is chariot-like in nature to inanimate things like chariots. And so far as the existence of the intelligent also is concerned, it is inferred only when there exists a body, but when there exists no physical body, no intelligence too is found. In other words, as the Lokāyukta consider, intelligence is a mere attribute of the body. Activity therefore belongs only to what is non-intelligent.

To this we reply. We do not mean to deny activity to non-intelligent things where it is observed. Let it belong to them. What we want to assert is that it is

due to an intelligent principle. For just as the capacity to burn and shine which exists in wood, and which is not manifested in many fire as such, requires for its manifestation the conjunction of wood with fire, even so, the activity of any non-intelligent thing is seen only when the intelligent principle is present and not otherwise. That is why, as the Lokayatikas also admit, it is present in a living body and not in a corpse, present in a chariot driven by a horse, and not in a mere chariot. Intelligence therefore possesses the power to move, without any contradiction.

It may still be said that because the Ātman is, according to the Vedāntins, pure consciousness and nothing else, it must itself be incapable of activity and incapable of making others active. But the objection does not stand. For a thing may be devoid of motion and yet capable of moving other things. A magnet may not move itself, but moves a piece of iron, colours and other objects of sense do not move themselves, but make the eyes and other senses active. So, the omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient God too, being the Ātman of all, can move the universe, himself remaining unmoved. It is no objection to suggest that there being only one Brahman and nothing else, there can be no motion at all. For we have repeatedly said that inasmuch as the entire world consisting of names and forms has been the work of Māyā or avidyā, God too is imagined to be connected with it as the substratum on which the illusion exists. Thus there is room for activity if the ultimate cause of all is taken to be the all-knowing Brahman, but not when it is taken to be the non-intelligent prakṛiti.

कथमुक्तम्येवमिति । ३

[Pray]—*matā, aśite—water, tat—his, tat—it, atra—there, aya—now*

It is he said that (prāṇīna matir eva jñāna) and water and milk, (not only that) turn, too, (the activity is due to intelligence). 3

Citing further instances of the non-intelligent milk and water which flow themselves naturally for the nourishment of the calf and for the benefit of mankind, the Śāṅkhya may wish to prove that the prāṇīna also, in like manner, transforms itself into the world so that man should achieve the highest end of life.

The argument, however, is not adequate ; for both the pattern-sawyer in trying that activity is not observed in merely non-intelligent things such as chariots. The activity of the non-intelligent milk and water like that of the non-intelligent chariot, must be said to be equally guided by intelligence, and therefore cannot be cited as affording a new argument. Besides, it is the loving wish of the intelligent cow for the calf, and the sucking of milk by the intelligent calf, which make possible the flow of the milk. The flowing of water too is dependent on the low level of the ground. Besides, in a general way, it is dependent on the intelligent principle viz. the Brahman which is present everywhere. Śaṅkara also supports what we say : " He dwells and rules the water from within " (Bṛ. 3, 7, 4) ; " By the command of the Akṣara water runs flow to the east " (Bṛ. 3, 8, 9).

The present Śūtra may be shown to contradict Śūtra 24 of adhyaīya second, pāda first. For there, the natural change of milk into curds without any external cause was used by us as an illustration to show that God can create the universe out of himself without the help of any other instrument ; while here we say that all activity is guided by intelligence. But there is no contradiction between the practical way of explaining things, as we did on the former occasion, and the logical way of explaining them, as in the present Śūtra. For even the natural way of the changing of milk into curds requires the guidance of God.

अविनिश्चयवर्तमानेतिवाक्येनप्रामाण्यम् । ४

[*Vyavahāra-anavasthita*—there being nothing beyond, or unperceptible—there being no purpose.]

{AND BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING BEYOND (PRAMĀṆA AS THE BASIS OF ACTIVITY, THE PRAMĀṆA) CANNOT HAVE ANY PURPOSE (TO BE ACTIVE OR INACTIVE). 4

According to the view of the Śākhāyikas, *pramāṇa* means the equipoised condition of the three *guṇas*. And there being no other principle beyond *pramāṇa*, there is nothing which could make it active or inactive. For *prajña*, in their view, is indifferent and so cannot be said either to cause action or the cessation of action. *Pramāṇa* thus being utterly independent, it is impossible to know why it should sometimes transform itself into *māhāt* and other things, and why at other times it should not. God, on the other hand, can be active or not as he pleases, because he is omniscient and omnipotent and can make use of his will, whenever he wants.

अन्यथाशक्यत्वात् न तु यत्किंचिदम् । ५

[*Anyatha-śakya*, *śakya*—because of absence, or not, type—*śi*—not like grass and other things.]

Now (DOES PRAMĀṆA SOMETIMES ITSELF) LIKE GRASS ITS (WHICH CHANGES INTO MILK), FOR (THERE IS THE WHITE ANIMAL, E. G. A COW, THE CHANGE OF GRASS INTO MILK) DOES NOT SEEM REASONABLE. 5

The Śākhāyikas may again argue that just as grass, herbs and water get themselves naturally transformed into milk, even so the *pramāṇa* may transform itself into *māhāt*.

1. If the *pramāṇa* is uncaused, there is no knowing when it will continue to exist, and when it may stop. Supposing the contrary to exist, *pramāṇa* existing it may determine us to act (hence) we need no classification of the world. Or supposing the world to be uncaused, there may not be any beginning of it.

and other things. For had there been any other cause responsible for transforming grass into milk, men could have employed it to produce as much milk as they liked. But as this is not done, the process must be considered as natural; and so too may expect the same in the case of prakṛiti.

We do not admit this; because we know that some other cause is responsible for changing grass into milk. It is only that grass, which is eaten by a cow, that changes into milk, and not that which is not eaten, nor that which is eaten by an ox. Besides, an event need not be said to be natural, simply because man cannot accomplish it. For things not brought about by men, are brought about by divine activity. And we do find that men too feed the cows with plenty of grass etc. if they want plenty of milk. Hence it is not correct to say that prakṛiti modifies itself spontaneously like grass and other things.

अप्रयत्नोऽप्यप्रयत्नः । ५

[*Abhyasaprasa-advaitaḥ, apratya, avāha-śābhaḥ—dhatuḥ
bhūḥ no purpose.*]

EVEN ADMITTING (THE SPONTANEOUS ACTIVITY OF PRAKṚITI, THERE REMAINS THE DEFECT OF) THERE BEING NO PURPOSE (FOR SUCH ACTIVITY), 5

Now, if by saying that prakṛiti is spontaneously active, it is meant that it is not in need of any other principle beyond it, it must also mean that it acts independently of any purpose. But to say so is to go against the very tenet of the Śāṅkhya view that the prakṛiti becomes active for fulfilling the purposes of man. If, on the other hand, the Śāṅkhya says that the spontaneous activity of prakṛiti is necessarily purposive, though not dependent on some other principle, we must search what that purpose is. If, in the first place, that purpose is to provide with appropriate pleasures and pains to the Puruṣa, we have

to suppose, what is impossible on the Stoic hypothesis, that the *Purpos* what is eternally unchanging undergoes corresponding modifications of increase or decrease in his nature¹. Besides, there would be no release, because experience of pleasure and pain has been now accepted as the only motive for the activity of *prohairesis*. If, in the second place, the purpose is to achieve the liberation of the *purpos*, it is merely to remove the experience that is, something which has already been realised; for the *purpos* was in the condition of liberation even before the activity of *prohairesis*. Besides, if the motive is not to provide with the pleasures and pains of life, there would be no empirical experience of worldly life, such as sounds, colours etc. If, again, in the third place the purpose be conceived as both removing pleasures and pains, and liberation, we shall find there no *anything* rather is possible. Liberation is not possible because the objects produced by *prohairesis* are infinite and so there would be no escape at all for final release. Satisfaction of the desire to fulfil the human ends cannot, as a matter of fact, be attributed to *prohairesis*, because it is not intelligent; nor can any desire be attributed to the *purpos* because he is said to be pure and passionless².

If, to avoid all these difficulties, the *prohairesis* is said to be active on account of its inherent power to produce, and on account of the inherent power of the *purpos* to 'look on' at things produced, we observe that there will be no less existence of this *anything* on account of the

¹ Even a phenomenal change must be ascribed to the *purpos*, according to the metaphysics of allegories or transmigration of souls (theory of *metempsychosis*), as in the Vedānta, is foreign to the theory of the Stoicists — *Chakrapani*.

² We will show, however, in chapter IV, that it does not require the activity of *prohairesis* for the coming into being.

³ *Phronesis* is a kind of *logos* of the soul, which is rational pure and is related with the capacity to know the distinction between good and evil, right and wrong etc. *Phronesis* characterises the capacity just as there is a sense characterises the capacity to reflect things.

imperishable nature of these two powers. In other words, once again, there will be no liberation at all. Hence it is incorrect to say that prakṛiti becomes active for the sake of fulfilling the purposes of the puruṣa.

दुर्लभमविति वैश्वमिति । ७

[Puruṣa, almost-^{ly} magnet : is : etc., rather-up-^{er} even then]

Is it in fact that (PURUṢA MOVES THE PRAKṚITI, AS A (LAMP) MAN (MAY LEAD A BLIND MAN) OR AS THE MAGNET (MAY ATTRACT THE IRON), EVEN THEN (THE DIFFICULTY REMAINS) ?

If the puruṣa is said to move the prakṛiti, then, in the first place, the Śāktīya has to abandon his own position, viz., that the prakṛiti is active on its own account, and that the puruṣa possesses no moving power. How indeed should the indifference, inactive puruṣa move the prakṛiti ? A blind man, no doubt, may lead a blind man by mounting on his back, but he leads him by means of words etc. How can the puruṣa, who is devoid of action and qualities be expected to move the prakṛiti ? Similarly, the magnet moves near the iron and then attracts it. But the puruṣa and the prakṛiti are permanently near each other, and so there would be perpetual activity and no final release. Besides, the magnet is required to be made clean before it can be expected to attract iron. The puruṣa, on the other hand, is already pure. Hence the illustrations are inadequate. So, between the non-intelligent prakṛiti and indifferent puruṣa, there being no third principle, there can be no connection at all between the two. Besides, as proved in the preceding śloka, there can be no purpose of the activity of prakṛiti, even though it is now assumed that that activity is caused by puruṣa. The highest Ātman, on the Vedānta doctrine, is only indifferent so far as its own nature is concerned. Still it is considered as active as its relation to mītrā.

and that is why there is no inconsistency* so say that the *Ātman* is both active and inactive.

वैविध्यवृत्तौ च । ८

[Anyon-ation of principal (and subordinate), anyon-
not-being responsible, co-and.]

AND AGAIN (THE THREE *Ātman*) ARE NOT RELATED AS PRINCIPAL (AND SUBORDINATE, *PRADĪNA* CANNOT BE ACTIVE) †

Pradhāna means the supposed, stored condition of the three co-ordinate, independent parts of active regard and action. So, the moment any one of them becomes superior to others, the very characteristic nature of the parts and therefore of the *pradhāna* itself will be lost. ‡ And as there exists no external principle to disturb the parts, the evolution of the universe will not be possible.

कल्पवृत्तौ च कृत्तृनिर्णीयाद् । ९

[Anyon- in another way, dependence- of inferred, co :
pradāna- intelligence, anyone being denied of.]

AND THROUGH ANOTHER MEANS (THE
INFERRED *Ātman*) *PRADĪNA* (INTELLECT) IS DENIED OF IN-
TELLIGENCE ‡

The *Śākhya*s may say that as he has no proof to
hold that qualities are unchangeable and without relation,

* The *Śākhya* view is contradictory because the *prajñā* is conceived to be both passive and the source of *pradhāna*. The *Yogin*s reply, as the *Ātman* itself has no self-contradiction, because there is the conception of *anyon* (*anyonanyatā*) arising out of ignorance or *Māyā*. The *Ātman* cannot go to the nature of the world and the nature of material substance, as source of creation. But when the part of *prajñā* of *Ātman* has the knowledge, there being no identity, the *prajñā* is neither dependent nor the source of empirical experience.

† *Pradhāna* will therefore neither be considered as *Ātman* (being denied by itself) nor *pragmatā* (known as a person).

he may infer from the nature of the effects that the qualities have got, in spite of their equipoise, the capacity to change and produce the effects. Even then, we reply that the argument will contain the defect we have already pointed out, viz., that there will be no orderly arrangement of the world, if the prakāśa is not-intelligent. And if, to avoid this difficulty, the Śālikhya would say that prakāśa too is intelligent, then he will not differ from us at all. For what we call Brahman, he will call prakāśa. And there will be only one intelligent principle which will also be the material cause of this material universe. Granting further that the gunas are capable of undergoing inequality in spite of their equipoise, they will never be unequal in the absence of an adequate cause. So there may not be any evolution of the world at all. Or if the gunas somehow happen to be unequal without any cause, they will always remain so, and there will be perpetual stagnation and no release.

निवर्तिताभावात् । १ *

[Vipratyakṣaḥ-cause is contradictory; no-and; answer-
 ॥prati- not satisfactory.]

REASON, (THE ŚĀLIKHYA DOCTRINE) IS UNSATISFACTORY ON ACCOUNT OF ITS CONTRADICTIONS. 21

The Śālikhya doctrine, moreover, contains many contradictions. Sometimes, they say that there are seven stages, sometimes eleven.¹ In some places, they tell us that the five subtle elements (sūksmāra) evolve from the great principle (mahat), while in other places, they are said to evolve from the consciousness of the ego (ātmabhāva). Sometimes, they speak of one internal organ, viz., the intellect (antahkaraṇa), sometimes of three viz. mind, intellect and ego-sense. Besides, it is well known that

* Five years of spirit, five of knowledge, and eight or five years of ego-sense, and the state of truth which transcends the five years of knowledge.

Such doctrine contradicts the Śveti teaching that God is the cause of the world.

At this, the Śāhikya too, brings a counter attack. The Vedānta doctrine also, says he, cannot be accepted, because even the practical distinction which the whole world is making between a person who suffers and his suffering is not possible on the Brahmanic theory. The sufferer and the suffering will be considered as the attributes of Brahman itself, and therefore the teaching of the Śveti, that knowledge should be attained for the purpose of getting an end to all suffering, loses its significance. A little consideration however will show that these are different though connected just as the flame though distinct cannot come apart from its light and heat, or just as, even in the illustration used by the Vedānta,¹ the sea-water, can never be conceived to be permanently different from the waves and foam, which are sometimes manifest and sometimes not, even so the Ātman must be thought of as essentially connected with its attributes of jñā and māhātā, or which is the same thing, as the sufferer and the suffering. In other words, if the Ātman is essentially and permanently bound up with the sufferer and the suffering, though not the same as the latter, there will be no release at all.

That the sufferer and the suffering are two different things from the practical point of view can be seen in another way also. An object of desire is different from the person who desires it; otherwise there will be no desire at all. A flame e. g., does not desire to have light, for it possesses it already. Nor can it be said that the object of desire desires itself, for this is nowhere seen. The relation implied in desire, cannot be established with reference to one thing or person only; it requires two terms to relate, viz., the object of desire and the person

¹The Vedānta shows that the Ātman may provide the same even though the individual goes away.

desiring it. The same holds good if instead of down there is heaven. Now there being a far greater number of objects of aversion or dislike than that of like, both of them are generally known as the objects that cause suffering to man.* To return to the point, if both the sufferer and the suffering go to form one self, there would be no release. But if they are two, then there is the possibility of release, inasmuch as the cause of bondage, viz., wrong knowledge may be removed.

We reply that all this reasoning is pointless. For Brahman being the only reality, there can neither be the sufferer and the suffering as two distinct things, nor any relation between them. For can neither birth nor death exist itself, even though it may be said that it possesses the attributes of heat and light, and grows in volume etc. No doubt from the practical point of view, it may be said that the Sun is the cause of suffering, while the living body which is scorched by the heat is the sufferer. Yet we cannot admit the argument of the Śāṅkhya that the suffering or pain may in reality belong to the intelligent being alone, and not to the non-intelligent body, on the ground, as he says, that if it were to belong to the latter, it would, as the Udrāṅgas hold, cease with the cessation of the body, and that there would therefore be no need to search for the means of liberation of the soul. For, apart from the fact that nobody can ever imagine a disembodied being becoming the object of suffering, the Śāṅkhya too, on his own theory, cannot admit the soul or puruṣa who is essentially pure to be affected by pain, either directly by itself or indirectly through the coverings of the body. Nor, again, can the conception of pain and puruṣa be established through the conception of puruṣa and aśvapura, and through the division of

*These words are translated as they occur, viz. in the first part of the number. Actually there are two to be supplied. Further, they mean good contrary when proceeding from, and of bad when proceeding towards. Hence, it is not always that they are good and that thought is good or heaven, but not in itself—Māṇḍūkya, by Śaṅkara, verse 10. Page 155.

suffer by rage. For there can be no connection between the non-intelligent gages and the intelligent and painless paraga. And finally if the paraga be supposed to suffer as it were, simply because he is said to be reflected in the sarva, we have no objection to his being so imagined to suffer, as it were. But to suppose that an *anaphasena* is like a serpent is not to make it poisonous, nor is it to make a serpent non-poisonous by supposing it to be like an *anaphasena*. Thus, on the theory of the *Śālisthaya*, too, the relation between the sufferer and the suffering is not real, or which is the same thing as the *Vedāntins* say, it is the effect of *avidyā*. The fact of suffering and the distinction between the sufferer and the suffering are in other words, impossible and unreal.

The *Śālisthaya* may again take a new line of thought and argue that the paraga is capable of suffering on account of the non-discrimination of the fact that he is different from *pradhāna*, and that therefore there will be release for him as soon as there will be the separation from him of the cause of non-discrimination, viz. the *tanogaga*. But this is to make the release all the more impossible. For, as the *Śālisthaya* believes, the *tanogaga*, which is the root cause of non-discrimination and non-release, is eternal as *mitra*, and as the conquest or defeat of one gaga by the other is neither final nor overwhelming, the *tanogaga* may at any time again overpower the *mitra*, and thus clouding the intellect of man may again bind him.¹

To the *Vedāntins*, on the other hand, release, or final release is an undoubted fact. For the *Ātman* alone being the one unchanging entity, and the so-called plurality having its origin in speech, as the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* says there cannot be any such distinction or relation as *mitra*

¹ The *Śālisthaya* argues that the conflict of the *mitragaga* becomes clouded by the non-discrimination of *tanogaga*, and so the paraga experiences the suffering released by rage. The paraga, however, unpermeated, is other than, is the quality of *pradhāna*. While, however, the non-discrimination means to be rid of the dominion of *mitra* over *tanogaga*, then what the *Śālisthaya*.

between subject and object or between sufferer and suffering in spite of the cognition of these in practical life.

२. ब्रह्मदीपनिवृत्तयम् । (११)

To refute now the stated theory of the Vaiśeṣika who argue as follows. 'White threads produce a white piece of cloth, and not of any other colour. From this we can infer that qualities which are found in the cause reappear in the effect. So, if we assume the intelligent Brahman as the cause of the world, we should expect the same quality of intelligence in the world also. But, as this is not, we conclude that Brahman is not the cause of the world.'

It is the reasoning which the Sūprakāśa shows to be fallacious, by taking his stand on the theory of the Vaiśeṣika themselves.

ब्रह्मदीपनता इत्यनेकव्यस्तम्भाद् । (११)

[*Brāhmaṇa-dīpaṇa-tat—as having dimensions known as 'width' and 'length', viz. *prāṇa-parmanūdāyaka*—from what is narrow and spherical.*]

AND, JUST AS (SPACE AND TIME FORMING DIMENSIONS OF) 'BREADTH' AND 'LENGTH' (ARISE FROM ATOM FORMATION) MINUTENESS AND SPHERICITY, (EVEN SO, THE WORLD MAY ARISE OUT OF BRAHMAN), (11)

The theory of the Vaiśeṣika is as follows:—'The atoms are spherical, though specific atoms have got specific qualities. During the time of dissolution, they do not produce anything, but at the time of a new creation, they come together on account of the force of the unseen

1. Each atom has got, by nature, the four qualities of colour, taste and smell, water atoms have more smoky smell, fire atoms have less the colour and smell, while air atoms have only one quality viz. touch.

marks and demerits of the actions of the soul, and being combined with the will of God, produce the entire world of effects. Along with this production, the qualities of the causes are reproduced in the effects. Thus when two atoms produce a dyad, the white colour of the atoms is produced in the dyad, but not the original sphericity or 'pīrṇatā' of the atoms. For the dyad is said to assume the new dimensions of 'aśūta' (smallness) and 'rāśvatā' (shortness). When two (four) dyads, in their turn, combine to produce a tetrad, it is the whiteness of the cause which is found to be repeated in the effect, but not the dimensions; for the tetrad assumes the new dimensions of 'mahatā' (largeness) and 'dīrghatā' (length). Similar is the case when many simple atoms, or many dyads, or an atom and a dyad combine to produce new effects.

So, if at every stage, while passing from atom to dyad, or from dyad to triad and tetrad, dissimilar qualities are produced on the Vaiśeṣika theory, we have to say that on the Vedānta theory also, there may arise the non-intelligent world from the intelligent Brahman.

At this, the Vaiśeṣika may say that the products like dyads, triads etc. being endowed with qualities opposed in nature to those of the causes, it is not possible for the latter to overcome the former and reappear in their place. But non-intelligence is not a quality opposed in nature to intelligence; it is merely the negation or absence of intelligence, and so there is nothing to prevent the Brahman from reproducing its quality of intelligence in the world.

But the argument is not correct. For, in the first place, the intelligence of the Brahman is not produced in the world, just as sphericity of the atoms is not produced in their effects. It cannot be said, in the second place, that the old qualities cannot be repeated because the effect is being endowed with new qualities. For, as the Vaiśeṣikas hold, substances are, in the first instance,

devoid of qualities, but become endowed with them only in the second instant; and so, it is possible that the old qualities can reproduce themselves in the effects during the period in which the latter are without any qualities. Nor can it be said, in the third place, that the old qualities like sphericity etc. are incapable of reproducing themselves inasmuch as it is those which create new and dissimilar qualities in new effects. As Karstén says, the new qualities such as 'maharva' (largeness), and 'dighatva' (length) arise out of plurality or largeness contained in the cause; *agave* (smallness) and *charatva* (shortness), on the other hand, arise when there is neither plurality nor largeness in the cause. In other words, as Karstén himself tells, these new qualities do not come out of the original qualities of sphericity etc. (Vat. 36 T. 1, 3 and 12 and 17). Nor finally can it be said that the plurality of the constituent members of a cause or the dualty of them 'being contiguous' with the effects produces the 'maharva' or 'agave' in them, though it is not so with sphericity etc. because these qualities of the cause instead of being contiguous with the effects, are, on the contrary, remote from them. As a matter of fact, all the qualities of the cause must reside in it in exactly the same manner, that is, either on all or on some of the parts of the cause, and are therefore equally contiguous or not with the effect. The reason then why sphericity etc. are not seen reproduced in the effects is not that they are not contiguous.

* When two things combine to make a dyad, the number 'two' is said to be contiguous with the dyad, while the 'dyaditva' or the 'dyadness' of the number is not said to be contiguous with the dyad. And further, not in the dyad is dependent but is contingent on two things taken together, not on the one of the two things taken separately, as also the number 'two' itself, as the two things taken together and not on each of them taken separately. The 'dyadness' of the number, however, being not made known separately, and not in two instances taken taken together. Therefore it is that 'dyadness' is said to be away or not contiguous with the dyad. Similarly, the 'maharva' (largeness) of total is contingently related to the plural number of the dyad—not of which the total number and it is contiguous with the total. The 'agave' of the dyad on the other hand stands to only one dyad and not on several dyads taken together, and so is not contiguous with the total. *Vat. 36, Monthi Tika. Atiyanta (Jaina Vat. II Page. 119).*

but that they have this natural mode of behaving. Why then can we not say with reference to the intelligence of the Brahman that it has the natural way of not being reproduced in the world?

Besides, we do find that from the quality known as conjunction, (*samyoga*) of the threads, there results the substance viz. a piece of cloth (and so the statement that the cause and effect are similar in nature is not true). If the Vaiśeṣika would object to comparing a quality with substance and thereby prevent us from saying that the Brahman, as substance, can produce a dissimilar effect, we reply that we are only interested in pointing out that the effect is dissimilar from the cause. Besides, there is no rule that while adducing examples one must choose the example of a quality, when the quality is under discussion or choose that of a substance when the substance is under discussion. Kapila himself cites the example of a quality when substance is under discussion, as in *Sūtra*, 4, 2.2, 'Inasmuch as the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible, is itself imperceptible, the body is not composed of the five elements.' The meaning of the *Sūtra* is that just as the quality of conjunction which is said to be inherent in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible *śūnā*, is itself imperceptible, even so, if the physical body were so made as whose parts constituted five elements some of which (viz. the earth, water and fire) are perceptible, and some (viz. air and *śūnā*) are not, it too would have been imperceptible. But the body is perceived, and hence it is not composed of the five elements. It is thus that Kapila himself has given the lead in comparing the quality of conjunction with the substance, viz. the body. Besides in *Sūtra* 6 of *Piṇḍa* 2 of *Adhyāya* 2, we have shown that the effect may be different from the cause. And though this is a repetition and we could have avoided it, (as we once did avoid a repetition while dealing with II, 1, 3 and 13) what we wished to do here is to relate the Vaiśeṣikas on their own ground.

॥ कदाचिदपि न कर्मादनुदयात् । (१५-१८)

उदयमपि न कर्मादनुदयात् । १५

[Udayachhiti—both udaya, १८, śhiti—activity; १८—
karma, १८—abstained—absence of that.]

NO ACTIVITY (IN SOMNUS) NOTWITHSTANDING BOTH
WAKE, BEING THE ABSENCE OF SLEEP (VIL. THE CREATION
OF THE WORLD) 12

Now begins the refutation of the atomic theory which can be stated thus. A piece of cloth is connected with the threads which are contained in it by the substance known as 'soma' (sya), and the several threads are brought together by 'samyoga'. In general, we may say that the parts inherent in any whole are brought together by conjunction; and that all things which consist of parts such as mountains and seas, or the four elements of earth, water, fire and air come out of the different combinations of four kinds of atoms. It is these things which can be considered as wholes of parts and which can ultimately be said to be produced out of atoms and disintegrated back into the atoms, at the time of the dissolution of the universe. But the atom being the limit of divisibility cannot be dissolved or destroyed. At the time of creation therefore the atoms of air first come together on account of the motion caused in them by the unseen cause and descent of the soul, and then it is that dyke, each etc. of the element of air are produced only to give rise to the air itself. Similar is the production of the other three elements of fire, water and earth in succession, and of the physical body and the senses. Thus is how the whole universe has come out of atoms. As for the qualities of the successive products, they are, as already seen, like those of the earlier causes. The quality of whiteness for instance of a piece of cloth is the same as that of the threads. Such, in brief, is the view of Kapila and his followers.

To this we reply. In the first place, it must be admitted that the conjunction which takes place between the several separate atoms at the time of creation is due to some action, like the one required in hanging about the conjunction of threads into a piece of cloth. The action, in its turn, implies some effort on the part of the soul, or some impact of one thing against another, like the impact, for instance, of wind with the tree, or of the hand with the thing which is moved by it. The effort of the soul is possible only when the mind is joined with the soul, and the impact only after the creation of the products like wind etc. But neither is possible during the condition of dissolution, because there is neither the physical body, nor any evolved product or thing except in its atomic condition. Therefore the causes which are only possible to exist after the creation of the world cannot be thought of as existing before it and producing the initial action necessary for the conjunction of the atoms. Creation therefore out of the atoms is impossible.

If, in the second place, it is said that it is the principle of 'unseen' accumulation of merits and demerits that causes the original motion of the atoms, we reply that this is not possible at all, whether the principle resides in the soul or in the atoms. For it is a non-intelligent principle, and as already shown in our examination of the Sāṅkhya view, a non-intelligent thing cannot of itself be the cause of any action. Nor can we suppose that the principle is guided by the soul, because the soul too is not intelligent in the Vaiśeṣika view. Even if the 'unseen' principle is said to reside in the soul there will be no connection between the principle and the atoms; and if the soul is said to be connected with the unseen soul as indirectly, if the unseen principle in the soul is said to be connected with them, there will be perpetual activity and perpetual creation and therefore no dissolution at all. Hence

[This will occur especially when the theory, who is according to the Vaiśeṣika, changed and self-sufficient, is supposed to be the cause of the action in the atoms, on account of the guidance of the unseen principle in the individual soul.

in the absence of any definite cause of action, there will be no activity in the atoms. Hence, further, there will be no conjunction of different atoms and no formation of dyads, triads, etc. In other words, there will be no creation at all.

Supposing the atoms combine, do they interpenetrate each other or are joined only partially? In the former case, there would be no increase in volume or size; and in the latter, the atoms shall have to be conceived as consisting of parts.¹ And even if they are imagined to be made up of parts, due to their position and direction in space, their conjunction will be an unreal thing of imagination, and so will not be useful as an efficient cause in producing dyads, triads, etc. And finally, as seen above, just as creation of things becomes impossible on account of any variable cause of motion and the consequent conjunction of the atoms, even so, the dissolution of the world will be impossible in the absence of any variable cause for the separation of the atoms. Nor can the attraction be saved by resorting to the unseen principle as the cause of dissolution, for it may explain the occurrence of pleasure and pain in this world, but not the state of complete dissolution in which there is neither pleasure nor pain. In short, in the absence of any cause, with or without, for the action and conjunction of the atoms there will be neither creation nor dissolution possible in the Vaisiṣṭika theory. It must therefore be rejected.

समस्तानामुत्पत्तयाम् सम्पत्तयन्तीति । १३

[Samarāṇāṃ, all-utpattayām—being adorned, or, adorned—owing to resemblance, samprāptāḥ—on account of ripeness and infirmity.]

AND BECAUSE THE INFLUENCE OF SAMARĀṆĀ which KUNDURA (THE DYAD IN ITS RELATION TO THE ATOM) LEADS TO KNOWLEDGE AND INFIRMITY (THERE WILL BE NEITHER CREATION NOR DISSOLUTION) 13

¹ Necessarily, in the former case, there will be no production of net desired effect; the latter is simply a continuation of the Vaisiṣṭika doctrine. —Rāmapada.

The relation of *anavripi* (inherence) too in the doctrine of the *Wastepika* will not be sufficient to explain the creation and the dissolution of the world. For just as a dyad which renders or unrenders two atoms is absolutely different from them, even so the relation of inherence or *anavripi* which is equally different from the two atoms must render in them on account of a second relation of *anavripi*. But this second relation will similarly require a third, and so on ad infinitum. It may be said that *anavripi* is never seen as an unconnected relation or as depending on some other connection, so that it may ultimately lead to the regress. On the contrary, it may be shown to be eternally present in the things which we see here and before us.¹ But in that case, *anavripi* (composition) also, we reply, can be said to be eternally connected with things which are joined together, and need not therefore depend on a further connection viz. *anavripi*, as the *Wastepika* supposes. Like *anavripi*, *anavripi* is a distinct relation, and so ought to depend on some other relation. Nor can it be said that *anavripi* is dependent on another relation because *anavripi* is the name of a quality, while *anavripi* is self-sufficient because it is not a quality. But this is no proof. For categories other than the category of quality, such as "being" and "essence" are in need of the relation of *anavripi*. The one thing which is common to both *anavripi* and *anavripi*, and an account of which *anavripi* is dependent on another relation, is the fact that both of them are absolutely different from the terms they relate, and so, *anavripi* too is dependent on a second *anavripi*. Now, as seen above, this involves the regress and makes the last term of the series unexplicable inasmuch as there is no relation beyond it with which it must be connected to have its own being possible. But being connected with this unexplicable last relation of *anavripi* all the earlier relations of *anavripi* also are as good as naught. So ultimately, in the absence of *anavripi* there will be no

¹ E.g. a piece of chalk is always, qualitatively and atomically, connected to whatever, qualitatively and atomically, it is connected to.

production of a dyad out of any two atoms. There
 is therefore no creation on the atomic theory.

शिवमेव च कथम् । १४

[Nityam—permanent, eva—only, ca—and katham—
 how?—because of existence].

AND REGARDING OF EXISTENCE (OF THE NATURAL
 ACTIVITY OR NON-ACTIVITY OF ATOMS) THERE WILL BE THE
 CONTINUATION OF IT. 14

Now the Vaisesika may resort to four possibilities.
 Either the atoms are naturally endowed with activity,
 or with non-activity, or with both or with neither. If
 the first, there will be perpetual creation and no dis-
 solution; if the second, there will be perpetual dis-
 solution, and no creation; the third is a statement of
 contradiction, and if the fourth, the activity or other-
 wise of the atoms must be due to some other cause.
 Now if this cause be the 'samana' approximation of atoms
 and elements, the very proximity of it with the atoms
 will cause permanent activity, otherwise there will be
 inactivity again.

लादिस्वाभा विषयो दर्शयत् । १५

[Lāpadi—swabha—an account of possessing colour and
 others, viśayam—objects, darśayati—because it is
 observed].

AND OPPOSITE CONCLUSION (WILL FOLLOW) IF ATOMS
 ARE ENDOWED WITH OTHERS ETC., AS IS OBSERVED (OF
 RAILY BEHAVIOUR), 15

Our ordinary experience tells us that things possess-
 ing colour and other qualities are more transitory and
 gross than their causes. A piece of white cloth is
 bigger and more easily perceptible than the filaments.
 Therefore the atoms of the Vaisesikas too, if admitted as

having colour, taste, smell and touch, must be due to some other cause, and must be gross and transient in comparison with that cause.

And if atoms have a cause, then Kaṇḍikā's definition of a permanent thing as 'That which has existence but no cause', (Vai ŚG 4, 1, 1) cannot be made applicable to atoms. The second reason also which Kaṇḍikā gives for the permanency of the atoms, viz. that if they too, as causes, are not permanent then there would be no meaning in making a specific reference to the non-permanency of the effects (4, 1, 4), is not at all adequate. No doubt the prefix 'no' (a) can never be applied to the word 'permanent' (nitya) and the word 'impermanent' can mean anything unless there is something which is permanent. But this is no ground to suppose that the atoms alone are permanent, for as we, the Vedāntins, hold the Brahman is the permanent cause. Besides, the mere use of a word need not be taken as a sufficient ground for the existence of a thing implied by that word, on the contrary, the thing which is the content or meaning of the word must be first established as existing by other means of knowledge. And if 'ignorance' of cause, that is the 'non-perception of the cause of atoms which exist themselves and which produce perceptible effects by their being combined,' is given as the third reason (4, 15) for believing that the atoms are permanent, we may say that this is too wide. For thereby we may believe that like atoms the dyads also are permanent, because they exist and produce perceptible effects like jars and cloth, and are themselves produced by atoms which are non-perceived. If to avoid this difficulty, the Vedāntin would say that he means by 'ignorance' or 'non-perception' of cause only the non-existence of a material substance responsible for the production of the effects, and that thereby he would prevent the dyads from being considered as permanent on account of atoms being there as the material substance out of which the dyads have come into being, then this is nothing but a repetition of the

either Śūtra (4, 1, 1) which speaks of the absence of cause as the ground of permanence of the atoms. In other words, the Śūtra, 4, 13, is superfluous.

The 'analysis' or non-perception in the Śūtra, 4, 1, 1, may again be interpreted by the Vaiśeṣika in a new way. According to him a thing can be destroyed either by the destruction of its cause or by the disintegration of it. The atoms having no further cause cannot be destroyed in either of these two ways. And there is no third reason of destruction known to man. Be it in the absence of any additional reason of destruction that is meant by the word 'analysis.' And because there is no such reason, the atoms are said by him to be permanent.

This reasoning of the Vaiśeṣika may be said to be correct provided the thing that comes into being is the result of combination of several substances. In that case alone, that particular thing will be said to perish, if the several substances become separate from each other or are themselves destroyed. In either case, in other words, as the Vaiśeṣika holds, there will be the end of that particular thing on account of the end of the 'composition' of the several substances. But as the Vedāntins view it, destruction of the effect is possible only by a modification in its condition, just as the solidity of ghee is destroyed by its being transformed into the liquid condition. Similarly, atoms may not be destroyed or disintegrated but may be transformed into a finer non-atomic condition, which is the condition of the being of Brahman.

अथवा न वेदात् । १५.

[Utiyarthā-haṁ veda, / an-and, śūtra-that is defect].

¹ Composition is the necessary cause in the Vaiśeṣika theory. Along with its cause being its being, and substance, new things, neither being with its cause, nor its disintegration of the several components causes, the thing also is destroyed. This may be true as far as Śrībhāṣya's is concerned. But as the Śūtra-idea of the Vedāntins, destruction may take place by modification of condition of cause. The Vedāntins do not hold that a jar is a new thing. It is not

How do these ideas affect the overall story? 15

The four elements of earth, water, fire and air are said to possess in decreasing number from four to one, the qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch, and are therefore endowed with increasing fineness. Water is subtler than earth because it does not contain smell; fire is subtler still because it lacks both smell and taste; and air is the subtlest of all because it lacks all the qualities except touch. Now if the specific atoms also are likewise supposed to possess qualities in decreasing number, the atoms which have the largest number of qualities will, necessarily, in view of the principle just observed, be larger in volume and greater in quality than those which have a small number of qualities. But, in that case, they will cease to be called atoms. And if, on the other hand, in order to maintain the equality of all kinds of atoms we suppose that they have each only one specific quality, the effect ion will have only one quality. Fire will be devoid of touch, water of colour and touch, and earth of touch, colour and taste. Or again, to maintain the equality, we suppose that each kind of atom is endowed with four qualities, then contrary to actual experience, we shall have to believe that water has smell, or that fire has smell and taste, or that air has smell, taste and colour. Hence we conclude that the atomic theory is not acceptable.

2017年12月15日 星期五

[² paragraph]—because not accepted, as—and, against—
 accepted, accepted—desired]

AND AS IT IS NOT ACCEPTED, (BY ANY CHRISTIAN
NATION) IT IS TO BE COMPLETELY DISREGARDED. 17

The other hand, was drawn from the earth, and on the character of the pot shows the derivation of a particular meaning of the word. It is known only as *ummal-ummal* and was *ummal-ummal*.

• Water vapor, though so light, goes where and will pour over. It can fly light winds through water without disturbing the surface of water. It flows through windows without disturbing the tops of the sea, and without making any noise at its exit. Therefore it is the lightest element of all.

The Śāṅkhya theory of predication is at least acceptable to a certain extent to some of the Vedāntins like Maṇḍa, because both the Śāṅkhya and the Vedāntins accept the anādi-paravāda theory of causation and the notion of the self or puruṣa as being essentially nonextended, pure and conscious. But the atomist theory has not been accepted by any competent authority, and therefore deserves to be completely disregarded.

Besides, the Vaiśeṣika contradicts himself when he maintains that the six categories of substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity and inherence are absolutely as separate¹ from each other, and even is from a part, or a part from genus, and at the same time holds the view that it is on the first category of substance that all the remaining five are dependent.² Or if the dependence of qualities and other categories is to mean their presence or absence subsequent to the presence or absence of the substance, then like the Śāṅkhya (and the Vedāntins) the Vaiśeṣika too may be supposed to believe that the qualities etc. are nothing but the different forms and conditions of one and the same substance, just as Devadatta is the same person in spite of changes in his dress. But this is to abandon the Vaiśeṣika view-point.

Upon this the Vaiśeṣika may point out that mere dependence of one thing upon another is not sufficient to show that both are one and the same thing. Smoke is dependent on fire and yet is distinct and separate from it. But we reply that smoke is believed to be separate because it is actually seen to be so. This is not however the case with substance and quality. A blanket which is white,

1. *Śāṅkhya Sūtra*, Atkāraṇa Sūtra, Page 181, Footnote.

¹ Substance is that in which the qualities reside. Quality is that which has neither activity nor quality. Gen is that the universal or less number and subject to part. Activity is that which requires conditions and duration. Universal of change is that which is not undivided and which causes or places in many things. Particularity or Vastuṭva is the distinguishing mark of one individual from others, e. g. head is the distinguishing sign of a person. Substance is an enduring existence, e. g. the relation of sweet with a pot.

² Substance and qualities though depending on each other and even are mutually dependent on change or substance.

or a cow which is red, or a lotus which is blue, is not at all seen separately without at the same time being white, red, or blue. In other words, the adjective, white, red or blue can have its being only in some substance. Similarly, action, generality, particularity and inference belong round are found in substance or *dravya* alone.

Now what appears to the Vādis as an instance of non-difference or identity may appear to the Vaiśeṣika as an instance of mutual dependence or *asamādhikā*. But what after all does the Vādis mean by it? If he means thereby the existence of two things in one and the same place, he will contradict the authority of Kapila, according to whom "a substance begets a substance, and a quality begets a quality" (*Vai* 36. 1. 1, 10) - the threads produce a piece of cloth, and the colour of the threads produces the colour of the cloth. But this means that the piece of cloth occupies the space covered by the threads, while the colour of the cloth occupies the space covered by the cloth and not that covered by the threads, whereas by the hypothesis of *asamādhikā*, the colour of the cloth and the cloth itself ought to have occupied one and the same space covered by the threads. If he were to mean by *asamādhikā*, the existence of two things in one and the same moment of time, even the two horns of a cow would be an illustration of it. And finally, if he means by it identity in character, there would be no difference between substance and quality.

Equally fallacious is the view of the Vādis regarding the relations of conjunction and inherence between things which are separate and between things which are mutually dependent respectively. For the cause (e.g. a piece of cloth) which exists one moment at least prior to its effect (viz. a quality) cannot be said to be inseparable from it. The Vādis may say that it is the effect which is inherent in the cause, the quality, for instance, cannot exist independently and apart from a piece of cloth. But how can the quality which has not come into

existence [and which, as the effect of cloth, comes into existence at least one moment afterwards] be related to the cause at all? Now can it be said that the effect comes into existence first and is then related with the cause. For this is to admit that the effect exists prior to its coming into existence, and therefore to admit that the effect is not incapable of separate existence. The necessitarian is spite of his belief the further admission that the connection between the two independent, separate terms of cause and effect is conjunction and not inference. And if the *śūdra* can be said to be related to all other things by means of *satyoga* and not *sanavāṇa*, even if there is no activity on the part of the things to be so related, it will also, contrary to his belief, be readily accepted that there would likewise be the connection of *satyoga* and not *sanavāṇa* between the cause and the effect also.

Besides, there exists no sound proof to show that *satyoga* and *sanavāṇa* are themselves some actual entities beyond the things in which they exist as relations. That they have names of their own and produce peculiar cognitions in us, just as pots and other things are named and produce cognitions peculiar to them, is no sufficient reason to believe that they are actual things. For things in the world have first got an original nature of their own, before they acquire a name and a new nature on account of their being related with other things. Devadatta, for instance has always got one and the same original meaning, viz. that he is a man, though he may acquire new names and meanings on account of his social relations. He becomes known as a learned Brahmin, as a young or old man, or as father, son, brother etc. A numeral remains the same, though it may have different meanings when it occupies different positions such as the tenth or the hundredth place. *Satyoga* and *sanavāṇa*, on the other hand, do not indicate anything by which we can discern their own nature, apart the nature from which they arise from the relatedness of the things. Devadatta is discerned and known distinctly as a 'man' even

apart from his social relations or context. The names and meanings of *śatpaga* and *śamanīya* arise only out of the relatedness of things; apart from this relatedness or apart from the things related, they have no permanent meanings of their own, which might continue even in the absence of things so related.

An additional reason why the *śatpaga* cannot exist between the atoms and the soul, or between the soul and the mind is that these are, as the *Vaiśeṣika* holds, without any parts.¹ And if, for the purpose of the theory, the existence of the parts is to be assumed, then anything can be assumed to exist. One may even assume that a hundred or a thousand things exist instead of merely six categories. Moved by compassion, a man may assume that this miserable worldly life may come to an end, a wicked person, on the other hand, may assume that even the liberated souls come back to samsāra.

And just as there cannot be any intrinsic connection or *anavāya* between a dead and the partless *Ikṣū*, as is conceivable between wood and varnish even so there can be no such connection between a partless dead and imperishable atoms. If in spite of this, the relation of *anavāya* is presumed to account for the dependence of effect on cause, there will creep in the defect of mutual dependence. For it is only when the difference between cause and effect is ascertained that there governs the dependence of one on the other, and it is only when the dependence of effect on cause is ascertained that it indicates that there is difference between the two. Thus will arise the defect of mutual dependence or what is known as "explanation to a circle."² The *Vedānta*, on the other hand, is free

¹ The irreducibility of atoms, between perfect atoms, on the one hand, and the soul and the mind, on the other, precludes the possibility of knowledge as due the production of things and other things.

² This is known as *Kaṇḍa-bhāṣa-vāda*. "What is the fault in the world? It is that the *śamanīya* are 'dead' when the *śatpaga* are!" It is said the *śamanīya*. This leads to an conclusion regarding the past of nature of them.

from this defect because he neither believes in any difference between cause and effect nor in the dependence of one on the other. To him, the effect is nothing but a state of the cause.

Besides the atoms being limited they must have as many limbs as there are directions, viz., eight or ten¹, and if they have limbs or parts, they are perishable, in spite of the Vaishakhya claim that they are eternal and partless. To say that these parts themselves are the atoms does not improve the argument. For the atoms too being of the nature of the four elements must ultimately perish, just as the gross elements and the clouds etc. perish. Now this destruction of the atoms, as we have already pointed out, need not take place by the disintegration of the parts. It may take place by mere transformation into the undifferentiated condition of the highest cause, viz. the Brahman, in the way in which the solid nature of gold is destroyed by mere change into liquid form. Similarly, things may come into being not by composition of parts, but in the manner in which curds and ice come into being out of the original condition of milk and water.

The atomic theory, in short, is based on weak arguments, is against the teaching of the Śaṅkara that God is the highest cause, and is not accepted by competent authorities like Mīmāṃsā and others. Hence those who are intent on having their spiritual goal should change it completely.

॥ महाभाष्यनिवृत्तिविकल्पः । (१८-१९)

महाभाष्ये नान्योक्तुमिहोक्तिः । १८

[*Samadhipati*—collection, *abhipreksatva*—due to both the reasons, *api*—even, and *aprasiddha*—they cannot be had.]

¹ They are not ten, but eight South and North, and upwards and downwards, right, viz. the four main directions and the four corner directions and the six other right directions and the two directions of upwards and downwards.

cease to be so, and hence there will be no savings. Even the activity of the mind, which might be supposed to be the cause of the groupings, will not be possible on the Buddhist view, without the accomplishment of the groupings, that is, without the presence of the body. Nor does the theory allow the existence of any other permanent and intelligent being such as the soul which enjoys, or the Lord who governs. Nor again can a chain of cognitions of one's own self as 'I am' be the cause. For if the chain is different in character from the several momentary cognitions of which it is made, it is to admit the permanent Atman of the Vedantists. But if the chain too is momentary, there is left no scope for it to be active and to bring into being the external and the internal worlds.

सर्वोत्तमं भवति । सर्वोत्तमं भवति ।

[Therefore—because, prototypal—because of original being, its use—of it be used, not, separate origin, nature—only, immutability—being the other.]

It is said that (bedrocks of stone and clastic are formed) on account of successive caldral lines (of water, *shōshōkan* etc. we say) it is not so, for they could explain the origin (of new floodings only, and not the formation of the bedrocks). 19

It may be said that even in the absence of a permanent ruling principle, the situation is made possible, on account of the causal force of a series¹ which begins with *avidyā* and ends with *death* and returns to life. These links in the chain follow upon each other as surely as water-pots on a wheel and exclude the solution.

* The seven members of each committee are: president, secretary, treasurer, chairperson, public relations, sports, and student representative. Members are: Jari, and Abigail, David

But the argument cannot be accepted, because it merely accounts for the origination of the several members in the series by reference to the preceding members in the same. It does not explain how the external and the internal groupings are formed. If, as we have already pointed out, it cannot be proved even on the Vaiśeṣika theory how the atoms are combined, in spite of the fact that the theory admits the existence of permanent atoms and of souls in which the various forms of actions reside, how much more responsible it must be for the Buddhists to explain the combinations, when the atoms are said to be momentary, and are devoid of any connection with the souls and with the various fruits? The series of analysis and other things, being itself dependent on the assemblage of atoms and strands, cannot be the cause of the latter. Avoiding these difficulties, if it be said that the series of analysis and others as well as that of atoms and strands on which it depends are simultaneously responsible for the continued existence of material, we have to ask a further question, whether the successive groupings of atoms and strands are like unto each other or unlike. In the first case, in spite of his good or bad actions, man will never be able to obtain the bodies of birds and animals or of angels and gods; in the second case, man may change, at any time, even while living, into an elephant or a god. Besides, if even the souls have got a momentary existence, it is inconceivable how they can wait till the objects of enjoyment are formed for their sake or till the time of final release. Release or enjoyment too serves no purpose.

उपरोक्ते च पूर्वोक्तेषु । २०

[Uparokṭe—subsequent; upade—as it arises; ca—and, pūre—prevailing, śūdrāṇi—in the destruction.]

AS EVERY NEW (MOMENTARY THING) ARISES ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PREVIOUS, (THERE CANNOT BE ANY GAINING TOO AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE SERIES OF ANALYSIS ETC.), 20

There cannot exist any causal relation between any two momentary things because it is only after the first has ceased to be that the second comes into existence. However, the antecedent may become developed and possess power, it cannot produce the consequent unless contrary to the theory of universal momentariness, it is assumed that the antecedent lives for the second moment and actually exerts influence in order to be connected with the second thing. The existence of the antecedent by itself is not again sufficient to produce the consequent, for there can be no consequent worth the name which has not in it the essence of the antecedent. But to admit this is to give up the view of momentariness and to say that the essence of the antecedent continues to sustain the name till the moment of the production of the consequent.

Besides what does the Buddhist mean by origin and destruction of things? If thereby we understand the nature of a thing, then whether the thing is destroyed or not, it is as good as saying that the thing is maintaining its own nature, in spite of the view of momentariness. If origin and destruction are the earlier and later stages of one and the same intermediate thing, even then it is as good as admitting that the thing lives at least during those moments of time. And finally, if they are absolutely distinct and separate from the thing, just as a horn is different from a buffalo, even then we reach the same conclusion. The thing is eternal because it is not affected either by origin or destruction. And further, if origin and destruction were merely to imply the perception and the non-perception of a thing, they would then refer to a perceptant being and not to the thing at all. Hence it is that the Buddhist view is untenable.

असति क्षिप्तोसोसो यौगपद्यमनसः । २१

[Asati—when absent; jayajñā—statement; āparokṣa—the immediate, jayajñā—remoteness, anyathā—otherwise.]

[IF THE EFFECT IS PRESENT, EVEN] WHEN [THE CAUSE IS] ABSENT, THERE WILL RESULT THE CONTRADICTION OF THE ADMITTED PRINCIPLE, OR THE SIMULTANEITY [OF CAUSE AND EFFECT]. 21

If it be said that there may be an effect even if there is no cause, the original principle of the school that the mind and its states arise on account of four different causes¹ will have to be given up. Besides anything may come into being at any time, if no cause is required. If, on the other hand, it is said that the antecedent may continue to exist till the consequent is produced, it will simply mean the giving up of the theory of universal momentariness and the acceptance of the simultaneous existence of cause and effect.

शिवं ह्येव तद्विनाशोऽपानिर्वाणोऽपि विनिर्मुक्तः । २२

[*Pratyanidhigat*—voluntary, *apratyanidhigat*—involuntary
vinashah—destruction; *apratyan*—not to have; *vinashahat*
 —being not disintegrating.]

AS THERE IS NO DISCONTINUITY [IN THE BEING], THERE CAN BE NEITHER VOLUNTARY NOR INVOLUNTARY DESTRUCTION. 22

The sūtras further maintain that all the objects of knowledge except *Ikita* and the voluntary and the involuntary types of destruction, are produced and are momentary in character. The three excepted things are not only nonsubstantial but are also negative in character. *Ikita*, which will be considered in Sūtra 24, indicates the absence of anything which will occupy space. Destruction, whether voluntary as in the case of a jar which is intentionally broken by means of a stick, or natural, which takes place on account of continual decay of things,

¹ The four causes are: material (kāraṇa), instrumental (samuhāra), sensory (kāraṇa), and volitional (kāraṇa). E.g. the pot, the potter, the potter's wheel, and the potter's mind.

must refer either to the stream of things as a whole or to the things themselves. But the stream or the series of things and events cannot be destroyed, because the members in the series are connected together as cause and effect in an indivisible manner. Nor are the things themselves capable of being destroyed. For in the various conditions or states of a thing there remains something¹ by which that thing itself is recognised, either actually or by intention. Hence, there is no kind of destruction possible, as is upheld by the nihilists.

उभयथा च दोषश्च । २१

[Ubhayathā—both ways, ca—and, doṣaḥ—due to defect.]

AND AGAIN DEFECTIVE BOTH WAYS. 21

Besides, if the destruction of *avasthā* and other things, as involved in the two kinds of destruction, were to result on account of perfect knowledge and other ethical means, the Brāhma teaching that destruction takes place without any cause will have to be given up. And if *avasthā* etc. are destroyed of their own accord, what then is the use of the path to salvation which consists in knowing, that everything is momentary, painful, and void?²

अकारोऽपि निर्विकारश्च । २२

[Akarō—on the side of *ākāśa*, ca, avikāraḥ—there being no difference.]

AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE BEING NOT DIFFERENT (WITH THE TWO KINDS OF DESTRUCTION) *ākāśa* (THAT CANNOT BE SAID TO BE A SUBSTANCE). 22

the eye, and the light, on the first means, on the case of the perception of a jar

¹ This is compared to the indivisible continuous stream of the different states of a jar, such as the phases in the period of its existence as a jar or as a fragment or as a lump of earth, on the case of the different states of the seed, such as the sprout, the plant, the flower etc.

Ākāśa too cannot be said to be devoid of positive characteristics, and therefore a non-entity. That it is a real thing can, first of all, be seen from the Śruti passage, "From Ākāśa came forth the Ākāśa" (Tait. 3, 1). Secondly, it can be inferred from the specific quality of sound, for as earth and other elements are considered to be real on account of smell and other qualities. Besides, if Ākāśa means simply uncovered space, the existence of any flying bird in the sky would render the space covered, and so may prevent any other bird from flying in the sky. If, in reply to this, it be said that another bird may fly in another portion of the sky, then this is nothing but to admit, with reference to that second portion of the sky, that there is first a portion of the sky or Ākāśa which exists independently of its being covered or not by the body of the flying bird, and that it is not simply the uncovered space. And if Ākāśa is to be defined only negatively, it will contradict Buddha's own reply, in another place, that Ākāśa is the support of wind. If, according to him, a positive entity like wind is the support of the earth, how is it possible that the wind should have its support in a non-entity like Ākāśa? Besides, there is a further contradiction involved in saying that Ākāśa, like the two kinds of destruction, is a non-entity and is at the same time eternal. How can that which is said to be either eternal or non-eternal? For the attributes can be predicated or not of real things only.

अनुसूतेषु । २५.

[Anusūteṣu]—On account of recollection, or—and.]

AND BECAUSE THERE IS RECOLLECTION, (THE EXPERIENCING SUBJECT CAN NOT BE A MOMENTARY THING). 25

The nihilist who believes in the universal non-existence of things shall have consistently to believe in the momentary existence of the experiencing subject. But the fact of recollecting makes this impossible. For recollection

or recognition of a thing belongs to the same person who has first cognized that thing. We never observe that one man cognizes things and another recognizes them. Even the distinction between a thing seen today and a thing seen yesterday cannot be noticed, unless both the things are seen by one and the same person. Even the subject cannot possibly deny that the perceptions which he now remembers belonged to himself in the past, he is as certain of this as of the fact that fire is hot and green light. If then the subject must connect in himself the two moments of perception and remembrance, and must think that from his cradle to the grave all his perceptions and the subsequent recollection of them must belong to himself as one and the same person, will he not be ashamed of having held the view that everything is momentary in character?

Should he argue that the belief in one and the same experiencing subject arises from similarity of two or more cognitions of the self, we reply that even for the cognition of similarity there is required a person who will be permanent enough to discern the similarity of two successive things. But from the point of view of the subject, these being only momentary things, to say that recognition is based on similarity is to utter sheer nonsense. Should he again argue that the knowledge of similarity is altogether a new cognition, and is therefore neither based on the prior cognitions of two things occupying two different moments of time, nor on the existence of a permanent experiencing subject, we reply that the expression 'this is similar to that' not only points to the 'this' and the 'that' as two distinct things but also to the common third thing of the similarity between them expressed in one single act of judgment. If similarity were to be altogether a distinct object of knowledge and unconnected with things which are similar, then the expression 'this is similar to that' would serve no purpose; we should be able in that case to speak of 'similarity' only without any reference to the 'this' or the 'that'. To refer to what is well-known fact, whether for the purpose of

establishing one's own position or for the purpose of refuting the position of others, is not only not to carry conviction to oneself or others, but also to expose oneself to the charge of being vainly talkative. It is therefore not proper to say, if we attach any value to our everyday life and thought, that what we apprehend is due to similarity only, for in recognition, what we are aware of is the sameness of the thing apprehended before and not of similarity of one thing with another. No doubt, it is likely that with reference to external things, a doubt may sometimes arise whether a thing is the same as seen before or as newly seen. But there cannot arise any such doubt with reference to the conscious subject, for everyone is distinctly and clearly aware that he is the same subject who remembers today what he has apprehended yesterday.

गणितोऽप्यस्य १६

(*Ma-mat, ganyito-jyau mam-matantah: a-hy, janyat-mat a is not observed.*)

SINCE IT IS NOT OBSERVED, (*AM MATANTAH MATAM*) HOW NOT ARISE FROM NON-EXISTENCE. 25

The nihilists must further believe that existence arises from non-existence, because they proposed the view that the effect does not arise without the destruction of the cause. Thus causes forth the sprout after the seed is destroyed, clouds is formed only when milk ceases to be milk, and the clay ceases to be a mere lump of clay, before we get a pot out of it. If changeless causes were to produce effects, then we say, as in the Buddhist, we will expect all the effects at once and without any delay.

To this we reply. If non-existence were to produce existence, then there would be no meaning in awaiting

special causes for special effects, such as seed for sprout, clay for jar or milk for curd. For there will be no difference between non-existence as indicated by the expression "The horn of a hare" and the non-existence indicated by the destruction of clay or seed. We need not even posit as much that there is first the non-existence of seed and then the existence of sprout, for a sprout may consist of the non-existence indicated by "The horn of a hare." If, on the other hand, we assume that different kinds of non-existence have different characteristics of their own, then like several things with their peculiar properties, non-existence too will have its character of being a causality. It will be an entity with a quality of its own, just as a horse has the quality of being blue. Besides, will not the effects of non-existence participate in the nature of their cause and become inconsistent? But we do not find this in our experience. On the contrary, we find every effect wearing a peculiar aspect of causation. The jar of clay is like clay and not like threads of cotton, indicating thereby that the jar participates in their appropriate causing cause viz. the clay and not in their non-causing cause viz., the threads of cotton. In the Buddha view that nothing which does not change can become a cause, is false. Gold does not change, though it is made into ornaments. Even in the case of seeds, where there is apparent change, the seed is not destroyed; the small particles of the seed are not destroyed and it is these which are the real cause of the sprout. In short, because we see that nothing originates from non-existence which is like the idea of the horn of a hare, and that, on the contrary, every entity originates from some other entity which has an enduring nature like gold or clay we conclude that the Buddha doctrine is fit to be rejected. It is to be rejected for the additional reason that the Buddhists contradict themselves by saying that the mind and its modifications arise from four skandhas, and the material things from atoms, and by saying again that existence is due to non-existence. Their doctrine is nothing but knowledge to others.

उदयनिवासायै वैव सिद्धिः । २७

[Udayanivasa-ayai vaiva-siddhiḥ; ud-ayam, ca-ayam, vaiva-siddhiḥ, adhiḥ-siddhiḥ]

AND THIS FRUITION ALSO WILL, THEN, ACHIEVE (THEN, 1999) 27

If the doctrine "unity arises from non-unity" were admitted, lay persons also would achieve their ends, for non-existence can be had without any effort. Corn would grow even if the farmer did not till the land, vessels would come into being without the moulding of clay by the potter, and cloth will be available even if the weaver were lazy and did not weave. No body will be required to put in any efforts for the attainment of the heaven or of release. All this is absurd and unacceptable. Therefore the doctrine referred to is false.

५. अवयवविग्रहः । (१.८-१९)

वायव उपलब्धे । १.८

[Va-ayam, adhiḥ-siddhiḥ—ayam—siddhiḥ; upalabdhaye—being available]

Non-existence (or spiritual release) cannot be attained, as achievement of (release) needs practice. 28

Now that the Buddha view that the external world is real though momentary is refuted on the ground that it is impossible to account for the groupings of atoms and molecules, there comes forward for consideration another view known as the Subjective idealism of the Vijñānavāda. The reality of the external world is believed to have been adopted by Buddha, in order to make it suitable to some of his disciples who were, according to him, too much attached to the things of the external world. His real view however was different. It was to maintain the reality of cognitions or ideas and nothing else.

According to the doctrine known as *Vijñānavāda*, all experience, whether in the form of cognition, or in the form of the subject, the object and the means of cognition is mental in character. Supposing that things exist in the outside world, we can have no experience of them unless they assume the form as determined by intellect. And if the external things are to be admitted, they must either be of the nature of atoms or of their groupings. Obviously, things like pillars cannot be apprehended as atoms, because the latter are imperceptible. Nor can they be apprehended as aggregations of atoms; for if these aggregations are different from atoms, they can be no longer considered as made up of atoms; and if they are non-different, they will be as imperceptible as the atoms, and hence there will be no cognition of pillars as pillars, or of any other gross objects. In the same way, one can show that the external objects have neither universality¹ nor any other category.

Now the various differences we find in our general, uniform awareness or experience, as awareness of the various references to objects of knowledge such as, a pillar, a wall or a pot, are, as a matter of fact, mental in character. They are differences in our ideas or cognitions, and are found to conform to things. This is to admit, in other words, that the forms of objects of our knowledge are determined by our ideas,² and not given by the reality of the external world. Besides, our knowledge of objects in the form of ideas and of the objects themselves being always simultaneously presented, they must in reality be one and the same.³ For had they been different, we

¹ If the universality or *jitā* via the *pañcāngas* is different from pillars, then there are two separate things and if it is non-different, then just as the pillar will be either atomic and imperceptible or mental, the universality will also be either imperceptible or mental in character.

² Instead of belonging to the various forms of objects, and corresponding to them in similar various forms of our ideas of objects, the *pañcāngas* relation really is to believe in our own ideas only as the means of our belief in the external world.

³ Through the idea and the thing are one and the same thing, the subjective factor, is itself its object, upon that the idea seems to rest.

might have been conscious of one and not of another ; but this is better the rest. Hence, too, we may say that the world of external things is not real.

One more reason for not believing in the external world is the similarity of the perceptions of our waking life to our experience in dreams and illusions. If our experience of the latter type appears to us as twofold, that is, as made up of subject and object, despite of the fact that there is no external world in dreams and illusions, our experience of the waking life also may be independent of the external world. Our perceptions of objects are nothing but simple ideas. As for the reason of the variety of ideas, it need not be sought in the existence of the external world, but in the combinations or the impositions of past ideas. The ideas and the impressions succeed¹ each other as necessarily as the seed and the sprout succeed and cause this endless sequence. That the ideas or cognitions are caused not by external objects but by impressions can be proved by reference to positive and negative assertions we can make regarding the relations between them. The Vedāntins too admit with us that in dreams, when there are no external objects, knowledge of ideas arise on account of prior mental impressions. But in the absence of impressions, there cannot be, as we hold, any knowledge or ideas. We therefore conclude that there is no external world of things.

To this we, the Vedāntins, make the following reply. It is wrong to hold that the external world does not exist ; for we are aware that corresponding to our ideas our perceptions point out to us external things like pillars and walls. Nobody will learn to a man who, while he is enjoying his dinner, says that he is neither eating anything nor having any satisfaction out of it. Let the Śaṅkha

¹ That the sequence of ideas and impressions is not an example of causal dependence upon each other is admitted even by the Vedāntins. Mental dependence (*paratantra-utpatti*) is a different, as is *parasvatantra-utpatti*. But when the sequence of ideas and impressions is described,

arbitrarily explain that what he means by saying that there is no object is that there is no consciousness of object apart from the act of consciousness. But the truth is that consciousness itself points out to us that what we are aware of in perception, for instance, is not the perception itself, but the objects of perception. The *Śaṅkharas* themselves tacitly acknowledge this fact when they say that the universal object of negation appears "like something external." How can there be something "like external" if there is really nothing external? Is it possible that *Vijayaśakti* should ever appear like the son of a barren mother? Besides, whether objects of perception are possible to be external or not is to be judged by reference to the means of knowledge; the means of knowledge are never said to exist or not to exist by reference to our perceptions¹ notions about things. That is possible which is capable of being apprehended by perception or other means of knowledge, that is impossible which is not so capable. So when, as a matter of fact, the external things are apprehended by means of knowledge, to say that they are only mental on the ground that they are neither different nor non-different from atoms, is to indulge in idle talk.

Again, if there are no external objects how can the ideas have the form of objects? And, if the ideas have the forms of the objects, does it mean that forthwith the objects whose forms the ideas have, are all reduced to these forms only? The truth is that objects are apprehended as external and distinct from ideas, and therefore the inseparable connection of the idea and the object should be conceived as the expression of the causal connection between them and not as that of identity. That the idea and the object are distinct from each other can moreover be shown by reference to the difference between a substance and the attributes or aspects which belong to it. The perception

¹ The *Śaṅkharas* themselves do not take it for granted that external things do not exist and that only in the consciousness that our only these things are located in themselves; but that even the means of knowledge are also mental.

of a white or differs from the perception of a black one, though the knowledge of an *on* is general is the same. The two kinds of knowledge as specified by the differing attributes 'white' and 'black' are also further different from the generic knowledge of an *on* as such. Similar is the distinction between the perceptions of a jar and a pot, or between the perception and remembrance of a jar, or between the smell and taste of milk, even though the generic knowledge in each case may be simply some indeterminate thing, or simply a jar of milk. Neither the attributes nor the substantives be said to be non-distinct and non-separate from each other. And if the ideas occupy different moments of time, and vanish immediately after they have been felt in consciousness, it will not be said about any one of them that it is either the knower or known. If the idea does not last even for two consecutive moments, then there ought not to be any talk about the ideas being different from each other, about everything being momentary and void, about the distinction between individuals and classes, or between existence and non-existence due to *avayāh*, and about bondage and release.¹

The *vijñānavādin* may further argue that while an idea dissolves by itself in a leap, the external objects do not, and hence we become conscious of the idea and not of the external world. But it looks strange that he should readily believe in something unheard enough like 'fire burns stuff,' and not believe in the altogether common and rational view that the ideas arise as a result of the external things. He may object to this by saying that this involves the spread of *upādāna*. For if the idea is to depend for its apprehension on something else, that something else has to be dependent for its

¹ All this is possible on the supposition that there exists a *śarīra* which can transport the idea into another, and that idea has as long as two moments to offer such transportation. But the Buddhist has no such belief.

apprehension on something else and so on. But as far as the knowledge of ideas, is concerned he may tell us, that just as a lamp does not require another lamp to illumine it, even so our cognition may not require another cognition to cognize it. But we reply that both the arguments are wrong. The negans need not arise; for, there is no other cognizer of the self¹ who cognizes the ideas, and the self and the cognitions are of different nature. They are related to each other as the knower and the known, or as the subject and object. As for the witnessing self, he exists by himself and cannot be doubted.

The lamplike, self-illuminating idea of the vijñān-vāda appears therefore neither in need of any means of proof nor of any other being beyond it. But this is like believing that a thousand lamps are burning in the interior of an insuperable rock. To say that the self-conscious nature resembles the view of the Vedāntins is not correct, for just as the light of a lamp is dependent for its being known on the eye of an intelligent being, even so the idea manifests itself through some intelligent principle beyond it. Besides, whereas the witnessing self of the Vedāntins is one, permanent and self-illuminating, the ideas of the Vijñānavāda are transitory and many and therefore require for their manifestation an intelligent principle beyond them.

विज्ञानं न स्वप्रकाशः । २९

[Vijñānagrahaṇa on account of difference in nature, as and as-not, arjuna-jñāna-vat-vijñāna-dream and others.]

AND ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE IN NATURE (FROM OF THE WAKING LIFE) CANNOT BE LIKE THOSE IN A DREAM ETC. 29

¹ According to the Vedāntins, the Brahmā alone is the only self-illuminating cognizer of all ideas in knowledge.

We now refute the Buddhist view that the ideas of the waking life may arise, in the absence of the external objects, in the same manner as which the ideas in a dream arise. The two kinds of ideas, we contend, are different in nature. The ideas in a dream arise falsely because the mind is infatuated by sleep. That is why the experience of having met a great person in a dream is cancelled in the waking life. Similar is the case with illusory experience. But the things of which we become conscious in the waking life continue to exist without being negated. Besides, what we experience in dreams is due to memory, while what we experience in the waking life is immediate apprehension. The difference between the two states is the difference marked by the presence or absence of objects. Notwithstanding this obvious, self-evident truth regarding the difference between the two states, if the Buddhist proceeds to insist that the knowledge of the waking life is like that of the dreaming state, simply on the ground that there is a kind of knowledge in both the states, he will thereby show that he has neither logic nor wisdom. What is contrary to experience, viz. the knowledge of the external world without the existence of the external world, he hopes to demonstrate by inference to a partial resemblance of consciousness between the waked and dreaming states. But how can an attribute which does not naturally belong to a thing, be ascribed to it, simply because that thing has a partial similarity with some other thing? Can fire be cold, because like water, fire is one of the five elements? Therefore it is that we say that the waking life is different from a dream.

॥ अतोऽनुसङ्गः ॥ ४०

[No—not, linked—sequence not—established—being not available.]

IS THE ASSUMPTION OF SEQUENCE (OR KINETICAL THEORY, THE MENTAL SEQUENCES) NO MORE TRUE ?

To relate now the possibility of knowledge due to impressions, even if there is no external world. We may ask, in the first place, as to how the impressions may arise at all if there are no external objects as their causes. To say that they are due to prior impressions in addition to the belief that cognitions are due to prior impressions, and to say that this has been going on without any beginning, is to start ourselves with a fruitless system of inference.¹ Like one blind man leading another, it will only cut the entire practical life. It will not also help the Buddhist to uphold his position, viz. that cognitions are due to impressions and not to external objects. The *anvaya* and *vyaśāhika*, that is the positive and the negative method of argument which he uses² is really in our favour. Our cognitions arise if 'there exist the external objects' and they do not arise if there are no such objects. As opposed to this, people believe in the existence of the external world even in the absence of the impressions.³ Moreover the impressions do require a substratum⁴ in which they reside, though such a substratum from the view-point of the Buddhist cannot be cognized by any means of knowledge.

उचितानुसङ्गः ११

[Kāryakāraṇa—an account of being momentary, etc.—and.]

AND ON ACCOUNT OF (THE *Īśvarasiddhānta*) BEING MOMENTARY, (IT CAMEO IN THE SUBSTRATUM OF MENTAL IMPRESSIONS). 11

1 The Buddhist is not prepared to tell the origin of illusion, hence he imagines that it is beginningless and eternally like the typical chain of seed and sprout. But this is not correct. There is a single cause for practical reality ascribed to the material objects that there arises a causal connection between impressions and impressions.

2 If there are impressions, then arise cognitions, and if there is no impression, there does not arise any cognition.

3 The material world being the cause of the impressions, not what without the objects.

4 That this substratum cannot be the 'Īśvarasiddhānta,' will be shown in the next Sūtra.

If the *pratyekjñāna* or the cognitions having the form of external things cannot be the substratum of impressions, the *śāśvatijñāna* 'also, that is, the cognitions which have the form of 'I am', cannot be the substratum because it is also momentary in character. Unless there be something which continues to exist and is therefore connected with the past, the present and the future, or unless there is the absolutely permanent on-looker of all things, there will be no proper explanation of the whole of the practical life which consists of memory, recognition and the various impressions. The *śāśvatijñāna* being as momentary in character as any other thing in the Buddhist scheme, the objections we raised against the *rukṣa* in *Sūtra 20* (*śāśvatijñāna* 2, p. 16) can also be raised against it.

As for the refutation of the *śāśvatijñāna*, which goes against all means of knowledge, no regard may be shown. For a complete denial of everything is not possible except on the recognition of some truth which cannot be denied.

निर्वचनं सर्वत्र । ११

[*Nirvachan*—in all ways, *anapekṣat*—on account of being defective, *ca-and*]

AND ON ACCOUNT OF BEING DEFECTIVE IN ALL WAYS [11]

To say in short, the more we search to find out some good point in the Buddhist system, the more it goes wrong on all hands, as the sandy walls of a well fall when we begin to dig it deep. By propounding the different waves of realism, idealism and nihilism, Buddha has merely exposed himself as a man given to teach contradictory things. Or thereby he has shown his hatred

1 That if the cognitions are *śāśvatijñāna* means or *śāśvatijñāna*, there is no room for anything substratum.

they apply the reasoning known as 'saptabhangapara'¹ which is—somewhere it is, somewhere it is not, somewhere it is and is not, somewhere it is indescribable, somewhere it is and yet is indescribable, somewhere it is not and yet is indescribable. They apply this reasoning even to such conceptions as unity and identity.

Against this doctrine we say the following. The reasoning itself is faulty, for it is impossible that contradictory attributes, like hot and cold, may belong to the same thing at one and the same time. To apply the saptabhangapara to the seven entities is to have confused an indefinite knowledge about them, for they may either have a particular nature or not have it. In other words, all assertions about them will end in doubt and not in any definite knowledge. To say that the cognition of a thing can assume more than one nature and is a definite part of knowledge, is itself untrue, for applying the same reasoning this so-called definite knowledge may or may not be definite. If, in short, this indefinite-ness belongs to all things without exception, that is, if it belongs to knowledge and the means of knowledge, to also to the knowing subject and the objects of knowledge, how indeed can it be said that the Jain Tirthankars teach anything which is undoubtable or definite? Or how indeed can his followers be said to accept his words which being thoroughly indefinite, appear to be uttered by a madman or a drunken person?

If we entered the application of the same reasoning to the five astakhyas, they may be seen to be more at loss

1 The first change in the reply to the Śāṅkhya replies. Because the earlier reply, after the second, has not to begin its reasoning properly. The second is the third in the paragraph above. Why should the reply end at all? The third is the reply to the Śāṅkhya, according to whom they are undoubted and, the foremost afterwards, which is the Jain book, a commentary. The fourth is the reply to the Yāgyavalki who says that things are real and eternal or unchanging. The fifth, sixth and the seventh verses of 'meaning-grounds' of the explanation of the first and the fourth, the second and the fifth, and the third and the fourth, respectively.

than five. To call them indefinable and yet to describe them is to contradict oneself. And to go on saying that they can be known or not known, that their knowledge is perfect or imperfect, implies of us being imperfect or not, is certainly to talk like a dreamer or a mad person. Nobody will ever act to achieve his release or go against the heaven, if these things mean nothing definite, so far as their existence or duration are concerned. As a matter of fact, being excludes non-being, and non-being excludes being, but if nothing definite can be said regarding soul or unity, whether it is one or many, permanent or non-permanent, separate or non-separate, we must reject the doctrine of the *Ārhas*. As for the Jain doctrine of the atoms or *padārthas*, we need not refute it again, as we have already refuted the atomic doctrine of the *Vaiśeṣikas*.

६॥ आत्मज्ञान-विद् । १४

[*From—that ; ca—and , ātmā—the soul ; ajñānāt—ignorance.*]

AND LIKEWISE (FURTHER OCCURS) THE NON-RE-
VISION OF THE SOUL. 14

The Jains believe that the soul has the same size as that of the body. But this means that being limited in extension, the soul is as non-eternal as you and other things. Besides, if the soul of man were to enter into the body of an elephant as a consequence of its previous deeds, it will not occupy the whole of it, nor will it find sufficient space for it as the body of an ant. Besides will be the difficulty if we take into consideration the bodies of one and the same person, as his childhood, youth and oldage. The Jain may explain away the difficulty by saying that the soul consists of infinite number of parts, which are capable of being compressed in a small body, and of being expanded to fill the space

as a large body. But if the infinite particles occupy different places, they cannot be contained in a small body, and if they occupy the same place, that is the place occupied by one particle only, the soul of the soul will always, in all cases, be very minute. Besides, there will be no reason why he should believe in the particles being infinite in number, when the soul has a limited extent of the body.

The Jain may say in reply that the particles join or fall away as the occasion for the soul is to enter into a large or a small body. To this the reply is given in the next Sūtra

न च परमाण्वभिवर्धो निवर्धनिवः । १५ ।

[Na-cha parmanv-abhivardho nivardhani-vaḥ etc.]
[No-not caused, parmanv-by atoms, abhivardho-increased-not-when subjected, nivardhani-vaḥ-because of change etc.]

Now is there any CONTRADICTION (OF PARTICLES JOINING AND FALL AWAY FROM THE SOUL) BY THIS, BECAUSE OF (OBJECTS BEING) CHANGE ETC. 15

The Jain theory that the soul has the size of the body cannot be shown to be free from contradiction, even if it is supported by another theory, viz. according to the size of the body is large or small, the soul gains new particles or loses some of those which are already there. For this new theory implies that the soul is capable of undergoing change, and is therefore non-permanent like the size of body. But this goes against the Jain doctrine of the soul's release which is likened to the coming up to the surface of water of a pearl (freed from dirt) which was previously covered in mud on account of the rightfold bands of karma. Besides, like the body which comes into being and is destroyed, these particles too have got origin and destruction, and therefore cannot be said to be of the nature of the self. If some non-permanent part is to be said as

the self, we do not know which one is meant. Nor do we know whence the particles come when they join the soul, and whether they go when they fall away. The soul being immaterial, they cannot be said to have sprung from the material elements so that they may return back into them. Nor do we know any storehouse of these particles. Besides, on the Jain view, the soul and the particles of it will both be indefinite in character. For all these reasons, the theory that the particles join and fall away from the soul cannot be accepted.

The Sūtra may be interpreted differently. To the objection that the soul will not be permanent if it is to be considered as having the use of the body, the Jain may be supposed to reply that the soul may be considered to be permanent in spite of its changes, just as a stream of water is said to be permanent in spite of the changing water, or just as, in the opinion of the Jains, a stream of ideas is permanent, though individual ideas pass away. To this the present Sūtra contains the reply: if the stream is not real, there will be the theory of the void, and if the stream is real, the defects such as the changing nature of the soul, etc. will follow. The Jain view, in short, will be inadequate.

वेदावस्थितो वेदकवनिस्तत्त्वद्विवेकः । ११

[*Anye-māthānāṁ*—an account of permanency of the soul :
ca-and, abhāva-vyavahāra—due to permanency of both; *anye*
anyā—without difference.]

AND BECAUSE THE FINAL (USE OF THE SOUL) IS CON-
 sidered PERMANENT AND BECAUSE OF THE PERMANENCY
 OF THE TWO (ANALYTIC SENSES), THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE
 (OF ANY) [35]

Moreover, because the Jains believe that the final
 use of the soul is permanent during its condition of
 release, it follows that the initial and the intervening

ness also must be permanent; otherwise there will be three different conceptions of one and the same soul. But this means that the different bodies of the soul will have one and the same size, and that the soul will not be required to enter into bigger and smaller bodies.

On the Sūtra may be explained in a different way. The dimensions of the soul being the same in its three conditions, as noted above, the soul must be either small or large, and must not vary according to the size of the body. Hence the doctrine of the Ārjans, like that of the Buddhists, is inadequate and therefore deserves to be rejected.

ॐ पञ्चमिकाशम् । (३३-३४)

पञ्चमिकाशम् । ३३

[Panchika—of the Lord, adhyatmyajit—because inadequate.]

[IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO THINK OF THE LORD (AS ONLY THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF THE WORLD), BECAUSE THIS IS INADEQUATE.]

In the Sūtra 33 and 34 of the fourth pīṭha of the first adhyāya, it was shown that God is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. And if the Sūtrikāra is not inconsistent, the present Sūtra cannot be meant to show that God is neither the efficient nor the material cause. It should therefore be understood that the Sūtra intends to attack what is contrary to the unity of Brahman, viz. the view that God is merely the efficient and not the material cause of the world.

There are many who are opposed to the Vedānta view regarding the nature of God. Some rely on the Śūtrikāra and the yoga systems and say that God is only the efficient cause, and that he is therefore different from both prakṛti and puruṣa. The Mīmāṃsikas hold that Prakṛti (Jiva) is the efficient cause, and say

that there are four other things as taught by Plotinus himself, viz. the effect, the *poiesis*, the ritual and the end of pain.¹ In a like manner, the Neoplatonists, the Visitationists and others have told us that God is only the efficient cause of the world.

All these opinions are however inadequate. For in supposing that the Lord is the cause of the differences in the various beings, such as low, intermediate and the best, we shall merely ascribe to him human motives of hatred and passion. Then he will be no real God, but like one of us. If, in order to get over this difficulty, it is said that God's choice is determined by the merits and demerits of the beings themselves, then it is to fall in another difficulty, viz. that God's choice and the works of beings will be mutually dependent on each other. To suggest that this mutual dependence is without any beginning is no solution of the difficulty, for this mutual dependence was as much a fault² in the past as it is the present time. Like one blind man leading other blind men, it will lead us nowhere. Moreover, the Neoplatonists caution that "it is some kind of imperfection that leads to action" (*Enchiridion* 2, 1, 15), and our experience that all persons, whether egoistic or altruistic, become active because they are imperfect, lead us to believe in a God who is spite of his benevolence and the consequent activity is imperfect still. The inadequacy of such a view becomes all the more apparent when the Plotinus *poiesis* tells us that God is a peculiar indifferent type of *poiesis*.

1 The effect means the world, *poiesis* is the production, or God's choice means in taking these beings as a day, withdrawal of pain in the night.

2 This mutual dependence or co-dependency is no fault only when the two things are actually determined, e.g. the soul and the spirit, though mutually dependent on each other, yet when the beginning of time was actually commencing, no direction should be imagined or we are avoiding the question. In the case of God's choice and the beings, however, there is more or less arbitrariness and no fixed connection. For the whole choice of God is connected to the first cause will be arbitrary and the whole being non-arbitrary in action cannot move the God to make his choice.

सर्वपापकर्मणः । १८

[Sārvapāpaka-karmṇaḥ : sarvapapāṇaḥ-karṇaḥ sa-pāpāḥ,
co-evil.]

AND THE CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. 35

Moreover the doctrine we are considering is not satisfactory for some additional reasons. The God, the soul and the soul being all minute and without parts, no one can be related with the other two by the connection known as *samyoga*; for *samyoga* can take place only between objects which consist of parts. It cannot be *samyoga* also, for we do not know which of them is the substratum. Nor can we establish any special kind of relation between God and the world. For this would have been possible, if the world were admitted to be the product of providence, but as yet this has not been proved.

It may be suggested that the Vedāntin also is sitting in the same boat, because according to him *Māyā* which is the cause of this world is in no way connected with the Brahman. But this is wrong, because the relation between the *Māyā* and the Brahman, according to him, is that of identity. He comes to know that Brahman is the cause of the world, because he relies upon *Śruti*, and does not think it necessary that what he believes must always conform to what he observes. His opponents, on the other hand, rely upon only what is observed and upon inference which is conformable to it. Besides, there is a fundamental difference between what the Vedāntin thinks about the nature of *Śruti* and what the opponents think. According to the former, the authority of *Śruti* or "Agama" is valid by itself, while according to the latter, it is due to some omniscient being*. The

* The Vedāntin believes that upon his *Śruti* are omniscient. Especially, according to him, because a *prajna* (knowledge) which has got all the truth of *Śruti*. The Vedāntin, on the other hand, believes that the *Agama* is valid by itself, and is not due to any omniscient being.

however creates a logical difficulty for the opponent, viz. the authority of the *śāstra* is to be referred to an omnipotent being, and the consequence is to be inferred by reference to *śāstra*. For all these reasons, the Śākhya-*śāstra* view about the nature of God, as also other theories which make no reference to the *Vedas*, are to be rejected.

अविद्यमानमुपपत्तये । ३९.

[*Avidyamāna—subject, unapparent—being impossible, not—can*]

उत्पत्त्यस्य स्यात् सम्भवः । (THE LORD CANNOT BE THE MAKER.) 39

People who resort to inference only may put forth the argument that just as the potter deals with clay while producing the *gṛha*, even so the Lord may be doing with *pradhāna*. But this is not possible, because *pradhāna* being devoid of colour and other qualities is not capable of being processed just as clay is, and will therefore not be a fit object to be dealt with and shaped into the world by the Lord.

कारणभवेत् योगादित्यः । ४०.

[*Kāraṇa—like the cause ; not—if ; not—not, it might—being—because of enjoyment of fruits etc*]

If it be said (THAT *pradhāna* IS CREATED BY THE LORD) JUST AS THE SINGER (ARTS BY THE SONG), IT IS NOT SO, FOR (THE LORD WILL BE SUBJECT) TO IMPUREMENTS ETC. 40

It may be supposed that the Lord guides the *pradhāna* in the same way as which the soul guides the organs of sight etc., even though the organs lack colour

*The Śākhya view related to *śāstra* is one which affects a plea in God.

and other qualities and are not objects of perception. The supposition however proves nothing. For whereas the soul is pleased or displeased on account of the activity of the senses, and affords us reason to infer that it must be guiding the senses, we do not get any such evidence for believing that the Lord derives pleasure or pain by the activity of the passions is enable us to infer that he rules over it.

Or this and the preceding Sūtra may be explained in a different way. Sūtra 39: If kings can rule over a country only if they are endowed with a body, and not otherwise, even so the Lord of all must have got some kind of body to which his senses must belong, and on account of which he should be able to rule. But bodies can exist only subsequent to creation and not prior to it. So a body can never be said to belong to the Lord, and therefore it can never be said that he is able to act and rule. Sūtra 40. And if we assume that the Lord possesses a body which he can create for himself even before creation, and which he can utilize for guiding his own senses as well as the passions, he remains no longer the Lord, but becomes like one of his subjects in pleasure and pain.

शेषवत्पश्यन्वेदुः ॥ ४१ ॥

[Anvita—able to perish, anvita—no more; anvita—no more; an—of]

[THE LORD WILL TAKE UP OTHER FORMS IN ORDER TO MANAGE HIS OWN CREATION. 41]

For an additional reason too, the theory of those who rely on mere inference becomes shaken. They teach that God is eternal and omniscient, and that passions and the souls also live for infinite duration. Now let us suppose, in the first place, that the omniscient God must have measured the duration, the extent and the number

of himself, of prakāsa and of the soul. But as experience tells us all measured things, like pots and the like, are of these durations only. No doubt the number of souls is too great; still it is limited from the view-point of the omnipotent Lord. That is why, gradually and one after another, the souls get the release from bondage. But when all of them get released, the *avasthā* itself comes to an end. In other words, it is nothing but the end-of-painful-ness itself, for it is the painfulness which, under the guidance of the Lord, had modified and manifested itself as the *avasthā*, for the good of the souls. And when the painfulness thus comes to an end, what remains there for the Lord to supervise or to rule? It is as good as saying that he too comes to an end,—and then, we are landed in a general void. If to avoid these unpleasant conclusions, we suppose, in the second place, that God did not or could not measure himself or the painfulness of the souls, we shall deprive him of his omnipotence. Thus the doctrine that God is only the efficient cause of the world, is untenable.

८ उत्पत्तिसर्वव्यापित्वम् । (११-१२)

उत्पत्तिसर्वव्यापि । ११

[*Utpatti—origination, avasthā—on account of impossibility*]

THE ORIGINATION (OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) BEING IMPOSSIBLE, (THE BHĒDĀNTA DOCTRINE CANNOT BE ADOPTED.)

HAVING refuted the *Sāra* doctrine that God is only the efficient and not the material cause of the world, we shall now refute the doctrine of the Bhāgavatas or the Viśiṣṭas. Their stance is no doubt faithful to Śrī in believing that God is both the efficient and the material cause of the world, but differs from it in certain respects, and it is in these respects that we have to examine the doctrine.

Their theory can be stated thus: *Vishodera* is the highest reality, he alone exists and in pure knowledge. Deriving himself in four forms the *Vishodera* or *Nirāyuga* appears as *Vishodera*, *Sādharpura*, *Pradyumna* and *Anurādha*, or appears, in other words, as the highest *Ātman*, the individual soul the mind and electricity, respectively. *Vishodera* represents the primal cause, and the three others are the effects. If a man goes to the temple and worships this *Vishodera* for hundred years by means of offerings, prayers and meditation, he will thereby be able to overcome affliction and reach the *Vishodera* himself.

Now we have no desire to dispute over the doctrine that *Nirāyuga* who transcends the *avasthas*, and who is the highest and the universal *Ātman* of all divides himself and manifests in various forms. For Śaṅkara also tells us that the highest *Ātman* appears in many forms, that "he is one, he becomes three" (Ud. 7, 12, 1). Nor do we wish to controvert against the devotional approach and the unceasing one-pointed meditation on God, for this has been recommended both by Śruti and Smṛiti.¹ But we do take objection to the origination of the individual soul (*Sādharpura*) from the highest *Ātman* (*Vishodera*), as also to the origination of mind and electricity from the soul and the mind respectively. For in that case, like all other things which are originated, the soul also will be perishable in nature. Besides there will be no refuge for the soul, because it will be simply destroyed and will not therefore reach the highest being. That the soul does not originate will be shown later on at II, 3, 27. Hence it is that the doctrine of the *Khilavatā* is untenable.

४५ ॥ ४५ ॥ ४५ ॥ ४५ ॥

[No—now, at—end, *Khilavatā*—of the door, *Khilavatā*—instrument.]

NOW IS THE WORK (OF BEING SUCH TO BE PROVED) FROM THE SOUL. 43

We never observe that an instrument of doing some work, springs forth by itself from the door¹ of that work. Devadatta may use an axe, but the axe does not come out of Devadatta. The Bhāgavatas teach us, however, that the mind (Pradipanna) arises out of the individual soul (Sattvasaṃ), and that āśakti (Āśakti) arises out of the mind. But as said above, experience goes against their teaching. Nor have they any support from Śruti.

विज्ञानादि यमे वा कश्चिन्मेषः । ४४

[Viśajāna-ādī-bhāve—when knowledge and other things exist; na—no; na-a-pratyakṣaḥ—non-evidence of that.]

AND THERE WILL BE NO EVIDENCE OF THAT (DEFECT OF NON-ORIGINATION,) EVEN IF (ALL OF THEM ARE ENDOWED AS) FORMER KNOWLEDGE AND OTHER (QUALITIES.) 44

The Bhāgavatas may now take a different line of thought and say that Sattvasaṃ etc. are not the soul, the mind or the āśakti, but are, all of them, gods endowed with the divine qualities of knowledge, glory, might, power, valour and luck. They are, in other words, prototypes of Viṣṇu, all of them being without any defects, self-supporting and permanent. Therefore the Bhāgavatas may think that the defect regarding origination (referred to, in Sūtra 42) does not at all apply to these deities.

To this we reply that objection does remain in spite of this argument. Does the Bhāgavata mean, in the first place, that the four deities have the same attributes, but are different in form? If so, it is a useless addition of multiple forms when the act of

1. As if the door is the material cause, and not simply the efficient cause.

government can be performed by one only. Besides, it is only to relinquish his own hypothesis, viz., that Vīśṇava alone is the one real Being. Or if, in the second place, the Bhāgavata means that the devatas, though possessing the same attributes, have sprung in succession from one highest Being, then, as shown already while discussing Sūtra 42, the objection does remain valid. Besides, we learn from experience that there must be some kind of difference¹ between the cause and the effect, or to put it negatively, whenever such difference does not exist, there exists no causal relation. Accordingly we should expect some kind of difference between one divinity and another, because one springs forth from another. But the Pāśurārdikas² acknowledge no such difference. They say, on the contrary, that all the devatas are forms of Vīśṇava.

Further, there is no reason why the forms of Vīśṇava be limited only to four in number. As a matter of fact, the whole world, from Embodiments down to a blade of grass, is the manifestation of God.

विशिष्टबोधः । ४५

[Viprasṛjāḥ—on account of contradictions, as—and.]

AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTIONS 45

The qualities mentioned above as belonging to the devatas are also mentioned, by way of contradiction, elsewhere as different selves or forms of Vīśṇava.³ Besides the statement that Śiṣṇidya acquired the knowledge of the Pāśurārdika school, when he became disgusted of wanting the highest bliss by the study of the four Vedas, is certainly an oblique of the Vedas. Hence the doctrine of the Bhāgavata cannot be accepted.

1. The *jar* is different from clay, so the *fruit* and *function*.

2. The Bhāgavatas are known as Pāśurārdikas because they accept the philosophy mentioned in the verses known as Pāśurams.

3. Even the devatas which are now mentioned as separate, i. e., as real self and deities, are again mentioned as non-different from each other.

SUMMARY

ADITYA FIRST

Pada First

The nature of Aditya: Extensive opposition of the usual and unusual, the subject and the object is experience. Yet the usual superimposition, i.e., the apprehension of something as something else, does take place on account of avidyā. Aditya is the root cause of all evil; knowledge of the unity of the Atman will remove this evil.

Śāstra.

1. The word 'now' indicates succession and not a mere suspicious beginning. The antecedent condition is neither the study of the Vedas, nor the knowledge of dharma. For Brahma-jñāna may be had without that of dharma. The real antecedents are the discrimination between the real and the unreal, non-attachment, possession of tranquility and desire to have liberation. Brahma-jñāna is the Supreme Source of life. Different opinions about the nature of self.

2. Origin, substance and dissolution of the world are due to Brahman. Difference between Charnajñāna and Brahma-jñāna.

3. Śāstra is the means of knowing that Brahman is the cause.

4. If as humans holds no Vedic passage has any meaning unless it is subservient to action, there is no direct reference to Brahman as an accomplished fact.

But the Śāṅkhya holds that the direct causative and harmonious result of all the Vedānta passages is that Brahman is the cause of the world. Brahman is not an object of perception or other means of knowledge, nor of meditation. Difference between Karma-vādyā and Brahman-vādyā. Māyā is Kāraṇa-māyā, and is the same as Brahman-jñāna. The knowledge of the identity of jīva and Brahman is neither a make-believe, nor due to superimposition, neither the result of acts or purification nor the indication of any functional correspondence. The Ātman is not unstable to change. To deny it is to posit it. It is the unswerving witness of all. The collection of a thing with action does not change that thing into action. Positivity of a negative proposition is to indicate the neutral condition of indifference to actions. Propositions like, 'This is a rope, not a snake', are useful in removing fear. Dissociated condition is possible on the side of death, description of the condition. Had Brahman been subservient to action, Jānu would have incorporated it as Pūrva-kāṇḍīya.

5 Non-intelligent prakāśa cannot possess 'being', i.e. intelligence, knowledge etc. Nor it is subsistent, because active is superseded by right and wrong. A yoga is transcendent, because he is a conscious subject, and not due to excess of active. By deriving causal activity from Brahman, prakāśa cannot be said to be the cause. Omnipotence and freedom of Brahman are not incompatible. Contradictory predicates attributed to God. Difference of soul from God, due to ignorance. Cannot prakāśa be said to be the cause in a secondary or figurative sense?

6 Not figurative also, for the word 'jīvaṭman' which means intelligent ruler cannot refer to prakāśa, but to Brahman. Cannot prakāśa be the cause if it helps the soul in having bhoga or māyā? Cannot the word Ātman refer to both intelligent and non-intelligent beings?

7. Moksha is possible on account of devotion to Atman as recommended by spiritual teachers, and not due to *pradhāna*. The word Atman refers to Śarīratma and to 'at' according to context, and so cannot be transferred to *pradhāna*.

8. The word 'at' is not used to denote *pradhāna* even as a preliminary step, so that this may be discarded afterwards, and 'at' used to denote Brahman. Besides, knowledge of *pradhāna* as the cause would mean knowledge of whole as effecting, but this is impossible because *pradhāna* is non-intelligent, and the soul is intelligent.

9. The conscious soul will find no rest in the unconscious *pradhāna* during sleep, but will find it in the conscious Atman.

10. The consensus of opinion is embodied in the Vedānta-passages is that Brahman is the cause.

11. Is Brahman the object of knowledge or devotion?

12. *Ānandamayā*, according to *prapancāra*, is the *dvaitam*, because it is the last of the series and has joy as its head. The Vedāntin holds that it is Brahman, because it is of the nature of favour which if once tasted, makes one fearless. The mention of the various *śākti* *līlāna* is simply an aid to understand the real *Ānandamayā* Atman. To conceive the Atman as having *śākti* is only an imagination.

13. *Ānandamayā* means 'abounding in bliss', and not 'made up of bliss'. Various *bliss*s upto that of Brahman, measured in ascending degrees.

14. Knowledge of Atman results in *bliss* because the Atman is full of *bliss*.

15 The mantras, the Brahmanya and the Bhāgava Vāisṇav vidyā, are all consistent in saying that Brahman is the innermost Ātman and is blissful.

16 Creation of the world on the pattern of his thought and non-different from himself is possible for the highest Ātman only.

17 The Anandamaya Ātman is to be searched and attained. The individual soul though illusory is non-distinct from God; but God being the ground of world and soul is different from either.

18 Neither the desire to create and become many, nor the 'tragedy' belongs to Brahman.

19 Anandamaya is not jñā, because salvation occurs when the jñā is joined with the Anandamaya. Anandamaya is one of the five sheaths the tail or support of Anandamaya is the Brahman. Anandamaya is Saguna Brahman, which no doubt must be first attained, in order to reach the Nirguna Brahman.

20 The person on the sun and in the eye is Saguna Brahman.

21 Even the sun does not know who dwells in him and controls him.

22 Ajita means Brahman, for the latter is the cause of all the elements including that of time. Words "only" and "all" would be useless, if there would mean the element. Infinity, exclusive mark of Brahman. The Udgitha or Om owns its eternity or greatness to Ajita or Brahman. Synonyms for Ajita are used for Brahman.

23 Does prāṇa mean the breath in which organs of sense and action merge during sleep? As the beings themselves who have the organs merge, prā-

means Brahman. More contiguity of words viz. the *prīṭa*, the sun and the food is no key to interpret the meaning. Grammatical position and context will be useful.

34 Can *gyoti* mean the physical light? 'Heaven' in the *Ālpatrī* passage and in the *gyoti* passage is the same. Brahman is the topic of the earlier *Ālpatrī* and the later *Sindhya* passages. Brahman is the meaning of the word *gyoti*. Brahman spoken of as *gyoti* for purpose of meditation.

35 *Ālpatrī* means the Brahman and not the meter. The four feet of *Ālpatrī* are those of Brahman.

36 The passage following that of *Ālpatrī* mentions the door-keepers of the heart in which Brahman with four feet resides.

37 The words '*śivā*' and '*śivāḥ*' make no difference so far as the nature of Brahman is concerned.

38 *Prīṭa* means Brahman. It cannot be the breath, for the highest God of man cannot be of the changing nature. Eternity and immortality are the marks of Brahman and not of air. *Prīṭa* is Brahman because it is unaffected by good and bad actions.

39 Can *prīṭa* mean Indra, because he is the resident of heaven and so has friends, and because he is the object of devotion and unaffected by aging, death and sorrow? It is Brahman, because it has the power of bestowing and taking away life; it is described as the one with the spokes of arrows etc. found in it.

40 Indra's reference to himself is the awareness of intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Reference to killing the son of Tvaṣṭi glorifies the redeeming nature of Self-realisation.

41 Brahman is the topic of knowledge and devotion; it is neither the *prīṭa* nor the *śivā*.

ADWYĀYA FIRST

Pāda Second

56a.

1-8 The resplendent Ātman described as *manomaya*, with pride in its body, and as the object of meditation it is Brahman and not the individual soul.

9-10 Brahman alone is the consumer of the whole movable and immovable world.

11 The two beings in the cave of the heart are the *jīva* and Brahman; for both are intelligent as indicated by 'Brahma'.

12 One eats the sweet fruit, and the other looks on. Or, the two birds may be considered as *baddha* and the released soul.

13-17 The person in the eye is the shadowy highest Ātman, and is recommended as the object of meditation. He is not the perishable reflection of some person in the eyes of another; for he is said to be immortal and fearless. The person in one's own eye is capable of being seen by meditation.

18 The internal ruler must be the Ātman.

19-20 It cannot be *pradhāna*, because though the Ātman is itself unseen like *pradhāna*, it sees the entire world. Neither can it be the individual *jīva* whose existence is due to *avidyā*.

21. *Bhūtapora* means the highest God; for consciousness cannot belong to prakāśa or to the individual soul.

22. The Upanishadic person who is the same as *bhūtapora* is described, unlike *jiva* and prakāśa, as *śūlagata*, bodiless, unproduced, without: and/or *polpa* and *pura*.

23. That *bhūtapora* has got a form in spite of being attributeless shows that it is the *Ātman* of all.

24-25. In view of its description as 'vastuous heaven' and of the result of meditation on it, viz. the eating of all the food, *Vastuśara* means the *Ātman* and not the substantial *jiva* or the *jiva*.

26-27. *Vastuśara* is said to be the *Purusa* and at the same time inside the body of man, so it is neither the deity nor the element of fact.

28-32. *Jaimini* and *Ānandashya* think him to be the object of meditation and as measured from him to forward.

ADHYAYA FIRST

Pañcā Third

Sūtra

1 The word 'setu' (bridge) with reference to Brahman does not indicate that there is another bank which is to be reached. It indicates the idea of holding together or lending support or of attaining immortality.

2 The man who has his mind on the Ātman, for he talks much in wisdom.

3-7 In Ātman alone, the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven.

8 *Ātman* means Brahman and not *prajña*. The quality of being an *atvīdita* refers to Brahman, and not to *prajña* on account of the series of 'truth' and other things. *Prajña* is not the last word of Śaṅkarācārya's teaching.

9 The bliss of deep sleep does not refer to *prajña*. Similarly, qualities such as immortality, truth, omnipotence etc. belong to Brahman or *Ātman*.

10-12 *Ājya* being imperishable and all-pervading means Brahman. Qualities of *ājya* such as 'unseen', 'unheard' etc. may be common with *pradhāna*, but the other qualities of 'seeing', 'hearing' etc. do not belong to *pradhāna* but to Brahman.

13. *Nirguṇa Brahman* alone is the object of meditation on Om and of sight; it transcends the transcendental *prag-ghata*.

14-17. *Dakṣiṇā*, though located in the heart, is as large as the elemental *ākāśa*; and yet it is not the elemental *ākāśa*, because qualities belonging to the *Ātman* are ascribed to it.

18-21. *Dakṣi* also does not mean the individual soul, for the qualities like freedom from sin belong to the *Ātman*. It refers to the real nature of the *jīva* which is gradually being shown to be identical with *Brahman*, and which is therefore described as rising beyond the body and as appearing in its own form. The hearing of this in *Karma-Kāṇḍa*.

22-23. The *Prithvī-Deva* is the cause of the light of the sun, the moon etc.

24-25. The *Ātman* is said to be of the size of the thumb, only with the view to show the identity of *jīva* and *Brahman*.

26-27. Gods too have got the capacity to have the knowledge of *Brahman*.

28. Words like 'man', 'śiṣya' are connected with the eternal species and not with transitory objects. The words connote some permanent meanings. According to grammarians, the words perish, and it is the 'sphota' which manifests the meaning of words and which alone is real. As opposed to this, *Ugriya* holds that it is not necessary to imagine the existence of *sphota* to explain the manifestation of meaning from the locution of the word.

29. The *Veda* (or the word) is the source of the universe.

35. The Veda is as eternal as Brahman, and it was available to Bhṛagyaśrī by the grace of the highest God.

36-37 Jaimini's opinion regarding incapacity of gods.

38. The Upanisadic testimony regarding the lack of knowledge of the Ātman, Indra and Varuṇa is extensive. The atharvika is as complete a story as the other Vēdas, but has got the additional function of praising some thing or person. It is from these that we know that gods have bodily forms and that they desire to have the knowledge of Brahman.

39. The word Śūdra may mean the great and not the caste.

40. Māntruti may be a Kṛtiya.

40-42 A Śūdra is unfit, because he is not a teacher. Yet they may learn through śikṣā and pāṭha.

43. Priya is Brahman, for to make the whole world tremble through fear is possible for the latter; and again, rage is due to knowledge of Brahman.

44. Similarly, light means Brahman; for colour and distinguished condition can belong to Brahman and not to the sun and other luminous bodies.

45. Akṛta means Brahman, because ultimately it is the cause of names and forms.

46-48. The conditions of sleep and of departure of the soul show it to be different from the Brahman or Ātman who is really the Lord.

ADHYĀYA FIRST

Pañc Fourth

Sūtra

1. *Avyākāra* does not mean the *pradhāna*, it means the body mentioned in the metaphor of the chariot, which aims at showing us the final destiny of the soul, viz. the shade of *Vijaya*.

2. *Avyākāra* means the subtle, causal body; it is the non-manifest condition of the world.

3. It is primordial power of God known as *avidyā*, *māyā*, *śakti*, *śāra* etc.

4. Not being mentioned as subject of knowledge or meditation, it serves no human purpose.

5. The object of perception referred to in the same *Upaniṣad* [Kātha, 2,3,15] is the intelligent, highest *Ātman*.

6. The dialogue between Narayana and Death refers to three things alone, viz. the fire, the individual soul and the highest *Ātman*, and does in no way mention the *pradhāna*.

7. The Vedic meaning of 'mānuṣ' as opposed to that of the *Śākhya*s is Puruṣ or the *Ātman*.

8-9. Just as 'gāṇanā' or the eye may mean the 'head' even so, 'apī' may not mean *pradhāna*, but may mean

that the three elements with their three colours have come out of the highest God.

10. *Prakṛti* being composed of three elements is poetically known as a she-goat.

11-13. '*Tadūpadeśa janyā*' does not mean the emergence of the *Siddhīpāras*, but particular types of beings. Various reasons for holding this view.

14. There may be contradictions regarding the accounts of creation, but inasmuch as the welfare of man does not depend on this, all the *Vedānta*-passages are dismissed in the search of *Brahman* alone.

15. If the word '*sat*' indicates the world or the *Brahman* with names and forms, the word '*asat*' indicates the same *Brahman*, without any names and forms. *Brahman* is both the efficient and the material cause of the world.

16-18. The work of creation refers to God as the creator.

19-23. The object of sight is the *Ātman* alone. While *Aśvaśrūṭya* believes in relative non-difference of the *jīva* and the *Brahman*, while *Andhīśvara* thinks they are identical in the condition of knowledge, *Kṛishṇāśrūṭya* voices forth the correct view embodied in '*Tasya sat that*'. The *Ātman*, as the object of sight, is not some future condition of the soul. On the contrary, the soul is a form of the *Ātman*.

24-26. *Brahman* is also the material cause of the universe.

ADHYĀYA SECOND

Pada First

Śloka

1 To accept prakṛiti as the cause is to make Śruti like the Bhagavadgītā is useless; for nirguṇa Brahman is considered by them as the efficient and material cause. A Śruti which goes against Śruti is to be rejected. Reference to Kapila is ambiguous and accidental; the main fact is the 'usage of God'.

2 Kapila Śruti cannot be treated as its reference to māhet, avyakta etc. because these are unknown to the Veda and to scripture.

3 Because yoga Śruti is useful and partially true, it cannot be accepted as wholly true, especially in its reference to prakṛiti as the independent cause.

4 Believing that reasoning comes very near to experience, the pūrvaśloka contends that Brahman which is pure and conscious cannot be the cause of the senses which is impure and unconscious. Absence of intelligence in the things of the world cannot simply be said to be apparent.

5 Though the elements are represented as thinking 'being' etc. the pūrvaśloka points out that the reflector is in the perceiving device and not in the non-intelligent elements.

6 To the Vedāntas, whatever exists, whether intelligent or not, is the effect of Brahman. Experience

circumstances that. As for the knowledge of Brahman, argument cannot achieve it; it is achieved only when another person speaks about it. Reasoning which is favourable to Brahman is welcome, illustrations of this. Disparity of nature is no reason why Brahman should not be the cause, especially when possibilities can be said to be the cause of intelligent souls.

7 To say that the effect was non-existent (in the form in which it appears) is meaningless. For it is a negation of nothing. The effect always exists in some form of the cause.

8-9 Size and shape of a jar can never be found in clay, the world therefore will never make the Brahman impure. The effect and its qualities are due to *avidyā*. The Ātman is the eternal spectator of the three states, and so is not affected by *avidyā*. New creation is due to the persistence of *avidyā* even in dissolution: in the case of the liberated souls, false knowledge is completely wiped out.

10 Objections against the Vedānta can be equally levelled against the Sāṃkhya, if *pradhāna* is without form and qualities.

11-12 One may say that reasoning is faulty in itself: proved by reason, and that fallacy is a point of attraction which leads to more reason. But reasoning may not lead to right knowledge, and so may not lead one to *mokṣa*.

13 From the practical point of view, there remains the distinction between subjects and objects, though they are, in reality, non-different from the Brahman, just as waves, foam etc. are distinct from each other, though they are, in essence, nothing but water.

14 Nothing exists apart from Brahman, *śūnyā* and forms have their origin in speech only. To know

the Brahman is to know all. Multiplicity is useful, yet it is believed as true so long as the knowledge of the identity of jiva and Brahman does not arise. Notwithstanding the fact that nothing is real except Brahman, the Vedic knowledge is useful to point out what is real. Though the dream is unreal, the knowledge that there was a dream continues to be real in the waking life. We need not be sceptic about having such knowledge, for Śrīmadbhakta did possess it and declared that Brahman is *brahma*. The reason in having the knowledge of Brahman as the cause of the world is not to know that it is modifiable, but to know that it alone is the reality. In order to negate the world character, Brahman is described negatively knowing which, Jivātmā is said to have achieved mokṣa. In one way the unity of Brahman contradicts its being the cause of the origin, subsistence and dissolution, or its being the ruler and protector. The pañcābhāṣa too is accepted by the Śāṅkaraite so far as it is subservient to the purpose of devotion to Supreme Brahman.

15 The perception of the jar makes us inevitably aware of the clay. Besides it will not exist apart from clay.

16 Either before or after its coming into being, the world is one with its cause viz. the Brahman.

17 The so-called non-existence of the effect before its origination means only a relative and not absolute non-existence; it means that during the period when the effect was in the form of the cause, it had not got its present names and forms.

18 Had the effect been really non-existent before its origination, there is no reason why curds should be produced out of milk alone, as a matter of fact, anything may come out of anything else. To say that curds has a specific power is no abheda *antahyavāda* and is

about the immediate prior condition of effect. Difficulty of examples and analogies, the category of whole and parts. Absolute non-existence, such as the existence of the son of a human woman, can never become a reality in spite of the efforts of parents etc. The operative agent arranges the cause in the form of effect. Devadatta is the same person, whether with limbs stretched out or drawn in.

12-22 What is not manifest in the cause becomes manifest in the effect.

23-23 Jiva and Brahman are different and non-different from each other

24-23 Brahman is self-sufficient to produce the world.

26-29 Not purusha but vivarta is the correct view. Besides Brahman is both unmanifest and transient, it is the ground of causes and forms which are both different and non-different from it. The negative description leads us from phenomena to God

30-31 Contradictions reconciled in Brahman

32-33 Rational activity may be motivated by the desire to sport naturally. Creation is not real from the view-point of the highest reality.

34-35 God is neither good nor unjust. Law of Karma is above responsible.

ADHYAYA SECOND

Pañc Second

Sūtra

1. A potter is necessary to produce a jar, mere clay is not sufficient. Even so, the prakṛiti will require an intelligent principle for its guidance.

2. Intelligent possesses the power to move a non-intelligent thing like a chariot, though itself it may remain unmoved.

3. The love of the cow for the calf and the suck-
ing of the milk are responsible for the flow of milk. God
is the ultimate intelligent principle.

4. If there is no intelligent principle beyond prakṛiti, neither activity nor cessation of activity will be explained.

5. Stricter is than the spontaneous transformation of prakṛiti into the world, like grass into milk. For the grass alone which is eaten by a cow changes into milk.

6. Either there is no purpose for the activity of prakṛiti which is against the Śāṅkhya hypothesis, or there is some purpose, in which case the Puruṣa shall have to undergo change. Thus, there will be no liberation.

7. If the Puruṣa is motionless, it cannot move the prakṛiti, the inadequacy of the illustration of the lame and the blind.

10.7 The moment the equilibrium condition of the three gases is disturbed, production itself is in danger of being lost. Either class will be perpetual fixtures or no evolution at all.

10 Besides, the Sāṅkhya doctrine is full of contradictions. On the Vedāntic view, the distinction between suffering and suffering is due to *avāpi*, but when the Sāṅkhya makes *saṃyoga* the cause of non-discrimination, release is impossible, for the tamoguna is as eternal as the *satva* and may overtake a man at any time.

11 Atomicity explained and criticised. Intelligence of Brahman is not produced in the world, just as sphericity of the atom is not produced in their effects.

12 The original motion of the atoms is neither explained by some impact which can take place after creation, nor by the principle of 'universal accumulation of merits' which is non-intelligent.

13 The motion of *manoviṣa* like *saṃyoga* must depend on another *saṃyoga* and so on *ad* infinitum.

14 If atoms possess qualities like colour and sound, they must be gross and transitory. Besides, they may not be destroyed or disintegrated, but be transformed into a prior non-atomic condition.

15 Atoms will not be atoms if they increase in volume and possess many qualities. And to maintain uniformity, if the four kinds of atoms have only one or four qualities, we shall have to say something against experience.

17 The Viśiṣṭa contradicts himself when he says that the six categories are independent, and that

five of them are dependent on one of them, not the substance. His view of *vyavahārika* either in space, time or character, is equally faulty for he will thereby go against the authority of Kapila, or say that there is no difference between substance and quality. His view about *utpatti* and *samutpanna* is riddled with contradictions, and involves mutual dependence.

18 The twofold world of the Buddhist system cannot be explained by reference to the non-existent atoms and *śūnyatā*. And if there is no mind, there is no cause of mental cognitions, nor a lord who will govern. *Nirvāṇa* is impossible.

19 The series of *avasthā*, *avasthānta* etc., being dependent on atoms and *śūnyatā*, cannot be the cause of the latter.

20 If everything is momentary, there will be no causal connection at all, and words like *utpatti*, *dharmatā* will have no meaning.

21 If the effect were to exist without cause, anything may come into existence, and if it has a cause, the view that everything is momentary shall have to be given up.

22 The voluntary and the involuntary types of destruction as well as *ākāśa* are non-substantial and negative in character.

23 *Ākāśa* cannot be a non-entity, its existence is inferable from the quality of sound. *Buddha* himself accepts it as the support of word. Besides a non-entity cannot be eternal.

24 Recollection and recognition of things as same will be impossible, if the experiencing subjects are momentary in character. The belief in the experiencing subjects as the same cannot be the result of

similarity of cognitions, for cognition of similarity itself is due to a permanent subject.

36-37 Nothing originates from non-existence, or else, the lay persons would get what they want.

38 The external world is not mental in character, for our sense point is perceptions and the perceptions point to external things. No one will be satisfied by a mental dinner. If things are only momentary in character, all practical life will be robbed of its meaning. It will be more reasonable for the Viññanavādin to believe in the continuous external world than in the self-luminous ātma. Besides, against the Viññana view, such ideas are transient and many.

39 Waking life is real and is to be distinguished from the dream, because it consists of immediate experience and is not due to memory, and because it consists of objects and is not capable of being negated by any other state.

40 Cognitions are not, unlike the Buddhist opinion, due to impressions, but are due to external objects, for in the absence of objects cognitions do not arise.

41 Like the prapñcāśāstra, the Sāyanyāśāstra also cannot be the substratum because it is momentary.

42 Buddhism is not only contradictory but leads to no spiritual good.

43 To apply the aptabhāgiya to the seven entities is to have indefinite and confused knowledge.

44 To consider that the soul has got the size of the body is to make it limited and perishable. Difficulty of considering it as having parts.

33-36 The potteries too like the body have got origin and decay and so are not of the nature of self or, the soul may have different bodies of the same class or none.

37 The God of the Vajapeyana and the Bṛhadaranyaka is only imperfect like us, however ever benignant he may be. God is not merely the efficient cause.

38 God, souls and prakṛitas being, all of them, infinite and partless, neither antyoga nor samavaya will establish any relation amongst them.

39 Prakṛitas is not to God as clay is to the potter.

40 Nor is there any evidence to show that the Lord guides the prakṛitas and is therefore pleased or displeased.

41 With the release of all souls there will be no purpose left either for prakṛitas or for the Lord.

42 Notwithstanding the manifestation of the Ātman in several forms and the devotional approach to it, the soul, on the Bhāgavata view, will be probable in nature.

43 Experience does not bear testimony to the production of āśakti by out of the mind and of the mind out of the soul.

44 To suppose that the soul, the mind and āśakti are, all of them, disintegrated like the highest Ātman, is to rest satisfied with an arbitrary multiplication of unity.

45 To say that Śāṅkhya got knowledge from the Pāṇinīya school is only to cast doubt on the Vedic text.

Extracts from Upanishads and other sources as found in Śaṅkara's commentary

Atarva Aranyaka

1, 1, 2, 6 — आहुतृणां यज्ञो विष्णुः ।

1, 4, 1, 1-2 [cf. An. Up. 1, 1] — अग्नौ वा सृष्टेः अग्नौ वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे विष्णुः । वा विष्णुः सोमस्तु वासतिः । वा सृष्टेः सोमस्तु वासतिः ।

1, 4, 2, 4 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

1, 2, 4, 7 — अग्नौ वा वासतिः । वासतिः वासतिः । वासतिः वासतिः । वासतिः वासतिः ।

Art. Brahmanas. 1, 8, 1 — अग्निं वेदवतीं अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । वासतिः वासतिः । वासतिः वासतिः ।

Śaṅkara's Commentary

1, 24-25 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

2, 25 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

4, 21 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

4, 27 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

5, 14-15 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

7, 6 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

7, 19 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

8, 6 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

8, 24 — अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः । अग्निर्वायवे वासतिः ।

10, 3—अमे विदुः सुप्रसन्नः अने न भवति । अन्वयिनि
देवतां भवति न भवति ।

10, 41-42—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

11, 3—अमे विदुः सुप्रसन्नः अने न भवति । अन्वयिनि

11, 13—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

11, 27—अमे विदुः सुप्रसन्नः अने न भवति । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

11, 31—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

12, 17—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनि

13, 3—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

13, 6—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

13, 12—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

13, 20—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि

13, 41—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि

1, 3, 7—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

1, 4, 8—अन्वयिनिभवात् न भवति । अन्वयिनिभवात् । अन्वयिनि
अन्वयिनि ।

३, ४, ५—ए संज्ञितानि यत्नेन पुनः शीघ्रतः प्रकृत्या न संज्ञितानि
सन्ति एव विनिर्दिष्टानि विज्ञातानि । एते न एतानि सर्वसंज्ञितानि
सन्ति ।

१. ७. १-४—य इमे वा लोका इव वा लोका लोकोक्ति वा लुपति
लोकास्ते वा लोकाः । लुपति लुपति लुपति वा लुपति वा लोका लोका
लोका लुपति वा लुपति । —४। लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति वा लुपति
वा लोका लुपति लुपति वा लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति
लोका लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति
लोका लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति लुपति

1, 7, 9—ए कविभिः विद्वद्भिरुक्तम्। यत्किञ्चि न न
कविभिः कविं न कविभिरुक्तं न कविभिरुक्तम्।

[illegible][illegible]

3, 9, 10 — कृषिसे सम्बन्धित/संबंधित एवं जलसिंचाई से सम्बन्धित/संबंधित ।

3. 9. 21.— का मूल विनिर्देशानुसारको अर्हिए सुसंगतताको अर्हिए
अतिरिक्तको अर्हिए सम्पत्तिको अर्हिए अर्हिए अर्हिए ।

३. ४. ३३ — विद्यायाः अङ्गं यद्विद्वत्पुत्रः सदा सदा विद्वत्पुत्रः
सर्वदा सति ।

4. I. 4 — word for some condition

४, ५, ६-७ — कालिकापुरम् । अतिविशालम् । कालिकापुरम् । अतिविशालम् ।
कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् ।
कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् ।
कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् । कालिकापुरम् ।

[illegible]

६, ७, ८—एषा मयैव मयैव विभं मयैव यमसि । मयैव स
मयैवाभविमममविममसि ।

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

६. ३. ३-३—सर्वे वैश्वेन्द्रियविभक्तौ वैश्वान्त्येन
अविभक्त्याप्यनुभूयितव्यं नान्यथाप्यनुभूयितव्यं । तान्तां विभक्त्या विभक्त्येनैव
नान्यथाप्यनुभूयितव्यं । सर्वे वैश्वेन्द्रियविभक्तौ वैश्वान्त्येन अविभक्त्याप्यनुभूयितव्यं
नान्यथाप्यनुभूयितव्यं ।

६, ७, ८ — सप्तमे श्लोके एवं शेषांशस्य च सप्तमं सप्तमं सप्तमं
सप्तमं ।

[illegible]

4—अथ परिश्रवणविकल्पकथा (सुश्रवणविकल्पः सुश्रवणविकल्पः) कथं
अनुसृतम् अस्ति :

Jaimini Sūtra (Pīrva-Mīmāṃsā)

1, 1, 1-2 (Sūtra-bhāṣya) एते हि वचनानि अस्तिपरिचयः
सौमनेने विचार्यतः अस्ति वचनम् ।

1, 2, 1—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 2, 7—विशेषा लोकावस्थायाः अनुसृतम् अस्ति ।

1, 3, 3—विशेषा लोकावस्थायाः अनुसृतम् अस्ति ।

1, 3, 4—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति ।

Kaṭhīparāṣad :

1, 1, 13—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 1, 20—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 2, 4—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 2, 9—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 2, 12—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 2, 14—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 2, 18—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 2, 22—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 2, 25—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 3, 1—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 3, 3—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

1, 3, 9-12—अथवाचनम् अस्तिपरिचयः वचनम् अस्ति । अथवाचनम्
अस्ति । अथवाचनम् अस्ति ।

३, ५, १३ — कुम्भमेखलं सङ्घिकमेखलां प्रथमं विमलमेखलं सङ्घिकमेखलां
अथ कुम्भमेखलं । अथ कुम्भमेखलं विमलमेखलं सङ्घिकमेखलां सङ्घिकमेखलां
Kumbhik — Balam — Upanad:

३, १४ — हा वा वरुण शुक्रः देवानां स्वर्गं निसेवन्तं विविधान् आसनेषु
ब्रह्मणेन बभूवे भूतानामापसीत् पुरुषादृष्टम् ।

[illegible][illegible]

५. ११-१३—यो हि ब्रह्मण्य मन्त्रोऽयं पुनश्चास्मां कर्तुं शक्यः तैत्तिरीयस्य ॥ अथवा योऽयं तैत्तिरीयः सदा सदा सदा तैत्तिरीयं पुनश्चास्मां कर्तुं शक्यः तैत्तिरीयस्य ॥ अथवा योऽयं तैत्तिरीयः सदा सदा सदा तैत्तिरीयं पुनश्चास्मां कर्तुं शक्यः तैत्तिरीयस्य ॥

100

[illegible][illegible]

Modulabschluss in (Staat)examen

47. ६०—सुप्रसन्नित्तमं भोक्तुं सर्वं भक्ष्यं भक्ष्यं भिक्षुः ।
सुप्रसन्नित्तमं भोक्तुं सर्वं भक्ष्यं भक्ष्यं भिक्षुः ॥

233, 24-25 — अथदिग्विजया विजया मरुतुभरतः सप्तमोऽङ्कः । अथदी
विजयस्य विजया मरुतुः सप्तमः मरुतुभरतः ॥ अथ सप्तमः मरुतुभरतः मरुतुभरतः
मरुतुभरतः । मरुतुभरतः मरुतुभरतः मरुतुभरतः मरुतुभरतः ॥

313, 115 — सत्यं कर्तव्यं हि सुखं भवत्यस्य कर्तव्यं सुखम् ॥
 स कर्तव्यं स कर्तव्यं स कर्तव्यं स कर्तव्यं स कर्तव्यं सुखम् ॥

136, 28-30 — वाङ्मयप्रतिष्ठापनम् । यं विना वाङ्मयं
विनाशो भवति । वाङ्मयप्रतिष्ठापनं विना विनाशः ।

[illegible]

Yana parva, १, ११७, १७ — यथा ब्रह्मसमाधि-विद्यायाः शक्तिः शक्तिः । शक्तिः यथा ब्रह्मसमाधि-विद्यायाः शक्तिः शक्तिः ।

1, 2—आर्सेनिकं तु आसमिति आर्सेनिकं वा सुप्रसिद्धम् । तेष्वर्सेनिकस्य
आसमितिं सुप्रसिद्धं यथा-
विहितम् ।

12.4 — Springing and Cracking

80, 196 — a new species of *Pteronotus*

१३, १४ — सर्वभूतानां साक्षात् सर्वभूतानि भूतानि । जीवन्मुक्ताः यदा
ये भूतानि भूतानि भूतानि ।

३३, ११५-१२५—अपराधपुरुषार्थं वा धर्मार्थं वा विहितकर्मार्थं । तत्र
 कृत्रिमित्वात् तस्मै परार्थेऽपि कर्तव्यमिति । तस्मै परार्थेऽपि तत्र विहितकर्मविहितम् ।
 परार्थविहितकर्मविहितम् वा तस्मै तत्र विहितम् ।

Wiederholungsfragen

1, 2, 3—в порядке убывания значения α .

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

1, 1, १—एक अक्षर, एकवचन, एकवचन, एक । एकवचन, एकवचन, एकवचन, एकवचन ।

[illegible][illegible]

1, 3, 13 — तस्यै च विद्याभूषणस्य सत्यव्यवहारीयविभागस्य सत्य-
विभागः । तस्यै च सत्यं चैव सत्यं विभागः च सत्यं सत्यविभागः ।

[illegible][illegible]

3, 3, 8— विषये इदमवर्णितमस्मिन् कर्मोपपत्तौ । अत्रिणे
माम्ना कर्मणि लङिण्ये पदान्ते ३-८३ ३८, ५, ३४— कर्मणि
लङिण्येऽपि अत्रावर्णितम् ।

3, 3, 9 — विस्मय के तीन निशान का विवरण । अत्यंत
मौनिक मौनव्यक्तियों का रूप है

2, 3, 10-11 — (CL. Ka. 2, 9, 15) — अ. अत्र कृत्तिं कर्त्ति
अ. कर्त्तव्यतात् अत्र कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात् । अत्र कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात्
अत्र कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात् । अत्र कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात्
अत्र कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात् । अत्र कर्त्तव्यतात् कर्त्तव्यतात्

[illegible]

समये तुल्यं सुखं निवर्तयितुं तस्मै सुखाय । सुखं वा
समस्तमर्थेषु तस्मात्सुखमर्थोऽथवा ॥

[illegible]

$\lambda_1, \lambda_2, 0$ — ସୂଚକମାନଙ୍କର ଅନୁକ୍ରମ; ଏ-ସଂଖ୍ୟାଗଣକ: ମୁଖ-
ଲେଖ: ॥ १ ॥ ଉପରୋକ୍ତ ପଦାର୍ଥରେ କରାଯାଇ ଚଳିଥିବାର ଜଣାଅଛି ।

३, ३, ३—यस भए सोभ्रमाका सोभ्रमाको समुक्ति भएको
विधान । यस विधानको अर्थ यो हो यहाँको योभ्रमाको विधान ।

[illegible]

www.uncc.edu

[illegible]

L. J. 18 — *unpublished data*

[!\[\]\(3e2231b1ad3ca8da8658228c00dd08e0_img.jpg\)](#)
[!\[\]\(96a82dd1250f57fd139c5f3b80c9d977_img.jpg\)](#)
[!\[\]\(3fd2f8db37e12aa5bbcaf4dfbd320f6c_img.jpg\)](#)

[illegible]

१, १३—सुदीर्घस्य सप्तमः अक्षरस्य अक्षरात् विनासकस्यस्य-
पक्षेति लक्ष्यमिति । अत्रैव आचार्यस्य सप्तमस्य सुदीर्घस्य सप्तमस्य
सप्तमः सप्तमस्यैव ।

१. — सत्यमेव जयते । सा श्रीमदात्मसंनिधौ ।
 सा चैव सत्यमेव जयते । सा श्रीमदात्मसंनिधौ ।

1. **THEORY**

४. १. ३—सुखं भावी भविष्यतीति मया भाविता । भावी भाविष्यतीति
अवधारणं भविष्यत्कालि । तदा सुखं सुखमनुभूयता । अयमर्थोऽर्थः किं भावी भवे
ति भाविष्यतीति । तदा भावी सुखो वा भविष्यति वा भाविष्यति वा भविष्यति वा
भविष्यति भविष्यति । अयमर्थः भावि भविष्यतीति । अयमर्थः भावि भविष्यतीति ।

[illegible]

५. ३-पञ्चमः सुप्रसन्नः सर्वं वारं वा ३३३ अस्मिन् । अस्मिन् ३-
पञ्चमः सर्वं वारं वा ३३३ अस्मिन् ।

3. 1—ए. सुपुत्रे विद्यमानेतिमेतिवर्गोप नरं पुत्रवर्गव्यापारो न
व्यापारो भवति चेन्नरः । अत्र वर्गव्यापारस्य विविक्त्यन्तः सन् न हि नान्यन्तः

विश्वविद्यालय का महाविद्यालयीय स्तर पर आयोजित प्रथम व्याख्यान

[illegible][illegible]

५. ३—हे आशीर्वादाचे हि या विना शीतल-आदिनामः या
यादं आशीर्वादि ।

Appendix A

1. ५४. ॥ — विष्णुसर्पस्य शरीरं सदा सदा हि न भूयान्मरिचिकम् ।

1. 201. 1 — ~~сделан по образцу~~ ~~сделан~~

1, 181, 19—*apud* apud omni admodumque etiam hunc
1

Figure 1

[illegible]

10, 21, 3 — also was synthesized after about 1

10, 85, 1 — श्री बाबुसा सुप्रीमी प्रादुर्भावसम्बन्धमेव
१५ ।

३३, ३४, ३५ — विष्णुसहस्रनाम स्तोत्रम् ॥ ३३ ॥

12. 10 — ~~confusion and against~~ **misconceived** **idea**

१३. १३३. १ — विष्णुपदार्थः समकालीनः सुप्रसन्नः ज्ञानः समीपः । सः समस्तः समीपः समस्तैः समीपः समस्तः समीपः ।

६, १३०, ६—कोटाया विजय का राजा अशोकन। सर्व विजयविजय

2, 190, 3—सुदीर्घादयस्तेषां चान्ये नान्यदुच्यते । तेषां च
अन्त्योच्चारणं नान्यदुच्यते ।

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

[illegible]

Abstract

10, 3, 3, 6—*यदा वै पुनः कश्चित् कालं तर्हि कालमेति ह्यत्र
पुनः कालं त्रीणि कालं कालः । तं यदा प्रपुनरी प्रपुनरीत्यत्र पुनरीत्यने ३*

10, 6, 3, 11—*तं यदीदृशं कालं वा कालाको वा कालाकादुपे*

कालाकादुपेति प्रपुनरी द्विपुनः ।

Śivādhīśvarapada.

1, 1 and 3—*अथान्वितो वह्निः । त्रिं वारान् अथ पुनः अथ
अथ त्रीण्यथ वेदः अथ त्र्योदशिका । त्रिं वारान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितवह्निः
अथान्वितपुनरा । तं अथान्वितं त्रिंवारान्वितं त्रिं वारान्वितपुनरा-
अथान्वितपुनरा ।*

3, 6—*त्रिंवारान् अथान्वितो वह्निः त्रिंवारान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।
अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा । (3) B. G. 6-11.*

3, 11—*अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।
अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।*

3, 12—*अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।
अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।*

3, 13—*अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।
अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।*

4, 3—*अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।
अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।*

4, 5—*अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।
अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।*

4, 10-11—*अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।
अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।*

5, 1—*अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।
अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।*

5, 2—*अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।
अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा अथान्वितपुनरा ।*

Bibliography

ADVOYAMA FIRST

THE

Notes.			Scales.		
1	Chd.	2, 1, 4	Er	1, 2, 1, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4	
	Ten.	2, 1, 2, 2	Mn.	2, 4	2, 2, 2
2	Ten.	2, 1, 2, 1, 4		2, 2, 4	2, 2, 2, 2
3	Ho.	2, 4, 2, 2		2, 2, 1	2, 2, 4
4	Alt. Alt.	2, 4, 2, 1	Myr. Cl.	2, 2, 2	
	Alt. Sol.	2, 4, 1	Pr.	2, 4	
	Ep.	2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2, 2	Pl. Solm.	2, 2, 2	1, 1, 2, 2
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 2	(Jan. 25)	2, 2, 2	1, 2, 2
		2, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2		2, 2, 2, 2	2, 1, 1
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2	Ser. Ser.	2, 1, 2	— 2
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2	Ser.	2, 1, 2, 2, 2	
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2	Ten.	2, 2	
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2	Ten. Ser.	1, 1, 1	
Chd.		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2	5	Alt.	1, 1, 1
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2		B. G.	2, 2, 2
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2		Ep.	2, 2, 2
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2		Chd.	2, 2, 2, 2
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2		Mn.	2, 2, 2
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2		Pr.	2, 2
		2, 2, 2, 2		Ser.	2, 2, 2, 2, 2
6		2, 2		Chd.	2, 2, 2, 2, 2
7		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2	6	Alt. Alt.	2, 2, 2, 2
		2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2	7	Chd.	2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2
		2, 2, 2			

Notes.

8	Chd	8, 1, 3-4
9	By	8, 1, 21.
	Chd	8, 8, 2, 8, 8, 2, 2, 8, 2, 2.
10	Chd	7, 18, 2.
	Kan.	2, 2.
	Pro	2, 2.
11	Syn	8, 2.
12	Aut. Ar	8, 2, 2.
	H. G.	8, 8, 10, 41.
	By	8, 2, 8, 2, 2, 8, 2, 2, 18, 4, 2, 12, 2, 14, 2, 7, 18, 2, 2, 12, 2, 2, 2.
	Chd	2, 18, 2.
	Tu. Ar	2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 7-8, 2, 2.
	Tu.	2, 18.
13	By	2, 2.
	Pro. 20.	2, 4, 18.
14	Tu.	2.
15	Tu.	2, 1, 4, 2.
16	Tu.	2, 2.
17	By	2, 7, 18.
	Tu.	2, 2.
18	Tu.	2, 2.
19	By	2, 8, 18, 4, 2, 18.
	Chd.	7, 14, 2.
	Syn	8, 18.
	Tu.	2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2.
	H. G.	12, 41.
20	By	4, 2, 18.
	Chd	1, 4, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 7, 5-6, 2, 14, 2, 7, 18, 2, 2, 7, 1, 12, 41, 2, 2, 18.
21	Kan.	2, 2, 18.
	By	2, 2, 2.

Notes.

22	By	2, 2, 18, 2, 2.
	Chd	2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 14, 2, 4, 18, 2, 2, 14, 2.
	By	2, 18, 18.
	Tu.	2, 2, 2, 7, 2, 2.
23	By	2, 4, 18.
	Chd	1, 18, 2.
	Kan.	1, 11, 4, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2.
	Syn. 20.	12, 2, 2, 2.
24	By	4, 2, 2, 4, 2, 18.
	Chd	1, 2, 2, 2, 12, 2, 18, 2, 2, 18, 2, 2, 12, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 18.
	Kan.	2, 12, 2, 7.
	Tu.	1, 2, 2, 2.
	Tu.	2, 2, 2, 18.
25	Aut. Ar	2, 11, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 14, 1, 4, 2, 2.
	Chd	12, 41.
26	H. G.	2, 12, 7-8.
	Chd	2, 18, 2, 7.
	By	18, 18.
27	Kan.	2, 2.
	Syn.	2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2.
	By	2, 2, 18, 2, 2, 2.
28	By	2, 2, 2, 2.
29	Kan.	2, 4, 18.
30	By	1, 2.
	Kan.	2, 14, 2.
31	Chd.	2, 2, 2.
	Kan.	

Sutra.

11	Ma	5, 1, 3
15	By	5, 3, 3
	Ma	5, 1, 3-4; 5, 1, 3-10;
	By	10, 10, 1
	Til	5, 10, 3
24	By	5, 3
	Chd	5, 11, to 5, 13; 5, 13, 3

Sutra.

	By	1, 10, 1; 10, 10, 10;
17	Ma	47, 49,
20	Chd	5, 14, 3; 5, 13, 1; 5, 13, 1; 5, 10, 1
	By	10, 10, 3
	Sec	10, 3, 1, 10
25	By	10, 3, 1, 10
31	Chd	5, 11, to 5, 13
	Sec	10, 3, 1, 11

ADHYAYA FIRST

Page Third

Sutra.

1	By	4, 4, 10; 5, 7, 3; 4, 3, 10;
	Chd	5, 3, 4
	By	5, 1, 10;
	Ma	5, 3, 10; 5, 3, 3; 5, 3, 10;
2	By	4, 4, 7; 4, 4, 10;
	Ma	5, 3, 3
3	Ma	1, 1, 3
6	Ma	1, 1, 3
7	Ma	1, 1, 3-4; 5, 3, 3; 5, 3, 1
8	By	4, 3, 10;
	Chd	7, 7 to 10; 7, 1, 3; 7, 10, 3; 7, 13, 4; 7, 10, 1; 7, 10; 7, 10; 7, 10, 3; 7, 10, 1; 7, 10, 1

Sutra.

	By	5, 3
	Pro	4, 3-5; 4, 3
	Sec	4, 10
	Til	5, 1
9	By	5, 3, 3; 4, 3, 10; 4, 3, 10;
	Chd	7, 10, 1; 7, 10, 3
10	By	5, 3, 7-10
	Chd	5, 10, 4
11	By	5, 3, 3
12	By	5, 3, 3; 5, 3, 11
13	By	1, 3, 13
14	Pro	5, 3, 3, 3
	By	5, 3, 10
	Chd	5, 1; 5, 3, 3; 5, 1, 3; 5, 3, 3; 5, 3, 3
	Pro	5, 3
	Sec	10, 3, 3, 3

Sopr.

	Sopr.	A, A.	
15	Chd.	A, A, 1. 8 1, 1.	
16	B.	A, A, 1. 4 4, 10.	
	Chd.	A, A, 1.	
17	Chd.	A, A, 1. 8, 14.	
18	Chd.	A, A, 4.	
19	B. G.	10, 11.	
	B.	A, A, 10, 4, 1, 10.	
	Chd.	8 7, 1. 8 7, 4.	
		8, 10, 1. 8, 10, 1.	
		8, 11, 1. 8 11, 1.	
	Ka.	1, 8, 10.	
	Ma.	1, 1, 1.	
21	B.	4, 1, 1. 4 1, 1.	
		4, 4, 10.	
	Chd.	1, 14, 1.	
	Ka.	1, 1, 11.	
	Ma.	1, 1, 1.	
		1, 1, 1, 10.	
23	B. G.	11, 14, 11.	
24	Ka.	1, 1, 14.	
		1, 4, 11, 11.	
	Ma. Hgt.	1, 10, 17.	
25	Ka.	4, 4, 11.	
	Pr. Mtn.		
	SS.	A, 1.	
26	Chd.	A, 11, 1.	
	Pr. Mtn.		
	SS.	A, 1, 1.	
	Ta.	1, 1.	
27	B.	1, 1, 1, 1.	
	Ma. Hgt.	11, 10, 11.	
28	B.	1, 1, 1.	
	Ma. Hgt.		
	S. P.	10, 11, 11, 11.	
	Mama		

Sopr.

	Sopr.	1, 11.	
	Pr. Mtn.	1, 1, 11.	
	B.	1, 11.	
	Ta. Hgt.	1, 1, 11.	
29	B.	10, 11, 1.	
30	Ka.	A, 1.	
	B.	11, 10, 1.	
	Sopr.	A, 11.	
	Ta.	1, 1, 1, 1.	
31	B.	1, 4, 1.	
	Chd.	1, 11, 1. 1, 11, 1.	
		4, 1, 1.	
32	Chd.	1, 1, 1.	
33	Aut. Bell.	1, 1, 1.	
	B.	1, 4, 11.	
	Chd.	1, 1, 1.	
	Salvation		
	Bell.	1, 1.	
	Ta.	1, 1.	
	Tops. Hgt.		
	11, 11, 1, 11.		
34	Chd.	1, 1, 1.	
	Ta. Hgt.	1, 1, 1, 1.	
35	Chd.	1, 11, 1. 1, 1, 1.	
	Mama. Hgt.	11, 1. 11, 11.	
	Pr.	1, 1.	
	Aut. Bell.	11, 1, 1, 1.	
37	Chd.	4 4, 1.	
38	Aut. Chd.	11, 1, 11, 1.	
	emulation.	11, 1, 1.	
	Mama.	4, 11.	
39	B.	1, 1, 1. 4 4, 11.	
	Ka.	1, 1, 1. 1, 1, 1.	
		1, 1, 1.	
	Sopr.	1, 11.	
	Ta.	1, 1, 1.	

Sims.			Sims.		
40	Chd.	4.4.4. 4.7.1. 4.4.4. 4.10.1. 4.11.1.	41	Bg.	4.4.7. 4.4.14-16. 4.4.20.
41	Chd.	4.4.4. 4.14.1.	42	Bg.	4.4.22.

ADHYAYA FIRST
Fide Fourth

Sims.			Sims.		
1	Bg.	1.4.	12	Tu. Bg.	1.4.1.4.
	Ed.	1.4. 3-4. 1.4. 10-11. 1.4. 12.		Bg.	4.4.17. 4.4.18.
	Sve.	4.10.		Chd.	4.10.10. 7.10.1.
2	Bg.	1.4.7.		Bg.	4.10.7.
	Bg.	2.40.4.	14	Aut.	1.4.
3	Bg.	1.4.11.		Bg.	1.4.7.
	Mu.	2.4.4.		Chd.	2.10.1.
	Sve.	4.10.			4.4.1-3.
4	Ed.	2.4.10.			4.4.4. 2.4.5.
5	Kapharv.	1.1.10-15. 1.1.10. 1.1. 4. 1.1.14. 1.1.10. 1.4.17.		Mu. Quer.	2.4.
				on Ed.	4.4.
7	Ed.	1.4.10.		Pro.	4.4.
	Sve.	4.4.		Sve.	4.4.
8	Bg.	1.4.4.		Tu.	4.4. 4.4. 1.5.
9	Chd.	4.4.4.	15	Bg.	1.4.7.
	Sve.	1.1. 4.5. 4.10-11.		Chd.	1.10.1. 4.4.1.
					4.4.4.
10	Bg.	4.4. 4.10.4.		Tu.	4.4. 4.4.4.
	Chd.	4.1.	16	Bg.	4.4.4.
	Sve.	4.12.		Kap. Bg.	4.1. 4.10. 4.10.
11	Bg.	4.4.10.	17	Chd.	4.4.4.
	Papua	4.1.10.		Kap.	4.10.
			18	Bg.	4.1.10-17.
					4.1.10.
				Chd.	4.1.1.
				Kap.	4.10-10.

[illegible]

1575-1576 1577-1578

Figure 1

Notes.			Notes.		
1	En.	7.		Tail. Head.	2, 12, 13, 14.
	Subul- Pect.	12, 13, 14, 15; 12, 13, 14, 15; 4, 12, 13, 14, 15.	4	En.	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 1, 7, 8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 14, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 15, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 16, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 19, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 20, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 21, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 22, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 23, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 24, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 25, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 26, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 27, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 28, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 29, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 30, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 31, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 32, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 33, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 34, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 35, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 36, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 37, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 38, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 39, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 40, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 41, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 42, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 43, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 44, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 45, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 46, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 47, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 48, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 49, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 50, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 51, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 52, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 53, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 54, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 55, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 56, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 57, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 58, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 59, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 60, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 61, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 62, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 63, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 64, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 65, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 66, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 67, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 68, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 69, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 70, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 71, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 72, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 73, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 74, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 75, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 76, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 77, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 78, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 79, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 80, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 81, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 82, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 83, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 84, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 85, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 86, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 87, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 88, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 89, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 90, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 91, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 92, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 93, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 94, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 95, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 96, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 97, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 98, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 99, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 100, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 101, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 102, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 103, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 104, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 105, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 106, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 107, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 108, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 109, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 110, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 111, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 112, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 113, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 114, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 115, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 116, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 117, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 118, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 119, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 120, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 121, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 122, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 123, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 124, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 125, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 126, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 127, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 128, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 129, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 130, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 131, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 132, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 133, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 134, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 135, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 136, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 137, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 138, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 139, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 140, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 141, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 142, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 143, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 144, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 145, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 146, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 147, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 148, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 149, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 150, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 151, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 152, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 153, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 154, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 155, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 156, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 157, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 158, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 159, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 160, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 161, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 162, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 163, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 164, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 165, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 166, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 167, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 168, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 169, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 170, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 171, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 172, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 173, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 174, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 175, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 176, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 177, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 178, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 179, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 180, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 181, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 182, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 183, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 184, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 185, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 186, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 187, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 188, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 189, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 190, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 191, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 192, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1

Sāra.

7	Br	1, 4, 8.
9	Br	1, 4, 8.
	Chl	1, 14, 1,
		4, 8, 24,
		7, 28, 2,
	Chandak.	1, 20,
	Mān	1, 11, 11,
11	Mān	
	Sap.	11, 105, 100
13	Tā.	1, 4,
14	Ant. Ar.	1, 1, 4, 7,
	B. Cl.	1, 14, 15, 14, 14,
	Br.	1, 4, 8, 1, 4, 11,
		1, 4, 14, 1, 4, 10
		1, 4, 8, 1, 4, 10
		1, 4, 4, 1, 4, 11
		1, 4, 10, 1, 4, 10
	Chl	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
		1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
		7, 24, 1, 7, 24, 1,
		1, 14, 1,
	Mā	1, 1, 11,
	Sap.	1, 11,
	Tā. Ar	1, 11, 7,
	Tā.	1, 1,
17	Chl	1, 4,
18	Ant. Ar	1, 4, 1,
	Chl	1, 1, 1,

Sāra.

17	Chl	1, 14, 1,
	Tā.	1, 7, 1,
18	Chl	1, 1, 1,
20	Chl	1, 1, 1,
21	Chl	1, 1, 1,
21	Br	1, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1,
	Chl	1, 1, 1,
24	Sap	1, 1,
26	Br	1, 4, 10, 1, 4, 1,
		1, 1, 1,
	Mā	1, 1, 1,
	Sap	1, 1,
17	Br	1, 1, 1,
	Chl	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
		1, 1, 1,
28	Br	1, 1, 1,
30	Br	1, 1, 1,
	Chl	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
	Mā	1, 1, 1,
31	Br	1, 1, 1,
	Sap	1, 1,
33	Br	1, 1, 1,
34	B. Cl.	1, 1,
	Br	1, 1, 1,
	Kā.	1, 1,
36	B. Cl.	1, 1,
	Chl	1, 1, 1,
	Br	1, 1, 1, 1,

ADHYĀYA SECOND

Pañc Second

Sāra.

5	Br	1, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1,
17	Vā. Br	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
		1, 1,

Sāra.

17	Vā. Br	1, 1, 1,
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ERRATA

Page	Line	Location	Correct
11	3	Postscript	tail
"	5	"	slit
10	12		Br. 3, 4, 10
10	6 from below	Br. 3, 4, 7	Br. 1, 3, 6
11	14	Ex. 3, 3, 7	Chas. 3, 3, 7
12	18	Ex. 3, 1, 4	Ex. 1, 3, 4
12	19	B. G. 17, 14	B. G. 16, 17
13	1 from below	AB. Ab.	AB-17p
43	10	" " AB. Ab. 3, 3, 12	AB. Ab. 3, 3, 3, 1
44	21	3, 1, 8	3, 8
45	3	Exm. 3, 3, 10	Ex. 3, 3, 10
70	2 from below	Exm. 3, 1	Exm. 3, 1
70	10	" " एवमेव	एवमेव
70	14	Exm. 3, 3	Exm. 3, 1
71	1	अस्मिन्	अस्मिन्
87	3 from below	Br. 3, 3, 10	Br. 3, 3, 10
88	4	" " लक्ष्मिदेवदेव	लक्ष्मिदेवदेव
100	8	सम्	सम्
100	17	सर्व	सर्व
100	2	सु	सु
"	5 from below	सर्व	सर्व
127	13	Br. 3, 3, 3, 8	Br. 3, 3, 3-8
144	11	as account	as account of
145	26	अस्मिन्	अस्मिन्
146	8	सर्व	सर्व
147	3	Ex. 1, 3, 10	Ex. 3, 3, 10
148	7 from below	and something	and accepts something

Page	Line	Source	Correction
168	22 from below	प्रसृतम्	प्रसृतम्
169	4	"	प्रसृतम्
172	18	"	integrated
174	9	"	प्रतिवेद्य
177	17	अप्रीत्यनयनेन—	अप्रीत्यनयन-प्रवेद्य
181	4	—प्रति ।	—प्रति न ।
184	22	सुखम् न	सुखम् न
188	8	सः 2, 12	सः 2, 12
189	4	नयति	नयति
"	17	सः 2, 3, 12	सः 2, 3, 12
198	24	न	न
197	2	नयति	नयति
206	8	"	नयति ।
208	6	—प्रतिवेद्य	—प्रतिवेद्य
217	11	नयति	नयति
219	17	नयति	नयति
220	5 from below	नयति	नयति
221	4	नयति	नयति
221	22	नयति	नयति
228	2	न	न
233	5 from below	the nature of	from the nature
233	23	नयति ।	नयति ।
239	3	नयति	नयति
242	4	नयति	नयति
246	7 from below	न	न
"	8 from below	न	न
250	4 from below	नयति	नयति
251	4	नयति	नयति

